A STUDY OF THE

MADHYĀNTAVIBHĀGA-BHĀṢYA-ṬIKĀ

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by

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This thesis is the result of my own research carried out while enrolled as a Ph.D. candidate at the Australian National University 1984 - 1988.

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Dedication

for Hannah and Ellie

ABSTRACT

This work contains two main components: (a) an English translation of the Sanskrit texts comprising the Buddhist Yogācāra philosophical work known as the Madhyāntavibhāga. It includes the verses (*kārikā*) of Maitreya/Asaṅga, commentary (*bhāṣya*) of Vasubandhu and sub-commentary (*ṭīkā*) of Sthiramati. (b) Text critical remarks for the establishment of the Sanskrit text of Sthiramati's commentary based upon: (i) a photographed copy of the original manuscript, (ii) the Edited Sanskrit text prepared by S. Yamaguchi and (iii) the Peking and Derge (*sde dge*) editions of the canonical blockprints of the Tibetan *bsTan lgyur*.

The Madhyāntavibhāga contains an exposition of the analysis (*vibhāga*) of the middle way (*madhya*) in relation to the various extreme views (*anta*). It is arranged in five chapters: The first chapter, "the defining characteristics" (*lakṣaṇa*) provides a detailed account of both the nature of the phenomenal world and the way that it is imaginatively constructed (*parikalpyate*) in consciousness, as well as the Yogācāra understanding of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Chapter two identifies the main obscurations (*āvaraṇa*) to enlightenment for the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha* and the *bodhisattva*. Chapter three provides an explanation of the ten realities (*tattva*) and their intrinsic relationship with the three natures (*svabhāva*), i.e the imaginary (*parikalpita*), the other-dependent (*paratantra*) and the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*). Chapter four is concerned with the development of meditative practices (*bhāvanā*), the various states (*avasthā*) of the latter and the results (*phala*) obtained from those states. Chapter Five extols the virtues of the universal vehicle (*mahāyāna*) in comparison to the other vehicles especially in regard to spiritual practice (*pratipatti*), objective support (*ālambana*) and full attainment (*samudāgama*).

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p. v.1	Theil-Horstmann; read: Thiel-Horstmann
p. xii.4	Mahāyana; read: Mahāyāna
p. xiv.7	as well his; read: as well as his
p. xiv.16	Stcherbatsky's and well annotated; read: Stcherbatsky and is well annotated
p. xiv.29	Sanskrityāyana; read: Sankrityāyana
p. xv.3	1976?; read: 1976
p. xvi.7	were listed; read: might be listed
p. xvii.41	accomodate; read: accommodate
p. xviii.25	imminent; read: immanent
p. xix.27	incumbent; read: future
p. xix.28	Heavens; read: Heaven
p. xx.5	Abhisamāyālaṃkāra; read: Abhisamayālaṃkāra
p. xx.9	Madhyāmika-prāsangika; read: Mādhyamika-prāsangika
p. xxi.5	*upadhyāya*; read: *upādhyāya*
p. xxi, n.38	Geistesgeschte; read: Geistesgeschichte
p. xxii	Insert immediately prior to the reference to Saṃyutta-nikāya: Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra #20.2 L99 & 219 N43.11 " Y133.12-13
p. xxiii.7	contempory; read: contemporary
p. 2.22	(a) by demonstrating what is expressed; read: (a) by demonstrating that it is expressed
p. 3, n.9	*ṅan pa'i*; read: *ñan pa'i*
p. 9.28	common to the *bodhisattvas* and the *śrāvakas* together with their novices[46]; read: common to the *bodhisattvas* and the *śrāvakas* etc. who are inferior [to them][46]
p. 9, n.46	Delete and replace with: Read: *sarvam apy etat sottaraśrāvakādīnāṃ sādhāraṇaṃ bodhisattvānāṃ* in place of *sarvam apy etat sottarāc chrāvakādibhiḥ sādhāraṇaṃ bodhisattvānāṃ*; Tib.(D193a.2): *de dag thams cad kyaṅ bla ma daṅ bcas pas byaṅ chub sems dpa' mams daṅ ñan thos la sogs pa daṅ thun moṅ ste*
p. 11, n.51	*Sūḷasuññata*; read: *Cūḷasuññata*
p. 15.24	devoidedness; read: devoidness
p. 17.10	possess a nature; read: possesses a nature
p. 21.25	**refer to the six; read: refers to the six**
p. 28.1	Insert the following sentence after "...subject.": The three natures are thus included in the imagination of what is unreal.
p. 35.24	Noble Ones and ordinary people etc.; read: Noble Persons etc.
p. 41.1	from that matured 'seed' which has undergone a special transformation; read: from that special transformation which is obtained due to the maturation of the 'seed'
p. 43.23	**It is due to suffering that the world is completely defiled, by birth, old-age and death; read: It is due to being made to suffer by birth, old-age and death, that the world is completely defiled**
p. 49.19	**It is due to suffering that the world is completely defiled, by birth, old-age and death[290]; read: It is due to being made to suffer by birth, old-age and death, that the world is completely defiled[290]**
p. 49, n.283	*mṇon par*; read: *mṅon par*
p. 76.7-11	**even when no counteragent has arisen, ...liberation would be in vain.; read: even when no counteragent has [yet] arisen, because of the absence of defilement, all sentient beings would be liberated quite without effort. But if, even when the counter-agent has arisen, should [emptiness] not be pure, the under-taking [of effort] with a view to liberation would be fruitless**

p. 77.6-9	**even when no counteragent has arisen ...because of the absence of defilement**; read: **even when no counteragent has [yet] arisen** - because of the word 'even' this [would be] like [the case where the counteragent] had arisen - then, **because of the absence of defilement, all sentient beings would be liberated quite without effort**[421]
p. 77.17-20	**Now, even when the counteragent has arisen ...liberation would be in vain**; read: **But if, even when the counteragent has arisen** - because of the word 'even' it [would be] like [the case when the counteragent] had not arisen - **should [emptiness] not**[425] **be pure**, **then the undertaking [of effort] with a view to liberation would be fruitless**
p. 81.22	skeptics who believe that [emptiness] is subject to defilement and purification; read: those who are uncertain whether defilement or purification will ensue in this way
p. 83.9	**refers to obscuration consisting in both moral defilement and the knowable**; read: **refers both to obscuration consisting in moral defilement and [obscuration] in regard to the knowable**
p. 84.8	**refers to obscuration consisting in both moral defilement and the knowable**; read: **refers both to obscuration consisting in moral defilement and [obscuration] in regard to the knowable**
p. 84.15	Insert: "[obscuration] in regard to" after "...consists in moral defilement and"
p. 84.20	that consists in; read: of
p. 84.22	sphere; read: object
p. 84.31	Delete: "[those consisting in moral defilement and the knowable]"
p. 85.16	that consists in; read: of
p. 85.19-25	Similarly, ...as is ignorance; read: Similarly, nescience in regard just to the sphere of the truth of suffering etc. is not [nescience] in regard to other spheres known as ignorance and moral defilement. In regard to other spheres it is just nescience, and neither ignorance nor defiled. Hence, since this [nescience] is known as the obscuration of the knowable because of obstructing the activity of direct intuition only in respect to the knowable, moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth are not produced as is ignorance
p. 85.25	that consists in; read: of
p. 85.27	that consists in; read: of
p. 86.32	and the knowable; read: and that in regard to the knowable
p. 87.12	that consists in; read: of
p. 94.3	from from; read: from
p. 108.11	**a craftsman**; read: **knowledge of craft**
p. 114.20	**a craftsman**; read: **knowledge of craft**
p. 114, n.155	Delete and replace with: Ms.(26a.1): *paripūrṇaśukladharmā ca*, but Y's emendation to *paripūrṇaśukladharmaś ca* is preferred.
p. 114, n.157	*sūritāni*; read: *sūtritāni*
p. 114, n.158	*āvaraṇan*; read: *āvaraṇavan*
p. 118, n.173	Insert: "which should be deleted" after "...sentence"
p. 122.7	**relevent**; read: **relevant**
p. 123.7	**relevent**; read: **relevant**
p. 126, n.220	*parṣanmaṇdeleṣu*; read: *parṣanmaṇḍaleṣu*
p. 150, n.27	Delete and replace with: Read perhaps: *-pratikṣepo 'pavādadarśanam iti / grāhakapratikṣepa iti cintyam etat* in place of: *-parihāro ...etat*; Tib.: *spoṅ ba ni skur pa 'debs par lta ba'o źes zer te / 'dzin pa spoṅ ba 'di ni bsam dgos pa* (D244b.3).
p. 151.23	in regard existent; read: in regard to existent
p. 154.14	**does exit**; read: **does exist**
p. 171.20	*karmadhārya*; read: *karmadhāraya*
p. 189.7	Sāṃkya; read: Sāṃkhya

p. 197.12 heretics; read: Nihilists
p. 199.12 Iimpossible; read: Impossible
p. 201, n.280 *tathtāgatacakravartinor*, read: *tathāgatacakravartinor*
p. 210.26 **goes forth; read: obtains liberation**
p. 211 Insert: N48 on line 1 in left-hand margin
p. 211.2 **goes forth [as a mendicant]; read: obtains liberation**
p. 211.5 **goes forth; read: obtains liberation**
p. 211.33 **goes forth [as a mendicant]; read: obtains liberation**
p. 212.1 goes forth; read: obtains liberation
p. 212.4 **goes forth; read: obtains liberation**
p. 212.11 **goes forth; read: obtains liberation**
p. 212.14 a going forth; read: liberation
p. 212.18 a going forth; read: liberation
p. 212.19 a going forth; read: liberation
p. 217.7 **going forth; read: obtaining liberation**
p. 217.8 **going forth; read: obtaining liberation**
p. 218.2 **going forth; read: obtaining liberation**
p. 218.3 going forth; read: liberation
p. 218.5 **going forth; read: obtaining liberation**
p. 218.6 goes forth; read: obtains liberation
p. 236.18 respecively; read: respectively
p. 237.20 unnourised; read: unnourished
p. 265.12 **(k) the higher meditative development; read: (k) the inferior meditative development**
p. 266.27 **(k) The higher meditative development; read: (k) The inferior meditative development**
p. 272, n.9 analagy; read: analogy
p. 274.4 **(c) prerogative; read: (c) service**
p. 274.13 **(c) the highest degree of prerogative; read: (c) the highest degree of service**
p. 274.23 **(c) The highest degree of prerogative is due to the prerogative for deeds of benefit for all beings; read: (c) The highest degree of service is due to the service of deeds of benefit for all beings**
p. 274.29-31 **(f) The highest degree of non-hardship ...through h's approval alone; read: (f) The highest degree of non-hardship is due to the fulfilment of the perfections merely through the act of approv–ing of the generosity, etc., of others**
p. 276.3 **while rejoicing in the birth of a Buddha; read: and attains [re–birth] when a Buddha is living**
p. 277.12 **[3] The highest degree of prerogative is due to the prerogative for deeds of benefit for all beings; read: [3] The highest degree of service is due to the service of deeds of benefit for all beings**
p. 278.15-19 Delete paragraph 7 and replace with: **The highest degree of non-hardship is due to the fulfilment of the perfections merely through the act of approving of the generosity, etc., of others.** The *bodhisattvas* with joyous mind express their approval of [all other] beings' roots of the wholesome consisting **in generosity, etc., in such a way that merely through the act of approving of them,** the perfections of generosity, etc., are fulfilled [in themselves].
p. 283.10 which consist in the transformation; read: which are transformed
p. 283.13 **while rejoicing in the birth of a Buddha[58]; read: and attains [rebirth] when a Buddha is living[58]**

p. 283.16-18 The action ...in each of one's rebirths; read: The actions pertinent to this are the attainment [of rebirth] when a Buddha is living in each of one's births and engagement in generosity etc. at all times

p. 288.17 Having paid respect to it, **the giving** of the written works etc. **to others**[81]; read: **The giving** of the written works etc. **to others**[81], carefully,

p. 288.18 Having paid respect to it, **listening when it is being recited by another**; read: **Listening** carefully **when it is being recited by another**

p. 321.1-4 **These are due to ...is non-existent**; read: **These are due to imagin–ing that: (a) there exists a personal entity whose destruction emptiness brings about, or else, (b) insubstantiality [means that it] does not exist**

pp. 333.28 to 334.4 **emptiness is for the destruction of** ...that insubstantiality does not[311]; read: **these are due to imagining that: (a) there exists a personal entity whose destruction emptiness brings about, or else, (b) insubstantiality [means that it] does not exist.** If [knowledge] does not cause the *dharmas* to be empty through emptiness [knowledge] because they are empty by nature, then, (a) there exists a personal entity whose destruction emptiness brings about, or else, (b) insubstantiality [means that it] does not exist because of the absence of the personal entity; for, without an adverse element, there is no counteragent. Therefore, the existence of the personal entity or its absence due to its insubstantiality[311] is necessarily to be accepted

p. 357, n.408 Sāśtra; read: -śāstra. cārya; read: Ācārya

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Abbreviations

AS (G...)	V.V. Gokhale's edition of the Abhidharmasamuccaya: Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṃga.
AS (P...)	P. Pradhan's edition of the Abhidharmasamuccaya: Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga.
AS-Bhāṣya	Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣya.
BB	N. Dutt's edition of the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Bodhisattvabhūmi of Asaṅga
Bhāṣya	Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya.
BHSD	F. Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary.
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
D	Derge (*sde dge*) Edition of the relevant Tibetan text.
DD-Vṛtti	J. Nozawa edition of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and Vṛtti: Studies in Indology and Buddhology.
DS	J. Rahder's edition of the Daśabhūmika Sūtra: Daśabhūmikasūtra.
de Jong	J. W. de Jong: "Notes on the Second Chapter of the Madhyānta-vibhāgaṭīkā" in Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. XXI, 1977.
Jaini	P.S. Jaini's: "The Sanskrit Fragments of Vinītadeva's *Triṃśikā-ṭīkā*" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental And African Studies, Vol. XLVIII Part 3 1985
Kośa	P. Pradhan's edition of the Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya: Abhidharma-kośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu
Kośa Index	A. Hirakawa et al: Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Part One
Kośa Vyākhyā	U. Wogihara's edition of the Abhidharmakośa-Sphuṭārtha-Vyākhyā: Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra.
KP	Baron A. von Staël-Holstein's edition of the Kāśyapaparivarta.
LVP Kośa	L. de La Vallée Poussin's translation & annotation of the Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya: L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu.
Ms.	Copy of the original manuscript of the Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā re-discovered in Nepal by the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project.
MSA	Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.
MSA (L/B...)	S. Lévi's edition of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra re-edited by S. Bagchi: Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga.
MSG	É. Lamotte's translation and Tibetan edition of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha in two tomes: La Somme du Grand Véhicle D'Asaṅga (Mahāyāna–saṃgraha)
Mvy.	Mahāvyutpatti.
N. Amend.	G. Nagao: "Collation of the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* with its Manuscript, Chapter I, Lakṣaṇapariccheda" in Annual of Oriental and Religious Studies (Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan Kenkyu Nempo), No.15 1978.
O	E. Obermiller's review of the G. Tucci & V. Bhaṭṭācārya edition of the Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā, Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. IX, March 1933.
P	Peking Edition of the relevant Tibetan text.

Siddhi	L. de La Vallée Poussin's translation and annotation of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang.
SN	É. Lamotte's translation and Tibetan edition of the Sandhinirmocana Sūtra: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra - L'Explication des Mystères.
St.	Th. Stcherbatsky's translation & annotation of the Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā (Ch. I): Discourse on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes.
T & B	G. Tucci & V. Bhaṭṭācārya's edition of the Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā (Ch. I): Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā.
T-Bhāṣya	S. Lévi's edition of the Triṃśikā-Bhāṣya: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.
UCR	University of Ceylon Review.
V-Vṛtti	S. Lévi's edition of the Viṃśatikā-Vṛtti: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.
Y	Susumu Yamaguchi's edition of the Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā: Sthiramati - Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā.

Introduction

The Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV) contains a comprehensive and detailed account of the philosophical thought of the Yogācāra school[1] of Mahāyāna Buddhism at an early stage of its development. As a systematic exposition of the Mahāyana from the perspective of the early Yogācāra it is unique; thus its understanding is fundamental to a proper appreciation of Yogācāra thought.

In the Indian Yogācāra tradition the MAV comprises three essential works: (a) the Kārikā text attributed to Maitreya / Asaṅga, (b) Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya and (c) the Ṭīkā of Sthiramati. Considering that all three of these works have been available for more than fifty years it is remarkable that they have not been comprehensively studied to-date. The French translation and annotation of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi by Louis de La Vallée Poussin in 1928-29[2] remains the most authoritative study of the Yogācāra-vijñaptimātra doctrine. However, this work is not representative of the Yogācāra as a whole but is heavily influenced by Dharmapāla's interpretation of the thought of Maitreya and Vasubandhu and has fundamental differences from Sthiramati's interpretations as contained in the MAV-Ṭīkā[3]. Apart from a flurry of scholarly activity that coincided with the publication of the Sanskrit Editions of Sthiramati's Ṭīkā[4] in the early 1930's and Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya[5] in the 1960's, the MAV has received only piecemeal attention.

There are three main reasons for this neglect: (a) The MAV- Ṭīkā stands virtually alone as a broad ranging account of early Yogācāra thought; consequently it is often not possible to seek help from other parallel texts for a proper understanding of some of its more complex passages. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (MSA) is closely related to the MAV and a study of Sthiramati's commentary will undoubtedly shed more light on the MAV; however, the MSA reflects a more practice oriented doctrine and many of its ideas are generally at an earlier stage of development. There are other shorter works in existence that obviously share common doctrinal elements with the MAV, such as the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi; however, these works are relevant only to specific aspects of the early Yogācāra and

1 Commonly known also as the *vijñānavāda*.

2 Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi - La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Tomes I & II, Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928-29.

3 Cf. Y. Ueda: "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy" in Philosophy East and West, 17 (Jan-Oct.) 1967, pp.155-65.

4 Cf. Sthiramati - Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. Exposition systématique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda. Edited by Susumu Yamaguchi. Tome I Texte, Nagoya: Hajinkaku, 1934; and Madhyānta-vibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā of Sthiramati, Part I, Edited by V. Bhaṭṭācārya and G. Tucci. Calcutta Oriental Series, No.24, 1932.

5 Cf. Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Edited by Gadgin M. Nagao. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964; and Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya. Edited by N. Tatia and A. Thakur. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. X, Patna: KP Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.

are themselves in need of further study. (b) An additional hindrance to the study of this school lies in the fact that the precise meaning of many of the words and concepts employed by Sthiramati is often of quite an enigmatic nature. This is due partly to his terse commentarial style but also because the reader's familiarity with many of the subjects discussed is assumed and no attempt is made at further clarification. In addition, when presenting the alternative views held by other schools Sthiramati never identifies the particular school intended; presumably because this is also assumed to be common knowledge. (c) The third factor that has had an inhibiting influence on the study of the MAV is the quality of the Sanskrit text of Sthiramati's Ṭīkā edited and published by S. Yamaguchi. The manuscript used by Yamaguchi was hand-copied from a badly damaged original, a large portion of which was reconstructed with the help of the Tibetan translations. Since it is often impossible to recast much more than the known technical terms from the Tibetan into Sanskrit with any certainty, such an enterprise is never entirely satisfactory and this edition stands in need of improvement.

It was the French scholar Sylvain Lévi who first discovered the Sanskrit manuscript of the MAV-Ṭīkā in Nepal in 1928 and arranged to have a copy prepared by hand. Inevitably scribal errors were incorporated during the copying process. As mentioned above, the original manuscript was incomplete with approximately one third of all the folios missing on the left-hand side. The copied manuscript was then entrusted to Susumu Yamaguchi who prepared a Sanskrit edition, the first two chapters of which were published over the next couple of years in various issues of Ōtani Gakuhō[6]. Meanwhile, the MAV-Ṭīkā was discovered for a second time in Nepal by Guiseppe Tucci, who, with the help of Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya, also engaged in the preparation of a Sanskrit edition. Although originally intending to edit and reconstruct the missing portions of the entire text, they eventually published only the first chapter in 1932[7]. This is a work of good quality (in *devanāgarī* script) and the reconstructed sentences are sometimes preferable to those of Yamaguchi's edition[8]. In 1934 S. Yamaguchi published an edition of the complete Sanskrit text in five chapters (in Romanised form) which includes the portions recast from the Tibetan[9]. Although this edition of the MAV-Ṭīkā has many shortcomings, it must be regarded as a significant and valuable scholarly achievement; this edition is used as the basis of the present study.

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6 Vol. XI, 1930, pp.576-602: Vol. XII, 1931, pp.24-67, 307-335, 719-775; Vol. XIII, 1932, pp.59-99.

7 Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā of Sthiramati. Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series No.24, 1932.

8 This work was reviewed by E. Obermiller in IHQ, Vol. IX, 1933, (pp.1019-1030) where he suggests some valuable alternative readings, especially in the reconstructed portions.

9 Cf. fn. 4 above; this edition was reprinted in 1966 by the Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo.

A Japanese translation of the MAV-Ṭīkā was published by S. Yamaguchi in 1935[10]. The following year the great Russian scholar of Buddhism Theodore Stcherbatsky published an English translation of just the first chapter[11] of the MAV-Ṭīkā. This work which includes a translation of Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya from the Tibetan is based on the Tucci and Bhaṭṭācārya edition of the Ṭīkā as well as the Tibetan translation. As far as the translation is concerned, it is not a very useful work since it suffers both from Stcherbatsky's somewhat florid and free style as well his many philosophical misconceptions regarding the Yogācāra doctrine. However, his text-critical remarks and annotations where he often provides a more literal translation are quite valuable; many are difficult to improve upon and are incorporated in the present study. At the same time that Stcherbatsky was preparing his translation, the Dutch scholar David Friedmann was also translating the first chapter of the Ṭīkā based on Yamaguchi's edition. When he discovered that the Russian scholar was translating the same work, Friedmann almost abandoned his translation but fortunately was persuaded by Stcherbatsky himself to complete his study[12]. The result is a good translation, generally superior to that of Stcherbatsky's and well annotated particularly through its references to the LVP Kośa and Siddhi; however, no attempt has been made to rectify the Sanskrit textual problems.

The MAV-Bhāṣya then became the focus of scholarly attention with the publication in 1937 of S. Yamaguchi's edition of Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya which included the Tibetan translation and the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha[13]. In 1953-54 P.W. O'Brien published an English translation of the third chapter of the Bhāṣya in two issues of Monumenta Nipponica[14]. This is a very thorough and readable work based on the Tibetan and Chinese translations and includes abundant references to Sthiramati's Ṭīkā (Yamaguchi's ed.) and also to the LVP Kośa and Siddhi. An important contribution to the study of the MAV was made in 1964 when Gadjin M. Nagao published a Sanskrit (Romanised) edition of Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya which incorporates the Kārikā text[15]. It was prepared from a manuscript discovered in the Ngor Monastery in Tibet by Rahula Sanskrityāyana in 1934 and is an exceptionally fine work requiring only a few minor corrections. The publication of this edition now made it possible to revise Yamaguchi's edition of the Ṭīkā since the latter contains many quotations from the Bhāṣya that were reconstructed

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10 Anne ashariya zō Chūhenfunbetsuron shakusho. Nagoya: Hajinkaku, 1935. Reprinted in 1966 by Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo.

11 Madhyānta-vibhaṅga - Discourse on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes, English translation and annotation. Reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies : Past & Present, 1971.

12 Sthiramati - Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes, English translation and annotation. Utrecht, 1937.

13 Kanzō taishō Benchūbenron. Nagoya: Hajinkaku, 1937. Reprinted in 1966 by the Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo.

14 Vol. IX April 1953, No. 1/2, pp.277-303 and Vol. X April 1954, No. 1/2, pp.227-269.

15 Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964.

from the Tibetan. The Bhāṣya component of the present study is based on this edition of the Sanskrit. Nagao also published a Japanese translation of chapters I and III of the Bhāṣya[16] and a translation of the whole Bhāṣya in 1976?[17] Another edition of the Sanskrit Bhāṣya was published in 1967 by Nathmal Tatia and Anantalal Thakur[18].

An attempt was made to improve upon Yamaguchi's edition of the Ṭīkā by the Indian scholar Ramachandra Pandeya who published a revised edition in 1971[19] incorporating the Bhāṣya and Kārikā text. In the introduction to this work Pandeya claims that his corrections to Yamaguchi's edition are made on the basis of the Tibetan translation (Peking Ed.). Pandeya's edition was reviewed by J.W. de Jong[20] who demonstrated that in many instances his emendations appear to be made quite arbitrarily without recourse to the Tibetan text and for this reason Pandeya's edition has not been consulted in the present study. In his review, de Jong resolves many of the textual problems of the second chapter of the Ṭīkā.

In 1982 Thomas A. Kochumuttom published a study of the essential doctrines from the works of Vasubandhu[21] which includes an English translation of the first chapter of the MAV-Bhāṣya as well as selected parts of the Ṭīkā. Although his translation of the Bhāṣya is generally quite accurate, his translation of the Ṭīkā passages (upon which much of his interpretative comment depends) is based on Pandeya's edition which, as we have seen, is not completely reliable. It should be noted that Kochumuttom's understanding of the philosophy of Vasubandhu is controversial for he argues that it is open to interpretation as a system that embraces "realistic pluralism". An English translation of the whole MAV-Bhāṣya was included in a publication by Stephan Anacker in 1984[22]. This is an unsatisfactory work which abounds with errors and misunderstandings[23].

When my own project was first conceived it was envisaged to have three main components: (a) A translation of the Kārikā, Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā texts based on Nagao's and Yamaguchi's respective editions. (b) Text-critical annotations to the Yamaguchi edition of the Ṭīkā with the help of the Sanskrit Bhāṣya and two versions of the Tibetan translation, i.e. the Derge (*sde dge*) and Peking editions, with the aim of making a significant contribution towards the establishment of a more reliable Sanskrit

16 Sekai no meicho, Vol. 2: Daijō butten. Tokyo, 1967, (pp.397-426).
17 Daijō butten. Vol. 15 (Tōkyō Chūōkoronsha), pp.215-358, 380-409.
18 Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. X. Patna: KP Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
19 Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
20 "Notes on the Second Chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā" in Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. XXI, 1977, pp.111-117.
21 A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.
22 Seven Works of Vasubandhu - The Buddhist Psychological Doctor. Religions of Asia Series No.4, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
23 Cf. my review of this work in Indo-Iranian Journal, Vol. 30, No.1, 1987, pp.57-60.

Ṭīkā text. (c) Time permitting, I also hoped to produce a preliminary exegesis of the work.

Several months after beginning my study I was fortunate enough to discuss my research with Professor M. Hahn of the Indologisches Seminar of the University of Bonn who was visiting the A.N.U. at the time. Following his suggestion I contacted the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project in Kathmandu, Nepal, on the chance that the original manuscript of the MAV-Ṭīkā were listed among their records. As it turned out, this was in fact the case - the Ṭīkā had indeed been discovered for a third time and was catalogued and microfilmed in 1970 by that organization. Many months later I managed to secure a copy of the manuscript which was photographed from the microfilmed copy. The script of the manuscript is clearly a variety of Nevari and the reproduction is generally of a very high quality, most characters being quite legible as can be seen from the samples shown in Appendix I. It soon became obvious that it was the very manuscript found by Lévi and Tucci more than fifty years earlier although a little worse for wear. When compared with Yamaguchi's edition, the lacunae coincide almost exactly; the only differences being caused by further deterioration along the damaged side of some folios where up to ten characters may be lost. The first folio (1b) is in a particularly bad state with only a small fragment that can be read with certainty. Also, two folios are completely absent (31b and 32a equivalent to Y105.15 to 106.27). The microfilm is kept in the National Archives, Kathmandu, Nepal, and the details found on the title page are as follows: Manuscript No. 5 - 233 vi *bauddhadarśana* 66; Catalogue: *bṛhat saṃkṣipta sūcipatram*; Title: Madhyāntavibhaga-kārikā; No. of leaves: 85; Size: 56 x 5.5 cm.; Date of filming: 22.9.70; Remarks: palm-leaf - half of the foll. very badly damaged; Reel No. A38/10.

The re-discovery of the original manuscript of the MAV-Ṭīkā has thus made it possible to include new material in this study, material that is particularly relevant to the establishment of the Sanskrit text. By comparing the original manuscript with the Yamaguchi edition it has been possible to detect and rectify many mis-readings and scribal errors that were incorporated into the Yamaguchi edition. This aspect of my work has been further complemented through the acquisition of a photo-copy of the actual manuscript used by Yamaguchi which was kindly supplied by Prof. G.M. Nagao.

As my research progressed it became apparent that there would not be time to carry out the third component originally envisaged, i.e. the exegesis of the text; rather, the completed study would be restricted to the translation and textual emendations. In addition to the textual problems encountered in the Sanskrit Ṭīkā, the Tibetan translation is also quite corrupt in many places, thus compounding the difficulties in establishing the Sanskrit. Although I am now reasonably satisfied that the majority of the textual problems have been resolved, the completed work cannot not be regarded as

definitive or conclusive. The MAV-Tīkā will no doubt yield greater coherence to future scholars and many of its more enigmatic passages will be translated with more certainty only after the writings of Sthiramati are understood in greater depth. Suffice it to say that, although there is considerable scope for improvement through future research, it is intended that this study may serve as the basis for a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the Ṭīkā and that the translation will be of value to those seeking a proper understanding of the philosophy and doctrine of the early Yogācāra.

The main materials used in the preparation of this study are as follows:

1. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pahi tshig lehur byas pa, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Derge (*sde dge*) Edition, Sems Tsam, Vol. 1, No.4021. Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1980.

2. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pa, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, Vol. 108, No.5522. Kyoto: Otani University, 1957.

3. Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya. Sanskrit text edited by Gadjin M. Nagao. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964.

4. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pahi hgrel pa, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Derge (*sde dge*) Edition, Sems Tsam Vol. 2, No.4027. Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1980.

5. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pahi hgrel pa, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, Vol. 108, No.5528. Kyoto: Otani University, 1957.

6. Madhyāntavibhāga-Tīkā, Sanskrit text edited by Susumu Yamaguchi. Reprint, Tome I, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966.

7. Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā, a photographed copy of the original manuscript from which S. Lévi prepared the hand-written copy used as the basis for the Yamaguchi Edition (6. above). The Ms. was re-discovered and catalogued in 1970 by the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project, Kathmandu, Nepal.

8. Madhyāntavibhāga-Tīkā, a photo-copy of the actual hand-written copy of the manuscript that was used by S. Yamaguchi to prepare his edition. Courtesy of G.M. Nagao.

9. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pahi hgrel bśad, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Derge (*sde dge*) Edition, Sems Tsam, Vol. 2, No.4032. Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1980.

10. Dbus dañ mthah rnam par hbyed pahi hgrel bśad, Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, Vol. 109, No.5534. Kyoto: Otani University, 1957.

11. Madhyāntavibhāga-Tīkā, [Chapter One] Sanskrit text edited by G. Tucci & V. Bhaṭṭācārya. Calcutta Oriental Series, No.24, 1932.

Synopsis of the Madhyāntavibhāga.

As its title suggests, the central theme of the Madhyāntavibhāga is the analysis (*vibhāga*) of the traditional Buddhist concept of the Middle Way (*madhya*) in relation to the various extreme views (*anta*) recast to accomodate the spiritual perspective of the Yogācāra. The extremes are normally identified as belonging to two essential categories, i.e. as the extreme views which lead to imputation (*samāropa*) or negation

(*apavāda*) in regard to the existence (*bhāva*) of phenomena in contrast to the way that they are to be understood in reality. The MAV is arranged in five chapters which deal with seven main subjects: (a) the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), (b) the obscurations (*āvaraṇa*), (c) the realities (*tattva*), (d) the meditative development of counteragents (*pratipakṣa-bhāvanā*), (e) the various states (*avasthā*) in the latter, (f) the attainment of results (*phala-prāpti*) and (g) the supremacy of the [universal] vehicle (*yānānuttarya*). Each chapter concludes with an abridged summary (*piṇḍārtha*) of contents which, according to Sthiramati[24], is included to enable the student to easily remember both the contents and sequential order of the subjects explained.

The first chapter, which is possibly the most complex of the five, provides a detailed account of the essential philosophy of this school. The chapter is divided into two parts: the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of: (a) the imagination of what is unreal (*abhūta-parikalpa*) and (b) emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Part (a) explores both the nature of the phenomenal world which is understood in essence as unreal (*abhūta*), and the way in which it comes into being or is imaginatively constructed (*parikalpa*). This part is divided into nine sections which include explanations of the three natures (*tri-svabhāva*), the dynamics of the actualizing consciousnesses (*pravṛtti-vijñānāni*) and an extremely detailed re-interpretation of the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) according to this school. Part (b) defines the correct understanding of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in the context of Yogācāra thought. This includes a sixteenfold differentiation of emptiness and contains some of the more enigmatic portions of the text particularly where emptiness is described as having some sort of positive ontological value, i.e. the characteristic of emptiness is defined as the existence of a non-*ens*. One of the most predominant themes throughout this chapter is the constantly re-stated significance of the imminent relationship between the conventional understanding of phenomena (*dharma*) and their real nature (*dharmatā*).

The second chapter has a more practical orientation than the first insofar as it examines the main obscurations (*āvaraṇa*) to enlightenment (*bodhi*). These are reduced to two broad categories, namely, the obscuration that consists in moral defilement and that which consists in the knowable (*kleśa-jñeya-āvaraṇa*). Firstly, it identifies obscuration that is common to the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha* and the *bodhisattva*. It then concentrates specifically on the *bodhisattva* by defining the obscurations to his attainment of (a) the factors that contribute to enlightenment (*bodhi-pakṣya*), (b) the perfections (*pāramitā*) and (c) the spiritual levels (*bhūmi*).

The third chapter provides an explanation of the ten realities (*tattva*). These are identified as the ten main areas where one's understanding of phenomena as they are in reality (*yathā-bhūta*) is susceptible to confusion especially in regard to erroneous inversion (*viparyāsa*), imputation and negation. Fundamental to the ten realities are the

24 Cf. MAV-Ṭīkā: Y109.5-6 & 164.23ff.

three natures (*tri-svabhāva*), i.e. the imaginary (*parikalpita*), the other-dependent (*para-tantra*) and the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*). These three natures collectively comprise the basic reality (*mūla-tattva*) which has an intrinsic relationship with the other nine realities. The latter half of the chapter is devoted solely to the tenth reality, the reality of the skills (*kauśalya-tattva*), which leads into a detailed explanation of many of the essential Buddhist doctrines from the Yogācāra point of view. It includes explanation of the meaning of the five aggregates (*pañca-skandha*), the elements (*dhātu*) and the sense-fields (*āyatana*).

Chapter four is divided into three sections concerned mainly with description of various aspects of spiritual practice (*pratipatti*). These are: (a) the correct practices of meditative development (*bhāvanā*) for the generation of the thirty-seven factors that contribute to enlightenment (*bodhi-pakṣya*). The practices are examined through their modes as counteragents (*pratipakṣa*) to particular adverse elements (*vipakṣa*). These factors include the applications of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna*), the correct exertions (*samyak-prahāṇa*) and the bases of psychic power (*ṛddhi-pāda*). (b) The nine states (*avasthā*) which define the progress of the *bodhisattva* engaged in these meditative practices. (c) The respective results (*phala*) that are attained by the *bodhisattva* stationed in any of these nine states.

The fifth chapter extols the virtues of the universal vehicle (*mahāyāna*) and indeed its superiority over the *śrāvaka-yāna* and the *pratyekabuddha-yāna*. This superiority is explained in relation to three categories: (a) spiritual practice (*pratipatti*) that is based on the ten perfections, (b) objective support (*ālambana*) which is twelvefold and (c) full attainment (*samudāgama*) which is tenfold. The chapter depends heavily on the Kāśyapaparivarta section of the Ratnakūṭa for a scriptural basis.

The Authorship of the Madhyāntavibhāga

The Madhyāntavibhāga [-Kārikā] is one of the five treatises which the Mahāyāna Buddhists traditionally ascribe to Maitreyanātha, the *bodhisattva* and incumbent Buddha who resides in the Tuṣita Heavens. The legendary accounts in the Tibetan tradition[25] tell of his materialization in the presence of the Ārya Asaṅga after he had completed twelve gruelling years of meditative practices. After transporting Asaṅga to the Tuṣita Heavens, it is said that Maitreya instructed him in the fundamental doctrines of the Mahāyāna and then passed on to him five important treatises to be taught for the benefit of sentient beings. They are:

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25 Cf. E. Obermiller: The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet by Bu-ston. Translation from Tibetan. Reprint, Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1986 & A. Chattopadhyāya and L. Chimpa: Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India. Translation from Tibetan. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970.

Madhyāntavibhāga
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
Ratnagotravibhāga [Uttaratantra]
Abhisamāyālaṃkāra

The first three of these stand in close relation as works belonging to the early strata of the Yogācāra. The fourth, wherein the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine features prominently, has some links with the Yogācāra (particularly the MSA) but is classified as belonging to the Madhyāmika-prāsangika school by certain Tibetan writers, notably Tsoṅ kha pa[26]. The fifth is generally regarded as a Madhyamaka work which presents the *bodhisattva* path based on the Prajñāpāramitā literature.

For the past sixty years scholars have remained divided over the precise identity of Maitreyanātha with some, notably Ui[27] and Tucci[28] preferring to explain him as a historical personage. Others such as Obermiller[29] and Demiéville[30] argue quite convincingly that Maitreya is intended as the tutelary inspiration of Asaṅga and disclaim the need to read an unwarranted historical facticity into the legendary material. Obermiller[31] has already drawn attention to the fact that it is in the MAV-Ṭīkā[32] that Maitreya is explicitly described as the *bodhisattva* who has reached the tenth spiritual level and is separated from Buddhahood by just one birth - thus adding credence to his identification as a tutelary entity.

No such confusion exists concerning the historicity of Vasubandhu, the author of the MAV-Bhāṣya; rather, it is over the actual number of Vasubandhus that contemporary scholars are unable to reach agreement. Traditionally it is believed that there was only one Vasubandhu, who was the younger brother of Asaṅga. Paramārtha[33] reports that he was born in Puruṣapura (modern day Peshawar) in the eleventh century after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha and that he was initially allied with various *sarvāstivāda* schools. During this time he composed his definitive work illustrating the *vaibhāṣika* and *sautrāntika* doctrines in the Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya. Although originally he was a staunch skeptic of the Mahāyana, it is said that through the efforts of Asaṅga he eventually became convinced of its theoretical and

26 Cf. E. Obermiller: "The Sublime Science of Maitreya" in Acta Orientalia. IX, 1932, p.83.
27 H. Ui: "Maitreya as a Historical Personage" in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman. Cambridge, 1929.
28 G. Tucci: On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya(nātha) and Asaṅga. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930.
29 E. Obermiller: "Sublime Science of Maitreya" ... pp.81-306.
30 P. Demiéville: "La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa" in Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient. No.44, 1954.
31 Cf. E. Obermiller's review of V. Bhaṭṭācārya & G. Tucci's Sanskrit edition of the first chapter of the MAV-Ṭīkā entitled: "Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā of Sthiramati..." in The Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. IX, March 1933, No.1, p.1024.
32 Cf. Y1-2.
33 J. Takakusu: "The Life of Vasu-bandhu by Paramārtha (A.D. 499-569)" in T'oung Pao, Vol. 5, 1904, pp.269-296.

practical integrity. It is reported that when he made the decision to enter the Mahāyāna, five hundred of his disciples also made the transition. He is credited with the authorship of numerous original works and commentaries[34] and his reputation for excellence in meditative practices and learning was known throughout the North of India. After the death of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu became *upadhyāya* (Abbot) of Nālanda and Tāranātha records that he was responsible for the creation of 654 Dharma centres in and around Magadha.

The dates of Vasubandhu are problematical. Some scholars argue in favour of the acceptance of more than one author with this name during the period of the third to fifth centuries A.D., while others maintain that the available evidence does not allow for such an interpretation[35]. It is a particularly hazy area of study that is based essentially on attempts to reconcile the Tibetan and Chinese historical accounts and hence necessarily contains considerable supposition and speculation. Suffice to say that Vasubandhu, the author of the MAV-Bhāṣya, probably lived during the third and fourth centuries A.D.

Bu-ston describes Sthiramati as a pupil of Vasubandhu who was more learned in the Abhidharma than his teacher. He is reputed to have joined Vasubandhu at the age of seven and worked diligently at his studies until becoming proficient in all the five sciences. According to the Chinese pilgrim I-Tsing[36], Sthiramati was at Nālanda for some years before moving on to Valabhī where he established a monastery and composed most of his works. He was a prolific writer who wrote sub-commentaries to most of Vasubandhu's commentaries in addition to numerous other works[37]. Scholars are in rough agreement concerning his dates which can be put approximately at 500-570 A.D.[38]

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34 For a complete list of his works as recorded in the Tibetan *bsTan ḥgyur* see L. Chimpa & A. Chattopadhyāya: Tāranātha's History..., pp.395-7.

35 The most recent studies in this regard are by: E. Frauwallner: On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu. Rome: Serie Orientale Roma III, 1951 & "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic" in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens, Band V, 1961, pp.125-148; P.S. Jaini: "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus" in BSOAS. Vol. XXI, 1958, pp.48-53; A. Wayman: Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. University of California Press, 1961, pp.19-24.

36 J. Takakusu: A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671-695) by I-Tsing. Reprint, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966.

37 For a complete list of his works as recorded in the Tibetan *bsTan ḥgyur* see L. Chimpa & A. Chattopadhyāya: Tāranātha's History..., pp.399-400.

38 Cf. E. Frauwallner: "Landmarks... & Y. Kajiyama: "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla" in Beiträge zur Geistesgeschte Indiens - Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner; Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens, Band XII-XIII, 1968/1969, pp.193-203.

Works Cited in the Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā.

Work cited	Page & line No. of Bhāṣya or Ṭīkā
Majjhima-nikāya-sutta No.121	N18.4ff.
Kāśyapaparivarta #60	Y15.22ff.
Abhisamayālaṃkāra V.21	Y29.7-8
Abhidharma-sūtra	Y34.1-2
Aṅguttara-nikāya III.54	Y40.22ff.
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.60	Y66.28-29
Daśabhūmika-sūtra R26.12ff.	N35.22ff.
" " R25.21ff.	Y100.19ff.
" " R33.15ff.	Y101.21ff.
" " R42.2ff.	Y103.9ff.
Abhidharma-sūtra	Y112.8-11
Saṃyutta-nikāya	N45.4
Bahudhātuka-sutta (cf. Majjhima-nikāya 115)	N.46.20
Dhammapada 223	Y150.13-14
Kāśyapaparivarta #52	Y233.13ff.
" #63	Y243.13-14
" #64	Y244.18
" #66	Y245.12ff.
" #67	Y246.11ff.
" #68	Y247.12ff.
" #69	Y248.11ff.
" #70	Y249.11ff.
" #71	Y250.12ff.

Notes on the Translation.

The arrangement of topics and sub-topics under their respective headings follows Nagao's edition of the Sanskrit Bhāṣya and sometimes differs slightly to the arrangement of Yamaguchi's edition of the Ṭīkā. The Kārikā and Bhāṣya text is translated in bold type and is placed immediately above the relevant Ṭīkā text. When the Kārikā or Bhāṣya is quoted in the Ṭīkā, this is also rendered in bold type. The numbers in the left-hand margin indicate: (a) the page number of the Sanskrit texts when a page break occurs or (b) the page and line number of the Sanskrit texts at the beginning of a new topic. The paragraph divisions of the Ṭīkā generally follow

Yamaguchi's arrangement although this is occasionally changed for the sake of a more coherent separation of Sthiramati's argument and discussion.

I have aimed for consistency in the choice of an English term for its Sanskrit or Tibetan equivalent although this principle is occasionally waived when it is felt that the context demands a different nuance. For example, *svabhāva* is usually translated as "own-being", but when used in the context of the *tri-svabhāva* doctrine, it is rendered as "nature" as is the normal practice of most contempory commentators. Due to their multivalent meaning and cumbersome English equivalents, some Sanskrit words have not been translated: the word *dharma* is not translated when its sense as "constituent of reality", or "ontological category" etc. is intended; when it is used to refer to the doctrine or teachings of the Buddha, it is rendered as "Dharma". Where the word *karma* is used chiefly in the sense of "action" it is translated as such, however, it is not translated when it is clear that its other more abstract moral connotations (as the fruition of the actions of the past) are intended. The word *jñāna* is usually rendered as "knowledge" and occasionally "cognition" except when it signifies the knowledge that is free from conceptual discrimination (*nirvikalpa*), in which case it is translated as "direct intuition". This latter sense is often clarified by the Tibetan translation which renders it as *ye śes* rather than *śes pa*.

My fundamental principle when translating both Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā has been to take the Sanskrit text as the reference point. If it reads differently to the Tibetan but maintains coherence both syntactically and philosophically, its reading is adopted in preference to the Tibetan and the latter is noted as a variant. In the case of the Ṭīkā, any difference between the manuscript reading and Yamaguchi's text is noted. If a coherent rendering is not possible from the manuscript, the Tibetan forms the basis of the translation and an emendation to the Sanskrit is suggested. The translation of the missing portions of the manuscript is always based on the Tibetan, and an improvement is annotated where I am unable to agree with Yamaguchi's reconstruction.

Index by Paragraph

Chapter One

Introduction

The 'Body' of the Treatise

The Defining Characteristics

1. The Imagination of What is Unreal:

(a) The Characteristic of Existence and Non-existence

1. Introductory
2. Rejection of the negation of the *dharmas*
3. The imagination of what is unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*) is a 'bare' existent devoid of the duality of subject and object
4. Avoiding the extremes of imputation and negation (*samāropāpavāda*)
5. The relationship between defilement and purification
6. *abhūtaparikalpa*
7. The characteristic of emptiness (*śūnyatā*)
8. All *dharmas* are established as neither empty nor not empty
9. This is the middle way

(b) The Individual Characteristic

1. The individual characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of *abhūtaparikalpa*
2. The establishment of the sense faculties, sense-objects and consciousness (*vijñāna*) in relation to *abhūtaparikalpa*
3. *abhūtaparikalpa* is the essential nature of consciousness
4. The four kinds of appearance (*pratibhāsa*)
5. The appearance as object (*artha*) and sentient being (*sattva*) is without aspect (*nirākāra*) The appearance as self (*ātman*) and representation (*vijñapti*) is a false appearance (*vitatha-pratibhāsa*)
6. The object cannot be differentiated from the nature of consciousness
7. Since the existence of the object cannot be established, consciousness - as discerning agent - is non-existent
8. Consciousness does not exist as such, nor is it non-existent
9. Why the non-existence of consciousness is not accepted
10. Why consciousness does not exist in the way in which it manifests

(c) The Characteristic of the Totality

1. The three natures (*svabhāva*)
2. Explanation of the three natures in the context of *abhūtaparikalpa*
3. *abhūtaparikalpa* is equivalent to the other-dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*)

(d) The Characteristic of the Expedient for Entry into the Characteristic of Non-existence

1. The characteristic of non-existence refers to the non-existence of the duality
2. The perception of representation-only (*vijñapti-mātra*) is the basis for the non-perception of the object
3. Consciousness arises in the nature of the appearance of the object
4. The nature of the objective support (*ālambana*)
5. Rejection of the various 'atomistic' theories as attempts to account for the objective support
6. Rejection of the sign (*nimitta*) as the objective support
7. Rejection of non-resistant matter (*apratigham rūpam*) as comprising the objective support
8. Rejection of the theory that the objective support derives from past experience

2. Emptiness:

Introductory

1. Explanation of the subjects discussed in relation to emptiness

(a) The Characteristic of Emptiness

1. Emptiness is characterized by the essential nature of a non-existent
2. Emptiness is equivalent to the absolute non-existence of the subject / object duality on the part of *abhūtaparikalpa*
3. The essential nature of emptiness neither exists nor does it not exist
4. The characteristic of emptiness is neither different from nor identical to *abhūtaparikalpa*
5. Why this differs from the Nirgrantha doctrine of the Jains
6. Summary

(b) The Synonyms of Emptiness

1. The five main synonyms are: (a) *tathatā*, (b) *bhūtakoṭi*, (c) *nimitta*, (d) *paramārthatā* and (e) *dharmadhātu*

(c) The Meaning of the Synonyms of Emptiness

1. The meaning of the five main synonyms

(d) The Differentiation of Emptiness

1. Emptiness is differentiated as defiled or pure
2. If it possesses the quality of change, why is emptiness not impermanent?

The Sixteen Kinds of Emptiness

1. Although its essential nature is undifferentiated, it can be differentiated in relation to four foundations (*vastu*; *gźi*)
2. The four foundations are: (a) the enjoyer, (b) the enjoyment, (c) the physical body and (d) the inanimate world
3. The sixteen kinds of emptiness are: (a) Internal emptiness
4. (b) External emptiness
5. (c) Internal and external emptiness
6. (d) Universal emptiness
7. (e) The emptiness of emptiness and (f) the emptiness of the absolute
8. (g) The emptiness of the conditioned and (h) the emptiness of the unconditioned
9. (i) Absolute emptiness
10. (j) Emptiness without beginning and end
11. (k) The emptiness of non-rejection
12. (l) Intrinsic emptiness
13. (m) The emptiness of the characteristic marks of a supreme being
14. (n) The emptiness of all *dharmas*
15. (o) The emptiness of non-existence and (p) the emptiness of the essential nature of non-existence
16. Re-assessment of the fourteen kinds of emptiness in the light of the two kinds of emptiness mentioned in 15
17. The object and essential nature of emptiness and the aim of the meditative development of emptiness

(e) The Logical Proof of Emptiness

1. If it were not defiled, all beings would be liberated
2. If it were not pure, effort would be in vain
3. It is neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure
4. The justification for the latter fourfold differentiation of emptiness

The Summary Meaning of Emptiness

1. In terms of its characteristics
2. In terms of its establishment

Chapter Two

1. The Five Obscurations Beginning with the 'pervading'

1. The 'pervading' is pertinent to the *bodhisattva*
2. The 'limited' pertains to the *śrāvaka* etc.
3. The 'excessive' pertains to the *bodhisattva* and *śrāvaka* etc.
4. The 'equal' pertains to the *bodhisattva* and *śrāvaka* etc.
5. The 'acceptance and rejection' of *saṃsāra* pertains to the *bodhisattva*
6. Summary of the five obscurations

2. The Obscuration that Consists in the Nine Fetters to Application

1. The nine fetters
2. Attachment and repugnance relate to anxiety and equanimity
3. Pride obscures the clear comprehension of the false view of individuality
4. Ignorance obscures the clear comprehension of the foundation of the latter
5. False view obscures the clear comprehension of the truth of cessation
6. Clinging obscures the clear comprehension of the truth of the path
7. Doubt obscures the clear comprehension of the three 'jewels'
8. Envy obscures the clear comprehension of gain and honour
9. Avarice obscures the clear comprehension of austerity
10. Summary of the nine fetters

3. The Obscuration Pertinent to the *Bodhisattvas*:

(a) The Obscuration to the Tenfold [Qualities] Beginning with Virtue

1. The ten qualities
2. Why these are relevant to enlightenment
3. The sequential order of the development of these qualities
4. The obscurations to the wholesome are: (a) lack of application, (b) the application to unworthy objects and (c) superficial application
5. The obscurations to enlightenment are: (a) the non-arising of the wholesome, (b) lack of mental attention and (c) incomplete accumulations
6. The obscurations to complete acceptance are: (a) deprivation of spiritual lineage, (b) deprivation of good friends and (c) mental exhaustion
7. The obscurations to intelligence are: (a) deprivation of spiritual practice, (b) living with foolish people and (c) living with pernicious people
8. The obscurations to absence of error are: (a) the disquiet of error, (b) the defilement of passion etc. and (c) the non-maturation of wisdom
9. The obscurations to the relinquishment of obscuration are: (a) innate disquiet, (b) laziness and (c) carelessness
10. The obscurations to transformation are: (a) attachment to existence, (b) attachment to enjoyment and (c) faintheartedness
11. The obscurations to lack of fear are: (a) a low opinion of people, (b) lack of firm conviction and (c) undue deliberation on the literal meaning
12. The obscurations to lack of avarice are: (a) lack of enthusiasm, (b) enthusiasm for gain etc. and (c) lack of compassion
13. The obscurations to mastery are: (a) loss of what is learnt, (b) learning little and (c) lack of the necessary preparation for *samādhi*

(b) The Ten [Instrumental] Causes

1. The ten instrumental causes
2. The causes for origination
3. The causes for the continuation of enlightenment
4. The causes for the support, i.e. *bodhicitta*
5. The causes for the manifestation of intelligence
6. The causes for the modification of error, i.e. into non-error
7. The causes for the disjunction from obscuration
8. The causes for the transformation into universal enlightenment
9. The causes for belief
10. The causes for belief in others

Chapter Three

Introductory

1. The differentiation of realities (*tattva*) is necessary to enable the understanding of their essential natures
2. The relevance of the realities, in brief
3. Alternative explanation of 2
4. Various views on the realities

1. The Basic Reality

1. The basic reality comprises the three natures
2. Why the three natures should be studied
3. The imaginary nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) is eternally non-existent
4. The other-dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) exists, but not as a reality
5. The perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*) both exists and does not exist as a reality

2. The Reality of Characteristic

1. The reality-characteristic in relation to the imaginary nature
2. The reality characteristic in relation to the other-dependent nature
3. The reality characteristic in relation to the perfected nature

3. The Reality Free from Erroneous Inversion

1. The reality free from erroneous inversion consists in the knowledge of what is impermanent (*anitya*), painful (*duḥkha*), empty (*śūnya*) and insubstantial (*nairātmya*)
2. The threefold nature of the impermanent object
3. Suffering that is due to appropriation
4. Suffering that is due to the characteristic
5. Suffering that is due to association
6. Emptiness as: (a) non-existence, (b) existence as something other and (c) intrinsic nature
7. Insubstantiality as: (a) the absence of characteristic, (b) a difference in characteristic and (c) the individual characteristic
8. Explanation of the difference between emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and insubstantiality (*nairātmya*)
9. The three kinds of impermanence as the counteragents to imputation and negation

4. The Reality of the Cause and the Result

1. The reality of cause and result refers to the four noble truths
2. The truth of suffering
3. The truth of origination
4. The truth of cessation
5. The truth of the path

5. Gross and Subtle Reality

1. The gross and subtle realities refer to the conventional and the absolute
2. The conventional as designation
3. The conventional as knowledge
4. The conventional as utterance
5. Explanation of the three aspects of the conventional
6. The absolute consists in the perfected nature
7. The absolute as object is thusness
8. The absolute as attainment is *nirvāṇa*
9. The absolute as spiritual practice is the path
10. The perfected nature includes both *nirvāṇa* (the unconditioned) and the path (the conditioned)

6. Well Established Reality

1. What is generally established is due to the imaginary nature
2. What is established through reasoning is due to the three natures

7. The Reality of the Sphere of Purity

1. The sphere of purity is twofold
2. The removal of obscuration that consists in both moral defilement and the knowable
3. The twofold sphere of purity is due just to the perfected nature

8. The Inclusion Reality

1. The five categories
2. The causal-sign (*nimitta*) and conceptual differentiation (*vikalpa*) are included in the other-dependent and the name is included in the imaginary
3. Thusness and correct direct intuition are included in the perfected nature

9. The Reality of Differentiation

1. The reality of differentiation is sevenfold
2. The imaginary and other-dependent consist in 'continuance'
3. The latter two also consist in 'arrangement' and 'wrong course'
4. The perfected consists in the 'characteristic', 'representations', 'purification' and 'correct spiritual practices'
5. Alternative explanation of the sevenfold differentiation

10. The Reality of the Skills

1. The ten false views in regard to the existence of a self among the aggregates
2. The skills are included within the basic reality in terms of: (a) the imaginary (*parikalpita*), (b) conceptual differentiation (*vikalpa*) and (c) real nature (*dharmatā*)
3. The latter three apply equally to all five aggregates
4. The aggregates in relation to the three natures
5. How the imaginary nature can be conceptually differentiated
6. The refutation of the theory that the object is generated by the name
7. Summary

(a) The Meaning of the Aggregates

1. They are considered in the sense of: (a) multiple, (b) collected and (c) disparate

(b) The Meaning of the Elements

1. They are considered in the sense of the 'seeds' of: (a) the subject, (b) the object and (c) the perception of these
2. Alternative explanation of the *ālaya-vijñāna* as support for the three groups of elements

(c) The Meaning of the Sense-fields

1. These are considered as the medium of origination for the experience of: (a) sensation and (b) the discrimination of the object
2. There is no 'agent' of experience, nor 'object' of experience
3. Explanation of the sense-field theory in the light of the *vijñapti-mātra* doctrine
4. Reply to the objection that the latter conflicts with the traditional theory
5. Reply to the objection that the *vijñapti-mātra* interpretation does not allow the appearance (*nirbhāsa*) of the object to be differentiated from consciousness

(d) The Meaning of Dependent Origination

1. Considered in the sense of an absence of imputation and negation in regard to cause, result and efficacy
2. The imputation of causality
3. The negation of causality
4. The imputation of the result
5. The negation of the result
6. The imputation of efficacy
7. The negation of efficacy
8. The absence of imputation and negation is due to the absence of these six

(e) The Meaning of the Possible and the Impossible

1. The possible and the not possible should be understood in the sense of a sevenfold dependency upon something other
2. Dependency in relation to what is not desired
3. Dependency in relation to what is desired
4. Dependency in relation to purity
5. Dependency in relation to the concurrent births of two *tathāgatas* or two *cakravartins*
6. Dependency in relation to sovereignty
7. Dependency in relation to complete attainment
8. Dependency in relation to behaviour
9. Summary

(f) The Meaning of the Faculties

1. The twenty-two faculties exercise an influence in five main areas: (a) perception, (b) duration, (c) continuity, (d) experience and (e) the two purities
2. The sense faculties are the influences in the perception of the object
3. The vital faculty is the influence in the duration of life-span
4. The female and male faculties are the influences in the continuation of the family
5. The faculties of sensation are the influences in experience
6. The faculties of faith etc. are the influences in mundane purity
7. The faculty of understanding what is not understood is the influence in supramundane purity
8. This arrangement is different for the *yogācāra*

(g) The Meaning of the Times

1. The perception and non-perception of cause and result

(h) The Meaning of the Four Truths

1. The truth of suffering is considered in the sense of sensation
2. The truth of origination is considered in the sense of the practice caused by 1
3. The truth of cessation is considered in the sense of the appeasement of 1 & 2
4. The truth of the path is considered in the sense of the counteragent

(i) The Meaning of the Three Vehicles

1. In order to go forth via the *śrāvaka* vehicle
2. In order to go forth via the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle
3. In order to go forth via the universal vehicle
4. Alternative explanation of the differentiation of the three vehicles

(j) The Meaning of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned

1. The conditioned consists in the causal-sign accompanied by both its designation and cause
2. Various alternative views on the definition of the causal-sign
3. The elements incorporated in the actual consciousness are: (a) mind, (b) apprehending and (c) conceptual differentiation
4. The unconditioned consists in: (a) tranquillity and (b) thusness - the object of tranquillity

The Summary Meaning of Reality

Chapter Four

Prologue

1. The Meditative Development of the Counteragent

Introductory

1 The counteragents are the factors that contribute to enlightenment

2. The State Therein

1. There are nine states in the meditative development of the counteragent: (a) the 'causal' state
2. (b) 'Arrival', (c) 'preparatory', (d) 'result', (e) 'with duties to be performed', (f) 'without duties to be performed', (g) 'excellence', (h) 'superior' and (i) 'unsurpassable
3. The nine states in the context of the spiritual levels and the Buddha Bodies
4. These states are differentiated as threefold in relation to the *dharmadhātu*
5. The states as the criteria for the assessment of individuals

3. The Attainment of the Result

1. The five main results are: (a) the *karma*-result, (b) strength, (c) inclination, (d) growth and (e) purification
2. Alternative description of these five results
3. Ten additional results

The Summary Meaning of the Meditative Development of the Counteragent, The State Therein and The Result

1. The summary meaning of the meditative development of the counteragent
2. The summary meaning of the states
3. The summary meaning of the results

Chapter Five

1. The Three Kinds of Supremacy

1. Since this is the final topic, it is now explained
2. There are three supremacies: (a) spiritual practice, (b) objective support and (c) full attainment
3. Supremacy consists in the universal vehicle which possesses a sevenfold universality

2. The Supremacy of Spiritual Practice

1. Spiritual practice is sixfold in relation to the perfections

(a) The Highest Spiritual Practice

1. The highest spiritual practice is twelvefold: (a) the highest degree of magnanimity
2. (b) The highest degree of duration
3. (c) The highest degree of prerogative
4. (d) The highest degree of inexhaustibility
5. Alternative explanation of 4
6. (e) The highest degree of continuity
7. (f) The highest degree of non-hardship
8. (g) The highest degree of wealth
9. (h) The highest degree of possession
10. (i) The highest degree of enterprise
11. (j) The highest degree of acquisition
12. (k) The highest degree of natural outcome
13. (l) The highest degree of accomplishment
14. Alternative explanation of 13
15. These twelve practices are contained within the perfections
16. The ten perfections and the actions pertinent to each: (a) through his generosity, the *bodhisattva* assists beings
17. (b) Through his morality, the *bodhisattva* does not injure beings
18. (c) Through his patience, he endures the injury inflicted by others
19. (d) Through vigour, he increases his virtues
20. (e) Through the meditative absorptions, he initiates beings
21. (f) Through his wisdom, he liberates beings
22. (g) Through the perfection of skill in expedients, his generosity etc. becomes inexhaustible
23. (h) Through the perfection of vows, he engages in generosity etc. at all times

24. (i) Through the perfection of strength, he engages eternally in generosity etc.
25. (j) Through the perfection of direct intuition, he experiences the enjoyment of the Dharma

(b) Spiritual Practice in Relation to Mental Attention

1. The mental attention to the Dharma through the three modes of wisdom
2. Mental attention acquires virtue through these three modes of wisdom
3. This spiritual practice is associated with the ten acts of the Dharma
4. Only in the universal vehicle do these Dharmic acts result in the immeasurable collection of merit
5. Alternative explanation of 4

(c) Spiritual Practice that Conforms with the Dharma

1. It is twofold: (a) without distraction and (b) without erroneous inversion

That Which Becomes Free from Distraction

1. There are six kinds of distraction: (a) innate distraction
2. (b) External distraction
3. (c) Internal distraction
4. (d) The distraction of signs
5. (e) The distraction of disquiet
6. (f) The distraction of mental attention

That Which Becomes Free from Erroneous Inversion

1. The absence of erroneous inversion manifests in relation to ten things; they are: (a) syllables
2. (b) The object
3. (c) Mental activity
4. (d) Non-dispersal of mind
5. (e) The individual characteristic
6. (f) The universal characteristic
7. The difference between the individual and universal characteristics
8. (g) The *dharmadhātu's* lack of purity and purity
9. (h) The adventitious nature of 8
10. (i) The absence of fear and (j) absence of arrogance
11. Alternative explanation of the lack of fear
12. Neither the *pudgala* nor the *dharmas* exist - it is all dependent origination
13. This is intended in the conventional sense, not the absolute
14. The ten absences of erroneous inversion in relation to the three natures

The Ten *Vajra* Words

1. Explanation of the ten *vajra* words which correspond respectively with the ten absences of erroneous inversion
2. The 'body' of the *vajra* words is established as fourfold:
3. (a) By way of the three natures
4. (b) By way of the objective support
5. (c) By way of the absence of conceptual differentiation
6. (d) By way of objections and their refutations
7. The second explanation of the 'body' of the *vajra* words in relation to error and non-error
8. The ten *vajra* words summarized as two *antara-ślokas*
9. Summary of the ten absences of erroneous inversion

(d) Spiritual Practice Which Avoids the Two Extremes

1. That which is taught as the Middle Way in the Ratnakuṭa
2. The extremes in regard to separateness and identity
3. The extremes of the *tīrthikas* and *śrāvakas*
4. The extremes of imputation and negation in regard to the *pudgala*
5. The extremes of imputation and negation in regard to the *dharmas*
6. The extremes in regard to adverse elements and their counteragents
7. The extremes of eternalism and annihilationism
8. The extremes in regard to the subject and object
9. The extremes in regard to defilement or purification of the *dharmadhātu*

10. The seven kinds of dual extremes consisting in conceptual differentiation: (a) in regard to existent and non-existent entities
11. (b) In regard to the object of appeasement and the act of appeasing
12. (c) In regard to the object of fear and the dread of the latter
13. (d) In regard to the subject and object
14. (e) In regard to correctness and falsity
15. (f) In regard to the performance of action and its non-performance
16. (g) In regard to non-origination and simultaneity

(e) Specific and Non-specific Spiritual Practice

1. The perfections that predominate on specific spiritual levels

3. The Supremacy of the Objective Support

1. There are twelve kinds of objective support considered to be supreme

4. The Supremacy of Full Attainment

1. There are ten kinds of full attainment; they are: (a) absence of defects in conditions
2. (b) The non-rejection of the universal vehicle
3. (c) The absence of distraction to the lesser vehicle
4. (d) The fulfilment of the perfections
5. (e) The generation of the noble path
6. (f) The development of the roots of the wholesome
7. (g) The pliability of mind
8. (h) Non-fixation in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa*
9. (i) The absence of obscuration
10. (j) The non-interruption of the Buddha level

The Explanation of the Name of the Treatise

1. It consists in the analysis of the middle in relation to the extremes...

The Summary Meaning of the Supremacy of the Vehicle

1. Supremacy is threefold
2. The highest degree of spiritual practice
3. The absence of erroneous inversion

Chapter One

The Defining Characteristics:

1. The Imagination of What is Unreal

2. Emptiness

Introductory

(Homage to the Buddha)

N17.3 **After honouring the author of this treatise, the son of the *sugata*, and the one who expounded it to us etc., I shall strive for a critical examination of its meaning.**

[Sthiramati]

(Homage to the Noble Mañjuśrī - Kumārabhūta)

Y1 [1]Since pre-eminent people, as a rule, engage in activities after paying homage to their preceptor and to their tutelary deity, in order to show that he too was a follower in the course of pre-eminent people, [Vasubandhu] wishing to compose a commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga Sūtra says: "the author of this treatise etc.", demonstrating that he has undertaken an analysis of its meaning after paying respect to both the author and the expounder. What virtue is obtained when this is done? When respect is paid to one who possesses virtue and is beneficent, merit is accumulated; when merit is accumulated, with little effort one completes one's enterprise which is unafflicted by impediments and hindrances.

Y2 Alternatively, in order to generate reverence towards the author, the expounder, the Sūtra and the commentary by stating that: (a) the author had undertaken the treatise and (b) the expounder [had undertaken] the commentary, he says all this: "the author of this treatise [etc.]". In this respect, (a) by demonstrating what is expressed by the author[2], reverence is generated towards the Sūtra for the Noble Maitreya is the author of this treatise in verse form. Since he is separated [from the attainment of Buddhahood] only by one birth, he has reached the highest perfection of all the *bodhisattvas'* higher knowledges, mystical formulae, analytical knowledge, meditative concentration, masteries[3], intellectual receptivity and emancipations. He has also dispelled the obscurations in their entirety on all the *bodhisattva* levels. (b) Through the correct presentation of the expounder, reverence is generated towards the commentary [of

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1 The first folio of the Ms.(1b) is in a particularly bad condition with just occasional words that can be read with any certainty, hence the translation of this folio is based essentially on the Tib. (D189b.2 - 190a.7).

2 Read (with St. p.13 fn.19): *praṇetroktapradarśanāt* in place of *praṇetrā vaktum upadiṣṭāt*; Tib. *mdzad pas bśad par bstan pas* (D189b.6).

3 Read (with St. p.14 fn.26): *vaśitā* in place of *indriya;* Tib. *dbaṅ* (D189b.7).

Vasubandhu], for the expounder here is the Noble Asanga[4]. The Venerable Ācārya Vasubandhu, after receiving the teaching from him, composed the commentary to it. Reverence is generated towards the commentary because the meaning of the Sūtra is unerringly stated in it because these two, since they possess the highest wisdom[5], are able to understand, retain and explain [it], without erring. In this way reverence arises towards both the Sūtra and the commentary on the part of those who rely on the authority of individual people[6]. Also, on the part of those who rely on the Dharma, reverence arises towards both the author and the expounder because after the true meaning of the Sūtra and the commentary has been understood, when a positive determination occurs, it is brought about through the understanding of the author and the expounder; but is not accomplished through just speculation and scriptural tradition[7] - thus reverence is generated towards the author and the expounder.

This now should be discussed: what is the nature of a treatise and why is it [described as] a *śāstra* ? A treatise consists in representations/conceptualizations appearing as groups of names, words, and syllables. Or rather, a treatise consists in representations appearing as specific words that cause the attainment of supramundane direct intuition. [Objection]: How can representations[8] be formulated or commented upon? [Response]: There is no fault here since the hearer's representations arise from the representations of the author and the expounder[9]. It is a treatise (*śāstra*) because it is an instruction for novices (*śiṣya-śāsana*)[10]. In order to generate excellence in moral-
Y3 ity, meditative concentration and wisdom, an instruction for novices dissuades them from the actions of body, speech and mind that do not produce the accumulations [of merit and direct intuition], and induces them [to engage] in actions that produce the accumulations. Alternatively, it is a treatise because it conforms with the characteristic of a treatise[11]. The characteristic of a treatise consists in the fact that, when the teaching is practised, one relinquishes moral defilements along with their latent impressions and is also protected from both becoming and the wretched states of existence which are

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4 Read: *vaktā hy atrāryāsangas* as per Ms.(1b.4); in place of *vaktā punar atrācārya Asangas* but Tib.(D189b.7).: *slob dpon* (*ācārya*) for *ārya*

5 Read : *uttamaprajñāvantau ..sūtrārtham abhrāntam upadiśata iti* in place of *uttamaprajñāvato ...sūtrārtho 'bhrāntam upadiṣṭa iti*; Tib.*de gñis kyan śes rab mchog dan ldan pas... 'dir mdo'i don ma nor ba bstan to* (D190a.1).

6 Read (with St. fn.32 p.15): *ye pudgalaprāmāṇikās* in place of *pudgalaṃ pramāṇīkurvanti*; Tib. *gan dag gan zag tshad mar byed pa* (D190a.2). Ms.(1b.5): *-ās teṣām*.

7 Read: *niścayaś ced utpadyate sa praṇetṛvaktrāvabodhād api prabhāvito bhavati na tu tarkāgama-mātreṇa prabhāvito bhavatīti*... in place of *jāta ca niścaye iyaṃ praṇetur vaktuś ca pratītyā prabhāvanā na tu tarkāgamamātreṇa prabhāvaneti*...; Tib. *nes pa skyes na 'di mdzad pa dan 'chad pa yan rtogs pas rab tu phye ba yin gyi / rtog ge dan lun tsam gyis rab tu phye bar ni ma zad do źes* .. (D190a.3).

8 Ms.(1b.7): *-jñaptayaḥ* ; disregard Y's fn.7 p.2.

9 Read: *śravaṇavijñaptīnām* in place of *prajñaptīnām* ; Tib. *ñan pa'i rnam par rig pa rnams* (D190a.5).

10 Ms.(1b.7): *-ṣyaśāsanāc chāstra-*.

11 Read: *atha vā śāstralakṣaṇayogāc chāstram* in place of *atha vā śāstralakśaṇasya śāsanāc chāstram*; Tib. *yan na bstan bcos kyi mtshan ñid du 'thad pa'i phyir bstan bcos te* (D190a.6). Cf. St. fn.44, p.19.

fearful on account of their manifold sufferings which are intense, continual and long-lasting.[12] Therefore, it has the characteristic of a treatise (*śāstra*) because it rules over (*śāsana*) the enemy-like moral defilements, and because it protects (*trāṇa*)[13] from becoming and the wretched states of existence. Moreover, this pair [i.e. 'ruling over' and 'protecting'] are found in all works of the universal vehicle and in their interpretations - but nowhere else - hence this [work] is a treatise [*śāstra*]. It is said:

> That which rules over the enemy-like moral defilements in their entirety; which rescues [beings] from the wretched states of existence and becoming, is a treatise, by virtue of its authority and protection. These two are non-existent in any other doctrinal view.

Of this; the term "of this" is a direct reference to the verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga *śāstra* which is a compendium of seven topics and enables the relinquishment of obscuration that consists both in moral defilement and the knowable, by way of the triple vehicle since it is firmly fixed in the [author's] heart.

The author refers to the composer. Although this verbal root [*nī*] has the sense of 'conveying', nevertheless, since it is compounded with the prefix *pra*, it is to be understood in the sense of 'effecting' [lit. 'making'][14], for it is said:

> The meaning of a verbal root is forcibly changed through the addition of a prefix, just as the sweetness of the waters of the Ganges [is changed through mixing] with the waters of the sea.[15]

[16] **The son of the *sugata***; the *sugata* refers to one who has excellently gone
Y4 (*suṣṭhugata*) to the *nirvāṇa* in which [the *bodhisattva*] is not permanently fixed which is [free] from the obscurations that consist in moral defilements, together with their latent impressions, and the obscurations that consist in the knowable. One who has relinquished the obscurations of all latent impressions, who has the understanding of all the *dharmas*, in every respect, for his essential nature, who is the basis of all might,

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12 Read: *tac ca śāstralakṣaṇaṃ yad upadeśe 'bhyasyamāne savāsanākleśaprahāṇaṃ nirantaradīrghavividhatīvraduḥkhabhītadurgatibhyo bhavāc ca trāṇaṃ bhavati* in place of *tac ca śāstralakṣaṇaṃ yad upadeśo bhāsamano 'bhyastaḥ savāsanākleśaprahāṇāyāpadyate nirantaradīrghavividhatīvraduḥkhabhītāyāś ca durgater bhavāc ca saṃtrāyate*; Tib.: *luṅ mnos pa goms par byas pas bag chags daṅ bcas pa'i ñon moṅs pa spoṅ bar 'gyur ba daṅ / bar chad med pa yun riṅ ba'i sdug bsṅal drag po sna tshogs kyis 'jigs pa'i ṅan soṅ rnams daṅ / srid pa las skyob pa gaṅ yin pa de ni bstan bcos kyi mtshan ñid* (D190a.6).

13 Read: *trāṇāc* in place of *saṃtārāc*; Tib. *skyob pas*. This reading is more appropriate in the context of this etymological explanation of the word *śāstra*.

14 Read (with T&B3.17): *karaṇe* in place of *viśeṣārthako* on the basis of the Tib. *byed par* (D190b.3).

15 This verse is also quoted in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ; cf. Y's fns. 3 & 4 p.3 for more details.

16 The Ms.(2a.3) inserts a passage here which, according to the Tib. arrangement, belongs in a subsequent portion of the text; cf. Y's fn.6 p.3.

whose body[17] possesses inconceivable power like the wishfulfilling gem[18], who is capable of performing all benefit for all sentient beings effortlessly and who has the nature of the excellence of direct intuition free from conceptual differentiation - he is the *sugata*. His nature consists in the thusness of purity[19]. Since his direct intuition which is free from conceptual differentiation is brought forth[20] from the latter, the son of the *sugata* is born from, or in, that [thusness of purity].

Alternatively, he is the son of the *sugata* insofar as he is born in the nature of the *sugata*; as has been said in another Sūtra: "he is born in the lineage of the *tathāgata* because he has obtained the essential qualities of the latter". This being the case, an entity that is to be known[21] in all its aspects appears to a *bodhisattva* established on the tenth spiritual level like a myrobalan fruit on the palm of his hand; however it is as though his eyes were covered by a fine silk veil. But for the Venerable One, the covering over the eyes is removed as it were - this is the difference. By the term "son of the *sugata*" in this context [i.e. here *sugata* means perfectly understood], the perfect understanding of reality is indicated on the part of the author of the treatise[22], and similarly perfect compassion and perfect wisdom [are indicated] through his authorship of the treatise without regard for gain and honour.

The expounder; i.e. the agent of exposition. This [term] is connected with the words "after honouring". Others believe that the term "son of the *sugata*" also refers to him. Moreover, he is the Noble Asanga, for this treatise was disclosed and elucidated to him through the [meditative concentration named] 'stream of *dharmas*'[23] due to the Noble Maitreya's miraculous power.

[24] [The word] **and** has a conjunctive sense or it is a superfluous word, i.e. it is an expletive. It also implies that he [Vasubandhu] pays respect to the other Buddhas and
Y5 *bodhisattvas*, not only to the author and the expounder. In response to the question as to whom it is expounded, he replies: **to us etc.**, which means that 'we etc.' comprise those of whom we are the first; it is to the latter that "to us etc." refers. Hereby it is shown that we ourselves have been instructed in a reliable manner[25].

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17 Tib. omits: *vigrahaḥ*; cf. D190b.6.

18 Ms.(2a.4): *cintāmaniratnavad*; the reason for Y's parenthesis is not clear.

19 This sentence is omitted from the Ms. and is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.3 p.4.

20 Read: *tatprabhāvitatvān* in place of *tajjanitatvān*; Ms.(2a.5): *-vitatvān*, Tib.: *rab tu byuṅ ba'i phyir* (D190b.7).

21 Read: *jñeyavastu* as per Ms.(2a.5) in place of *jñeyaṃ vastu*.

22 Read (with St. fn.70 p.24): *atra sugatātmaja iti śāstrapraṇetus tattvāvabodhasampan nirdiṣṭā*... in place of *atra hi sugatātmajas tasyaiva śāstrapraṇayanasyāvabodhasampat pradarśitā*; Tib.: *'dir ni bde bar gśegs pa'i bdag ñid las skyes pas / bstan bcos mdzad de kho na thugs su chud pa phun sum tshogs par bstan pa*... (D191a.2).

23 Read: *dharmasrotasā* in place of *dharmasaṃtānena*; Tib.: *chos kyi rgyun gyis* (D191a.4).

24 In the Tib. the second part of this paragraph precedes the first part, i.e. it begins from *kebhyo vaktāram*, =*su la 'chad pa źe na* (D191a.4).

24 Read: *anena vayam eva avisaṃvādena upadiṣṭā iti darśitam* in place of *anenātmano 'mṛṣāyā upadeśe bhāsamāno nirdiṣṭaḥ*; Tib.: *'di ni bdag ñid kyi mi slu ba las luṅ mnos par ston to* (D191a.4).

After honouring; i.e. after paying respect [to him] as though he were actually present and positioned nearby. After honouring, i.e. after paying respect with body, speech and mind. Having paid respect to the author of the treatise and its expounder, what should you do then? He says:

I shall strive for a critical examination of its meaning; i.e. I shall undertake the effort to critically examine its meaning and to explain its meaning or to make distinctions between things. And here the locative case[26] [in the terms *artha-vivecane* etc.] has the sense of purpose; what is meant is: for the purpose of a critical examination of its meaning.

The 'Body' of the Treatise.

N17.6 **In this regard, the 'body' of the treatise is respectively determined from the beginning.**

> **(a) the characteristic, (b) obscuration, (c) reality, (d) the meditative development of the counteragent, (e) the stage therein, (f) the attainment of the result and (g) the supremacy of the vehicle.**

For these seven subjects are expounded in this treatise, namely: (a) the characteristic, (b) obscuration, (c) reality, (d) the meditative development of the counteragent, (e) the state in regard to that meditative development of the counteragent, (f) the attainment of the result and (g) the supremacy of the vehicle which is the seventh subject.

[Sthiramati]

Y5.10 The subjects here [comprise] the 'body' **of the treatise** because of the statement: **these seven subjects are expounded in this treatise**[27]. Why has this treatise been composed? (a) In order to generate correct[28] direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation belonging to the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, (b) because direct intuition that is free from conceptual differentiation is generated on account of the

26 Tib. omits *saptamī*; cf. D191a.7.

27 Read: ...*cchāstra upadiśyanta* in place of *śāstra ~khyāyanta*; cf. Bhāṣya N17.9.

28 Ms.(2b/2): *samvanvinirvikalpa* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.5 but his emendation to *samyagnirvikalpa* is preferred; this term is omitted from the Tib. (cf. D191b.1).

teaching[29] of the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*, and (c) due to the practice of the latter [the *bodhisattva*] obtains the complete relinquishment of obscuration consisting in both the knowable and moral defilement together with their latent impressions. Furthermore, concerning the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*, this treatise is undertaken in order to present the insubstantiality of the *dharmas* as it is in reality by refuting these two incompatible views: (a) that the non-existence of all *dharmas* is [equivalent to] the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*, and (b) that the non-existence of an internally active being is [equivalent to] the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*[30].

Others believe [the treatise is undertaken] in order to remove both the lack of insight and wrong insight on the part of those who lack insight or possess wrong insight in regard to the characteristic and obscuration etc. through the generation of correct understanding.

Alternatively, [the treatise is undertaken] in order to remove the faintheartedness of the *bodhisattvas* who, in regard to the fivefold objects of knowledge consisting in the realms of[31]: (a) the world sphere, (b) sentient beings, (c) *dharmas*, (d) moral discipline and (e) expedients, may believe that these are difficult to discern individually because of their infinite differentiation; hence he says:

(a) the characteristic, (b) obscuration, (c) reality etc.

Y6 **In this regard, the 'body' of the treatise is respectively determined from the beginning**[32]. "In this regard" [means]: in regard to the critical examination of the subjects of the treatise, or else, in rega[rd to] the treatise [itself]. "From the beginning" [means]: from the very outset. The term "treatise" has already been elucidated[33]. Its 'body' is an abridgement or summary meaning; or it is the 'body' in the sense of a basis. For, just as the physical body, which has the external and internal sense-fields for its basis, is described as a 'body', similarly, the subjects upon which a treatise depends and proceeds form its 'body'; and these subjects are seven, beginning with the characteristic. By "respectively determined" is meant: 'designated', or, 'explained'[34].

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29 Read: *deśanayā* as per Ms.(2b.2) in place of *deśanatayā*; Tib.: *bstan pas* (D191b.2).

30 Read (essentially in agreement with St. fn.81 p.26): *dharmanairātmyaṃ punar sarvadharmanāstitvaṃ dharmanairātmyam antarvyāpārapuruṣanāstitvaṃ ca dharmeṣu nairātmyam ity etayor viṣamavādayor pratiṣedhena yathābhūtaṃ dharmanairātmyapratipādanārthaṃ śāstrārambhaḥ* in place of *ayaṃ punar dharmanairātmyasya virodhavādo yat sarvadharmarahitatā dharmanairātmyam / antarvyāpārapuruṣarahitatā ca dharmanairātmyam ity atas tatpratiṣedhena tathābhūtanairātmyapratipādanārthaṃ śāstrārambhaḥ*; Tib.: *chos la bdag med pa yaṅ chos thams cad med pa ñid chos la bdag med pa daṅ / naṅ na byed pa'i skyes bu med pa ñid chos rnams la bdag med pa'o źes mi mthun par smra ba de dag bkag pas / chos bdag med pa yaṅ dag pa'i ji lta ba bźin du bstan par bya ba'i phyir bstan bcos brtsam mo* (D191b.2).

31 Tib. omits *dhātu*; cf. D191b.4.

32 Read: *śāstraśarīraṃ vyavasthāpyata* in place of *śāstraśarīravyavasthāpanam*; cf. Bhāṣya N17.6; Ms.(2b.4): *tatrāditaḥ śāstraśarīraṃ vyava-*.

33 Read (with T&B6.18): *vyākhyātam* in place of *vivaraṇam*; Tib. *bśad par zad* (D191b.6).

34 Read: *vyavasthāpyata iti prajñapyate / nirdiśyata ity arthaḥ* in place of *vyavasthāpanam iti prajñaptir ucyate abhidhānam ity arthaḥ*; Tib. *rnam par gźag ces bya ba ni bcas pa ste / bśad ces bya ba'i tha tshig go* (D191b.7).

[Objection]: is it not so that this 'body' will be discerned just through an understanding of the treatise and thus its respective determination at the beginning serves no purpose? [Response]: No, it is not without purpose for the subjects are helpful for novices because a novice who has an appreciation of the subjects understands the details with ease when they are being discussed, like a horse galloping without fear on familiar ground[35], it is not for any other reason. **For these seven subjects are expounded**[36] **in this treatise**. What is meant by this statement is that the 'body' of the treatise is complete[37]. By "these" [is meant] the [subjects] beginning with the characteristic that are listed. "Seven" is their number; it is an enumeration in order to reveal the total[38]. They are subjects (*artha*) because they are sought (*arthyante*), i.e. insofar as they are understood. By "in this treatise" is meant: in [this work] titled the Madhyānta-vibhāga. By "expounded" is meant: "explained" or "ascertained"[39]. **Namely**[40]; this is the term that introduces these subjects. The **characteristic**; it is a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) insofar as [things] are characterized (*lakṣyante*) by this. And it is twofold: the characteristic of defilement and the characteristic of purification. Of these, the characteristic of defilement is ninefold, beginning with: "there is unreal imagination" (I.1a), and concluding with: "because of the seven kinds of unreal imagination" (I.11d). The characteristic of purification is explained in the remaining half [of the first chapter]. [Objection]: If it is said that it is a characteristic because [something] is characterized by it, this being the case, the characteristic would be something different from defile-
Y7 ment and purification. [Response]: This is not so because the characteristic of something is none other than its own-being. For example, the element earth has the characteristic of solidity, and the element earth is not something separate from solidity[41]. Alternatively, it is a characteristic insofar as [something] is characterized as that. For thus, defilement and purification are characteristics insofar as [something] is characterized as being of the nature of defilement or purification. Or again, the characteristic of both defilement and purification is a twofold characteristic: the individual characteristic and the universal characteristic. **Obscuration** (*āvaraṇa*) is so-called because it conceals (*āvṛṇoti*) the wholesome *dharmas*; or else, it is an obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) since the wholesome *dharmas* are concealed (*vriyante*) by it since it prevents their arising. Furthermore, these obscurations have fifty-three modes. **Reality** implies that 'this'

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35 Read: *dṛṣṭabhūminiḥśankāśvavāhanam iva* in place of *dṛṣṭā bhūmiḥ niḥśaṅkam aśvavāhanam iva*; Tib. *dkyu sa kyis bstan pa'i rta thags thogs med par rgyug pa bžin te* (D192a.1) - *dkyu sa kyis* is problematical and should possibly read: *dkyus kyis sa*; cf. St's fn.85 p.29. Ms.(2b.6): *dṛṣṭabhūminiḥśānkāśvavāha-* ; disregard Y's fn.1 p.6.

36 Read: *upadiśyanta* in place of *uddiṣṭā*; cf. Bhāṣya N17.9.

37 Ms.(2b.7): *samāptyarthaḥ*, Y's rendering is better; cf. his fn.2 p.6.

38 Tib. omits: *paryantādhigamārtham upādānam* and the sentence order does not agree with the Sanskrit.

39 Read: *upadiśyanta iti nirdiśyante nirṇayante vā* in place of *uddiṣṭā ity upadiṣṭā viniścitā vā*; Tib. *'chad ces bya ba ni bstan pa 'am gtan la 'bebs pa'o* (D192a.3).

40 Read: *yad uteti* in place of *tatheti*; cf. Bhāṣya N17.9.

41 Read: *pṛthivīdhātuḥ khakkhaṭalakṣaṇo na ca khakkhaṭatvāt* as per Ms.(3a.1) in place of *pṛthivīdhātuḥ kharalakṣaṇo na ca kharatvāt*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.7.

here is none other than 'that'; the state (*bhāva* = *-tva*) of 'that' (*tat*) is 'reality' (*tattva*); what is meant is: it is free from erroneous inversion and it has ten modes. **The counteragent** is the side that has the relinquishment of the adverse elements for its aim - it is the path; the practice of that is **meditative development**. The **state** refers to the particular [states] of that [path] which arise in a continuous sequence. This has nineteen modes beginning with the state of the spiritual lineage. **The attainment of the result**[42]; i.e. obtaining the 'fruit'; this has fifteen modes beginning with the *karma*-result. **The supremacy of the vehicle**; it is a vehicle since one travels by it, and since it is a vehicle and is also supreme, it is described as the supremacy of the vehicle. Furthermore, it is threefold beginning with the supremacy of spiritual practice. He states that this is **the seventh subject** so as to delimit [the exact number of subjects] and also to [show] their sequential order. Just this many subjects are explained, i.e. there are none other than these.

Now, this sequence is for conformity with supramundane direct intuition; for thus the *bodhisattva* stationed at the spiritual level[43] of one who courses in firm conviction and is established in morality, should firstly become skilled in defilement and purification. Then, that particular obscuration to each wholesome *dharma* should be known because liberation is not possible without relinquishing it; and one is unable to relinquish what has not been discerned[44] since the fault is not seen. Then, that objective support through which the mind is liberated from a particular obscuration should be understood as reality[45]. After that, the application which destroys that obscuration on account of that particular objective support is to be known as the meditative develop-
Y8 ment of the counteragent. Then, owing to the diminution of the adverse elements and the increase in the counteragent, the state in regard to that meditative development of the counteragent should be known as the state of the spiritual lineage etc. Following from that there is the actual presence of the supramundane *dharmas*, i.e. the results which should be known as the result of winning the stream etc. And this whole [sequential progression] is common to the *bodhisattvas* and the *śrāvakas* together with their novices[46] as has been stated in a Sūtra: "this recluse is trained in the instructions, conduct, associations and modes of address of the *śrāvaka*, is trained in the instructions, conduct, associations and modes of address of the *pratyekabuddha*, is trained in the instructions, conduct, associations and modes of address of the *bodhisattva*." However, since the supremacy of the *bodhisattva* is not common [to the others], supremacy is the seventh subject.

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42 Ms.(3a.3): *phalaprāptes* but Y's rendering of *phalaprāptiḥ* is better; cf. his fn.4 p.7.

43 Tib. omits *bhūmi*; cf. D192b.5.

44 Read *avijñātam* as per Ms.(3a.5) in place of *avijñānaṃ*..

45 Read (with O. p.1027): *tat tattvam ity avagantavyam* in place of *tat tattvaṃ veditavyaṃ*; Tib. *de ni de kho na yin par khoṅ du chud par bya'o* (D192b.7).

46 Read (with O. p.1027): *saśiṣyaśrāvakādīnām* in place of *sottarācchrāvakādibhiḥ*; Tib. *bla ma daṅ bcas pas* (D193a.2).

However, another [school] says that the characteristic [is explained] at the beginning in order to generate skill in regard to the characteristic of defilement and purification. Of these, defilement is [equivalent to] obscuration, and purification is [equivalent to] a reality; and since the relinquishment of obscuration is due to the understanding of reality, hence the [subjects of] obscuration and reality [follow in successive order]. After that comes the counteragent together with its associated elements, i.e. the path, in order to demonstrate the expedients for the relinquishment of that [obscuration]. The state therein [is then explained] in order to demonstrate the weak, middling and higher differentiations[47] in relation to the beginning, middle and end of the path. And since the state brings a corresponding result[48], the result [is explained] immediately after that. All these are common to the *bodhisattva* and the *śrāvaka* etc., thus the supremacy of the vehicle [is then explained] in order to proclaim that the universal vehicle is not common [to the *śrāvaka* etc.].

Others again say that the characteristic is stated at the beginning in order to show the characteristics of existence and non-existence. When the characteristic is known, obscuration should be relinquished and reality should be realized, thus, immediately after that, obscuration and reality [are explained]. The meditative development of the counteragent [is explained next] since this is the expedient for both the relinquishment and realization [respectively] of the latter two and the special states are [equivalent to] the successive degrees of that [meditative development]. And the result is the relinquishment caused by the latter. In order to demonstrate that immediately after that [comes] the supremacy of the vehicle, this sequence [has been explained].

Y9 Others now believe[49] that the explanation of the characteristic is for the purpose of relinquishing negation and imputation for one who is confused about the existence or non-existence of the *dharmas*. Obscuration is for the purpose of [developing] skill in regard to obscuration for one whose confusion has been relinquished. Since reality is obscured by the latter, reality comes immediately after that for the purpose of [developing] skill in regard to reality. Since there is the relinquishment of obscuration through meditative development which penetrates reality[50], the meditative development of the counteragent [is explained] immediately after reality. In order to develop skill in the classification of these [counteragents] the state [is then explained]. And since the result is constituted by the state, immediately after the state comes the result in order to generate skill in that. The supremacy of the vehicle is explained at the end because this whole [sequential progression takes place] owing to the universal vehicle.

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47 Ms.(3b.1) line begins: *-bhedapradarśanārtham...*; these words are not reconstructed as Y's text suggests; cf. T&B8.20-22 which accords with Ms.

48 Read *avasthā cānurūpam* as per Ms.(3b.1) in place of *avasthānurūpam*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.8.

49 Read *aparo 'pi manyate* in place of *anyac ca sattvasya*; Tib. *gźan yaṅ sems pa* (D193b.1).

50 Read *prativedha* as per Ms.(3b.3), in place of *pratividdha*.

The Defining Characteristics

1. The Imagination of What is Unreal.

a. The Characteristic of Existence and Non-Existence.

N17.15 Therein, concerning the characteristic, he says:

I.1 abcd — There is the imagination of what is unreal; the duality is not found therein; but here emptiness is found and the former is found in the latter.

N18 In this [verse], the imagination of what is unreal refers to the conceptual differentiation of the apprehended object and the apprehending subject. The duality refers to the apprehended object and the apprehending subject. Emptiness is the absence of apprehended object and apprehending subject on the part of that unreal imagination. When he says: "and the former is found in the latter", ["the former" refers to] the imagination of what is unreal. Thus, the characteristic of emptiness which is not erroneously inverted is shown by this quotation[51]: "One perceives [phenomena] as they are in reality by realizing that where something is non-existent, it is empty of that, and furthermore one correctly comprehends [phenomena] as they are in reality by realizing that what is left as a remainder in this respect does really exist here".

I.2 abcd — Therefore all is established as neither empty nor not empty, because of existence, non-existence and again existence; and this is the middle way.

[All] is neither empty of emptiness and unreal imagination, nor not empty of the duality of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. "All" refers to both the conditioned [phenomena] which are called 'the imagination of what is unreal', and the unconditioned [phenomena] which are called 'emptiness'. The term "is established" [means] "is explained". Because of the existence of: unreal imagin-

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51 G. Nagao has shown that this passage probably comes from the *Sūḷasuññata sutta* (*Majjhima-nikāya sutta* no. 121); cf. his "'What Remains' in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness" in Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation....

ation; because of the non-existence of: the duality; and because of the existence of emptiness in the imagination of what is unreal and [the existence of] the imagination of the unreal in the former. Moreover, this is the middle way. All [phenomena] are neither absolutely empty nor are they absolutely not empty. Thus, this passage in the Prajñāpāramitās etc.: "all this is neither empty nor not empty", is in agreement.

[Sthiramati]

[1]

Y10 Therein, concerning the characteristic, he says:

I.1 abcd — There is the imagination of what is unreal; the duality is not found therein; but here emptiness is found, and the former is found in the latter.

Therein [means] with reference to, or with regard to the characteristic, among the seven subjects mentioned above, such as the characteristic and obscuration, he says: "[there is] the imagination of what is unreal"[52]. Considering that the explanation complies with the way [the subjects] are listed and the characteristic was listed firstly, hence, the explanation of just that [subject] is undertaken initially rather than the other [subjects].

[2] Some believe[53] that all *dharmas* are devoid of own-being in every respect, like horns on a hare, hence, in order to refute their total negation he says: "there is the imagination of what is unreal"; the ellipsis here is: "by way of own-being". [Objection]: Is it not so that such a statement is at variance with the Sūtras because it is said in a Sūtra: "all *dharmas* are empty"? [Response]: There is no contradiction because: "therein the duality is not found". For the imagination of what is unreal is described as empty, i.e. as devoid of the essential nature of the apprehended object and apprehending subject, but not as devoid of own-being in every respect; consequently, it is not at variance with the Sūtras. [Objection]: If the duality is thus non-existent in every respect, like horns on a hare, and unreal imagination does exist by way of own-being in an absolute sense, then emptiness would be non-existent. [Response]: This is
Y11 not so because: "but here emptiness is found". For, since this is the very emptiness which consists in the absence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject in the imagination of what is unreal, emptiness is not non-existent. If emptiness is free

52 Ms.(3b.5): *abhūtaparikalpa ityādi*, contrary to Y's rendering of *abhūtaparikalpo 'sti ityādi* which agrees with the Tib. (cf. D193b.5)

53 Read: *kecin manyante* in place of *ke cid virundhanti*; Tib. *la la dag... sñam du sems pa* (D193b.6).

from the duality and exists in unreal imagination, why is it that we are not [already] liberated; and if it were something existing, why is it not apprehended?[54] - In order to remove such a doubt, he says: "and the former is found in the latter"; because the imagination of what is unreal is found in emptiness too, therefore one is not [already] liberated. And this is why [emptiness] cannot be perceived, like the clear water element [cannot be perceived], because it is accompanied by stain.

[3] Alternatively, in order to refute that [false] view of those who believe that mind, the mental concomitants and also form exist substantially[55], he says: "there is the imagination of what is unreal". The latter certainly exists substantially but form does not exist separately from it; [form] does not exist substantially. What is the reason? Because: "the duality is not found therein"; for, the imagination of the unreal is not the apprehending of something nor is it apprehended by anyone. What is it then? It is just a 'bare' existent devoid of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. For thus, form and the like are not apprehended externally to consciousness; consciousness arises in the appearance of form etc., like in dreams etc., and if it has a cause, its arising in the absence of one is not tenable. Therefore it is devoid of an objective support, just as in dreams and the like; elsewhere too it is to be concluded that consciousness is produced in the appearance of the object due to the maturation of an individual 'seed'. The existence of the apprehending subject is not tenable if the apprehended object does not exist because, if the apprehended object does not exist, the apprehending subject [too] does not exist[56]. Therefore, form does not exist separately from unreal imagination. [Objection]: If the apprehended object does not exist, there can be no liberation because
Y12 of the absence of an objective support of purity. [Response]: This is not so because: "but here emptiness is found"; the word "but" has the sense of "because". For, emptiness is the objective support of purity[57] and since it exists as an absence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject in the imagination of what is unreal, liberation is not non-existent. [Objection]: If it exists and is present in unreal imagination, what is the reason that it is not apprehended? [Response]: It is not apprehended because it is obscured by unreal imagination, like the stainlessness[58] of space [is not apprehended] - but not because it does not exist. In order to illustrate this point he says: "and the former is found in the latter".

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54 Ms.(3b.8): *gṛhṇata* but *gṛhyata* is preferred as suggested by N. Amend. p.19.

55 Read *atha vā cittaṃ caitasikaṃ ca rūpaṃ ca dravyato 'stīti* in place of *atha vā cittacaittebhyo 'nyatra rūpādayo dravyatvena santīti*; Tib. *yaṅ na sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba rnams daṅ / gzugs daṅ rdzas ñid du yod par...* (D194a.4). St. (p.43 fn.11) is probably correct when he suggests that a better rendering of this statement would be: "form exists substantially like mind and the mental concomitants", in agreement with T-Bhāṣya (L16.9).

56 Read (with St. p.44 fn.15): *grāhyābhāve grāhakasyābhāvād asati grāhye grāhakabhāvo na yujyate* in place of *grāhyābhāve grāhakasyābhāvād grāhye 'sati grāhako 'stuṃ na yujyate*; Tib. *gzuṅ ba med na 'dzin pa med par 'gyur bas gzuṅ ba med na 'dzin pa yod par mi ruṅ ste* (D194b.1).

57 Read: *viśuddhyālambanam* as per Ms.(4a.3) in place of *-ālambanā*.

58 Read: *ākāśanairmalyavat* as per Ms.(4a.4) in place of *-nairmālyavat*.

[4] Alternatively, in order to refute all negation, he says: "there is the imagination of what is unreal"; considering that it is not entirely non-existent, nor does it have the nature of an existent since it exists in the nature of the transformation of consciousness. However, there are those who believe that form etc. exists, by way of own-being, in exactly that way in which they manifest, i.e. as separate from unreal imagination. With regard to such [people] and in order to refute imputation in regard to what is unreal[59], he says: "the duality is not found therein". The intended meaning is that there is just 'bare' unreal imagination. The non-existence of the duality[60] is apprehended by some as of the nature of annihilation[61], like [the absolute non-existence of] the son of an infertile woman. The absence of an internally active being is said to be [equivalent to] the emptiness of the *dharmas* by others. Hence, in order to refute the negation of emptiness, and in order to reveal insubstantiality in reality, he says: "but here emptiness is found". [Objection]: If emptiness exists in the imagination of what is unreal, then all living beings would be liberated effortlessly. [Response]: This is not so because: "and the former is found in the latter"; since there is no liberation in an emptiness that has not been purified and [emptiness] that has been defiled[62] is purified by a mighty effort, thus there is no liberation without effort.

[5] Alternatively, there is no characteristic other than that mentioned in regard to defilement and purification, hence in order to explain the characteristic of defilement
Y13 and purification, he says: "there is the imagination of what is unreal". Defilement has the imagination of what is unreal for its own-being because it is characterized by error. How should the fact that it is characterized by error be understood? Because: "the duality is not found therein". It is known to have an essential nature that consists in error because it manifests in the aspect of the apprehended object and apprehending subject which do not exist in its own nature. Now in order to examine[63] the nature of purification, he says: "but here emptiness is found"; for the own-being of emptiness is purification because its own-being consists in the non-existence of the duality. And in this context, the inclusion of both the path and cessation should be understood because they are constituted by emptiness. In order to demonstrate that the side of purification is to be sought from the side of defilement and the individual continuum does not exist separately[64], he says: "here". The question arises: if the duality does not exist, how can

59 Ms.(4a.5): *abhūtasamāropa u-* contrary to Y's fn.1 p.12 but his reading of *abhūtasamāropapratiṣedhārtham* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.

60 Read: *kaiś cid dvayābhāvo* in place of *dvayam abhāvo;* Tib. *kha cig gñis po med pa* (D194b.6).

61 Read: *vandhyāputravad ucchedarūpo* as per Ms.(4a.6) in place of *-putravac chedarūpo.*

62 Read: *saṃkliṣṭā ca* as per Ms.(4a.7) in place of *saṃkliṣṭaś ca.*

63 Read *parīkṣārtham* which agrees with Y's original reading in place of *pradarśanārtham* since D has *brtag pa'i phyir*; cf. Y's errata p.128.

64 Read perhaps: *na punaḥ pṛthak svasaṃtāna asyāstīti* in place of *na punaḥ pṛthaktvam asyāstīti* on the basis of the Tib.: *raṅ gyi rgyud gud na med par* (D195a.5); cf. St's fn.33 p.48. Ms.(4b.2) perhaps: *na punaḥ pṛthak sattvam asyāstīti*, but is not clear.

the world be in error if that [emptiness] exists? Hence he says: "and the former is found in the latter".

[6] There is the **conceptual differentiation**[65] **of the apprehended object and apprehending subject**, just like the aspects etc. of elephants [which are imagined] in a magical creation that is empty of the aspects of elephants etc.[66] **It is the imagination of what is unreal** (*abhūtaparikalpa*) since the duality which is unreal (*abhūta*) is imagined (*parikalpyate*) in it, or by it. By the word "unreal" he demonstrates that this [phenomenal world] does not exist in the way in which it is imagined, i.e. as the [dichotomy of] apprehended object and apprehending subject. By the word "imagination" he demonstrates that the way in which an object is imagined [*qua* existent object], it does not exist as such. Thus the characteristic of this [unreal imagination] is revealed as being quite devoid of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. What then is it? The mind and the mental concomitants of the past, present and the future, which consist in cause and result, which pertain to the three realms of existence, which exist from time immemorial, which end in *nirvāṇa* and which are in conformity with *saṃsāra*, are, without exception, unreal imagination; but especially it Y14 refers to the conceptual differentiation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. Therein the conceptual differentiation of the apprehended object refers to consciousness with its appearances as objects and sentient beings. The conceptual differentiation of the apprehending subject refers to the appearances as the self and mental representations.

[7] **The duality refers to the apprehended object and apprehending subject**; of these, the apprehended object refers to form etc.; the apprehending subject, to eye consciousness etc. For, emptiness is **the absence**[67], or devoidedness, **of the apprehended object and apprehending subject** on the part of the imagination of what is unreal, however the imagination of what is unreal itself is not non-existent; just as a rope is empty of the own-being of a snake[68] because never at any time does it possess such an own-being, but it is not that a rope[69] is empty of own-being. It is the same in this respect [i.e. unreal imagination is not empty of own-being]. When he says: **"the former is found in the latter", ["the former" refers to] the imagination of what is unreal**; for thus it has been described as not apprehended because it is defiled by adventitious obscuration, like the [clarity of the] water-element etc. **Thus... "one perceives [phenomena]... by realizing that where**

65 Ms.(4b.3): *vikalpo* contrary to Y's fn.1 p.13.

66 Tib. is slightly different: "just like a magical creation appears as an elephant etc. but is empty of elephants etc." (cf. D195a.6).

67 Read: *virahitatā* in place of *rahitatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N18.3.

68 Ms.(4b.6): *sarpasvabhāvena* although, as N. Amend. (p.19) notes, Y's Ms. reads *sarpatvabhāvena* which agrees with T&B (cf. fn.128 p.12); Tib. *sbrul gyi dṅos pos* (D195b.4).

69 Ms.(4b.6): *rajjuḥ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.14.

something[70] **is non-existent, it is empty of that.** What does not exist in what? The duality [does not exist] in the imagination of the unreal; consequently, one sees that the imagination of the unreal is empty of the duality; **...and furthermore what is left as a remainder in this respect does really exist here...".** Just what is left as a remainder here? The imagination of the unreal and emptiness - since both of these exist herein, seeing without superimposition and negation, **one correctly comprehends [phenomena] as they are in reality.** It is free from superimposition in this regard because one sees the absence of the duality in the imagination of the unreal; and it is free from negation because one sees the existence of both the imagination of the unreal and emptiness. **The characteristic of emptiness, which is not erroneously inverted, is shown...**; because of the actual existence of that which is empty and because of the non-existence therein of that which it is empty of. If on the one hand all [*dharmas*] exist or on the other, all were non-existent, the characteristic of emptiness would not be non-erroneously inverted because this would lead to the non-existence of emptiness itself. If that which is called 'empty' were non-existent, emptiness would not be tenable, because real nature (*dharmatā*) is dependent upon something existent, like the impermanence [of what is impermanent] etc. If the duality did exist, emptiness would not exist. [Objection]: If [the non-existence of] the duality is just like the [absolute non-existence of the] horns of a hare[71], how is the emptiness of that [duality] on the part of the imagination of the unreal possible, for that the one is empty of the other has [already] been seen? For example, a hermitage can be [empty] of monks[72]. [Response]: This is not so[73]; just as a rope[74] or a magical creation, although non-existent in themselves, appear in the aspect of a snake or as men etc. and are described as empty of the snake and men etc. in order to check the grasping
Y15 of any [entity] there. Similarly, the imagination of the unreal too, which manifests in the aspect of the apprehended object and apprehending subject which are non-existent in themselves, is described as empty[75] of the duality in order to induce naive people to abandon their attachment to such a notion[76].

[8]

I.2 a **[Therefore all is established] as neither empty nor not empty.**

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70 Read: *yad yatra* in place of *yasmin yan;* cf. Bhāṣya N18.4.
71 Read: *śaśaviṣāṇakalpam eva* as per Ms.(5a.2), in place of *-kalpena.*
72 Read: *vihārasya* as per Ms.(5a.2), in place of *vihāram syān.*
73 Tib. omits *naitad evam*; cf. D196a.3-4.
74 Ms.(5a.2): *rajjur*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.14.
75 Read: *śūnya iti* as per Ms.(5a.3), in place of *śūnyam iti.*
76 Read: *tadgraha* as per Ms.(5a.3), in place of *tadgrāha.*

For what reason was this verse composed? In order to show that all conditioned and unconditioned [*dharmas*] are devoid of the duality[77]. For thus[78], by rejecting absoluteness the intended meaning of the quotation from the Prajñāpāramitās is made evident[79]: "**All this is neither empty nor not empty**". For otherwise[80] there would be an inconsistency between the former and the latter. Furthermore, [this verse was composed] in order to demonstrate the middle way; otherwise it would lead to the extremes of that which is absolutely empty on the one hand; and that which is not empty on the other[81]. Alternatively, it was composed to sum up the refutation of both negation and imputation. The imagination of what is unreal is conditioned because it possess a nature[82] that is bound to causes and conditions; however, emptiness is unconditioned because it does not depend on these. "**Is established**" [means] is quoted in the Prajñāpāramitās and other works. **Because of existence**, i.e. **of the imagination of what is unreal** - that which is conditioned is not empty since it has the nature of the imagination of the unreal. **Because of non-existence**, i.e. **of the duality** - it is empty of the nature of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. **And because of existence**, i.e. **of emptiness in the imagination of what is unreal**[83], considering that that [emptiness] is the real nature of the latter; the imagination of the unreal is found in emptiness too in the nature of the possessor of that *dharma*. Similarly, even what is unconditioned is not empty of the nature of real nature but is described as a non-existent insofar as it is empty of a nature that consists in the duality[84].

[9] **And this is the middle way**, i.e. that which is taught in the Ratnakūṭa and other works[85]:

> "To say it exists, O Kāśyapa, this[86] is one extreme and to say it does not exist is a second extreme; that which lies between these two extremes is described as the middle way, O Kāśyapa, since it consists in the investigation of the reality of the *dharmas*."[87]

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77 Read: *dvayarahitatvajñāpanārtham* in place of *vigatadvayatvaṃ jñāpanārtham*; Tib. *gñis daṅ bral ba ñid du śes par bya ba'i phyir ro.* (D196a.6).

78 Read: *evam hy* omitting *ca* as per Ms.(5a.4).

79 Read: *abhiprayatāviṣkṛtā* as per Ms.(5a.4) in place of *abhiprayatā niṣkṛtā*.

80 Read: *anyathā hi* as per Ms.(5a.4) in place of *anyathā*.

81 Read: *anyathā ekāntena śūnyasyaiva aśūnyasya vā antas syāt* in place of *anyathaikāntika-śūnyataivāśūnyānto vā syāt*; Tib. *gźan du na ni gcig tu stoṅ pa kho na 'am / mi stoṅ pa'i mthar 'gyur ro* (D196a.7).

82 Read: *ātmalābhatvād* as per Ms.(5a.5) in place of *ātmalābhād*.

83 Read (with St. fn.54 p.58): *śūnyatāyās tu sattvāc ceti abhūtaparikalpe* in place of *śūnyatāyās tu sarvam abhūtaparikalpe*; cf. Bhāṣya: *sattvāc ca śūnyatāyā abhūtaparikalpe* (N18.13-14).

84 Read: *abhāva iti dvayarūpeṇa śūnyam* in place of *abhāvasaṃjñakena dvayena svarūpa-śūnyam*; Tib. *dṅos po med ces bya ba gñis kyi ṅo bos stoṅ pa'o* (D196b.3).

85 Read: *Ratnakūṭādimadhye yat paṭhyate 'sūtr*; omitting *yat paṭhyate* from line 24 as suggested by N. Amend. p.20.

86 Ms.(5a/7): *kāśyapāyam*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.15.

87 From KP #60.

Y16 This middle way is thus in agreement[88] [with the latter]. All refers to the conditioned and unconditioned [*dharmas*]; they are neither absolutely empty, because of the actual existence of both the imagination of what is unreal and the emptiness of that, nor are they absolutely not empty, because of the non-existence of the duality. If all [*dharmas*] were to exist, or all were non-existent[89], these would indeed be extremes and not the middle way

b. The Individual Characteristic.

N18.19 Thus, having stated both the characteristic of existence and the characteristic of non-existence on the part of the imagination of the unreal, he states the individual characteristic:

I.3 abcd

Consciousness comes into being in
the appearances as objects, sentient
beings, the self and representations,
although its object does not exist.
Due to the non-existence of the
latter, the former too does not exist.

The appearance as object therein refers to that which appears as an entity of form etc. The appearance as sentient being refers to that which [appears] as the five sense-faculties within one's own and others' mental continuum. The appearance as self refers to the defiled mind because this is associated with delusion about the self etc. The appearance as representations refers to the six consciousnesses. "Although its object does not exist" - because the appearances as objects and sentient
N19 beings is without aspect, and because the appearances as self and representations are false appearances. "Due to the non-existence of the latter, the former too does not exist" - because of the non-existence of the latter, i.e. the fourfold object to be apprehended, namely, form etc., the five sense faculties, mind and the six consciousnesses, the former too does not exist, i.e. the apprehending consciousness.

I.4 abc

Consequently, it has been proven
that the imagination of what is unreal
pertains to this [consciousness];

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88 Read: *anulomito bhavati* in place of *anulomakṛtā*; cf. Bhāṣya N.18.16.

89 Read: *sarvanāstitve sarvāstitve* as per Ms.(5a.8) in place of *sarvanāstitvaṃ sarvāstitvaṃ*.

because it does not exist as such, nor
is it non-existent in every respect.

Because it does not exist in that way in which it arises as an appearance, nor is it non-existent in every respect because of the production of 'bare' error. What is the reason then that its definite non-existence is not accepted? Because...

I.4 d

Liberation is considered as being due
to its extinction.

Otherwise there would be the fault of the negation of defilement and purification since neither bondage nor liberation could be established.

[Sthiramati]

Y16.5 [1] Thus, having stated both the characteristic of existence and the characteristic of non-existence on the part of the imagination of what is unreal...; the characteristic of its existence is existence itself since this is characterized by existence; what is meant is: he demonstrates the existence of the imagination of what is unreal by this statement: "there is the imagination of what is unreal". Similarly, the characteristic of its non-existence is non-existence itself since this is characterized by non-existence. Furthermore, this refers to that which does not exist as the apprehended object and apprehending subject; because the duality does not exist in unreal imagination therefore it is said that unreal imagination too does not exist in the nature of the duality. Now he states the individual characteristic. What is the difference between the characteristic of existence and the individual characteristic? The characteristic of existence is a universal, but the individual characteristic is a particular. What would be the consequence if the individual characteristic were not stated here? The 'body' of the imagination of what is unreal would not be mentioned, hence, in order to clearly illustrate its 'body' it is said:

[2]

I.3 abcd

Consciousness comes into being in
the appearances as objects, sentient
beings, the self and representations,
although its object does not exist.
Due to the non-existence of the
latter, the former too does not exist.

Alternatively, it is not known how the sense faculties, sense-objects and consciousness are established in relation to that 'bare' imagination of the unreal referred to above as the existence of just the 'bare' imagination of the unreal devoid of the apprehended object

and apprehending subject[90]; thus in order to show[91] that they are established in relation to that according to their differentiation as the appearances of the imagination of the
Y17 unreal, he states the individual characteristic of the imagination of the unreal: "in the appearances as objects, sentient beings, the self and representations" etc.

[3] Alternatively, by the [words] "there is the imagination of what is unreal", its 'bare' existence is made known[92] but not its own-being; and if the duality is non-existent, the reason for the notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject is not discerned. Also it has not been discussed as to why it is recognized that the duality does not exist, hence in order to clearly illustrate this, he says: "in the appearances as objects, sentient beings, the self and representations". In this regard, the imagination of the unreal is the own-being of consciousness, and consciousness together with its associated elements is intended here[93], but it is chiefly consciousness itself that is referred to. The ground for that notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject is the appearances as objects and sentient beings etc.[94]. "Although its object does not exist. Due to the non-existence of the latter, the former too does not exist"- this is the reason why the duality is non-existent. The appearances as objects and sentient beings therein refers to the store-consciousness together with its associates; and the latter is definitely undefined because it is the *karma*-result. The appearance as the self refers to defiled mind together with its associated elements; and that is described as obscured and undefined because it is associated with moral defilement. The appearances as mental representations refers to the group of the six beginning with eye-consciousness together with their associates; these are wholesome, unwholesome and undefined. In this way, these eight consciousnesses, together with their associated elements, come forth in the appearances as objects, sentient beings, self and representations in the five respective states of existence, from the store-consciousness which depends upon co-operating conditions and which incorporates the [noble] truth of the arising [of suffering]. There is a certain 'special transformation' of the latent impressions of the wholesome, unwholesome and undefined *dharmas* in the store-consciousness and through the influence of that, consciousness comes into being

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90 Read: *atha vā grāhyagrāhakarahitābhūtaparikalpamātrasyaivāstitvam ity uddiṣṭe tasminn abhūtaparikalpamātra indriyaviṣayavijñānānāṃ yathā vyavasthā na jñāyata iti* in place of *atha vā grāhyagrāhakarahitābhūtaparikalpamātratety uddiṣṭam / tasyām abhūtaparikalpamātra–tāyām indriysviṣayavijñānaṃ yathā vyavasthitaṃ na jñāyata iti*; Tib. *yaṅ na gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa med pa'i yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa tsam ñid yod* do / źes bstan pa yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa tsam de la / dbaṅ po daṅ yul daṅ / rnam par śes pa ji ltar rnam par gźag pa mi śes pas* (D197a.3). * P omits *yod.*

91 Read: *tadvyavastheti jñāpanārtham* as per Ms.(5b.3) in place of *tadvyavasthitijñāpanārtham.*

92 Read: *jñāpyate* in place of *jñāyate*; Tib. *śes par byed kyi* (D197a.5).

93 Read: *tac ca vijñānaṃ sasaṃprayogam atra abhipretam* as suggested by N. Amend. p.20 in place of *tac ca vijñānam atra sasaṃprayogam abhipretam*; Tib. *rnam par śes pa de yaṅ 'dir mtshuṅs par ldan pa daṅ bcas par dgoṅs te* (D197a.6).

94 Read: *arthasattvādipratibhāsaṃ tasyaiva grāhyagrāhakābhiniveśasya nibandhanaḥ* in place of *sa eva grāhyagrāhakābhiniveśo 'rthasattvādipratibhāsanibandhanaḥ*; Tib. *gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa la mṅon par źen pa de ñid kyi rgyu ni don daṅ sems can la sogs par snaṅ ba* (D197a.7).

in mutually differentiated appearances. [Objection]: How does consciousness arise in the appearance of those [entities] if the objects etc. do not exist, for when there is no person [present] a post[95] does not appear as a person? [Response]: This is not a fault for naive people are notionally attached to consciousness in the appearance of objects etc. as objects that exist separately from consciousness, like the 'hair-nets' seen by a
Y18 person with impaired eyesight. Therefore, in order to induce them to abandon their attachment to those [objects etc.] it is said: "this is just consciousness that arises in the appearances of objects etc. although devoid of objects and sentient beings etc., just as there is the appearance of 'hair-nets' etc. for those people who have ophthalmia". Thus it is said that the other-dependent [nature] with its entities of the eight consciousnesses comprises the imagination of what is unreal.

[4] ...**As an entity of form etc.** [Consciousness] appears in the nature of form, sound, odour, taste, contact and non-sensibles because it arises in such an aspect. **The appearance as sentient beings refers to that which [appears] as the five sense faculties within one's own and others' mental continuum**[96]; the term: "appears" is understood[97]. With regard to the five sense faculties, there is the appellation *sattva* because it is the locus of excessive attachment (*sakti*); it is sentient being (*sattva*) since it is attached (*sajjate*) by, or to, these [sense faculties]. Because it arises in such an aspect, consciousness possesses that particular appearance. **The appearance as self refers to defiled mind because that is associated with delusion about self etc.**[98]; because defiled mind is always[99] associated with delusion about self, the false view of self, the craving for self[100] and self conceit. Since these [four] have the self for their objective support it is proper[101] that the appearance as the self pertains to defiled mind. **The appearance as representations refer to the six consciousnesses.** The appearance as representations [occurs] on account of the arising of the aspects of those [consciousnesses] through manifesting in the nature of apprehenders of sense-objects.

[5] **"Although its object does not exist"**, i.e. [the object which arises] in these four aspects, **because the appearances as objects and sentient beings are without aspect, and because the appearances as self and representations are false appearances.** Since the appearances as objects and sentient beings manifest in the nature of the apprehended object, the reason for the non-existence of the

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95 Read: *sthāṇuḥ* as per Ms.(5b.7) in place of *sthāṇaḥ*.

96 Ms.(6a.1): *santāyoḥ* is amended to *santānayoḥ* in the margin; disregard Y's fn.1 p.18.

97 Read: *pratibhāsata iti adhikṛtam* as per Ms.(6a.1) in place of *pratibhāsa iti*

98 Read: *ātmapratibhāsaṃ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ /. ātmamohādisaṃprayogād iti* in place of *ātmapratibhāsam ātmamohādisaṃprayuktatvāt kliṣṭaṃ mana iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N18.25.

99 Ms.(6a.2): *ca nityaṃ*; disregard Y's fn 2 p.18.

100 Ms.(6a.2): *ātmatṛṣṇayā* although the Tib. *bdag la chags pa* would suggest *ātmasneha* as is the term employed when these four items are listed in the T-Bhāṣya, (cf. L23.11-17).

101 Ms.(6a.2): *cātmālambanatvād yuktam*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.18.

object is precisely that it is without aspect, because of the impossibility of its being a false appearance. However, because the other two [i.e. self and representations] manifest in the nature of the apprehending subject, they are not without aspect and the reason given for the non-existence of the object [in these cases] is precisely that they consist in false appearances. For the aspect is the mode of the 'taking hold' of the objective support in the nature of something impermanent etc. and this does not exist in the [former] two [i.e. objects and sentient beings] because they manifest in the nature of the apprehended object. Hence, "because it is without aspect" means: because there is no apprehender. Alternatively, the aspect consists in the correct knowledge of the objective support and since this is non-existent on the part of the latter [i.e. objects and sentient beings], they are without aspect because of the non-existence of the objective support[102].

[6] [Objection]: If both [objects and sentient beings] are without aspect and have natures that are mutually differentiated, i.e. just as there is form etc. on the one hand
Y19 and sight etc. on the other - this being so, what is this exceptional essence belonging to consciousness rather than form etc. and sight etc. which are well known both generally and exegetically, whence, after rejecting them, consciousness is perceived to have a nature that is not differentiated from them? [Response]: Because it is impossible that the object [exists] separately from that [consciousness]. This is respectively determined as follows: consciousness in the appearances of different objects etc. is brought forth from an individual 'seed' each one appropriated[103] by each particular determination of the mental continuum, although the essential nature of the different objects does not exist. Thus for example, the *pretas* see [a river] filled with pus, excrement and urine etc. guarded on both sides of the river by men with sticks in their hands[104]; however, humans and the like perceive it as filled with pure, clear water and as quite inoffensive[105]. Also, the ascetics, who practice mental attention in regard to impure things etc., see the ground completely covered by skeletons; and likewise, in regard to [all the topics of contemplation] such as [the element] 'earth', they see everything pervaded by earth etc. Moreover, the generation[106] of a consciousness which possesses a nature that depends upon an object is not tenable without that object, nor [is the generation of a consciousness tenable] whose aspects are different from the essential nature of the object. Therefore it is ascertained that it is just consciousness

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102 Read: *ālambanābhāvād* in place of *upalabdhyabhāvād*; Tib. *dmigs pa med pa'i phyir* (D198a.6).

103 Read: *pratyekam upāttaṃ* in place of *pratyekātmagṛhītam*; Tib. *so sos zin pa* (D198b.1).

104 Read: *pretāḥ pūyapurīṣamūtrādipūrṇāḥ sarito daṇḍapāṇibhir ubhayataḥ puruṣaiḥ saṃrakṣyamāṇāḥ paśyanti* as per Ms.(6a.6) in place of *pretā apaḥ pūyapurīṣamūtrādipūrṇā dhṛtadaṇḍapāṇibhir ubhayataḥ puruṣaiḥ saṃrakṣyamāṇāḥ paśyanti*; disregard Y's fns.1, 2 & 3 p.19. Cf. V-Vṛtti (L4.3-6).

105 Tib. expands *nirvibandhā* to: "fit to bath in and fit to drink"; *bkur ruṅ ba daṅ btuṅ du ruṅ ba* (D198b.3)

106 Read: *prasūtir* as per Ms.(6a.7) in place of *prasutir*.

that is brought forth in all its appearances[107] as objects and sentient beings etc. without [the existence of] such an object.

[7] Both the appearances as the self and representations are false appearances because they manifest in the aspect of the apprehending subject although the apprehended object does not exist. Alternatively, the object does not exist in that way in which it is imaginatively constructed by consciousness; it is a false appearance because it is a false objective support, just as when sounds etc. [are imagined as the roaring] of tigers etc. Similarly, it is an established fact that mental representations too are devoid of a nature that is imaginatively constructed[108] by another representation. Hence the object of the
Y20 appearances as the self and representations also does not exist, just like [the objects] of the appearances as objects and sentient beings[109]. **Because of the non-existence of the ...object, ...the former too does not exist, i.e. consciousness...**; it is described as consciousness (*vijñāna*) since it discerns (*vijānāti*)[110]. If the apprehended object does not exist, the [existence of the] discerning agent[111] is not tenable. Therefore, due to the non-existence of the object, consciousness does not exist as a discerning agent; but not so [regarding consciousness] in the appearances of objects, sentient beings, the self and representations, for, if the latter were non-existent it would result in total non-existence since there can be no explanation for the essential nature of consciousness apart from this. If its essential nature were different from this how would [the existence] of that consciousness be tenable? How could one be differentiated from the other?

[8] Thus, because of the non-existence of the apprehended object and the apprehending subject and due to the actual existence of consciousness in the appearance of the latter, that which was asserted previously, i.e. "there is the imagination of what is unreal; the duality is not found therein", has been established. In order to demonstrate this, he says:

I.4ab **Consequently it has been proven that the imagination of what is unreal pertains to this [consciousness];**

That the imagination of what is unreal pertains to these four consciousnesses has been proven. By "consequently", is meant: by reason of what was just stated, i.e. "because of the non-existence of the object, the former too does not exist." Furthermore, in

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107 Ms.(6a.7): *-nirbhāsaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.19.

108 Ms.(6a.8): *-parikalpitenātmanā*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.19.

109 Read: *ataś cārthasattvapratibhāsasyevātmavijñaptipratibhāsasyāpy artho nāsti* which agrees with Tib.: *de'i phyir don daṅ sems can du snaṅ ba bźin du / bdag daṅ rnam par rig pa snaṅ ba'i don yaṅ med do* (D198b.6-7) in place of *ataś cārthasattvavijñānasyevātmavijñaptipratibhāsasyāpy arthābhāvaḥ..*

110 Tib. (D198b.7) *rnam par rig pas na rnam par śes pa ste* = *vijñaptir iti vijñānam.*

111 Ms.(6b.1): *vijānanāpy* but *vijñātṛtāpy* is better as amended by Y on the basis of the Tib.; see his fn.2 p.20.

order to prove the existence of unreal imagination[112] and in order to prove the non-existence of the duality, he says:

I.4c **Because it does not exist as such, nor is it non-existent in every respect etc.**

Alternatively, by "consequently" is meant: by the reason that will be stated below. In order to demonstrate just this, he says: "because it does not exist as such, nor is it non-existent in every respect." Because it does not exist as such and because it is not non-existent in every respect [consciousness] arises in the appearance of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. Although, in this regard, there are four modes [of appearance], there is no apprehending subject because [the first two modes] are without aspect and because [the latter two] are false appearances, respectively. Furthermore, there is no apprehended object because all [four modes] are devoid of a
Y21 nature that is imaginatively constructed[113] by another representation. **Nor is it non-existent in every respect because of the production of 'bare' error**[114]; that which appears in an aspect, although non-existent in itself[115], is described as "error"; it is like a magical creation. The word "bare" has the sense of the exclusion of what is additional to it. This is what is being said: because of the actual existence of consciousness that consists in error, [consciousness] is not non-existent in every respect.

[9] **What then is the reason that the definite non-existence of that** consciousness that consists in error is **not** accepted, like the non-existence[116] of the apprehended object and apprehending subject [is accepted]? If [such a question] implies that its existence is unable to be imagined by anyone since it transcends the domain of all consciousnesses, [the answer is] because...

I.4d **Liberation is considered as being due to its extinction**[117].

Hence its definite non-existence is not accepted; on the contrary, its existence is inferred because of its capacity [as a basis] for the sides of defilement and purification. Otherwise, if its definite non-existence in every respect is accepted, there would be neither bondage nor liberation[118]. If 'bare' error also did not exist, bondage too would

112 Ms.(6b.3): *abhūtaparikalpāstitva-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.20.

113 Ms.(6b.4): *-parikalpitena*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.20.

114 Read: *bhrāntimātrasyotpādād* in place of *bhrāntimātrotpādād*, cf. Bhāṣya N19.8.

115 Read: *ātmanāsad api yad ākāreṇa pratibhāsate* in place of *ātmatvenābhāvo na tu yad ākāreṇa pratibhāsate*; Tib. *bdag ñid kyis med kyaṅ / rnam par snaṅ ba gaṅ yin pa* (D199a.6).

116 Ms.(6b.5): *grāhyagrāhakabhāvavat* but Y's amendment to *-ābhāvavat* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.21.

117 Read: *tatkṣayān* in place of *tatkṣepān*; cf. Bhāṣya N19.10.

118 Tib. omits *na mokṣa*; cf. D199b.2.

not exist because there would be no defilement. Liberation too would not exist, considering that it is from a previous state of bondage that one is released.

[10] Alternatively, in order to exclude other interpretations which beg the questions: "why is [consciousness that consists in error] not considered as existent in that way in which it manifests[119], or else, as non-existent in every respect? He says: "liberation is considered as being due to its extinction"[120]; what is meant is: when that is not completely extinguished[121] there is bondage. This is what is being said:[122] **otherwise there would be[123] the fault of the negation of defilement and purification[124] since neither bondage nor liberation [could be established].** If [phenomena] were to exist absolutely in exactly that way in which they appear as the apprehended object and apprehending subject for [all beings] from cattle upwards[125], this being the case, defilement would be eternal and thus there would be no *nirvāṇa*. Similarly, if 'bare' error were also non-existent, there would be no defilement, and purification would be eternal. Thus in both cases, the effort of those who seek liberation would be in vain and consequently, the existence of the imagination of what is unreal should necessarily be admitted as well as the non-existence of the duality.

c. The Characteristic of the Totality.

N19.14 **Having thus stated the individual characteristic of the imagination of what is unreal, he states the characteristic of the totality, i.e., the way in which there is a totality of the three natures when there is the 'bare' imagination of what is unreal.**

I.5 abcd **The imaginary, the other-dependent and indeed the perfected are taught; on account of the object, the imagination of what is unreal and the non-**

119 Read: *katham yathā prakhyāti tathā bhāvo neṣyate* in place of *katham na yathā prakhyāti tathā bhāveneṣyate*; Ms.(6b) line 7 begins: *yathā prakhyāti yayhā bhāvo neṣyate.*

120 Read: *tatkṣayān* as per Ms.(6b.7)in place of *tatkṣepān*; cf. fn.112 above.

121 Ms.(6b.7): *cāparikṣīṇe*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.21.

122 Ms.(6b.7): *ity arthād uktam* but Y's emendation to *ity arthaḥ / etad uktam* is preferred; cf. his fn.4 p.21.

123 Read: *syāt* in place of *bhavati*; cf. Bhāṣya N19.12.

124 Tib. replaces *vyavadāna* with *nirvāṇa* (*mya ṅan las 'das pa*), cf. D199b.4, but Tib. Bhāṣya: *rnam par byaṅ ba* (D2b.6).

125 Read: *yathā grāhyagrāhakatvena paśuprabhṛteḥ pratibhāso 'pi yadi tathā syāt paramārthataḥ* in place of *yathā grāhyagrāhakatvena bhrāntir udbhāsitāpi yadi tathā syāt paramārthataḥ*; Tib. *gal te ji ltar gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa ñid du phyugs yan chad la snaṅ ba yaṅ gal te de bźin du don dam par 'gyur na ni* [D199b.4].

existence of the duality [respectively].

The object consists in the imaginary nature; the imagination of what is unreal consists in the other-dependent nature; the non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject consists in the perfected nature.

[Sthiramati]

Y22 [1] **He states the characteristic of the totality.** [The term *saṃgraha-lakṣaṇam* may be resolved as a *karmadhāraya* compound, i.e.]: the totality itself is the characteristic, or [as a *tatpuruṣa*]: the characteristic of the totality, i.e. that by which the totality is characterized. And why is it mentioned? Because it was stated in the above that there exists just the 'bare' imagination of what is unreal devoid of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. Furthermore, the three natures are taught in other Sūtras, hence, in order to demonstrate that there is no contradiction with other Sūtras, their totality is described here. This is why the author of the commentary says: **...when there is the 'bare' imagination of what is unreal**[126]

I.5 abcd **The imaginary, the other-dependent and indeed the perfected are taught - on account of the object, the imagination of what is unreal and the non-existence of the duality [respectively].**

Although both the apprehended object and apprehending subject[127] are unreal because they are empty of own-being, on account of the fact that the latter is imagined to exist, it is described as imaginary[128]. Moreover, although this does not exist substantially, [the imaginary] is described as a 'nature' since it exists in conventional expression. The other-dependent [nature] is subject to others because its arising is dependent on causes and conditions. It is said:

> It is non-imaginary, is produced from conditions and is inexpressible in every respect - because the other-dependent nature is the sphere[129] of mundane purity;

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126 Read *abhūtaparikalpamātre satīti* in place of *abhūtaparikalpamātram eveti*; cf. Bhāṣya N19.15.

127 Ms.(7a.2): *cāsvabhāva-* , but Y's emendation to *ca svabhāva-* is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.22.

128 Ms.(7a.2): *parikalpita ucyate*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.22.

129 Ms.(7a.3): *-caraḥ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.22.

The perfected nature is the absence of the duality on the part of the imagination of the unreal because it is unconditioned and because it is perfected on account of being devoid of change. It is said:

> That absolute emptiness of the imaginary nature on the part of that [other-dependent nature] is the perfected nature, the sphere of direct intuition free from conceptual differentiation.

"On account of the object" [means]: owing to the influence of the object; the same is to be stated with regard to the [other two statements from verse I.5]: "on account of the imagination of what is unreal", and "on account of the non-existence of the duality".

[2] **The object consists in the imaginary nature**[130]; in this context[131] the object
Y23 refers to form etc., sight etc., self and representations; and since it is non-existent in the imagination of the unreal in a nature that is imaginary, being non-existent[132], it is described as the imaginary nature. It is said:

> Conceptual differentiation devoid of conceptual differentiation[133] is imagined by another conceptual differentiation; its nature here which is imagined by another conceptual differentiation, does not exist.

The imagination of what is unreal consists in the other-dependent nature; it is other-dependent since it depends on, or is produced by, other causes and conditions but does not exist in itself. **The non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject consists in the perfected nature**; it is described as perfected because it is perfected insofar as it consists in both perfection devoid of change and perfection devoid of erroneous inversion.

[3] For, in this context, the absence of the duality on the part of the imagination of the unreal is described as the non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject, but not merely the non-existence of the duality. Thus, it is just the imagination of the unreal that is other-dependent because it depends upon causes and conditions. The latter also is imaginary because it manifests in the natures of the apprehended object and apprehending subject which are non-existent in themselves. The latter is also perfected because of its absence of the apprehended object and apprehending

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130 Read: *arthaḥ parikalpitaḥ svabhāva ity* as per Ms.(7a.4) and Bhāṣya N19/19 in place of *artho hi parikalpitasvabhāva ity*.

131 Ms.(7a.4): *athorūpādayaś*, but Y's emendation to *artho 'tra rūpādayaś* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.6 p.22.

132 Ms.(7a.4): *ataḥ* but Y's amendment to *asaṃ* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.23.

133 Read: *vikalpo nirvikalpo* in place of *akalpito vikalpo*; Tib. *rnam rtog rnam par mi rtog ni* (D200a.6).

subject. After considering it in this way, having clearly comprehended[134] what is to be clearly comprehended and having clearly comprehended what is to be relinquished, that entity of the imagination of the unreal that is to be realized, has been shown.

d. The Characteristic of the Expedient for Entry into the Characteristic of Non-existence.

N19.22 Now he reveals the characteristic of the expedient for entry into the characteristic of non-existence in regard to that imagination of what is unreal.

N20 I.6 abcd — Based upon perception, non-perception comes into being. Based upon non-perception, non-perception comes into being.

Based upon the perception of representation-only, the non-perception of the object originates. Based upon the non-perception of the object, the non-perception of representation-only originates as well. In this way, one enters the characteristic of the non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject.

I.7 ab — Consequently, it is proven that the own-being of perception is non-perception;

Because, in the absence of the object to be perceived, perception is not tenable.

I.7 cd — Therefore, it should be known that non-perception and perception are equivalent.

Because perception is not proven to be perception but is described as perception insofar as it consists in the appearance of an unreal object, although it has non-perception for its own-being.

134 Tib. is slightly different; cf. Y's fns.3 & 4, p.23.

[Sthiramati]

Y23.19 [1] Since the characteristic of non-existence has not been clearly comprehended, the imagination of what is unreal leads to[135] the defilements of moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth. Consequently, in order to clearly comprehend the characteristic of non-existence, and in order to demonstrate the expedient for that[136], he says:

1.6 a Based upon perception etc.

Y24 Since it is indicated implicitly within the imagination of the unreal, or rather since it is the imagination of the unreal, the characteristic of non-existence is that very non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject - the entry into that is [equivalent to] its understanding. The expedient for the latter is that through which one enters the characteristic of non-existence. Moreover, this consists in a twofold skill, i.e. a special basis[137] for the application to penetrate[138] the all-pervading sense of the *dharmadhātu*. This verse was articulated in order to indicate [all] this implicitly.

[2] **Based upon[139] the perception of representation-only, the non-perception of the object originates.** This absence of an objective support is the fact of representation-only; [consciousness][140] arises in the appearance of form etc. due to the maturation of the individual 'seed' However, since there is no object consisting in form etc., one thus enters the non-perception of the apprehended object based upon[141] the perception of the apprehending subject.

[3] It should be deliberated upon in this way: consciousness[142], whether in the process of arising, or, already arisen, would depend upon a sense-object. In this respect, to depend upon a sense-object while in the process of arising is not tenable because [consciousness] does not [yet] exist when it is in the process of arising. Nor does it exist when it has already arisen because it arises in the nature of the appearance of a sense-object; and since there is no other activity[143] on the part of consciousness with the exception of its arising in the nature of the appearance of the sense-object, it is said that consciousness depends upon the sense-object while performing[144] that activity.

[4] Alternatively, if the functioning of the objective support [occurs] when consciousness is already present and not when it is in the process of arising, then consciousness does not arise[145] with the objective support for its causal condition. This hypothesis is

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135 Read: *saṃvartate* as per Ms.(7a.7) in place of *sampravartate*.
136 Ms.(7a.7): *tadupāyaṃ* but Y's amendment to *tadupāya-* is preferred.
137 Ms.(7a.8): *niśraya*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.24.
138 Read: *prativedha* as per Ms.(7a.8) in place of *pratibodha;* disregard Y's fn.1 p.24.
139 Read: *niśritya* in place of *āśritya*; cf. Bhāṣya N20.3.
140 *vijñānaṃ* is not found in the Ms. but is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D200b.7.
141 Ms.(7b.1): *niśritya*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.24.
142 Ms.(7b.1): *vijñānaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.24.
143 Ms.(7b.2): *kriyā 'sti*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.24.
144 Ms.(7b.2): *kurvat*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.24.
145 Read: *utpattiḥ* in place of *utpādakaḥ*; Tib. *skye ba* (D201a.2).

meaningless, for, if there is the 'seizing' of an objective support that exists, that would annul the theory of momentariness[146], and in the absence of an exceptional nature, like in the latter case, the 'seizing' of the objective support by consciousness is not tenable. Or else[147], it is considered to have an exceptional nature at the time of the 'seizing' of the objective support - even so, due to the observation of an exceptional nature only in the other case, it is concluded that [consciousness] 'seizes' only the other objective support that has already arisen.

Y25 [5] Another [school] believes that only the object that ceases to exist [from moment to moment] is the causal condition that is the objective support for consciousness while in the process of arising and that this is distinguished from the [three] other causal conditions by the fact that it is the cause of consciousness[148] in the appearance of individual aspects. Thereby, either atoms of form etc., or a collection of them, is imagined to be the objective support although, in both cases, the objective support does not exist because all consciousnesses arise in the appearances of jars and clothes etc., but not in the appearances of atoms. Moreover, consciousness appearing as one thing in the aspect of the object cannot have an objective support which is different[149], since even sight and the other [sense faculties] would be objective supports. Moreover, one may believe that an accumulation of atoms forms the objective support but the individual [atoms] do not - this is also a non-argument, for although they may be accumulated they can only be considered as objective supports individually - not as an accumulation. With regard to the latter [view], consciousness[150] does not arise in the individual appearances of atoms, for [it arises] in the appearance of an accumulation of them; therefore [the notion] that atoms form an objective support is not possible. Nor is the objective support a collection of atoms because causality is not possible on the part of that which has [only] nominal existence, because like the immediately preceding-causal condition etc.[151], the objective support-causal condition is also considered to be the cause of consciousness. Therefore, it is not possible that something that ceases to exist [from moment to moment] can be the objective support-causal condition[152]. Likewise, if that which has actually ceased to exist forms the objective support[153], this

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146 Read: *kṣaṇabhaṅgabādhaḥ syāt* in place of *kṣaṇabhaṅgadoṣo bhavati*; Tib. *skad cig pa 'jig pa'i gnod par 'gyur* (D201a.3)

147 Ms.(7b.3): *tathā*, but Y's rendering of *atha* is preferred; cf. his fn.7 p.24.

148 Ms.(7b.4): *jñāna*, but Y's rendering of *vijñāna* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.25.

149 Read: *na cārthākārasya anyapratibhāsasya vijñānasya 'nyad ālambanam asti* in place of *arthākāraś ca vyatirekataḥ pratibhāsamānaṃ vijñānaṃ / na tv ālambanaṃ vyatiriktam*; Tib. *don gyi rnam pa gźan du snaṅ ba'i rnam par śes pa'i dmigs pa ni gźan ma yin te* (D201a.6).

150 Read: *vijñānaṃ* in place of *jñānaṃ*; Tib. *rnam par śes pa* (D201a.7).

151 Ms.(7b.6): *-pratyayavad*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.25.

152 Read: *tasmān na nirudhyamāno 'py ālambanapratyayaḥ saṃbhavati* in place of *tasmān na nirudhyamāno 'py ālambanam*; Tib. *de'i phyir 'gag pa'i tshe yaṅ dmigs pa'i rkyen du mi srid do* (D201b.1).

153 Read: *atha ca niruddha evālambanaṃ* in place of *atha ca nirodhatvam ālambanam*; Tib. *ji ste yaṅ 'gag pa ñid dmigs pa yin na* (D201b.1).

being so, then past and the future [time] would be sense-objects and it has been proven that consciousness is devoid of the sense-object in dreams etc.

[6] Some believe[154] that the consciousness in dreams etc. is not without an objective support because it has the sign (*nimitta*) for its objective support. But, the sign is the reflected image of the object which has the dissociated formative forces for its own-being, for if the object does not exist in dreams etc., [the existence of] its sign is not tenable, like in the absence of a face etc., its reflection cannot be established[155]. [Response]: Consciousness, whether in the process of arising or already arisen, does not have the sign for its objective support because both its non-existence and cessation have already been described. Consciousness itself consists in the reflection of the object because of the fact that it is an appearance of the object, hence it is not tenable that the sign has the nature of the dissociated[156] formative forces. Moreover,
Y26 consciousness is to be admitted necessarily as possessing the aspect of the object, for if it were without aspect, one could not determine the apprehended object and apprehending subject.

[7] However, others believe that non-resistant [i.e. transparent] matter forms the objective support in a dream and in the [meditative contemplation] of ascetics upon impure things etc.; but [the notion that] the latter are non-resistant and belong to the domain of mind alone is contradicted by the fact that they have colour and shape etc. Also, non-resistant matter other than mere non-information (*avijñapti*) is not taught in the *śāstras*; therefore this is no more than a hypothesis.

[8] Others again consider that the object of past experience forms the sense-object of consciousness in a dream because there is no perception of the colour blue etc. in dreams for one who is born blind. [Response]: It is not that one who is blind from birth does not perceive colour in dreams, rather, because [the object's] conventional symbol has not been explained to him, he does not know it by name and hence cannot communicate it to others. Moreover, if it is only what has been experienced [in the past] that one sees in a dream, then why is it not considered that one who is blind from birth also does not see colour, for colour certainly was perceived by such a person in previous lives[157]? Also, it is not that only what is perceived in the present life appears in a dream, for there is no distinction whatever between one who sleeps and one who is awake in relation to past, future and present experience. Therefore, it is purely hypothetical to assert that consciousness[158] has an object of past experience as its

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154 Read: *iti kecit* as per Ms.(7b.7) in place of *iti ke cet.*

155 Ms.(7b.7): *-pratibimbavat* but Y's emendation to *-pratibimbāsiddhavat* is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.25.

156 Ms.(7b.8): *viprayukta-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.25.

157 Ms.(8a.2): *-janmasu rūpam*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.26.

158 Ms.(8a.3): *jñānam* but Y's emendation to *vijñānam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.26.

sense-object in a dream. Moreover, because the past [experience] is non-existent it is certain that consciousness, although devoid of a sense-object, arises in the appearance of the object in a dream. Thus, [the notion of] the non-perception of the sense-object is cultivated because its perception [occurs] as a mental representation-only.

[9] **Based upon the non-perception of the object**[159]**, the non-perception of representation-only originates as well.** Just as one enters the non-existence of the apprehended object[160] through the force of representation-only, since the imaginary apprehended object does not exist externally to consciousness; similarly, one understands the non-existence of representation-only too through the force of the non-existence of the apprehended object. It is not tenable that the apprehending subject exists if the apprehended object does not exist because the determination of the subjectivity of that is dependent upon objectivity. **In this way, one enters the**
Y27 **characteristic of the non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject** which have an imaginary nature; however, [the entry into the characteristic of the non-existence] of the imagination of what is unreal has not been shown[161].

[10] What then is the reason that just the non-existence of representation-only was not determined[162] from the very beginning? [Response]: Because the apprehending subject is dependent upon the apprehended object - when the object to be supported does not exist one easily enters [the non-existence of representation-only] due to the destruction of the entity which has the nature of the objective support[163]. Otherwise there would be a definite negation[164] of existence because the apprehended object and apprehending subject would be devoid of the relation of mutual dependence. At the conclusion of the first immeasurable aeon [the *bodhisattva*], progressing without interruption in the accumulations [of merit and direct intuition] enters this level of direct intuition which transcends the conceptual differentiation of the apprehended object[165] and apprehending subject. Thus, while cultivating[166] the non-existence of form etc. based upon this [doctrine of] representation-only, he realizes the meditative concentration known as the state of heat (*uṣmagata*), together with its peripheral elements. This is the essential nature of the first [stage] of the supramundane path. Following

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159 Read: *arthānupalabdhiṃ niśritya* in place of *viṣayānupalabdhim āśritya*; cf. Bhāṣya N20.3.

160 Omit *mano* as it is not found in the Ms.(8a.4) nor in the Tib.(D202a.4).

161 Read: *darśitaṃ* as per Ms.(8a.5) in place of *darśanaṃ*.

162 Ms.(8a.5): *vibhāvayati* but Tib. *mam par gźag pa* (D202a.5); perhaps *vyavasthāpayati.* is a better rendering.

163 Read: *grāhyapratibaddhād dhi grāhakasyālambhyārthābhāve ālambanarūpavastuvināśāt sukhena praviśati* in place of *grāhyapratibaddhatvād dhi grāhakasyopalabhyārthābhāve sukhaṃ praveśaḥ syād ālambanassvabhāvavināśāt*; Tib. *'dzin pa ni gzuṅ ba la rag las pa'i phyir dmigs par bya ba'i don med na / dmigs pa'i ṅo bo'i dṅos po 'jig pas bde blag tu 'jug par 'gyur gyi* (D202a.5).

164 Ms.(8a.6): *-pavādam*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.27.

165 Ms.(8a.6): *ca grāhya-* ; disregard Y's fn.2 p.27.

166 Read: *-bhāvayato* in place of *-bhāvanā*; Tib. *-r bsgom pa ni* (D202a.7).

from this [comes the concentration] known as the summit (*mūrdhan*); Immediately after that comes the concentration known as receptivity to knowledge (*kṣānti*) which is conducive to the non-perception of the apprehender and is due to the non-perception of the apprehended object in its entirety. Immediately after that, based upon the non-perception of the object, while cultivating[167] the non-perception of even representation-only[168], [the *bodhisattva*], in accompaniment with wisdom etc., realizes the meditative concentration known as the highest mundane experience (*laukikāgryadharma*) together with its peripheral elements. Immediately after that [he attains] the path of vision and it is only here that he enters the first spiritual level due to his understanding of the all-pervading *dharmadhātu*. This is a mental attention directed towards reality; it is not a mental attention towards firm conviction[169] like the [four] immeasurables are.

[11] In order to demonstrate the fact that perception has non-perception for its own-being, he says:

I.7 ab **Consequently, it is proven that the own-being of perception is non-perception;**

Alternatively, that which was previously asserted, that the duality does not exist in the imagination of what is unreal, has been proven because it is introspectively knowable in this aspect. It is in order to demonstrate this that he says: "consequently, it is proven
Y28 that the own-being of perception is non-perception". **Consequently**, i.e. because there can be no perception if there is no object to be perceived[170]. The term 'perception' could be construed as any one of: (a) a state, (b) an agent, or (c) an instrument; however this trio is not tenable due to the non-existence of an objective referent[171] (*karma*) - "consequently, it is proven that the own-being of perception is non-perception". This is why the author of the commentary says: **because, in the absence of the object to be perceived, perception is not tenable.**

[12]

I.7 cd **Therefore, it should be known that non-perception and perception are equivalent.**

Since perception has non-perception for its own-being, therefore they are the same; i.e. the fact that they are equivalent should be known because there is no difference insofar as there is neither the non-perception of the object nor is there perception consisting in representation-only. In order to remove mutual contradiction between the words 'perception' and 'non-perception', he says: **...but is described as perception**

167 Read; *bhāvayato* in place of *bhāvayan*; Tib. *-r bsgom źiṅ* (D202b.2).
168 Ms.(8a.7): *vijñaptimātra* but Tib. *rnam par śes pa* (D202b.1).
169 Ms.(8a.8): *nādhimukti-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.27.
170 Tib. reads simply: "because of the absence of the object to be perceived"; cf. Y's fn.1 p.28.
171 Read: *karmābhāvān* in place of *abhāvān*; Tib. *las med pas* (D202b.5).

insofar as it consists in the appearance of an unreal object; but since nothing is perceived by that [perception] because of the absence of the object, hence, there is no contradiction in an absolute sense because he says: ...although having non-perception for its own-being[172].

[13] Others say that on the one hand there is the perception of the object[173] by naive people, although there is no object, and on the other hand there is the non-perception of the object by the Noble Ones; both of these should be known to be the same because their characteristics are equivalent, like in the [perception and] non-perception of an erroneous snake. This is why he says: "...but is described as perception insofar as it consists in the appearance of an unreal object, although having non-perception for its own-being[174]", like in the statement about the non-perception of an erroneous snake.

[14] Others again say that on the one hand there is the perception of the apprehending subject by naive people; and on the other hand there is the non-perception of the apprehending subject by the Noble Ones, because of the absence of the object. Although in the two cases both perception and non-perception should be known to be the same because there is no difference insofar as there is no apprehender if there is no apprehended object. This is why he says: "...insofar as it consists in the appearance of an unreal object".

[15] However, others believe that in order to counteract imputation and negation he says: "therefore, it should be known that non-perception and perception are equiva-
Y29 lent", i.e. because of the absence of the object and since perception[175] does not have the essential nature of perception, it is described as not having such an essential nature. [Response]: [The notion] that perception has perception for its essential nature is not excluded[176], nor is it interpolated that it has non-perception for its essential nature.[177] What is it then? Both of them are the same owing to the absence of conceptual differentiation. Therefore, regardless of imputation and negation, the fact that there is introspective equality on the part of both non-perception and perception should be known. It is said:

> Nothing should be excluded from it and
> nothing should be interpolated. The real

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172 Read: *'nupalabdhisvabhāvāpi satīti* as per Ms.(8b.3) & Bhāṣya N20.10 in place of *'nupalabdhisvabhāve 'pi satīti.*

173 Ms.(8b.3): *'rthopalapalambhaḥ* but Y's reading of: *arthopalambhaḥ* is preferred.

174 Read: *anupalabdhisvabhāvāpi satī* as per Ms.(8b.4) in place of *anupalabdhisvabhāve 'pi satī*; cf. fn.172 above.

175 Ms.(8b.5): *upalabdher*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.29.

176 Read: *nopalabdher upalabdhisvabhāvo 'panīyate* in place of *upalambha upalabdhisvabhāvo nāpanīyate*; Tib. *dmigs pa la dmigs pa'i raṅ bźin bsal bar bya ba ...med de* (D203a.5).

177 Ms.(8b.6): *-bhāvabhāvāprakṣipyate*, but Y's emendation to *-svabhāvaḥ prakṣipyate* is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.29.

should be seen in its reality - one who sees
the real is liberated.[178]

If this is so, why is perception described as representation[-only][179]? Because it is acknowledged as such, both generally and didactically, as the appearance of an unreal object, "...although having non-perception for its own-being"[180].

e. The Characteristic of the Differentiation.

N20.12 **Now he states the characteristic of the differentiation of that imagination of what is unreal.**

I.8 ab **The imagination of what is unreal consists in the mind and the mental concomitants that pertain to the three realms of existence.**

According to their differentiation among the spheres of sense-desire, form or formlessness.

[Sthiramati]

Y29.14 [1] **He states the characteristic of the differentiation.** There are various modes of differentiation of the imagination of the unreal as being of the nature of[181] the realms of sense-desire, form and formlessness. Since the differentiation itself is the characteristic, it is the characteristic of the differentiation [i.e. the term *prabheda-lakṣaṇam* is a *karmadhāraya* compound] because the imagination of the unreal is characterized by this differentiation[182]. What is the reason that the characteristic of the differentiation is declared? Because the [existence of the] realms of sense-desire and form is not tenable if there is just the imagination of what is unreal. [If] the differentiation of Noble Ones and ordinary people etc. is not made according to the differentiation[183] of realms of existence as the result of the differences in the adverse elements and their counteragents, there would be a great calamity on the part of the teachings; [hence], in order to dispel such a fear, the characteristic of the differentiation is stated.

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178 Abhisamayālaṃkāra, V.21.

179 D inserts *tsam* (203a.7).

180 Read: *-svabhāvāpi satī* as per Ms.(8b.7) in place of *-svabhāve 'pi satī*; cf. fns. 172 and 174 above.

181 Read: *ātmakatvam* as per Ms.(8b.7) in place of *ātmakam*.

182 Read perhaps: *anena prabhedenābhūtaparikalpo lakṣyata iti* in place of *anena prabhedenābhūtaparikalpasya lakṣaṇāt*; Tib. *rab tu dbye ba 'dis yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa mtshon pa'i phyir* (203b.1).

183 Ms.(8b.8): *-bhedena*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.29.

[2] Alternatively, some believe that the imagination of what is unreal is found only where[184] there is conjecture and deliberation and not otherwise; hence, in order to reject
Y30 such a [notion], the characteristic of the differentiation is mentioned.

1.8 ab **The imagination of what is unreal consists in the mind and the mental concomitants that pertain to the three realms of existence.**

But not just where there is conjecture and deliberation. Just as form refers to the primary[185] and secondary elementary matter; similarly, the imagination of what is unreal also refers to both mind and the mental concomitants and not just to mind alone. Moreover, these are the own-being of the three realms of existence, i.e. they pertain to the three realms **according to their differentiation**[186] **among the spheres of sense-desire, form and formlessness.** The realm of sense-desire therein refers to the twenty[187] modes [of existence] in the aspects of the *narakas* etc. which manifest from that unreal imagination. The realm of form refers to the seventeen modes [of existence] in the aspects of the *brahmakāyika* etc. The formless realm refers to the four modes [of existence] in the aspects of the *ākāśānantyāyatana* etc.

[3] However, another says that the realm of sense-desire[188] refers to those who belong to the sphere of sense-desire[189], i.e. whose passion for sense-desire has not been relinquished and whose notions about form have not been abrogated. The realm of form refers to those who belong to the sphere of form[190], i.e. whose passion for sense-desire has been relinquished and whose notions about form have not been abrogated. The formless realm[191] refers to those who belong to the sphere of formlessness[192], i.e. whose passion for sense-desire has been relinquished and whose notions about form have been abrogated[193].

[4] Others believe that the realm of sense-desire refers to those with a propensity for the passion of sense-desire, the realm of form refers to those with a propensity for the passion of form and the formless realm refers to those with a propensity for the passion of formlessness.

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184 *yatra* is not found in D (cf. D203b.3-4), but is found in P.
185 Ms.(9a.1): *bhūtāni*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.30.
186 Read: *-bhedena* in place of *bhedāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N20.15.
187 The Ms. generally does not distinguish between *sa,śa* and *ṣa*; cf. Y's fn. 4 p.30.
188 Tib. omits *kāmadhātu*; cf. D203b.7.
189 Read: *kāmāvacarāḥ* in place of *kāmāvacaraḥ*; cf. fns. 190 & 192 below.
190 Read: *rūpāvacarā* as per Ms.(9a.3), contrary to Y's emendation to the singular form; the plural should be retained in the light of its usage in the subsequent paragraphs; cf. D204a.1. Tib. omits *rūpāvacarā*.
191 Tib. omits *ārūpyadhātuḥ*; cf. D204a.1.
192 Read; *cārūpyāvacarā* as per Ms.(9a.3).
193 Ms.(9a.3): *vibhūtārūpya* but Y's emendation to *vibhūtarūpya* is preferred; cf. his fn.6 p.30. Tib. *gzugs kyi 'du śes daṅ yaṅ bral ba rnams* (D240a.1).

[5] Others believe that the realm of sense-desire refers to those who are constantly distracted and have become the basis of [special] sorts of mental dissatisfaction. The realm of form refers to those who are meditatively composed and whose modes of mental dissatisfaction have been dispelled. The formless realm refers to those who are meditatively composed and whose modes of pleasure and dissatisfaction have been relinquished.

[6] Others again believe that the realm of sense-desire refers to those who have not relinquished odours and tastes and their appearances in consciousness. The realm of form refers to those who have relinquished both odours and tastes and their appearances in consciousness. The formless realm refers to those who have relinquished the appearances of the fifteen elements.

[7] Which is most relevant among all these explanations? It is only necessary that what was described in the first explanation be mentioned since the [subsequent]
Y31 explanations are only correlative to it. This is a further reference to the imagination of what is unreal in the chapter on unreal imagination because it was interrupted by [the explanation of] non-perception.

f. The Characteristic of its Synonyms.

N20.17 **He states the characteristic of the synonyms:**

I.8 cd **Vision in regard to the object consists in consciousness, but in regard to its particulars, it consists in the mental concomitants.**

Therein, vision in regard to the object alone consists in consciousness; vision in regard to the particulars of the object consists in the mental concomitants, such as sensation.

[Sthiramati]

Y31.4 [1] **He states the characteristic of the synonyms**[194]. By demonstrating the particulars as belonging to the mind and the mental concomitants[195], he states the characteristic of the synonyms of the imagination of what is unreal. How so? Because the mind and the mental concomitants manifest as imaginative constructions in regard to

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194 Read: *paryāyalakṣaṇaṃ ca khyāpayatīti* in place of *paryāyalakṣaṇaṃ ceti*; Tib. *rnam graṅs kyi mtshan ñid kyaṅ ston te* (D204a.6). Cf. Bhāṣya N20.17.

195 Read: *cittacaittaviśeṣapradarśanena* in place of *cittacaittānāṃ prabhedaṃ pradarśayitvā*; Tib. *sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba rnams kyi bye brag rab tu bstan pas* (D204a.6).

both the own-being and the particular of an unreal[196] entity that is to be imaginatively constructed. Since the vision[197] of an object's essential nature and particulars consists in both the mental concomitants and unreal imagination they are included as synonyms, however, the particular does not exist in the object.

[2] **Therein, the vision in regard to the object alone**[198] **consists in consciousness.** The word 'alone' is for the purpose of excluding the particulars[199]; what is meant is: the perception of just the essential nature of an entity - the particulars are not 'seized'. **Vision in regard to the particulars of the object**[200] **consists in the mental concomitants, such as sensation;** because they function with regard to that [i.e. the object][201] in various particular forms. In this regard, the particulars of joyfulness or sorrow can pertain to an entity and the 'seizing' of the condition of well-being etc. belonging to that is 'sensation' (*vedanā*). The particular of an object is the sign[202] which consists in a conventional expression, such as 'man' or 'woman' and its apprehension is 'ideation' (*saṃjñā*). The other respective [mental concomitants] should also be construed in this way. Thus these[203] are associated by having the same nature in regard to (a) basis, (b) objective support, (c) time and (d) substance, but not by having the same nature in regard to aspect too, because it would be non-distinguishable from consciousness.

[3] Some [schools] understand that it is just the special modes of mind (*cittaviśeṣa*) that are intended as the mental concomitants in this context and that same consciousness arises in variegated appearances, like the eyes on a peacock's tail, in forms etc. that are similar[204]. [Objection]: How can it be both singular and variegated since, with regard to a singular entity[205], the world does not accept a variety of [incompatible][206] characteristics? Otherwise it would be said that a singular entity has a manifold own-being. [Response]: This fault would apply if the own-being of a *dharma* were per-
Y32 fected, but this fault does not relate to 'bare' error because of the statement: "because it does not exist as such, nor is it non-existent in every respect"; (I.4 c). [Objection]: This is not so because it contradicts this statement from a Sūtra: "these *dharmas* known as sensation (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), mind (*citta*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are mixed together - they are not discrete; and close-contact (*saṃsarga*) indeed belongs to

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196 Ms.(9a) inserts *abhūta* in the margin; cf. Y's fn.1 p.31.
197 Read: *dṛṣṭiś citta-* as per Ms.(9a.6) in place of *dṛṣṭicitta-*.
198 Read: *tatrārthamātre dṛṣṭir* in place of *tatrārthamātradṛṣṭir*; cf. Bhāṣya N20.19.
199 Read: *viśeṣāpanayanāyā-* in place of *viśeṣanirasanenā-*; Tib. *khyad par sel ba'i phyir* (D204b.1).
200 Read: *arthaviśeṣe dṛṣṭiś* as per Ms.(9a.7) & Bhāṣya N20.19 in place of *arthaviśeṣadṛṣṭiś*.
201 Ms.(9a.7): *tatrābhipravṛtteḥ*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.31.
202 Read: *-nimittam* in place of *-lakṣaṇo* on the basis of Tib. *mtshan ma* (D204b.3).
203 Read: *caiṣām āśrayā-* disregarding Y's fn.4 p.31.
204 Read: *-rūpādinā* in place of *-svarūpādinā*; Tib. *ṅo bo la sogs par* (D204b.4).
205 Ms.(9b.1): *naikaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.31.
206 Tib.(D204b.5) inserts *mi mthun pa* =*viruddha*.

existent [entities] and is simultaneous[207]." [Response]: For one who considers the own-being of the *dharmas* to be non-perfected [i.e. the *yogācārin*], this Sūtra is not a valid source[208] in this sense .

g. The Actualizing Characteristic.

N20.22 **Next he states the actualizing characteristic:**

N21 **I.9 abcd** **The first is consciousness as causal condition; the second pertains to sense-experience; the mental concomitants therein are sense-experience, discrimination and stimulation.**

Consciousness as causal condition is the store-consciousness since it is the causal condition for the other consciousnesses. Actual consciousness, which pertains to sense-experience, has the latter for its causal condition. Sense-experience refers to sensation. Discrimination refers to ideation. The stimulations refer to the formative forces of consciousness - volition and mental attention etc.

[Sthiramati]

Y32.10 [1] In order to demonstrate that when there is the 'bare' imagination of the unreal and nothing else, its differentiation as cause and result is not discerned, [hence] he states the actualizing characteristic. It is a characteristic since the imagination of the unreal [is characterized] as cause and result on account of this. [Since] the actualizing itself is the characteristic, it is the actualizing characteristic [i.e. the term *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇam* is a *karmadhāraya* compound]. Furthermore, this actualization[209] is twofold: (a) the actualization as a regular succession of momentary instants under the influence of which there is the defilement of sense-experience in the present lifetime and (b) the actualization as another rebirth under the influence of which there is the defilement of moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth, in the future. The actualization as a regular succession of momentary instants in this context is described as the actualizing characteristic. The actualization as another rebirth will be stated as the characteristic of defilement [in the next section].

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207 Tib. omits *na visaṃsṛṣṭā* from the preceding sentence and reads instead: *'dres pa źes bya ba ni yod pa rnams cig car phrad par 'gyur ba la bya'o* (D205a.1): "That which is mixed together is the simultaneous close contact of entities".

208 *ajñāpakam*; Tib. *khuṅs su mi ruṅ* (D204b.7).

209 Ms.(9b.3): *pravṛttiḥ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.32.

I.9 a **The first is consciousness as causal condition etc.**

In the above, "the first" refers to the store-consciousness[210]. Since it is the cause, i.e. the basic causal condition (*hetupratyaya*), of the remaining seven consciousnesses, it is consciousness as causal condition.

I.9 b **The second pertains to sense-experience.**

Y33 The word "consciousness" remains in force [from the preceding sentence]. The ellipsis is: it is the result of the latter [i.e. the store-consciousness]; moreover, it is sevenfold. The actual consciousness pertains to sense-experience because it has sense-experiencing for its purpose.

I.9 cd **The mental concomitants therein are sense-experience, discrimination and stimulation.**[211]

It is the fact that the mental concomitants therein, i.e. in consciousness, are also the result of that [store-consciousness] that is referred to because they are [constituents of] consciousness and because they share its attainments and protection as one.

[2] **Consciousness as causal condition is the store-consciousness since it is the basic causal condition for the other consciousnesses**[212]. It is [described as] a store-house (*ālaya*) since, in its mode as result, all impure[213] *dharmas* are collected (*ālīyante*) there, and, in its mode as cause, it collects in them. It is consciousness because it causes the representation of the world of sentient beings and inanimate things through appearing as such: moreover, because it consists exclusively in the *karma* result, it is undefined. It is consciousness as causal condition since it is the basic causal condition for both the 'seeds' of all impure *dharmas* that follow in consequence of it[214] and for the other actual consciousnesses. **Actual consciousness, which pertains to sense-experience, has the latter for its causal condition**; what is meant is: since it arises (*pratyeti*) from that store-consciousness, it is produced with the latter for its causal condition (*tatpratyaya*). How does it arise? The actual consciousness, while in the process of manifesting from the store-consciousness, fosters in that store-consciousness a 'seed' which is the progenitor of an actual consciousness which has not yet arisen and which is of the same genre. [Then]

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210 Ms.(9b.4): *ālaya...*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.32.

211 In the Tib. this verse segment has been paraphrased: cf.D205a.4-5.

212 Read: *ālayavijñānam anyeṣāṃ vijñānānāṃ hetupratyayatvāt pratyayavijñānam* in place of *ālaya-vijñānasya hy anyavijñānapratyayatvāt pratyayavijñānam*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.3. Tib. *kun gźi rnam par śes pa ni rnam par śes pa gźan dag (gi)* rgyu'i rkyen yin pas rkyen gyi rnam par śes pa'o* (D205a.5-6). * The actual reading here is *ni* rather than *gi*; cf. Tib. Bhāṣya D3a.7.

213 Ms.(9b.6): *sāsravā*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.33.

214 Read (with St. p.123 fn.25): *sarvasāsravadharmabījānubaddhānāṃ* in place of *sarveṣāṃ sāsrava-nāṃ dharmāṇāṃ bījam anubadhyate*; Tib. *zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i chos thams cad kyi sa bon rjes su 'brel ba daṅ* (D205a.7).

an actual consciousness of the same genre is produced again from that matured 'seed' which has undergone a special transformation[215]. Thus, that actual consciousness[216] has that [store-consciousness] for its causal condition[217].

[3] [Objection]: Is it not so that[218] the store-consciousness also pertains to sense-experience, and the actual consciousness can be [construed as] the consciousness as causal condition because [the store-consciousness] is the basis of the sense-experience of non-painful and non-pleasurable sensations and also because the latent impressions are activated[219] in the store-consciousness? There is no other activation of the latent impressions[220] except as causal conditions, as has been stated in this verse from the Abhidharmasūtra:[221]

Y34 All *dharmas* are collected in consciousness,
and likewise the latter in the former - as
result and cause of each other, eternally.

[Response]: It need not lead to this conclusion. Why?[222] Because of the difficulty in distinguishing the sensation that belongs to it, [the store-consciousness] is not recognized as being pertinent to sense-experience, like actual consciousness is, or it should be known as something pre-eminent, like the sun. Accordingly, only actual consciousness is the basis for the sense-experience of the three kinds of sensation - the store-consciousness is not. Moreover, in this context [the store consciousness] is intended as the basic causal condition, not just a causal condition. Likewise, under the influence of wholesome and unwholesome *dharmas*, the store consciousness incorporates the latent impressions consisting in both the *karma*-result and the natural outcome-result, whereas[223], under the influence of the undefined *dharmas* [it incorporates] only the latent impressions that belong to the natural outcome-result. Hence the store consciousness is the basic causal condition for all impure *dharmas* in their entirety. However, actual consciousness is the predominant causal condition for the store consciousness - it is not the basic causal condition[224]. Thus, that the actual consciousness is a causal condition is not a [wrong] conclusion.

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215 Read (with St. p.123 fn.26): *labdhapariṇāmaviśeṣāt* in place of *pariṇāmaviśeṣalābhāt*; Tib. *'gyur ba'i bye brag rñed pa ...las* (D205b.2).

216 Read: *tat pravṛttivijñānaṃ* as per Ms.(9b/8) in place of *pravṛttivijñānam*, although *tat* is omitted from the Tib. (cf. D205b.2).

217 Ms.(9b.8): *tatpratyayaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.33.

218 Read: *nanu cālaya-* as per Ms.(9b.8) in place of *nanv ālaya-*.

219 Read: *vāsanābhāvitatvāt* in place of *vāsanābhāvanāt*; Tib. *bag chags bsgo ba'i phyir* (D205b.3).

220 Read: *na ...anyā vāsanābhāvitāsti* in place of *na ...vyatirekeṇānyā vāsanābhāvanāsti*; Tib. *bag chags bsgo ba gźan med de* (D205b.3).

221 This verse is also cited in MSG (L13 in Tomes I & II).

222 Tib. inserts *ci'i phyir* which is not found in the Sanskrit text.

223 Ms.(10a.2): *ca niṣyanda-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.34.

224 Read: *pravṛttivijñānam ālayavijñānasyādhipatipratyayo na hetupratyaya iti*, omitting: *[ahetupratyayatvāt]* from Y34.13; Ms.(10a.3): *-layavijñānasyādhipatipratyayo na hetupratyaya iti*. Tib. *'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa'i bdag po'i rkyen te / rgyu'i rkyen ma yin pas* (D205b.7).

[4] **Sense-experience refers to sensation**; It is [described as] sense-experience since just the three modes [of sensation] are 'partaken of'[225]; what is meant is: they are experienced. Sensation is like the essence of the flavour of existence. Due to the latter, naive people are attached to sense-objects[226] for the sake of the full sensory experience of them. Others believe that sense-experience refers not just to sensation but also to the perception of objects, but this is not so because it is in contradiction with [Vasubandhu's] commentary which states: "sense-experience refers to sensation". Moreover, since the perception of an object is not different from consciousness, it would not be logically tenable[227] that it can be a mental concomitant. **The discrimination** of what has been sensed **refers to ideation**, because it consists in the apprehension of the particulars, such as what is pleasurable. **The stimulations** towards sense-experience and ideation **refer to the formative forces of consciousness**[228]**, volition and mental attention etc.**

Y35 [5] Alternatively, he says: "sense-experience refers to sensation", because one experiences an objective support according to its nature; and because one experiences the *karma* of what is to be sensed as pleasure etc. Thus[229], since sensation consists in the sensory experience of both sense-objects and their *karma*, it is sense-experience. Discrimination refers to ideation since it discriminates the mark (*cihna*) of the sense-object, i.e. its conventional sign (*vyavahāra-nimitta*). The stimulations towards different objective supports on the part of consciousness are the formative forces[230]; hence, through the influence of volition etc., consciousness 'partakes of' a different objective support[231]. Will-power and the like are referred to by the term "etc.".

The actualizing [characteristic] has now been described in terms of from whence [it manifests], what kind of nature[232] it possesses and its purpose.

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225 Read: *upabhujyata* as per Ms.(10a.3), in place of *upabhukṣyata*.

226 Read (with T&B): *viṣayeṣu sajyante* in place of *viṣayam abhiniveśanti*; Tib. *yul mams la chags* (D206a.2).

227 Read: *yujyate* as per Ms.(10a.4) in place of *prayujyate*.

228 Read: *upabhoge saṃjñāyāṃ ca prerakāḥ saṃskārā vijñānasya* in place of *upabhoge saṃjñāyāṃ ca vijñānapravartakāḥ saṃskārāḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.5.

229 Ms.(10a.5): *evaṃ tu*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.34.

230 Read: *ālambane prerakāḥ* in place of *ālambana ābhogāḥ*; Tib. *dmigs pa ...la 'jug par byed pa dag ni* (D206a.5).

231 Ms.(10a.6): *-mbanāntaraṃ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.35.

232 Read: *uktā yato yādṛśī yadarthā ca pravṛttir iti* as per Ms.(10a.6) in place of *uktaṃ yato yādṛśo yadarthā ca pravṛttir iti*.

h. The Characteristic of Defilement.

N21.8 Now he states the characteristic of defilement:

I.10 abcd — Due to: (a) concealing, (b) implanting, (c) conducting, (d) encapsulating, (e) completing, (f) threefold discriminating, (g) sense-experiencing and (h) attracting;

I.11 ab — (i) Fettering, (j) directing and (k) suffering - the world is defiled.

In the above: (a) it is due to concealing, because of the obstruction of [one's] vision [of phenomena] as they are in reality, by ignorance. (b) It is due to implanting, because of the establishment of the latent impressions of *karma* in consciousness, by the formative forces. (c) It is due to conducting, because it is made to reach the place of rebirth, by consciousness. (d) It is due to encapsulating, of the individual nature by name / form. (e) It is due to completing, by the six sense-fields. (f) It is due to threefold discriminating, by contact. (g) It is due to sense-experiencing, through sensation. (h) It is due to the attracting, of the new existence projected through *karma*, by craving. (i) It is due to the fettering, of consciousness to the sense-desires etc. that are conducive to rebirth, through the graspings. (j) It is due to directing, because the *karma* that has been performed is directed towards the provision of the *karma*-result in the new existence, by becoming. (k) It is due to suffering that the world is completely defiled, by birth, old-age and death. This:

I.11 cd — Threefold, twofold and sevenfold defilement [manifests] from the imagination of what is unreal.

Defilement is threefold: the defilement of moral defilement, the defilement of *karma* and the defilement of rebirth. Of these, the defilement of moral defilement consists in ignorance, craving and grasping. The defilement of *karma* consists in the formative forces and becoming. The defilement of rebirth consists in the remaining [seven] elements.

N22 Defilement is twofold: defilement as cause and defilement as result. Of these, the defilement as cause includes those elements which have moral defilement and *karma* for their own-being. Defilement as result includes the remaining [elements].

Sevenfold defilement refers to the seven types of causes: (a) the cause of erroneous inversion, (b) the cause of projection, (c) the cause of leading, (d) the cause of possession, (e) the cause of sense-experience, (f) the cause of attraction and (g) the cause of anxiety[233]. Of these, the cause of erroneous inversion is ignorance. The cause of projection is the formative forces. The cause of leading is consciousness. The cause of possession is name / form and the six sense-fields. The cause of sense-experience is contact and sensation. The cause of attraction is craving, grasping and becoming. The cause of anxiety is birth, old-age and death. And all of these defilements manifest from the imagination of what is unreal.

[Sthiramati]

Y35.6 [1] **Now he states the characteristic[234] of defilement.** The characteristic of defilement refers to that mode in which the defilements of moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth, while in the process of manifesting, lead to the complete defilement of the world. Although it is insubstantial[235], *saṃsāra* is generated just from the imagination of what is unreal. In order to demonstrate this it is stated:

I.10 ab **Due to: (a) concealing, (b) implanting, (c) conducting, .(d) encapsulating etc.**

These twelve elements of dependent origination are shown with reference to[236] the actualizing side [of consciousness].

[2] **In the above, it is due to concealing, ...that the world is defiled;** the latter portion of this statement [i.e. "the world is defiled"] refers to all [twelve elements]. How is it that [the world] is defiled due to concealing and by what is it concealed? Hence he says: **because of the obstruction of [one's] vision [of phenomena] as they are in reality, by ignorance.** Since ignorance[237] consists in the absence of vision, when the sphere of one's vision of reality is hidden, the vision of what is real does not arise. Consequently, because it obstructs the arising of one's vision of the real, ignorance is an obstruction to [the arising of] the vision of what is real; furthermore, the vision of the real consists chiefly in supramundane wisdom. The latter, which is subsequently attained because it arises subsequently [to the path of vision] and which consists in learning, reflection and meditative development which

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233 This passage concerning the seven causes is omitted from the Tib., i.e. from *viparyāsahetuḥ* to *udvegahetuś ca* of the Bhāṣya (N22.2 - 22.4); cf. Tib. Bhāṣya D4a.1.

234 Ms.(10a.6): *-lakṣaṇaṃ ca*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.35.

235 Read: *tac ca nairātmyam apy* in place of *tac cāsato 'py ātmano*; Tib. *de ni bdag med par yaṅ* (D206a.7).

236 Read: *adhikṛtya* as per Ms.(10a.7), in place of *adhi.*

237 Ms.(10a.8): *avidyayā* but Y's emendation to *avidyāyā* is preferred; cf. his fn.4 p.35

purify it because of that understanding, is described as the vision of the real[238]. Because it obstructs the vision of what is real, ignorance is described as the causal condition for the formative forces, thus it is said: "due to concealing by ignorance, the world is defiled".

[3] **It is due to implanting;** that the world is defiled - this is understood. As to the agent, locus and object of implanting, he says: **of the latent impressions of**
Y36 ***karma* in consciousness, by the formative forces.** Therein, the formative forces consist in *karma* of body, speech and mind and its essential nature can be virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral. It is a formative force (*saṃskāra*) since it formatively influences (*abhisaṃskaroti*) the new existence; what is meant is: it implants what was not previously implanted[239]; it is just this [sense] that is expressed by the term "formative force", but not all [its meanings]. Moreover, since they have the capacity to project the new existence because of the influence of ignorance[240] and not merely on account of their existence, it is said that the formative forces have ignorance for their causal condition. Accordingly, they bring about the new existence for one whose knowledge[241] has not yet arisen, but not for one whose knowledge has arisen. Ignorance is not described as the causal condition for the formative forces merely as the predominant [causal condition] because it is the general causal condition in the manifestation [of the new existence] as well, for ignorance is likewise associated with all moral defilement. Just as it is the causal condition in general for the arising of the moral defilements that do arise[242], so too is it [the causal condition] for the volitions which arise[243] from the latter. Even when the [meritorious][244] formative forces manifest, i.e. those that follow as a consequence of the genuine wish for[245] the special states of existence and enjoyments, ignorance which is innate to them[246], is their general causal condition. Also, [when there is the arising] of neutral[247] [formative forces] that arise[248] with the notion that one can escape to those levels[249], ignorance, which is

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238 Read: *tatpṛṣṭhodbhavāt tatpṛṣṭhalabdhā tadavabodhāc ca tadviśodakaśrutacintābhāvanāmayī bhūtadarśanam ity ucyate* in place of *tatpṛṣṭhodbhavāt tatpṛṣṭhalābhāt tadavagamāc ca tatprayogaśrutacintābhāvanāmayī bhūtadarśanam ity ucyate* Ms.(10b.1): *-mayī...* not *-m api...* as T&B's reading indicates; (cf. 30.3).

239 Read: *āropitaṃ ropayatīty arthaḥ* in place of *apraṇihitaṃ rohayatīty arthaḥ*; Tib. *ma btab pa 'debs źes bya ba'i tha tshig* (D206b.6).

240 Ms.(10b.2): *cāvidyādhipatyāt*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.36.

241 Tib.:*avidyā* (*ma rig pa*) for *vidyā* (cf. D206b.6).

242 Read (with T&B30.14): *yathā kleśasamutthānāṃ sāmānyena (samutthāna)*-pratyayas* in place of *yathā samutthānakleśānāṃ sāmānyapratyayas*; Ms.(10b.3): *-mānyena samutthānapratyayaḥ*; *Tib. omits *samutthāna* and has:*ji ltar ñon moṅs pa kun nas 'byuṅ ba rnams kyi spyi'i rkyen yin pa* (D206b.7 - 207a.1).

243 Ms.(10b.3): *samutthānānāṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.36.

244 Tib. inserts: *puṇyānām* (*bsod nams*) which is not found in the Ms.

245 Ms.(10b.3): *prārthanānvayānāṃ*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.36.

246 Read: *tatsahabhūr avidyā* as per Ms.(10b.3) in place of *tatsahabhūtāvidyā*; disregard Y's fn. 7 p.36.

247 Ms.(10b.3): *āniñjyānāṃ*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.36.

248 Read: *-samutthānāṃ* as per Ms.(10b.3), in place of *-samutthānānāṃ*.

249 Tib. omits *bhumi* (cf.D207a.2).

innate to them[250], is their general[251] causal condition. Thus it is described as the causal condition for the formative forces. In the above, the store-consciousness is intended by the term: "consciousness", and not the actual consciousness because of the impossibility of being conveyed to the place of rebirth by the actual consciousness whose continuity is interrupted[252], and also because the latent impressions of *karma* are not established therein by the formative forces since both the wholesome and defiled [*dharmas*] cannot be brought together. When [Vasubandhu] says: "[it is due to the implanting] of the latent impressions of *karma*...", just what is this that is described as the latent impression of *karma*? It is the 'seed' of the future birth[253], i.e. a causal entity. For example, a grain of rice is the seed, i.e. the causal entity, for the arising of a sprout [which develops] through a transformation in dependence upon special conditions such
Y37 as soil, ash and manure. **Because of the establishment...**; this term expresses implanting again through a different synonym. Furthermore, "establishment" in this context refers to the augmentation of that 'seed' in the continuum of consciousness from the very beginning[254], by these [formative forces]; for, no previously non-existent 'seed' of any *dharma* that is accompanied by impurity is generated, like in the case of one without impurity. In this way, the world is defiled due to the generation of the 'seed' of the new existence in consciousness , by the formative forces.

[4] **It is due to conducting;** that the world is defiled. Since the agent, locus and object of conducting is not discerned, he says: **because it is made to reach[255] the place of rebirth[256], by consciousness.** Conducting refers to the conveying of the latent impressions of the 'seed' of the new existence, from the place of death to the place of rebirth, by consciousness which is fully developed by *karma* and which functions as a continuum[257]. After considering it in this way[258], then the consciousness at conception cannot have the formative forces for its causal condition; and it has been demonstrated that only the consciousness belonging to the previous existence has the formative forces for its causal condition, because the arising of an effect from a cause that has perished is not tenable. Since those who have gained the formless attainments are reborn in that very place where they die, how can they be conveyed to a place of rebirth in the formless [realms]? [Rather] it should be understood according to the circumstances, as is the case with name / form.

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250 Cf. fn. 246 above.

251 Ms.(10b.3): *sāmānya*; disregard Y's fn.9 p.36.

252 Read (with T&B30.20): *santānocchedena pravṛttivijñānena cotpatti-*, in place of *vyuparamapravṛttivijñānasya*; Tib. *rgyun chad pa dan 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pas skye ba'i-* (D207a.3).

253 Tib. omits *janmano*; cf. D207a.4.

254 *tatprathamatas*; Tib. *des thog ma kho na'i* (D207a.5).

255 Read: *samprāpaṇād* in place of *sampreṣaṇād*; Ms.(10b.6): seems to read: *samprakṣaṇād* with the *kṣa* expunged; cf. Bhāṣya N21.14.

256 *utpatti*, but Bhāṣya *upapatti*; cf. N21.14.

257 Ms.(10b.6): *vijñānena*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.37.

258 Read: *evaṃ kṛtvā* in place of *tathā ca sati*; Tib. *de ltar byas na* (D207a.7).

[5] **It is due to encapsulating**[259]; that the world is defiled. As to the agent, locus[260] and object of encapsulation[261], he says: **of the individual nature, by name / form.** Because name / form are [equivalent to] the five aggregates. The latter, after appropriating conception, while in the first, second, third, fourth and fifth stages of embryonic development[262], and before the six sense-fields have arisen, comprise name / form which have consciousness for their causal condition. Thus, the differentiation into different homogeneous groups is accomplished through a special activation within that [name / form]. And when the latter have arisen, their individual nature is differentiated due to the difference in homogeneous groups, such as between human and animal; thus it is said that the individual nature is encapsulated by name / form. Alternatively, it envelops the whole individual nature up until death[263] because the whole is determined as a causal state from the beginning. Or else, although it is not differentiated[264], the individual nature is enveloped by name / form, thus he shows it to
Y38 be separate; just as everything conditioned is included in the five aggregates [yet are separate from them]; however, only[265] the sense-fields of creatures of miraculous birth (*aupapāduka*) have consciousness for their causal condition[266] [and not name / form]. Consequently, it should be known that name / form have consciousness for their causal condition, according to the circumstances.

[6] **It is due to completion**; that [the world] is defiled[267]. As to the agent, locus[268] and object of completion, he says: of the individual nature which is included in name / form[269], **by the six sense-fields.** For the individual nature[270] is described as incomplete in the state of name / form because of the absence of the sense-fields of sight etc. Moreover, although the tactile and mind sense-fields do exist in that state, they too are definitely incomplete because as a ['field' comprising] both that which is based [i.e. the object of the senses] and the basis [i.e. the sense organs], it is incomplete. Furthermore, the basis[271] is complete in the state of the six sense-fields because of the actualization of sight etc. The tactile sense-field is also complete because of the

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259 Read: *samparigrahāt* in place of *parigrahāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.14.
260 Tib. inserts *kva* (*gaṅ du*); cf. D207b.2.
261 Read: *samparigrahāt* in place of *parigrahāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.14.
262 Read: *kalalārbudaghanapeśīpraśākhāvasthā* as per Ms.(10b.8) in place of *kalalārbudapeśīghana–praśākhāvasthā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.37. Cf. Mvy. # 4067-71.
263 Read: *ā maraṇāt* as per Ms.(11a.1) in place of *'maraṇāt*..
264 Read: *abhinno 'pi* in place of *abhinnam api.*
265 Ms.(11a.2): *eveti*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.38.
266 Ms.(11a.2): *vijñānapratyayaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.38.
267 Tib. inserts *jagat* (*'gro ba*); cf. D207b.6.
268 Tib. inserts: *kva* (*gaṇ du*); cf. D207b.6.
269 Read : *nāmarūpasaṃgṛhītasya ātmabhāvasya* in place of *nāmarūpasaṃgṛhītaṃ śarīram*; Tib. *miṅ daṅ gzugs su bsdus pa'i lus te* (D207b.7). Ms.(11a.2): *nāmarūpasaṃgṛhīta-*.
270 Read: *ātmabhāvo 'paripūrṇa ucyate* in place of *śarīram aparipūrṇam ucyate*; cf. ibid.
271 Ms.(11a.3): *āśrita*, but Y's rendering of *āśraya* is preferred.

completion of sight etc. which is based on it[272]. How is it that sight etc. are based on it[273]? Because their functioning depends upon it. The mind sense-field too, which is included in the six consciousnesses, is completed at this time because of the completion of the basis [274] in its entirety. Also, since the major and minor members [of the body] are complete[275] only in the state of the six sense-fields[276] because the basis is complete, it is said that the world is defiled by the six sense-fields.

[7] **It is due to threefold discriminating;** "that the world is defiled" is understood. "Threefold" refers to the combination of sense faculty, sense-object and consciousness. **Contact** refers to the discrimination of the three modes of modification of the sense faculty and is conducive to the arising of the sensation of pleasure etc. It is described as contact (*sparśa*) since it is an aspect of that likeness of modification of the sense faculty which it touches (*spṛṣati*)[277]. Alternatively, contact which has the six sense-fields for its causal condition, produces a threefold modification of the sense faculty that is conducive to the sensation of pleasure etc.

[8] **It is due to sense-experiencing[278], through sensation;** because sensation
Y39 is experienced on account of craving; what is meant is: 'consumed with relish'. Alternatively, the sense-experience of sensation is due to the experience of *karma*[279] that is virtuous etc. Alternatively, in this context sense-experience refers to the experience of a sensation and when pleasure etc. is experienced, due to the full development therein of [sensations] such as pleasure, the world is defiled by [subsequent] passion, hatred and delusion.

[9] **It is due to the attracting;** since the agent and object of attraction are not discerned, he says: **of the new existence projected through *karma*, by craving;** i.e. [the attraction] of the new existence projected due to the maturation of its 'seed' on account of the formative forces in consciousness, by craving, which can be likened to the moisture[280] [in the generation of a seed]. Then, after securing the generation of the new existence on account of the 'moistening', i.e. on account of the indiscriminate

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272 Read (with T&B32.7): *tadāśritānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ* in place of *taccakṣurādyāśritānāṃ;* Tib. *mig la sogs pa de la brten pa rnams* (D208a.1).

273 Read (with N.Amend. p.21): *kathaṃ cakṣurādayaḥ tadāśritāḥ* in place of *kathaṃ taccakṣurādyāśritaṃ*; Ms.(11a.4): *-ḥ*. Tib. *de ltar mig la sogs pa de la brten źe na* (D208a.1).

274 Read: *paripūritaḥ* as per Ms.(11a.4) in place of *paripūritāt.*

275 Read: *paripūritaś ca* in place of *paripūritāc ca*; cf. fn.274. Ms.(11a.4): *paripūriś ca*

276 Ms.(11a.4): *ṣaḍāyatanāvasthāyām evam,* but Y's rendering of *-āvasthāyām evā-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.: *skye mched drug gi dus ñid na* (cf. D208a.2).

277 The Tib. reads differently: "...since it makes contact through a similarity in aspect of that which is a modification of the sense faculty: *de bas na dbaṅ po'i 'gyur pa gaṅ yin pa de'i rnam pa daṅ 'dra bar reg pa byed pas reg pa źes bya'o*; cf. T-Bhāṣya L20.8: "Furthermore, since contact touches the sense faculty through a likeness of modification of the sense faculty, it is described as 'contact'; *sparśaḥ punar indriyavikārasādṛśyena indriyaṃ spṛśatīndriyeṇa vā spṛśyata iti sparśa ucyate.* Cf. also St's fn.83 p.143.

278 Ms.(11a.6): *-ṇaḥ // upabhogād* ?!

279 Omit *phala* (Y38.24) since it is not found either in Tib. nor in the Ms.

280 Read: *punarbhavasyāpkalpayā* as per Ms.(11a.7): in place of *punarbhavasyodakakalpayā*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.39.

wish for an individual nature in all states of existence, that which establishes the generation is 'attraction'[281].

[10] **It is due to the fettering;** when questioned as to the agent, locus and object of fettering, [Vasubandhu] himself says: **of consciousness to the sense-desires etc. that are conducive to rebirth[282], through the graspings.** Consciousness, which is projected by *karma* by means of the four graspings that are characterized by notional attachment[283] and the passion of sense-desire, is fettered to, i.e. fixed in[284] sense-desire, false view, morality and observances and false view of self[285] which are conducive to rebirth because consciousness abides therein [in the new birth] by force of the passion of sense-desire[286].

[11] **It is due to directing;** here too when questioned by another, [Vasubandhu] himself responds: **because the *karma* that has been performed is directed towards the provision of the *karma*-result in the new existence[287], by becoming.** Thus, the *karma* performed in the past is the cause of consciousness and as being pertinent to the new existence is in a state of latent impression; it receives an existence since the 'fruit' of the *karma*-result acquires a functional status and is directed towards accomplishing the projection of an existence[288]. Thus the world is defiled due to directing[289], by becoming.

[12] **It is due to suffering that the world is completely defiled by birth, old-age and death[290].** Thus, when there is the actualization of the new existence
Y40 due to becoming, from the very outset [the world] is defiled as the consequence of the coagulation of consciousness in semen and blood at the time of impregnation. Similarly, it is defiled due to the to-and-fro movement [of the foetus] midway between the stomach and the abdomen of the mother. Similarly, it is defiled because of the mother's inability to dispel anxiety and anguish when eating and moving about.

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281 Read: *-ābhilāṣākhyena ārdrīkaraṇeṇa punarbhavotpādakam upayujya yadutpādakavyavasthāpanaṃ tat karṣaṇam* in place of *-ābhilāṣeti yad ārdrīkṛtya punarbhavam utpattāv upayuṅkta utpattiṃ cāvasthāpayati tat karṣaṇam*; Tib. *'dod pa źes bya bas brlan nas yaṅ srid pa 'byuṅ bar ñe bar sbyor źiṅ 'byuṅ ba ṅes par 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni sdud pa* (D208a.7).

282 *upapatti*, but Bhāṣya *utpatti*, cf. N21.17.

283 Tib. (D208b.1) inserts *abhiniveśa* (*mṇon par źen pa*) which is not in the Sanskrit.

284 Read: *nibadhyate 'vasthāpyate* in place of *nibandhayaty avasthāpayati ca*; Tib. *sbyor ba byed 'jog par byed de* (D208b.2).

285 Read: *ātmadṛṣṭiṣu* in place of *ātmavādeṣu*; Tib. *bdag tu lta ba dag tu* (D208b.2).

286 Read (with T&B33.8): *tathā hi chandarāgavāśād vijñānam tatrāvatiṣṭhate* in place of *vijñānaṃ hi cchandarāgavaśāt tatra vartate*; Tib. *'di ltar 'dun pa'i 'dod chags kyi dbaṅ gis rnam par śes pa der gnas* (D208b.2).

287 Ms.(11b.1): *punarbhavavipāka-*, but Bhāṣya (cf. N21.19): *punarbhave vipāka-*.

288 The Sanskrit fragments of this passage are difficult to reconcile with the Tib. hence it is translated on the basis of the Tib. *ji ltar sṅon byas pa'i las rnam par śes pa'i rgyu yaṅ 'byuṅ bas bag chags kyi dus su gyur ba rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu'i phyir (/) 'jug pa rñed pas srid pa yod par gyur ciṅ srid pa btab pa 'grub par mṅon du gyur pa ste* (D208b.3-4).

289 Read: *ābhimukhyāj* in place of *ābhimukhīkaraṇāj*; Tib. *mṅon du'i phyir* (D208b.4).

290 Read: *duḥkhanāj jātyā jarāmaraṇena ca kliśyate jagat iti* in place of *duḥkhitāj jātyā jarāmaraṇena ca kiṃ kliśyante jagantīti*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.19. Ms.(11b.2): *-khanāj jātyā jarāmaraṇena ca (kiṃ) kliśyate jagad iti*; disregard Y's fns. 5 & 7.

Similarly, the world[291] is defiled by coming out[292] [of the womb] through a restricted and impure passage. Again, the world is defiled insofar as one is born only to be deprived of[293] cherished youth and vitality by old-age characterized by baldness and grey hair etc.[294] and by death which is characterized by the dissolution[295] of name / form.

[13] Since it is in motion (*gacchati*), it is [described as] the 'moving', [i.e. the world] (*jagat*); what is meant is: it progresses from an homogeneous condition to a momentary condition. By "it is defiled" is meant: in [all] the three realms of existence, [the world] is afflicted on account of birth, old-age, sickness and death etc. and on account of its incessant motion through a regular succession of moments. Others believe that the term "it is defiled" means: 'it is not purified'. Thus, these twelve elements of dependent origination which are characterized by defilement, arise on account of these eleven modes beginning with "due to concealing" as the direct counterpart to purification; and, beginning with ignorance, they form a sequential progression, since each subsequent element is brought about by each preceding element.

[14] How many kinds of defilement have been demonstrated in total through these twelve elements of dependent origination? Hence he says:[296] these twelve elements of dependent origination are:

I.11 cd **Threefold, twofold and sevenfold defilement[297].**

The word "and" has a conjunctive and repetitive[298] sense. Since moral defilement itself is defilement, it is described as the defilement of moral defilement. Similarly are the defilements that consist in *karma* and rebirth [so-called], for moral defilement manifests as defilement [in general] because it is harmful to both oneself and others; as is said in a Sūtra: "one who is enamoured[299] and overcome with passion is intent upon harming
Y41 himself, is intent upon harming others and is intent upon harm in both [this and the next world]. Aversion and delusion should be understood in the same way."[300] And it is defilement because the defilements that consist in *karma* and rebirth are generated; accordingly, the *karma* projects the rebirth under the influence of moral defilement. Since the projection of the new existence does not occur for one who has seen the truth even when there is *karma*, because the 'seed' of the new existence is caused to come

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291 Tib. (208b.6) omits *jagat* (*'gro ba*).
292 Ms.(11b.3): *nirgacchat*, but *nirgacchati* is preferred.
293 Ms.(11b.3): *bhraśyamānaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.40.
294 Ms.(11b.3): *khālityapālityādi-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.40.
295 *bheda*; Tib. *'jig pa* (D208b.7).
296 Read: *ity ata idam* as per Ms.(11b.5) in place of *ity ata evedam*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.40.
297 Read: *tredhā dvedhā ca saṃkleśaḥ saptadhā* in place of *tridhā dvīdhā ca saṃkleśaḥ saptadhā*; cf. Bhāṣya N21.21.
298 Tib. *go bsnor ba* (D209a.4).
299 Read: *sūtre / rakto* as per Ms.(11b.6) in place of *sūtre 'pi rakto*.
300 From Aṅguttara-nikāya III.54.

into being [only] on account of the manifestation of moral defilement and since there is the bond of conception in a new existence for one whose mind is defiled, the defilement that consists in rebirth is a cause [for the defilement of the world]. Consequently, since the Arhat does not possess a defiled mind, there is no bond of conception. Moreover, *karma* whether pure or impure is [equivalent to] defilement because it both causes bodily and mental fatigue in the present[301] and provides the *karma*-result in the future. Rebirth too is [equivalent to] defilement because it is the locus of all misfortune.

[15] **Defilement is threefold**; because the cause is differentiated as twofold. **The defilement of moral defilement consists in ignorance, craving and grasping**[302]; the latter form a trio because they have the nature of moral defilement. **The defilement of *karma* consists in the formative forces and becoming**; the latter form a pair because they have the nature of *karma*. However, there is this difference: *karma*, in its state as essential nature consists in the formative forces, but in its state as 'seed' it consists in becoming. **The defilement of rebirth consists in the remaining [seven] elements**, i.e. consciousness, name / form, the six sense-fields, contact, sensation, birth, old-age and death, since these are included within rebirth.

[16] **Defilement is twofold**, since the cause is not differentiated. **The defilement as cause includes those elements which have moral defilement and *karma* for their own-being**[303]**; defilement as result includes the remaining elements.** Of these, the defilement as cause[304] is pertinent to *karma* and moral defilement because the latter are engaged in the generation of rebirth which: (a) begins with consciousness and concludes with sensation, (b) has the nature of birth and (c) possesses the distress of old-age and death[305]. Moreover, defilement as result includes the remaining elements beginning with consciousness, because they are the result of *karma* and moral defilement.

[17] Furthermore, that same process of dependent origination consists in a **sevenfold defilement which refers to seven kinds of causes** because they are the causes of: (a) erroneous inversion, (b) projection, (c) leading, (d) possession, (e) sense-experience, (f) attraction and (g) agitation. **Of these, the cause of erroneous**
Y42 **inversion is ignorance**, for one who has succumbed to ignorance erroneously inverts what is impermanent etc. as being of the nature of something permanent etc.[306]

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301 Ms.(11b.8): *tadātve*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.41.

302 Ms.(11b.8): *'vidyātṛṣṇopādānānīti*; disregard Y's fn. 2 p.41.

303 Read: *svabhāvair* in place of *svarūpair*, cf. Bhāṣya N22.1.

304 Tib. omits: *hetusaṃkleśatvaṃ*; cf. D209b.5.

305 Read: *jarāmaraṇādīnavaṃ janma*; as per Ms.(12a.2) in place of *jarāmaraṇādinavajanma*..

306 Read: *viparyasyati* as per Ms.(12a.3) in place of *darśanād viparyāsa ucyate* and contrary to Y's fn.1 p.42; Tib. is slightly different: "... by seeing the nature of something permanent in what is impermanent etc." *...mi rtag pa la sogs pa la rtag pa'i ṅo bor mthoṅ bas* (D210a.1).

due to his confusion about reality. **The cause of projection is the formative forces**, because they establish in consciousness the 'seed' of rebirth which consists in four of the elements [of dependent origination]. **The cause of leading**[307] **is consciousness**, because it conveys one who has died here in this world to the place of rebirth. **The cause of possession is both name / form and the six sense-fields**, because that which is led [i.e. consciousness] possesses a [particular] homogeneous grouping on account of name / form and the six sense-fields. The possession just by name / form was mentioned in the above where the womb of creatures born from a womb was intended. Here, the possession by the six sense-fields as well is mentioned having regard for creatures of miraculous birth. Alternatively he wishes to say that, prior to [its possession] by the latter, just the individual nature is possessed by name / form; however, since it refers to [the possession][308] of either the completed [state], or that which is incomplete - there is no contradiction here. **The cause of sense-experience is contact and sensation**[309], because the sense-experience of wholesome and unwholesome *karma*-result is on account of experience, together with its cause. **The cause of attraction is craving, grasping and becoming**; a naive person whose *karma*-result has been experienced, craves for various feelings; when craving intensifies he clings to sense-desires etc. on account of his craving for both the union with, and non-separation from, the latter. As the consequence of the grasping for these [sense-desires] his *karma* belonging to the past, which pertains to the new existence and which is in a state of latent impression, is transformed. This leads to the imparting of the *karma*-result, in accordance with what has been projected, then after being activated it is 'becoming'. Moreover, that [*karma*] is attracted, i.e. is directed[310] towards the actualization of the new existence projected by the formative forces on account of craving, grasping and becoming. Alternatively, craving, grasping and becoming are the cause of attraction since they are directed towards one of the two latent impressions of *karma* conducive to the passion of sense-desire, on account of craving. **The cause of anxiety is birth, old-age and death**; thus, here one experiences the pain of birth, old-age and death among the various classes of sentient beings because of the attraction of birth, as well as [experiencing] an endless variety of suffering that consists in sorrow, lamentation, depression and perturbation.

Y43 [18] In the above, moral defilement and *karma*[311] are shown as general and specific causes [respectively] of rebirth, through the description of threefold defilement. Moral defilement is the general cause [in the germination] of the 'sprout' of rebirth, just as soil is [for a plant]; however, *karma* is the specific cause, just as the seed is [the specific

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307 Read: *upanayahetur* in place of *upanayanahetur*; cf. Bhāṣya N22.5.
308 Tib. inserts *parigraha* (*'dzin pa*); cf. D210a.3.
309 Read: *sparśavedana iti* in place of *sparśavedanā iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N22.7. Ms.(12a.5): *-vedane iti*.
310 *abhimukhīkriyate*, but Tib. *mṅon par 'du byed* (*abhisaṃskriyate*); cf. D210a.6.
311 Read: *kleśakarmaṇor* as per Ms.(12a.8) in place of *kleśakarmaṇo*.

cause] for its sprout because the differentiation among rebirths is according to the differentiation in that [*karma*]. Alternatively, although there are not three separate segments that comprise the past, present and future in this regard [i.e. dependent origination], he nevertheless demonstrates that it does consist in *karma*, moral defilement and their result.

[19] Through the statement about twofold[312] [defilement] he demonstrates that this[313] is merely cause and result and that no other agent of action nor agent of sensation is defiled in this regard. Alternatively, the cause refers just to *karma* and moral defilement in this context because it is seen that the presence or absence of rebirth is due to the presence or absence of these two [i.e. *karma* and moral defilement]; hence, rebirth is indeed the result of them. Therefore, he demonstrates that there is neither cause nor result in this regard, but in every case [i.e. in each of the twelve elements] there is a state possessing the five aggregates.

[20] Furthermore, two kinds of dependent origination have been demonstrated through the explanation of the sevenfold causes, namely: that characterized by projection and that characterized by actualization. Of these, that characterized by projection has been explained through the seven elements of dependent origination by demonstrating: (a) that by which it is projected, (b) the way in which it is projected and (c) that which is projected. That which is characterized by actualization [has been explained] through the five [remaining] elements [by demonstrating]: (a) that by which there is the actualization of what has been projected, (b) the way in which it actualizes and (c) the actualization [itself], as well as the distress [implicit] therein. What is the agent of projection? The formative forces which have ignorance for their causal condition. How so? After becoming acquainted with erroneous inversion due to delusion about reality[314], [ignorance] formatively influences the wholesome, unwholesome and neutral formative forces. How is it projected by those formative forces? They establish it in the appropriate place[315] of rebirth due to the development of the 'seeds' in consciousness. What is projected? All that pertains to the new existence, i.e. name / form, the six sense-fields, contact and sensation, respectively. By what means is there the actualization of that which is projected in this way? As has been said, [it is actualized] in stages from what was previously projected through grasping which has for its causal condition that craving which has already arisen in dependence upon the sensation that has arisen in the present lifetime. How is it actualized through this [grasping]? The *karma* which is in the state of latent impression within consciousness is caused to come into being through that [grasping], for many kinds of latent

312 Read: *dvidhā*... as per Ms.(12b.1) in place of *dvividhā*...

313 Ms.(12b.1): *evedan*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.43.

314 Read (with T&B): *kathaṃ tattvamohād viparyāsaṃ jñātvā* in place of *yathā tattve mugdhvā viparītaṃ saṃjānāti*; Tib. *ji ltar de kho na la rmoṅs nas phyin ci log tu śes te* (D210b.7).

315 *bhavyatā*; Tib. *nus pa* (D210b.7).

impressions of *karma* exist in consciousness because it is fully developed by various
Y44 kinds of formative forces. That on account of which there is a new existence, because it is encapsulated by a special grasping, is described here as 'becoming'. Just what is this actualization? It is that birth in the future of the name / form etc. that has been projected. Now, when that occurs what is distressful? Old-age and death, because one is deprived of cherished youth and vitality[316]. [Objection]: What if one were to suggest that the 'cause of leading' is meaningless here? [Response]: It is not meaningless[317] for [its inclusion] is for the purpose of removing the understanding[318] that, after the existence that pertains to death is severed, there is the arising of a [new] existence that pertains to birth [- thus invalidating dependent origination].

[21] **All these defilements manifest from the imagination of what is unreal**[319], since the mind and the mental concomitants are the basis of defilement[320]. Moreover, it has been stated that:[321] "the imagination of what is unreal consists in the mind and the mental concomitants that pertain to the three realms of existence" (I.8 ab).

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316 Ms.(12b.1): *-jīvata-* but Y's *-jīvita-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.(*srog*); cf. D211a.4.

317 Ms.(12b.6): *atra tūpanayahetur na nirarthakaḥ* but Y's *tūpanayahetur nirartha iti cet na nirarthakaḥ* is preferred on the basis of Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.44.

318 Read: *adhigamanirākaraṇārthaṃ* in place of *adhigamaṃ nirākaraṇārthaṃ*; Tib. *rtog pa bsal ba'i phyir* (D211a.4).

319 Read: *sarvaś caiṣa saṃkleśo 'bhūtaparikalpāt pravartata iti* in place of *ime sarve saṃkleśā abhūtaparikalpāt pravartanta iti*; Ms.(12b.7): *-'bhūtaparikalpāt pravartata iti*. Cf. also Bhāṣya N22.8.

320 Read: *cittacaittāśrayatvāt saṃkleśasya* as per Ms.(12b.7) in place of *cittacaittā āśrayatvāt saṃkleśasya*; Tib. *sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba rnams ni kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i gnas yin pa'i phyir te* (D211a.5).

321 Read: *uktaṃ caitad* in place of *uktaṃ hi tad*; Ms.(12b.7): *uktaś caitad*, Tib. *de yaṅ ...źes bśad pa yin no* (D211a.5).

The Summary Meaning of the Imagination of What is Unreal.

N22.11 **[To recapitulate], the summary meaning of the imagination of what is unreal is revealed as consisting in nine types of characteristic: (a) the characteristic of existence, (b) the characteristic of non-existence, (c) the individual characteristic, (d) the characteristic of the totality, (e) the characteristic of the expedient for entry into the characteristic of non-existence, (f) the characteristic of the differentiation, (g) the characteristic of the synonyms, (h) the actualizing characteristic and (i) the characteristic of defilement.**

[Sthiramati]

Y44.13 **[To recapitulate], the summary meaning of the imagination of what is unreal...**; the explanation of the meaning in detail is for the purpose of reaching an understanding with ease. Whereas the xplanation of the summary meaning is for the purpose of remembering it. Consequently, both meanings are stated here: **(a) The characteristic of existence**: "there is the imagination of what is unreal" (I.1 a). **(b) The characteristic of non-existence**: "the duality is not found therein" (I.1 b). **(c) The individual characteristic**: "consciousness comes into being in the appearances of objects, sentient beings, the self and representations" (I.3 ab). **(d) The characteristic of the totality**: "the imaginary, the other-dependent and indeed the perfected" (I.5 ab). **(e) The characteristic of the expedient for entry into the characteristic of non-existence**: "based upon perception, non-perception comes into being" (I.6 ab). **(f) The characteristic of the differentiation**: "the imagination of what is unreal consists in the mind and the mental concomitants that pertain to the three realms of existence" (I.8 ab). **(g) The characteristic of the synonyms**: "therein, vision in regard to the object consists in consciousness, but in regard to particulars, it consists in the mental concomitants" (I.8 cd). **(h) The actualizing characteristic**: "the first is consciousness as causal condition, the second pertains to sense-experience" (I.9 ab). **(i) the characteristic of defilement**: "due to concealing, implanting, conducting, encapsulating..." (I.10 ab) etc.

2. Emptiness.

Introductory.

N22.17 **Having thus stated the imagination of what is unreal, he now explains the way in which emptiness should be understood.**

I.12 ab **Now (a) the characteristic of emptiness, (b) its synonyms, (c) their meanings, (d) its differentiation and (e) logical proof, are to be understood in total.**

[Sthiramati]

Y45.15 [1] **Having stated the ninefold** characteristics **of the imagination of what is unreal, he now explains the manner in which emptiness should be understood**[322]. What is the relation here [between them]? The two were introduced by him [i.e. Vasubandhu] as: (a) the imagination of the unreal and emptiness; and (b) purification which is preceded by defilement and the correct determination of real nature (*dharmatā*) which has for its basis an understanding of the *dharmas*. Hence, immediately following the explanation of the imagination of the unreal, he explains the manner in which emptiness should be understood.

Y46 I.12 a **Now (a) the characteristic [of emptiness], (b) its synonyms**[323] **etc.**

(a) The characteristic, in this regard, consists in the denial of both existence and non-existence[324] because emptiness pervades all differentiations[325]. (b) A synonym is a different name[326] [for something]. (c) [The possession of] a similar quality on the part of the synonym - being the reason for the use of the synonym - constitutes the meaning of the synonyms. (d) Although [emptiness] is devoid of conceptual differentiation because it is characterized by non-differentiation, like space, differentiation [can be

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322 Read: *evam abhūtaparikalpaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ navavidhaṃ khyāpayitvā yathā śūnyatā vijñeyā tan nirdiśatīti* in place of *evam abhūtaparikalpalakṣaṇaṃ navaprakāram uktvā yathā śūnyatā jñāyate tat khyāpayatīti*; cf. Bhāṣya N22.17.

323 Read: *lakṣaṇaṃ cātha paryāya* in place of *lakṣaṇam atha paryāya*; cf. Bhāṣya N22.19.

324 Read (with T&B38.7): *tatra lakṣaṇaṃ bhāvābhāvapratiṣedhātmakaṃ* in place of *tatra lakṣaṇaṃ hi bhāvābhāvapratiṣedhātmatā*; Tib. *de la mtshan ñid ni dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa dgag pa'i bdag ñid de* (D211b.5).

325 Read: *śūnyatāyāḥ sarvaprabhedavyāpakatvāt* in place of *sarvatra śūnyatāprabhedavyāpakatvāt*; Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid kyis rab tu dbye ba thams cad la khyab pa'i phyir* (D211b.5).

326 Ms.(13a.3): *nāmānantaraṃ*, but Y's rendering of *nāmāntaraṃ* is preferred.

made] because of its different states that are associated with or are separate from adventitious secondary defilement. Moreover, its differentiation is sixteenfold according to the imputative differences in regard to the personal entity (*pudgala*) and the *dharmas*. (e) The logical proof refers to the reasoning in regard to the demonstration of the differentiation of emptiness. What then is the reason that emptiness should be understood by way of these modes? It should be understood: (a) by way of the characteristic by those who seek purity because it is the objective support of purity. (b) For the sake of non-confusion in regard to the excellent[327] explanations by means of synonyms in other Sūtras [it should be understood] by way of its synonyms. (c) When the meaning of its synonyms is understood[328] [it should be understood] by way of the meaning of its synonyms[329] because emptiness is ascertained as the objective support of purity . (d) Since it is purified when defilement is removed [it should be understood] by way of its differentiation in order to generate diligence for the relinquishment of[330] that defilement. (e) It should also be understood by way of the logical proof of its differentiation since, although there is no modification, its differentiation is easily understood due to an awareness of the logical proof of its differentiation.

a. The Characteristic of Emptiness.

N22.22 **How should the characteristic be understood?**

I.13 ab **The non-existence of the duality, which consists in the existence of a non-existent, is the characteristic of emptiness;**

There is the non-existence of the duality of apprehended object and apprehending subject. The existence of that non-existent is the charac-
N23 **teristic of emptiness. Thus it has been revealed that emptiness has the characteristic of the own-being of a non-existent. Moreover, this own-being of that non-existent, it:**

I.13 c **Neither exists nor does it not exist;**

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327 Ms.(13a.4): *paryāyāgranirdeśeṣv* contrary to Y's reading; *agra* is not found in the Tib. (cf. D211b.7).

328 Read: *paryāyārthāvabodhe* in place of *paryāyārthāvabodhārthāç*; Tib. *mam grańs kyi don khoṅ du chud par gyur na* (D211b.7 - 212a.1); Ms.(13a.4): *paryāyārthāvabodhārtha-*.

329 Read: *paryāyārthataḥ* in place of *paryāyārthaḥ* in conformity with the previous explanations.

330 Read perhaps: *-prahāṇāyādarotpādanārtham* in place of *-prahāṇāyā yatnotpādanārthaṃ*; Tib. *spaṅs pa'i phyir 'bad pa skyed pa'i don du* (D212a.1). Ms.(13a.5): *-prahāṇāyādanotpādanārthaṃ* contrary to Y's fn.4 p.46.

How can it be non-existent? Because there is the non-existence of the duality. How can it be not non-existent? Because there is the existence of the non-existence of the duality. And this is the characteristic of emptiness. Therefore, in relation to unreal imagination:

I.13 d **The characteristic consists neither in difference nor identity.**

If there were difference, real nature (***dharmatā***) would be something other than a ***dharma***, like the impermanence and painfulness [of something impermanent and painful], which is not tenable. If there were identity, there would not be an objective support of purity, [consisting in direct intuition][331], nor would there be a universal characteristic. In this way, its characteristic has been revealed as being devoid of identity and difference.

[Sthiramati]

Y46.17 [1] **How should the characteristic be understood?** Since the characteristic was listed initially[332], hence it is that which is queried from the very beginning.

I.13 ab **The non-existence of the duality, which consists in the existence of a non-existent, is the characteristic of emptiness[333].**

Thus should it be understood. **There is the non-existence**, in the nature of an entity, **of the duality of apprehended object and apprehending subject**, because its nature is imaginatively constructed either in the imagination of what is unreal, or by the imagination of what is unreal. This **existence of that non-existent duality is the characteristic of emptiness.** Owing to the rules of prosody in the above verse, the abstract suffix[334] [i.e. the *tā* of ***śūnyatā***] is to be regarded as

Y47 expressed although omitted. What is meant by "the existence of a non-existent"? The nature of a non-existent is existence, otherwise, because its non-existence would not exist as an [empty] existent[335], there would be the existence of the existent duality. This is why he says: **Thus it has been revealed that emptiness has the char-**

331 *jñāna* is omitted from both Ms. and Tib. Bhāṣya.

332 Ms.(13a.5): *prāguddiṣṭa-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.46.

333 Read: *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇam* in place of *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaś ca śūnyalakṣaṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N22.23.

334 Ms.(11a.6): *bhāvapratyayo lupta-*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.46.

335 Read: *tadabhāvasya bhāvato* (Tib. expands *bhāvato* to *bhāvaśūnyato*) *'vidyamānatvāt* as per Ms.(13a.7) in place of Y's *tadbhāvasya śūnyatāvidyamānatvāt* or his revised version: *tadbhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyato 'vidyamānatvāt* (cf. errata p.129); Tib. *de'i dṅos po med pa'i dṅos po stoṅ pa med pa'i phyir* (D212a.4-5).

acteristic of the own-being of a non-existent[336], i.e. it is not characterized by the nature of an existent. [Objection]: The word "existence" is superfluous here because this meaning is understood as being implicit in the word "non-existence" even if the word "existence" is omitted, since it is a statement about the denial of existence. [Response]: It is not superfluous. If it were only stated that "the non-existence of the duality is the characteristic of emptiness", one would understand[337] the non-existence of the duality as just an independent reality, like the non-existence of the horns of a hare, and not the fact that it consists in real nature, like the painfulness etc. [of something painful]. Therefore the non-existence of the duality is thus described as emptiness and the existence of its non-existence in the imagination of what is unreal is also described as emptiness. The fact that [emptiness] has the nature of real nature is demonstrated because it is included as the characteristic of the existence of a non-existent.

[2] Alternatively, since the word "non-existence" in the statement "the non-existence of the duality is emptiness" has only general significance, it cannot be discerned here which non-existence is intended. Thus in order to demonstrate its absolute non-existence it is said: "there is the existence of the non-existence of the duality in the imagination of what is unreal", for antecedent non-existence [i.e. before coming into being] and subsequent non-existence [i.e. after passing from being] cannot be spoken of other than as self-appropriation[338]. Moreover, reciprocal non-existence, i.e. as having a single basis, is not tenable because a [separate] basis is required in both cases. Therefore, because it appropriates the characteristic of the non-existence of an existent, it has been shown that it is indeed the absolute non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject that is [equivalent to] emptiness.

[3] If emptiness has the nature of non-existence, how can it be described as the absolute? Because it is the object of the highest direct intuition, like the impermanence [of what is impermanent], but not because it is an entity. Moreover, this does not have a non-existent own-being, because **this own-being of that non-existent, it**[339]:

I.13 c Neither exists nor does it not exist;

How can it be non-existent? Because there is the non-existence of the
Y48 duality, for if it were an existent there would not be the absolute non-existence of the duality[340], nor would there be the real nature of the imagination of what is unreal. **How can it be not non-existent? Because there is the existence of the**

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336 Read: *ity abhāvasvabhāvalakṣaṇatvaṃ* as per Ms.(13a.7) in place of *ity abhāvasvabhāvo lakṣaṇatvaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.1.

337 Ms.(13a.8): *evātragamyate* but Y's emendation to *evāvagamyate* is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.47.

338 Read: *svopādānād anyatra* as per Ms.(13b.1) in place of *svopādānād anyā*.

339 Read: *yaś cāsau tadabhāvasvabhāvaḥ sa* in place of *yas tadabhāvasvabhāvaḥ sa*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.2.

340 Read: *dvayasyātyantābhāvaḥ syāt* as per Ms.(13b.3) in place of *dvayabhāvasyātyantābhāvaḥ syāt*.

non-existence of the duality, [341]for the non-existence of the duality is not [equivalent to] the non-existence, by way of own-being, of the non-existent duality. If it were that non-existent, the duality would exist and there would not be the real nature of the imagination of what is unreal; and, by analogy; [there would be no] impermanence and painfulness [of what is impermanent and painful]. It is said to be neither existent nor non-existent because it has the nature of the non-existence of a permanent and pleasurable entity which is imputed through erroneous inversion on the part of sentient beings.

[4] If the emptiness of the imagination of what is unreal is real nature, [342]should this be described as other than that [imagination of what is unreal], or not other? Hence he says: **and this[343] is the characteristic of emptiness**; i.e. it is the very own-being of non-existence[344]. Alternatively, existence itself has the nature of the denial of non-existence. **Therefore, in relation to unreal imagination:**

I.13 d The characteristic consists neither in difference nor identity.

If there were difference, real nature (*dharmatā*) would be something other than a *dharma* which is not tenable. Why is it not tenable? Because if its characteristic were different from a *dharma*, real nature would in fact be another *dharma*, like any *dharma* other than it; however, one *dharma* cannot be the real nature of another *dharma* because, in that case, another *dharma* would have to be sought [to account for real nature] and there would be an infinite regress. **Like the impermanence and painfulness [of something impermanent and painful]**; i.e., just as impermanence is not other than what is impermanent and painfulness [is not other] than what is painful[345], so too is emptiness not other than what is empty. **If there were identity, there would not be an objective support of purity, nor would there be a universal characteristic.** Since one is purified by it, the path is purity[346]. The path would not be an objective support, like the individual characteristic of a *dharma*, because there would be no difference from the individual char-
Y43 acteristic of that *dharma*. Therefore, since it would not be different from the individual characteristic, the universal characteristic would not be tenable. Also, since it can be differentiated from something else, just as the essential nature of one *dharma* [can be differentiated from another], universality is lost. Alternatively, because the individual characteristic would not be different from this [universal characteristic] there would be

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341 Note: this section (Y48.2 - 48.11) is translated from the Tib. since it is omitted from the Ms.(13b.3). Fn.342 below marks the point where the Ms. resumes.

342 The Ms. continues from this point.

343 Read: *etac ca* as per Ms.(13b.3) in place of *etac*.

344 Read: *abhāvasvabhāva eva* in place of *abhāvasya svarūpam eva*; Tib. *dṅos po med pa'i ṅo bo ñid kho na* (D212b.7).

345 Ms.(13b.5): *duḥkhatā ca duḥkhād*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.48.

346 Ms.(13b.5): *viśuddhir*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.48.

no difference, like [in the case of] the essential nature of an existent thing[347]. Consequently, there would be no universal as well because the universal characteristic depends upon the fact of differentiation[348] [i.e. such as between the universal and the individual characteristic]. Alternatively, an objective support of purity is an objective support for purification; and the individual characteristic of something, if it is taken as [an objective] support, does not bring purity because all sentient beings would already be purified.

[5] If [emptiness] cannot be described in terms of difference and identity [in relation to the imagination of what is unreal], why is the doctrine of the Nirgrantha not given credence? Because one who believes in the Nirgrantha doctrine does not make a distinction in regard to the difference or identity of something that truly exists[349]. However, since emptiness is not an existent, there is no fault here.

[6] Thus emptiness is: (a) the characteristic of non-existence, (b) the characteristic of the essential nature of non-existence, (c) the characteristic of the absence of the duality and (d) **its characteristic has been revealed as being devoid of identity and difference**. The characteristic of emptiness has now been described.

b. The Synonyms of Emptiness.

N23.13 **How are the synonyms to be understood?**

I.14 abcd **(a) Thusness, (b) the limit of what is real, (c) the signless, (d) the absolute and (e) the *dharmadhātu* are the synonyms of emptiness in brief.**

[Sthiramati]

Y49.16 [1] Now the synonyms are described:

I.14 abcd **(a) Thusness, (b) the limit of what is real, (c) the signless, (d) the absolute and (e) the *dharmadhātu* are the synonyms of emptiness in brief.**

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347 Tib. is slightly different: "...there would be no differentiation of the essential nature of an entity"; *dṅos po'i raṅ gi ṅo bo tha dad pa med do* (D213a.5).

348 Ms.(13b.6): *bheda-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.49.

349 Read: *yo hi bhāvasya satas tattvānyatve na vyākaroti* in place of *yo hi bhāvasya satas tattvānyatvena [na] vyākaroti*; Tib. *dṅos po yod pa la de ñid daṅ gźan du luṅ mi ston pa gaṅ yin pa* (D213a.7).

A synonym[350] is well known as a different word[351] for the one thing. It is described as a synonym since it is expressive of a synonymous meaning. The one and the same emptiness is explained in other Sūtras by these terms. Although these five synonyms as mentioned in the verse are the principal ones, the other synonyms[352] that are not
Y50 mentioned here are to be learned from the scriptures; for example: the absence of the duality, the realm without conceptual differentiation, real nature, the inexpressible, absence of cessation, the unconditioned and *nirvāṇa* etc.

c. The Meaning of the Synonyms of Emptiness.

N23.17 **How should the meaning of the synonyms be understood?**

I.15 abcd **The meaning of the synonyms are, respectively: (a) immutability, (b) the absence of erroneous inversion, (c) the cessation of those [signs], (d) the sphere of the Noble Ones and (e) the cause of the noble qualities.**

It is thusness in the sense of immutability, considering that it is eternally just thus. It is the limit of what is real in the sense of the freedom from erroneous inversion because there is no foundation for erroneous inversion. It is signless in the sense of the cessation of signs because of the absence of all signs. Because it is the sphere of the direct intuition of the Noble Ones, it is the absolute for it is the domain of the highest direct intuition. Because it is the cause of the noble qualities, it is the *dharmadhātu*, for the noble qualities arise with that as their support - in this context the meaning of "*dhātu*" is 'cause' (*hetu*).

[Sthiramati]

Y50.3 [1] **How should the meaning of its synonyms be understood[353]?** He shows this as follows: these words are not metaphors, rather, they conform with the actual meaning [of emptiness].

350 Ms.(13b.8): *iti paryāyo*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.49.

351 Read: *bhinnaśabdatvena prasiddhaḥ* in place of *bhinnaśabdatvaṃ pratyāyayati*; Tib. *sgra tha dad par grag pa ste* (D213b.2).

352 Ms.(14a.1): *paryāyā*; disregard Y's fn. 7 p.49.

353 Read: *vijñeya* in place of *jñāyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.17.

I.15 abcd **The meaning of the synonyms are, respectively: (a) immutability, (b) the absence of erroneous inversion, (c) the cessation of those [signs], (d) the sphere of the Noble Ones and (e) the cause of the noble qualities.**

It is thusness in the sense of immutability. What is meant is: in the sense of unchanging. In order to demonstrate just this, he says: **considering that it is eternally just thus**[354]. What is meant is: it is unchanging because it is unconditioned always, i.e. at all times[355]. **It is the limit of what is real in the sense of the freedom from erroneous inversion;** the real means: the true and non-erroneously inverted. The limit is the extremity; i.e. beyond this there is nothing to be known. Hence the limit of what is real[356] is described as the extremity of what is real. How can thusness be described as the extremity of the knowable?[357] Because it is the sphere of direct intuition that is purified[358] from obscuration consisting in the knowable. The words: "in the sense of the freedom from erroneous inversion" are equivalent to: 'in the sense of the freedom from superimposition and negation'. Here now he gives the reason: **because there is no foundation for erroneous inversion.** Erroneous inversion is [equivalent to] conceptual differentiation; [emptiness] is not a foundation[359] for erroneous inversion because it is not an objective support for conceptual differentiation. **It is signless in the sense of the cessation of signs**[360]. Signlessness, in this context, is described as the cessation of signs. In order to demonstrate just this, he says: **because of the absence of all signs.** Since emptiness is empty of all signs, both conditioned and unconditioned, it is described as signless. It is signless because of the non-existence of all signs; only that which is without signs[361] is signless. **Because it is the sphere of the direct intuition of the Noble Ones, it is the absolute**[362]. For, supramundane direct intuition is the highest (*parama*); the object (*artha*) of that is the absolute (*paramārtha*) - in order to demonstrate just this, he says: **since it is the domain**[363] **of the highest direct intuition.**[364] **Because it is the cause of the noble qualities, it**

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354 Read: *nityan tathaiveti kṛtvā* in place of *nityaṃ tathātvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.20.
355 Read: *sarvakāle* in place of *sarvadā*; Tib. *dus thams cad* (D213b.5).
356 Ms.(14a.3): *bhūtakoṭi*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.50.
357 Read: *kathaṃ tathatā jñeyaparyanta ucyate* in place of *kathaṃ tathatā jñeyam ucyate*; Tib. *ji ltar de bźin ñid śes par bya ba mu źes bya źe na*; (213b.6).
358 Read: *viśuddha* in place of *viśodhana*; Tib. *rnam par dag pa* (D213b.7).
359 Tib. omits: *vastu* (*gźi*); cf. D214a.1.
360 Read: *nimittanirodhārthenānimittaṃ* in place of *nimittanirodhād animittam*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.21-22.
361 Ms.(14a.5): *animitta*, but Y's *animittam* is preferred.
362 Read: *paramārtha iti* in place of *paramārthateti*; cf. Bhāṣya N23.23.
363 *gocara*; but Bhāṣya: *viṣaya*.
364 *etad eva pradarśayann āha paramajñānagocaratvād iti*, is omitted from the Tib. (cf. 214a.2).

is the ***dharmadhātu*** . In this context it is the noble qualities that are [referred to] by the word *dharma*, i.e. those beginning with correct view and concluding with correct liberation and direct intuition; since it is the cause of these, it is the source (*dhātu*). In
Y51 order to illustrate just this he says: **for the noble qualities arise with that as their support.** Since this term *dhātu* also occurs in the sense of a base for both the individual characteristic and the [twenty-four] secondary forms of matter[365], he says: **in this context, the meaning of "*dhātu*" is 'cause' (*hetu*) ;** for example, [a mine is described as] the source of gold or the source of copper[366]. Other synonyms that are also mentioned in other Sūtras should be explained by way of their intrinsic meaning in accordance with this method.

d. The Differentiation of Emptiness.

N24.4 **How should the differentiation of emptiness be understood?**

I.16 a **As defiled and pure;**

Thus is its differentiation. In which state is it defiled and in which is it pure?

I.16 b **It is both accompanied by stain and devoid of stain;**

When it is accompanied by stain, it is defiled; when that stain has been relinquished, it is pure. If, after being stained it becomes devoid of stain, how can it not be impermanent since it possesses the quality of change? Because its:

I.16 cd **Purity is considered as like the purity of elementary water, gold and space.**

Due to the removal of adventitious stain, however there is no alteration to its own-being.

[Sthiramati]

Y51.7 [1] [Vasubandhu] asks [the following question] since the differentiation of emptiness is not possible because it has the nature of the non-existence of the apprehended object

365 Read: *svalakṣaṇopādāyarūpadhāraṇe* in place of *svalakṣaṇopādāya rūpadhāraṇe*; Tib. *raṅ gi mtshan ñid daṅ rgyur byas ba'i gzugs 'dzin pa la* (D214a.4).

366 Read: *suvarṇadhātus tāmradhātur iti* in place of *suvarṇadhātus tāmradhātū raupyadhātuḥ*; Tib. *gser khuṅ daṅ zaṅs khuṅ bźin no* (214a.5).

and apprehending subject; or else, it was stated that its differentiation should be understood immediately following the [section on the] meanings of its synonyms. Hence, immediately after the explanation of the latter, he asks: **how should the differentiation of emptiness be understood?** The imagination of the unreal is [equivalent to] defilement - when that is relinquished, it is described as purity; and at the times of defilement and of purification[367] there is nothing else that is subject to defilement and to purification apart from emptiness. Therefore, in order to demonstrate that at the times of defilement and of purification it is just emptiness that is subject to defilement and to purification, he says:

I.16 a **As defiled and pure;**

Thus is its differentiation.[368] Since it is not known when it is defiled and when it is devoid of stain, he asks: **in which state is it defiled and in which is it pure**[369]**?**

I.16 b **it is both accompanied by stain and devoid of stain**[370] **etc.**

[Emptiness] is respectively determined to be accompanied by stain[371] and as having its stain relinquished depending upon whether or not there is a turning about of the basis. Emptiness does not manifest for those who do not know, whose mental continuum possesses the stain of defilement of the notional attachment to both the apprehended object and apprehending subject and passion etc., due to the faults of both lack of insight and wrong insight - with regard to such [people] it is determined as being accompanied by stain. However, the emptiness which is unblemished like space manifests continually for the Noble Ones whose minds are free from erroneous inversion because of their direct intuition of reality - with regard to such [people] it is said to have had its stain relinquished. The fact that emptiness has a relationship[372] with
Y52 defilement and purity in this way should be seen, although its own-being does not possess stain because it is luminous by nature.

[2] **If, after being stained...**[373] Since a differentiation in state is not seen without a modification, and since modification is logically connected with production and destruction, he says: **how can it not be impermanent since it possesses the quality of change?** Because there is no other modification of emptiness apart from

367 Read: *saṃkleśaviśuddhikālayoś* in place of *saṃkleśaviśuddhikāle*; cf. Y51.13.
368 Ms.(14b.2): *asyāprabhedaḥ* but Y's rendering of *asyāḥ prabhedaḥ* is preferred.
369 Read: *kasyām avasthāyāṃ saṃkliṣṭā kasyāṃ viśuddhā* in place of *kadā saṃkliśyate kadā viśudhyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N24.6.
370 Read: *samalā nirmalā ca sā* in place of *sā samalā nirmalā ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N24.8.
371 Read: *saha malena* as per Ms.(14b.3) in place of *samalā ca*.
372 Read: *āpekṣikī* as per Ms.(14b.4) in place of *āpekṣikā*; Tib. *ltos pa can* (D214b.4).
373 Read: *yadi samalā bhūtvā* in place of *yadi samalā syād*; cf. Bhāṣya N24.10.

[the modification] from a defiled state to a pure state[374], [emptiness], established in reality, does not take on a different own-being due to the removal of adventitious stain[375]; because [its]:

I.16 cd **Purity is considered as like the purity of elementary water, gold and space.**

Therefore, it is not impermanent. For example, elementary water, gold and space do not possess stain for their own-being because they do not have such an own-being; both when possessing adventitious stain and also when adventitious stain is removed, while not taking on a different own-being, they remain pure. Similarly, emptiness too is defiled by adventitious stain and is purified as the result of the removal of that, although its own-being is unchanged. For, he who determines the one and the same entity initially as having the characteristic of defilement and then subsequently as having purity for its own-being, does not [avoid the conclusion] that a *dharma* which is modified is destroyed due to a modification in its own-being. However, this is not so when both [i.e. defilement and purity] are adventitious; therefore, this [process] does not 'touch' the real nature of change [i.e. emptiness].

The Sixteen Kinds of Emptiness.

N24.15 **There is another differentiation, [namely], the sixteen types of emptiness: (a) internal emptiness, (b) external emptiness, (c) internal and external emptiness, (d) universal emptiness, (e) the emptiness of emptiness, (f) the emptiness of the absolute, (g) the emptiness of the conditioned, (h) the emptiness of the unconditioned, (i) absolute emptiness, (j) emptiness without beginning or end, (k) emptiness of non-rejection, (l) intrinsic emptiness, (m) emptiness of characteristic, (n) the emptiness of all *dharmas*, (o) emptiness of non-existence and (p) emptiness of the own-being of non-existence - these should be known in brief as:**

I.17 abcd **The emptiness of the foundation for: (a) the enjoyer, (b) enjoyment, (c) the body [which is the locus] of these and (d) the support. The**

374 Read: *na hi saṃkliṣṭāvasthātaḥ śūnyatāyā viśuddhāvasthāyām anyo vikāraḥ* in place of *na hi saṃkliṣṭāvasthātaḥ śūnyatāviśuddhāvasthāyām anyo vikāraḥ*; Tib. *kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i gnas skabs las stoṅ pa ñid ma'n par dag pa'i gnas skabs su 'gyur pa gźan med kyi* (D214b.5).

375 Read perhaps: *tattvasthitāyās tu svabhāvāntaram anāpadyamānāyā* in place of *tattvasthititā tu svabhāvāntaram anāpadyamānā*; Tib.: *de kho na ñid du gnas par raṅ bźin gźan du 'gyur ba med pa ste / glo bur gyi dri ma daṅ bral ba'i phyir* (D214b.5). Ms.(14b.6): *-vāntaram anāpadyamānāyā*.

N25 emptiness of that [knowledge]: (a) through which the latter is seen, (b) the manner in which it is seen and (c) for the sake of which [the *bodhisattva* aspires].

Of these, the emptiness of the enjoyer refers to the internal sense-fields. The emptiness of enjoyment [refers to] the external [sense-fields]. The body belonging to those is the physical body which is the locus of both the enjoyer and enjoyment - the emptiness of that is described as internal and external emptiness. The foundation for the support refers to the inanimate world - the emptiness of that is described as universal emptiness because of its extensiveness. Moreover, as to the knowledge of emptiness through which the internal sense-fields etc. are seen to be empty - the emptiness of that is the emptiness of emptiness. Also, the way in which they are seen in an aspect of the absolute - the emptiness of that is the emptiness of the absolute. And there is the emptiness of that for the sake of which the *bodhisattva* aspires. For the sake of what does he aspire?

I.18 a For the attainment of the dual virtues;

[For the attainment] of the wholesome which is both conditioned and unconditioned.

I.18 b And for the welfare of sentient beings, always;

For the perpetual welfare of sentient beings;

I.18 c And for the non-abandonment of *saṃsāra*;

Because one who does not see the emptiness of *saṃsāra*, which is without beginning and end, would become wearied and completely abandon *saṃsāra*.

I.18 d And for the non-extinction of the wholesome.

That which, even in the *nirvāṇa* that is devoid of the remnants of
N26 existence, he does not throw away or dismiss; the emptiness of that is described as the emptiness of non-rejection.

I.19 a — And for the purity of the spiritual lineage (*gotra*);

Because the spiritual lineage is intrinsic since it derives from own-being.

I.19 b — For the attainment of the principal and secondary marks;

For the attainment of the principal and secondary characteristic marks of a supreme being.

I.19 cd — The *bodhisattva* aspires for the purity of the Buddha qualities.

Such as the [ten] powers, the [four] intrepidities and the special qualities etc. The establishment of the [first] fourteen emptinesses should be understood in this way. What again is emptiness in this regard?

I.20 abcd — The non-existence of the personal entity and of the *dharmas* is [one] emptiness here, and the actual existence of their non-existence in that [enjoyer etc.] is another emptiness.

The non-existence of the personal entity and the *dharmas* is one emptiness and the actual existence of their non-existence in the above-mentioned enjoyer etc. is another emptiness. In order to state the characteristic of emptiness he respectively determines emptiness as twofold at the end, [namely], the emptiness of non-existence and the emptiness of the own-being of non-existence for the purpose of avoiding imputation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas* and the negation of their emptiness, in due order. The differentiation of emptiness should be understood in this way.

[Sthiramati]

Y52.19 [1] Since all differentiations of emptiness should be described in the section that explains its differentiation[376], he says this is another differentiation: the sixteen types of emptiness. It is sixteenfold according to its differentiation in relation to [various] entities, however, there is no differentiation in regard to its own-being which consists in the non-existence of the duality. These sixteen types are taught in the Prajñāpāramitās as emptiness, beginning with internal emptiness and concluding

376 Ms.(15a.1): *prabheda*...; disregard Y's fn.3 p.52.

with the emptiness of the own-being of non-existence. These should be known in brief as:

Y53 I.17 ab

> The emptiness of the foundation for: (a) the enjoyer, (b) enjoyment, (c) the body [which is the locus] of these and (d) the support etc.

Emptiness is a universal characteristic because all *dharmas* have the essential nature of the non-existence of the duality. Since it is not possible to show its multiplicity in any other way, he shows its multiplicity by way of its multiple foundations.

[2] From the very beginning, the enjoyer is to be annihilated [through clear understanding][377] in order to abandon one's affection and notional attachment to it; for this affection and notional attachment are impediments to the attainment of liberation and Buddhahood. Immediately after that, the enjoyment belonging to that [enjoyer] [is to be annihilated]. Immediately after that, the physical body which is the locus of both of these [is to be annihilated]. Then, the inanimate world, i.e. the support for the physical body which is the locus for both [the enjoyer and the enjoyment] is to be annihilated [through clear understanding] in order to destroy the grasping of and affection for [the inanimate world] as belonging to the self because it is of service to the enjoyer. These are the four types of foundation - the emptiness of these is described as the emptiness of the foundation.

[3] **Of these, the emptiness of the enjoyer refers to the internal sense-fields**[378], beginning with 'sight' up until 'mind'. Because there is no agent of enjoyment apart from these and because they see the eyes etc. as active in the sense-experience of objects, people have an erroneous view of the 'enjoyer' especially in regard to sight and the other [senses]; therefore the emptiness of the sense-fields of sight etc. is described as the emptiness of the enjoyer.

[4] **The emptiness of enjoyment [refers to] the external [sense-fields]**[379]; beginning with 'form' up until the 'non-sensible'. Since they are enjoyed (*bhujyante*) as entities of the sensory domain, they are [described as] enjoyments (*bhojana*). Hence the emptiness of the external sense-fields is described as the emptiness of enjoyment.

[5] **The body belonging to those is the physical body** because both the **enjoyer and the enjoyment** are established as mutually inseparable [entities][380] in

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377 *vibhāvayitavyaḥ*; Tib. *gźig par bya* (to be destroyed); (D215a.5).

378 Read: *ādhyātmikāny āyatanāny* in place of *ādhyātmikāyatanair*, cf. Bhāṣya N25.2.

379 Read: *bhojanaśūnyatā bāhyāniti* in place of *bhojanaśūnyatā bāhyair iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.3.

380 Read: *parasparāvinirbhāgena* as per Ms.(15a.6) in place of *parasparāvinibhāgena*..

the physical body; hence the **emptiness of that is described as internal and external emptiness**[381].

Y54 [6] **The foundation for the support** refers to **the inanimate world**; because it is perceived as the foundation for the support of sentient beings in every respect[382]. This is why he says: the **emptiness of that is described as universal emptiness because of its extensiveness.** The word "foundation" is connected individually [with each of the four categories discussed].

[7] To that *bodhisattva-yogi* who is mentally attentive, through proper mental attention accompanied by deliberation in regard to the emptiness of the four types of entity[383] that are to be known, a different 'sign-grasping' becomes evident, [namely] - that **knowledge of emptiness through which** this [entity] consisting in **the internal and external sense-fields etc. is seen to be empty**[384]. There is [a twofold] conceptual differentiation: (a) the notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject and (b) just this here is an aspect of the absolute according to what is seen through that knowledge of emptiness. For the sake of the annihilation [through clear understanding] of these two modes of conceptual differentiation which have the sign of error pertinent to the spiritual level of the *yogi*, (a) the emptiness of emptiness and (b) the emptiness of the absolute [are indicated], respectively. These are indicated, bearing in mind that the words "knowledge" and "aspect" are [respectively] omitted[385] [i.e. the full expressions would be *śūnyatā(jñāna)śūnyatā* and *paramārtha(ākāra)śūnyatā*]. Alternatively, that knowledge is described as emptiness[386] because it has emptiness for its object. **The emptiness**, of the existence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject, **of that is the emptiness of emptiness. Also, the way in which** [the latter, i.e.] the internal sense-fields etc., **are seen** through that knowledge of emptiness **as the absolute** in this context - **the emptiness of that** aspect **is the emptiness of the absolute.** What is the reason? Because the absolute is empty of the imaginary nature[387].

[8] The other 'sign-grasping' [referred to above] is harmful to the meditative development of emptiness; the essential nature of an entity (*bhāva*) is imputed upon that for **the sake of which the *bodhisattva* aspires**[388] to [the understanding of] emptiness. In order to clearly understand this emptiness has been explained, beginning with

381 Read: *tacchūnyatā 'dhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatety ucyate* in place of *tacchūnyatādhyātmabāhyaśūnyatety ucyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.4-5; *'dhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatety* is omitted from the Tib. cf. D215b.2.

382 Read: *sarvathā* in place of *sarvatra*; Tib. *thams cad du* (D215b.3).

383 Tib.: *gźi* should read: *bźi* (D215b.3).

384 Read: *-ādi śūnyam* in place of *-ādiśūnyam*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.6.

385 Read: *jñānākāralopaṃ kṛtvā nirdiṣṭe* as per Ms.(15b.2) contrary to Y's fn.1 p.54.

386 Tib. reads: "...is described as empty (*stoṅ pa*)", and not "emptiness"; cf. D215b.6.

387 Tib. is slightly different: "because emptiness, which is the absolute, is empty of the imaginary nature"; *stoṅ pa ñid ni don dam pa ste kun brtags pa'i raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa źes bya* (D215b.7).

388 *pratipadyate*; Tib. *sgrub pa*, however Bhāṣya: *prapadyate* and Tib. *sgrub par byed pa*.

the emptiness of the conditioned and concluding with the emptiness of all *dharmas*. **For the sake of what does he aspire?**

I.18 a — For the attainment of the dual virtues;

He aspires to [the understanding of] emptiness for the purity [of all virtues] concluding with the Buddha qualities; what is meant is: he cultivates emptiness [for the attainment] of **the wholesome which is both conditioned and unconditioned**[389],
Y55 i.e. the path and *nirvāṇa*[390]; the emptiness of the conditioned and the emptiness of the unconditioned refer respectively to the latter two.

[9]

I.18 b — And for the welfare of sentient beings, always;

[The *bodhisattva* makes the following resolve]: "I shall act in the welfare of sentient beings in every way and at all times". The emptiness of this is absolute emptiness.

[10]

I.18 c — And for the non-abandonment of *saṃsāra*;

[The *bodhisattva* makes the following resolve]: "For the sake of sentient beings I shall not abandon *saṃsāra*". If he were to abandon *saṃsāra*, [the *bodhisattva*] would not attain enlightenment because he would remain at the *śrāvaka*-level[391]. The emptiness that pertains to this is the emptiness without beginning or end; but why is the emptiness of this taught?[392] Hence he responds: **because one who does not see the emptiness of *saṃsāra*, which is without beginning and end, would become wearied and completely abandon**[393] ***saṃsāra*.**

[11]

I.18 d — And for the non-extinction of the wholesome[394]**.**

[The *bodhisattva* makes the following resolve]: "The roots of the wholesome shall not be destroyed[395] **by me even in the *nirvāṇa*** devoid **of the remnants of exis-**

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389 Read: *kuśalasya saṃskṛtasyāsaṃskṛtasya ca* in place of *śubhadvayaṃ hi saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtaṃ ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.12.

390 Ms.(15b.4): *nirvāṇaṅ ca*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.55.

391 This rendering is on the basis of the Tib.: *'khor ba yoṅs su btaṅ na byaṅ chub ma rñed par / ñan thos kyi sar gnas par 'gyur bas* (D216a.4). The Sanskrit is problematical - Ms.(15b.6): *-va bodhiṃ śrāvakabodhau vyavatiṣṭhate*; T & B's rendering (p.45.17): *na khalu labhate saṃsāra-parityāga eva bodhiṃ śrāvakabhūmāv avatiṣṭhate*, is preferable to Y's: *saṃsare hi parityakte 'labdhvā bodhisattvabodhiṃ śrāvakabodhau vyavatiṣṭhate*. Cf. also St's fns.112 & 113, p.196.

392 Read: *diśyate* in place of *diśyatā*; Ms.(15b.6): *deśyata* (*iti*).

393 Read: *parityajeteti* in place of *parityajatīti*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.17.

394 Read: *kuśalasyākṣayāya ca* in place of *akṣayāya śubhāya ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N25.18.

395 Y's rendering of (*kṣīyan*)*te* is difficult to improve upon, although Ms.(15b.7): *-to*; Tib. ...*rtsa ba rnams mi zad par bya'o* (D216a.5). B&T's solution of (*sva*)*to* (p.45.23) is not convincing in the light of the parallel passages in the preceding paragraphs where *bdag gis* is rendered by *mayā*.

tence". The words[396]: "**he does not throw away**", express the same sense as "**he does not dismiss**". If this is so, how then can the *nirvāṇa*-realm that is devoid of the remnants of existence be proven? It is an established fact that even in the *nirvāṇa*-realm that is devoid of the remnants of existence, there is no interruption to the Dharma Body belonging to the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, which is an entity free from impurity[397] because of the non-existence of the body which is the *karma*-result of the impure *dharmas*. Hence, **the emptiness of that is described as the emptiness of non-rejection.**

[12]

I.19 a — **And, for the purity of the spiritual lineage (*gotra*);**

The emptiness of this is intrinsic emptiness; here now he gives the reason: **because the spiritual lineage is intrinsic;** how so? - he responds: **since it derives**
Y56 **from own-being**[398]. That which derives from own-being exists from time immemorial; what is meant is: it is not adventitious. In the same way that some [entities] in beginningless *saṃsāra* are endowed with consciousness and some are non-conscious, similarly, in this regard some [beings] endowed with the six sense-fields belong to the spiritual lineage of the Buddhas and some belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvakas* etc. Since the spiritual lineage consists in a regular sequence [of rebirths] that is beginningless, it is not accidental like the difference between non-conscious and conscious [entities]. Others believe that since all sentient beings belong to the spiritual lineage of the *tathāgata*, the term "spiritual lineage" in this context should be understood accordingly[399].

[13]

I.19 b — **For the attainment of the principal and secondary characteristic marks;**

Consequently, the emptiness of the principal and secondary characteristic marks of a supreme being is described as the emptiness of characteristic marks.

[14] Furthermore,

I.19 cd — **The *bodhisattva* aspires for the purity of the Buddha qualities.**

Because of the expression: "he aspires" at the end [of verse 19], [this expression is to be supplied] in each case; [for example, what is intended is]: "The *bodhisattva* aspires for the attainment of the dual virtues" (I.18 a), and "The *bodhisattva* aspires for the welfare of sentient beings, always" (I.18 b). Which of the Buddha qualities [does he

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396 *Ity etad*; contrary to Y's fn.8 p.55 D: *źes bya ba ni de* (D216a.5).
397 Ms.(15b.7): *anāsra-*; disregard Y's fn.10 p.55.
398 Read: *svābhāvikatvād* in place of *svābhāvikād*; cf. Bhāṣya N26.3.
399 Read: *tathā jñeyam* in place of *tathātvaṃ jñeyam*; Tib. *de bźin du śes par bya'o* (D216b.3).

aspire to]? Hence he said: **such as the [ten] powers, the [four] intrepidities and the special qualities etc.** In short, he undertakes [with this resolve]: "I should strive[400] for the attainment of all the Buddha qualities". This is why it is said: "he cultivates emptiness"[401]. The emptiness of that is described as the emptiness of all *dharmas*. What is 'cultivation' in this context? The unimpeded engagement[402] of cognition in regard to the object of cognition. Now **the establishment of the [first] fourteen emptinesses, beginning with** internal [emptiness] **and concluding with**[403] the emptiness of all *dharmas*, **should be understood in this way.**

[15] **What again is emptiness in this regard,** i.e. in regard to the enjoyer etc.?
Y57 [404]What is its essential nature? Hence he says:

I.20 abcd **The non-existence of the personal entity and of the *dharmas* is [one] emptiness here and the actual existence of their non-existence in that [enjoyer etc.] is another emptiness.**

The non-existence of the personal entity and the *dharmas* is one emptiness and the actual existence of their non-existence in the above-mentioned enjoyer etc. is another emptiness. Of these, the non-existence of the personal entity and the *dharmas* is [equivalent to] the emptiness of non-existence. The actual existence of that non-existence is [equivalent to] the emptiness of own-being of non-existence. [405]For what reason are these two kinds of emptiness respectively determined at the end?[406] Hence he responds: **in order to state the characteristic of emptiness**[407]. Why is there a re-statement of emptiness? Hence he says: **for the purpose of avoiding both imputation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas* and the negation of their emptiness, in due order.** In order to avoid imputation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas*, he determines the emptiness of non-existence; and in order to avoid negation in regard to the emptiness of the latter, [he determines] the emptiness of own-being of non-existence. If the

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400 Ms.(16a.4): *pratitavyam*, but Y's rendering of *prayatitavyam* is preferred; Tib. *'bad par bya ba* (D216b.5).

401 Read perhaps: *tasmāc cchūnyatāṃ prabhāvayatīty ucyate* in place of *tasmād vibhāvanocyate*. Although the Tib.: *de'i phyir mam par bsgom pa źes bya ste* (D216b.5) does not substantiate *cchūnyatāṃ prabhāvayatīty*, the insertion of *śūnyaṃ* is suggested by the Ms.(16a.4): *tasmāt śūnya-* (not *śūnyatā-* as per Y). This statement seems to refers back to the words: *śūnyatāṃ prabhāvayatīty arthaḥ* (Y54.24).

402 Read: *avibandhanapravṛttiḥ* in place of *avyavahitapravṛttiḥ*; Ms.(16a.5): *-napravṛttiḥ*.

403 Ms.(16a.5): *-paryantānāṃ*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.56.

404 Note: this section (Y56.22 - 57.11) is translated from the Tib. since it is missing from the Ms.(16a.5). Fn.405 below marks the point where the Ms. resumes.

405 The Ms. continues from this point.

406 Read: *...eṣā dvividhā śūnyatānte vyavasthāpyate* in place of *eṣāṃ...*; Ms.(16a.5): *eṣā dvividhā śūnya.*

407 Read: *ata āha śūnyatālakṣaṇākhyāpanārtham* in place of *ata āha śūnyatālakṣaṇapradarśanārtham*; cf. Bhāṣya N26.12-13.

emptiness of non-existence were not mentioned one may conclude that the *dharmas* and the personal entity, whose essential nature is imaginary, do exist. If the emptiness of own-being of non-existence were not mentioned, one may conclude that emptiness is indeed non-existent and as a consequence of the non-existence of the latter, the personal entity and the *dharmas* would exist like before.

[16] In the above, internal emptiness refers to: (a) the non-existence of: (i) the personal entity, i.e. the 'enjoyer' and (ii) sight etc., whose characteristic is imagined, among the internal sense-fields which have the [*karma*-] result-consciousness [i.e. the store-consciousness] for their own-being and are regarded by naive people as constituting an 'agent of enjoyment', and (b) the actual existence of the non-existence[408] of the latter.
Y58 External emptiness refers to: (a) the non-existence of: (i) enjoyment that pertains to the self and (ii) form etc., whose characteristic is imagined, among the external sense-fields which have the appearances of representations of form etc. for their own-being and are regarded by naive people as objects of enjoyment, and (b) the actual existence of the non-existence of the latter. Internal and external emptiness refers to: (a) the non-existence of: (i) a personal entity as 'enjoyer' in that body, i.e. the physical body, (ii) form etc. which is imaginatively constructed by naive folk and (iii) the body itself, and (b) the existence of the non-existence of the latter. Universal emptiness refers to: (a) the non-existence of a world of sentient beings within the inanimate world, (b) the non-existence, by way of essential nature, of such an imaginative construction and (c) the actual existence of the non-existence of the latter. In regard to both the knowledge of emptiness[409] and an aspect of the absolute, the emptiness of emptiness and the emptiness of the absolute refer respectively to the non-existence of: (a) the knowledge of emptiness, on the part of the knowing agent, which has the characteristic of an imaginative construction and (b) the aspect of the absolute on the part of the personal entity who is the apprehender of the aspect[410], and the actual existence of the non-existence of the latter. Now, that for the sake of which the *bodhisattva* aspires, i.e. [the understanding of] the emptiness of the conditioned[411], concluding with the emptiness of all *dharmas* refers respectively to: (a) the non-existence both of the *dharmas* which have an imaginary characteristic and of the personal entity, among those elements beginning with the conditioned up until all the Buddha qualities which are the aim of the *bodhisattva's* accomplishment[412] and (b) the actual existence[413] of the non-existence of

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408 Ms.(16b.1): *-vasya*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.57.

409 Ms.(16b.2): *śūnyajñāne* but Y's rendering of *śūnyatājñāne* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid śes pa... la* (D217b.1).

410 Read: *ākāragrahītṛpudgalasya ca* in place of *ākāragrahītṛpudgalasya*; Tib. *rnam pa 'dzin pa po'i gaṅ zag daṅ* (D217b.1).

411 Ms.(16b.4): *saṃskṛtaśūnyatā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.58.

412 Read (with St. fn.140 p.208): *bodhisattvasādhanaprayojaneṣu* in place of *bodhisattvapratipattavyeṣu*; Tib. *byaṅ chub sems dpa' bsgrub dgos pa rnams la* (D217b.2-3).

413 Ms.(16b.4): *bhāṣā*, but Y's emendation to *sadbhāvo* is preferred; Tib. *dṅos po yod pa* (D217b.3).

the latter. For there exists no personal entity, whether it be 'owner' or 'agent' pertinent to the conditioned, nor does a conditioned [entity] exist in the nature imagined by naive folk. These sixteen kinds of emptiness which pertain to the *bodhisattvas* and which are not common to the *śrāvakas* have been explained in brief in order to counteract all grasping on account of conceptual differentiation, and also, in order to explain all hidden meanings of the Sūtras.

[17] And in this respect, the object of emptiness, the own-being of emptiness and the aim of the meditative development of emptiness have been shown by the Venerable One. Of these, the object of emptiness refers to those subjects beginning with the 'enjoyer' up until the Buddha qualities; furthermore, the demonstration of the latter is for the sake of showing that emptiness pervades all *dharmas*. The own-being of emptiness refers to both the own-being of non-existence as well as the own-being of
Y59 the existence of non-existence[414]. Moreover, the demonstration of the own-being of emptiness is in order to show the nature of escape[415] from all [false] views since it [acts as] counteragent to superimposition and negation. The aim of the meditative development of emptiness begins with the [aspiration for the] attainment of the dual virtues (cf. I.18a) and concludes with the [aspiration for the] attainment of the Buddha qualities (cf. I.19cd). Furthermore, the demonstration of the latter is in order to demonstrate that the culmination of the perfection of the Form and Dharma Body, for oneself and others, is due just to the meditative development of emptiness[416]. **The differentiation of emptiness should be understood in this way**; i.e. it should be known that [emptiness] is defiled in the stained state and is purified in the stainless state; and it has a sixteenfold differentiation as just described, beginning with internal emptiness.

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414 Ms.(16b.6): *śūnyatāsvabhāvo abhāvo abhāvasvabhāvaś ca*, but Y's emendation to *śūnyatāsvabhāvo 'bhāvasvabhāvo 'bhāvabhāvasvabhāvaś ca* is preferred; Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid kyi raṅ bźin ni dṅos po med pa'i ṅo bo ñid daṅ / dṅos po med pa'i dṅos po'i ṅo bo ñid do* (D217b.6).

415 Ms.(16b.6): *niḥsaraṇātma-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.59.

416 Read: *śūnyatābhāvanād eveti* as per Ms.(16b.7) in place of *śūnyatābhāvanāyāḥ prāpya iti*. Tib. is slightly different: '"(the culmination) ...is attained due to meditative development..."; *stoṅ pa ñid bsgom pa las 'thob bo* (D217b.7 - 218a.1).

e. The Logical Proof of Emptiness.

N26.18 How is its logical proof to be understood?

I.21 abcd — If it were not defiled, all incarnate beings would be liberated. If it were not pure, effort would be in vain.

If the emptiness of the *dharmas* were not defiled by adventitious
N27 secondary defilement, even when no counteragent has arisen, all sentient beings would be liberated without any effort at all because of the absence of defilement. Now, even when the counteragent has arisen, should [emptiness] not become purified, undertakings for the sake of liberation would be in vain. And so, after considering it in this way:

I.22 ab — It is neither defiled nor is it undefiled. It is neither pure nor is it impure;

How can it be neither defiled nor impure? [Because] by way of intrinsic nature:

I.22 c — There is the luminosity of mind[417];

How can it be neither undefiled nor pure?

I.22 d — Because of the adventitious nature of defilement.

In this way, the differentiation of emptiness that was listed [above] is proven.

[Sthiramati]

Y59.11 [1] Since its logical proof was listed immediately following the listing of the differentiation[418], immediately after the explanation of that he asks: How is its logical proof to be understood?[419] What is to be proven here? The fact that: (a) it is defiled by adventitious secondary defilement and (b) it has purity of own-being. In the above, with reference to the proof of the fact that it is defiled, he says:

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417 Verse 22 cd is not found in P or D editions of the Bhāṣya; cf. N's comments in the introduction (pp.9-10) to his Sanskrit edition.

418 Ms.(17a.1): *bhedoddeśā-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.59.

419 Read: *vijñeyam* in place of *jñeyam*; cf. Bhāṣya N26.18.

I.21 ab **If it were not defiled, all incarnate beings would be liberated[420];**

Liberation is [equivalent to] the relinquishment of defilement; the relinquishment of such defilement is due to the meditative development of the path. In this respect, if **the emptiness of the *dharmas* were not defiled by adventitious secondary defilement, even when no counteragent has arisen;** the word "even" implies that like when it has arisen [it would not be defiled] - this being so, all **sentient beings would be liberated without any effort at all[421] because of the absence of defilement.** The words: "without effort"[422] are [equivalent to] 'without a counteragent'. However, since there can be no liberation for living beings without the counteragent, in the state of ordinary people the fact of defilement of thus-
Y60 ness[423] by adventitious stain must necessarily be admitted - the differentiation of emptiness as defiled is proven in this way.

[2] Now, in order to prove the differentiation [of emptiness] as purified, he says:

I.21 cd **If it were not pure, effort would be in vain[424].**

It is [the effort] of incarnate beings that is referred to. **Now, even when the counteragent has arisen;** the word "even" implies that like when it has not arisen [it would not become pure]; **should [emptiness] not[425] become purified;** this being so, the **undertakings for the sake of liberation would be in vain** because even through the meditative development of the counteragent, separation from such stain would not occur and also because liberation is not possible for one who possesses stain. However, [the undertakings] for the sake of liberation are not considered to be in vain; therefore, due to the practice of the counteragent, the purity of emptiness, through the separation from adventitious secondary defilement, must necessarily be admitted. The differentiation of the purity of emptiness is proven in this way. In this context, defilement is due to the appropriation of the *dharmas* that constitute defilement and purity is due to the appropriation of the *dharmas* that constitute purity. However, neither defilement nor purity is considered to be manifestly present for emptiness[426] because real nature is dependent upon the *dharmas*. This is why he says: "all incarnate beings would be liberated". The term "incarnate beings" in the

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420 Read: *saṃkliṣṭā ced bhaven nāsau muktāḥ syuḥ sarvadehinaḥ*
in place of *yadi na syāt sa saṃkleśo muktāḥ syuḥ sarvadehinaḥ* Cf. Bhāṣya N26.19.

421 Read: *ayatanata eva muktāḥ sarvasattvā bhaveyuḥ* in place of *prayatnam antareṇa sarve sattvā muktāḥ syuḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.1-2.

422 Read: *ayatanata iti* in place of *prayatnam antareṇeti*; cf. ibid.

423 Read: *tathatāyā* as per Ms.(17a.3) in place of *tathatāyām*.

424 Read: *viśuddhā ced bhaven nāsau vyāyāmo niṣphalo bhavet*
in place of *yadi na sā viśuddhiḥ syāt prayatnam aphalaṃ bhavet* Cf. Bhāṣya N26.20.

425 *na* is omitted from Ms.(17a.4) but should obviously be inserted on the basis of the Tib. and the Bhāṣya.

426 Read: *śūnyatāyāḥ* in place of *śūnyatāyāṃ*; Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid la* (D218b.2). Cf. Y60.17 below = D218b.3.

above refers to just the 'ground' (*upādāna*; *rgyu*) of these [i.e. defilement and purity]. Otherwise, if defilement or purity were manifestly present for emptiness, then what connection would it have with incarnate beings, on account of which both the purity and defilement of the incarnate beings is described as being due to the purity of emptiness and the defilement of emptiness, respectively? And when emptiness is defiled in the state of ordinary people and is pure in the state of the Noble Ones - this too[427] has been proven:

[3]

I.22 ab **It is neither defiled nor is it undefiled; it is neither pure nor is it impure.**[428]

Y61 **How can it be neither defiled nor impure?**[429] It is definitely pure because this is made clear through the use of the double negative. Here he quotes scriptural tradition: **[Because] by way of intrinsic nature:**

I.22 c **There is the luminosity of mind;**[430]

Here it is indeed the real nature of mind that is referred to by the word "mind" for the [phenomenal] mind is characterized by stain.[431] **How can it be neither undefiled nor pure?** On the contrary, the use of the double negative makes it clear that it is definitely defiled.

I.22 d **Because of the adventitious nature of defilement.**[432]

He shows that it is defiled but not intrinsically so[433]. Scriptural tradition is also quoted here: "It is defiled by adventitious secondary defilement".

[4] When it has been differentiated as twofold, i.e. as defiled and pure, why then is a fourfold differentiation mentioned? Some say that it is in order to demonstrate[434] the distinction between the mundane path and the supramundane path, for, the mundane path is defiled by the stain pertinent to its own level but not by that which belongs to a lower [level] because [the former] is the counteragent to the latter. The supramundane path is impure [in one sense] because it is differentiated as weak, middling etc., however, it is pure due to the absence of impurity; but not so in the case of emptiness. Again, after describing [emptiness] as undefiled, others describe it as not impure in order to distinguish it from the [sense-faculties] of sight etc., because sight etc. are not

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427 Read: *tata idam* as per Ms.(17a.7) in place of *ata evedam*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.60.

428 Read: *na kliṣṭā nāpi vākliṣṭā śuddhā 'śuddhā na caiva sā*
in place of *na kliṣṭā nāpi cākliṣṭā śuddhāśuddhāpi naiva sā* Cf. Bhāṣya N27.5.

429 Read: *nāpy cāśuddhā* in place of *nāpy aśuddhā*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.6.

430 Y's text paraphrases this verse I.22 cd.

431 Ms.(17b.1): *cittasyaivaṃ lakṣaṇatvāt* but Y's emendation to *cittasyaiva malalakṣaṇatvāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. *sems ñid ni dri ma'i mtshan ñid kyi phyir* (D218b.6).

432 Read: *kleśasyāgantukatvataḥ* in place of *sā cāgantukakleśena*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.9.

433 Read: *sā kliṣṭā na tu prakṛtyeti darśayati* in place of *kliṣṭā na tu prakṛtyeti darśayati*; cf. ibid.

434 Ms.(17b.2) omits *pradarśana* which is inserted by Y on the basis of Tib. *bstan pa* (D219a.1).

defiled for they are unobstured and undefined yet are described as impure because they are not intrinsically pure on account of their possession of impurity. Thus, after describing it as undefiled, it is described as impure in order to distinguish it from wholesome [elements] which are accompanied by impurity because that which is wholesome and accompanied by impurity is not undefiled since it belongs to *saṃsāra* and is pure because it has an agreeable *karma*-result. Real nature is definitely not so[435], for, in the defiled state it is described as defiled and consequently as being impure. In this way, the differentiation of emptiness, by way of defilement and purity, that has been listed [above] is proven[436].

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435 Read: *naivaṃ* as per Ms.(17b.4) in place of *naiva*.

436 Read: *evaṃ śūnyatāyā uddiṣṭaḥ saṃkleśaviśuddhiprabhedo 'yaṃ sādhito bhavati* in place of *evaṃ śūnyatāprabhedasya saṃkleśaviśuddher nirdeśo 'yaṃ sādhito bhavati*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.10.

The Summary Meaning of Emptiness.

N27.12 Therein, the summary meaning of emptiness should be known both in terms of characteristic and establishment. Of these, in terms of characteristic includes both the characteristic of non-existence and the characteristic of existence. Furthermore, the characteristic of existence includes both the characteristic as devoid of existence and non-existence and the characteristic as devoid of identity and difference. Again, its establishment should be known in terms of the establishment of its synonyms etc. In this regard, through these four modes of teaching: (a) the individual characteristic of emptiness, (b) the characteristic of ***karma*** [pertinent to its realization], (c) the characteristic of both its defilement and purification and (d) the characteristic of reasoning [pertinent to its proof] are made known - these lead to the appeasement of: (a) conceptual differentiation, (b) fear, (c) indolence and (d) doubt, [respectively].

[Sthiramati]

Y61.22 [1] The summary meaning of emptiness[437] should be understood both in terms of characteristic and establishment. Of these, in terms of characteristic includes both the characteristic of non-existence and the
Y62 characteristic of existence. It [should be known] in terms of the characteristic of non-existence because of the statement: "the non-existence of the duality" (I.13 a). It [should be known] in terms of the characteristic of existence because of the statement: "which consists in the existence of a non-existent" (I.13 b). Furthermore, the characteristic of existence...; because of the statement: "it neither exists nor does it not exist" (I.13 c); ...refers to both the characteristic as devoid of existence and non-existence[438] and the characteristic as devoid of identity and difference, because of the statement: "...this is the characteristic of emptiness. Therefore, in relation to the imagination of what is unreal:" (I.13 c comm.) "The characteristic consists neither in difference nor identity." (I.13 d). This is the summary meaning in terms of characteristic.

437 Read: *śūnyatāyāḥ* in place of *śūnyatā-*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.12.

438 Read: *bhāvābhāvavinirmuktalakṣaṇatas* in place of *sadbhāvābhāva...*; these words are omitted from the Ms.(17b.6) and are inserted on the basis of the Tib.: *dṅos po yod pa daṅ dṅos po med pa las rnam par grol ba'i mtshan ñid daṅ* (D219a.7) which corresponds to Bhāṣya N27.14.

[2] How should its summary meaning be understood in terms of establishment? **Again, its establishment should be known in terms of the establishment of its synonyms etc.**[439] What is meant is: its synonyms, their meaning, its differentiation and logical proof. **Through these four modes of teaching,** beginning with the characteristic, **(a) its individual characteristic, (b) the characteristic of *karma*** [pertinent to its realization], **(c) the characteristic of both its defilement and purification and (d) the characteristic of reasoning** [pertinent to its proof] **are made known** as the counteragents to the four types of secondary defilement[440]. Of these, the individual characteristic [acts] as the counteragent to **conceptual differentiation**; the latter consists in the perception [of things] as existent, non-existent, both [existent and non-existent] and different or identical. The characteristic of *karma* [acts] as the counteragent to **fear** for those who, after learning of the characteristic of emptiness, do not have firm conviction, for example, (a) the *karma* that pertains to [the realization of] thusness that is free from error, (b) the *karma* that pertains to the absence of erroneous inversion, (c) the *karma* that pertains to the relinquishment of all signs, (d) the *karma* that exists in the sphere of all supramundane direct intuition and (e) in regard to the objective support, the *karma* that pertains to the causal ground of the noble qualities. Thus, the characteristic of the differentiation is for the removal of **indolence** on the part of lazy people who, just by learning of the own-being of emptiness and the *karma* [pertinent to its realization]
Y63 'seize' this as sufficient. The characteristic of reasoning is for the removal of doubt on the part of skeptics who believe that [emptiness] is subject to defilement and purification.

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439 Read: *vyavasthānaṃ punaḥ paryāyādivyavasthānato veditavyaṃ* in place of *vyavasthānato hi paryāyādivyavasthānato veditavyam*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.15.

440 Read: *etayā ca catuḥprakāralakṣaṇādideśanayā caturvidhopakleśapratipakṣeṇa svalakṣaṇaṃ karmalakṣaṇaṃ saṃkleśavyavadānalakṣaṇaṃ yuktilakṣaṇaṃ codbhāvitaṃ bhavati* in place of *etaṃ ca lakṣaṇādicatuṣprakāraṃ nirdiṣṭvā caturvidhopakleśapratipakṣeṇa svalakṣaṇaṃ karmalakśaṇaṃ saṃkleśavyavadānalakṣaṇam rig pa'i mtshan ñid brjod pa yin no*; cf. Bhāṣya N27.16-18. Ms.(17b.7): *etayā ca catuḥprakārala-*.

Chapter Two

The Obscurations

1. The Five Obscurations Beginning with the Pervading.

N28.3 With reference to the obscurations, he says:

II.1 abc

(a) The pervading, (b) the limited, (c) the excessive, (d) the equal and (e) acceptance and rejection are elucidated as the obscurations that pertain to the two.

Of these, (a) the pervading refers to obscuration consisting in both moral defilement and the knowable and is pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the ***bodhisattva*** because it forms the totality[1]. (b) The limited refers to obscuration consisting in moral defilement and is pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the ***śrāvaka*** etc. (c) The excessive refers to [obscuration] that pertains only to those who course in passion etc. (d) The equal refers to [obscuration] that pertains to those who course in equal shares. (e) The obscuration comprising the acceptance and rejection of ***saṃsāra*** is pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the ***bodhisattva*** because it is an obscuration to the ***nirvāṇa*** [wherein the ***bodhisattva*** is] not permanently fixed. Thus these obscurations are elucidated respectively as being pertinent to both, i.e., as pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the ***bodhisattva*** as well as those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the ***śrāvaka*** etc.

[Sthiramati]

Y64 [1][2] Immediately after the explanation of the characteristic is an appropriate place for the explanation of obscuration and since [the latter] was mentioned immediately following the former, [Vasubandhu] says: with reference to the obscurations, [Maitreya] says:

II.1 abc

(a) The pervading, (b) the limited, (c) the excessive, (d) the equal and

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1 Read: *sākalyāt* omitting *kam*. Although the Tibetan (*mtha' dag la sgrib pa'i phyir* D6a.4) would substantiate a reading of *sākalyāvaraṇāt*, *sgrib pa* here is probably an elaboration inserted by the Tibetan translator as is clearly the case in several of the following sentences.

2 The first few folios are missing from the Ms. of Ch.II hence the translation of this section is based entirely on the Tib. Fn.15 below indicates the point where the Ms. begins.

(e) acceptance and rejection are elucidated as the obscurations that pertain to the two.

The obscurations that pertain to the two refer to obscurations pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva* and those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc. This verse has been composed in order to demonstrate that the differentiation among the obscurations is in accordance with the difference in benefit that is obscured. **Of these, the pervading refers to obscuration consisting in both moral defilement and the knowable and is pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*.** It is the pervading (*vyāpi*) since it pervades or permeates (*vyāpnoti*). Because it is an obscuration in regard to the totality of benefit; the totality of benefit is both benefit for oneself and benefit for others. Alternatively, it is described as the pervading since it pervades the obscuration that pertains to the *bodhisattva* according to the designation of the two as obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable. Since
Y65 moral defilement is itself an obscuring, it is [described as] an obscuration. Herein, secondary defilement is also referred to by the word "moral defilement" because it is exactly similar in its nature as moral defilement. Otherwise, the words: "the characteristic of moral defilement is ninefold" [verse II.1 d], would not include envy and avarice since these two are both secondary defilements. It is an obscuration that consists in the knowable because it is an obscuration in regard to the knowable. Since that which is knowable is concealed (*prāvṛta*) on account of this, it is not the sphere of knowledge. Alternatively, it is an obscuring of direct intuition in regard to the knowable because it creates an obstruction to the arising of direct intuition in regard to the knowable. There is the omission of the word "of" between the words "obscuration" and "knowable" [in the compound *jñeyāvaraṇa*] as in the [*tatpuruṣa*] compound 'a pot of oil' (*tailakuṇḍa*). Furthermore, it consists in undefiled nescience. Those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva* endeavour in every way to produce the accumulations of merit and direct intuition for the sake of the attainment of Buddhahood since it is the culminating attainment[3] in regard to benefit for both oneself and others. Because both [those consisting in moral defilement and the knowable] are obscurations to the latter [i.e. Buddhahood] they are determined as obscurations pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*. [Objection]: In this respect, given that the pervading has the whole for its domain and the expression "the totality" means "in every respect", how does the totality intimate pervading? [Response]: It is described as obscuration that pervades because it forms the totality by way of its explanation as a cause. Alternatively, the statement: "because it forms the totality" is made in order to explain the word "pervading" as having the meaning of totality.

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3 D: *phul du byuṅ ba thob pas* (220a.5), although P: ...*thob pa*.

[2] **The limited refers to obscuration consisting in moral defilement and is pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka*** etc. It is designated as an obscuration since it is an obscuration in regard to just one's
Y66 own benefit and is described as "limited" because it does not pervade. Why does undefiled nescience not pertain to *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*? Because if it is determined that only obscuration consisting in moral defilement is pertinent to them, then in that case, [undefiled nescience] is not an obscuration pertinent to them because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* [are said to] attain enlightenment even though it exists. [Objection]: Is nescience on the part of the *śrāvaka* etc. not an obscuration to the arising of knowledge in regard to the sphere of the truth of suffering etc.? Therefore, the two obscurations would be pertinent to them as well. Consequently, perhaps it should not be said that only obscuration consisting in moral defilement is pertinent to *śrāvakas* etc.? [Response]: This is not so, since ignorance is determined just as obscuration that consists in moral defilement because: (a) it is defiled, (b) it is adverse to knowledge and (c) it is the root of *saṃsāra*. However it is not [determined as] obscuration that consists in the knowable, like uncertainty. For example, uncertainty in regard to the sphere of the truth of suffering etc. is not [uncertainty] in regard to other spheres described as doubt and moral defilement, for it is only uncertainty in regard to another sphere and not defilement nor doubt. Similarly, nescience in regard to just the sphere of the truth of suffering etc. is ignorance and moral defilement but not in regard to other spheres, for in regard to other spheres it is only nescience and not ignorance nor moral defilement. Therefore, since [nescience] is described as the obscuration that consists in the knowable because it is an obscuration to the emergence of only the direct intuition of what is knowable, moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth are not produced as is ignorance. [Objection]: If this be so, [obscuration that consists in the knowable] cannot be determined as the obscuration pertinent to *bodhisattvas*. [Response]: This is not so [since] obscuration that consists in the knowable is the obscuration pertinent to *bodhisattvas* because they are characterized by the accumulations of learning. It is said:

> Without applying himself to the five kinds
> Y67 of learning, in no way can a Supremely
> Noble One arrive at omniscience; thus, he
> applies himself to these, either to restrain or
> assist others or, for his own knowledge.[4]

[3] **The excessive**; even a small aspect of passion etc. that manifests continually and to an excessive degree in those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*

4 This verse is from MSA XI.60:
vidyāsthāne pañcavidhe yogam akṛtvā sarvajñatvaṃ naiti kathamcit param āryaḥ /
ity anyeṣāṃ nigrahaṇānugrahaṇāya svājñārthaṃ vā tatra karoty eva sa yogaṃ //

and those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc. ...**refers to [obscuration] pertinent to those who course in passion etc.** Those who course in passion and the like refers to those for whom any passion manifests continuously and to an excessive degree even in regard to a miserable thing[5].

[4] **The equal**; i.e., obscuration pertinent to both those belonging to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva* and those belonging to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc. It is equal because the two modes are absent[6]; **refers to [obscuration] pertinent to those who course in equal shares.** They who course in equal shares refers to those for whom moral defilement manifests in conformity with the object, but not continuously.

[5] **The obscuration comprising the acceptance and rejection of *saṃsāra*...**; the *bodhisattva* accepts *saṃsāra* on account of his compassion yet, on account of his wisdom, after observing the evil of *saṃsāra* as it is in reality, he rejects[7] it. Consequently, although free from moral defilement [himself], having regard for sentient beings, he takes rebirth in the ***nirvāṇa* [wherein the *bodhisattva* is] not permanently fixed,** because he is not permanently fixed in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa*. The obscuration to this consists in the acceptance of *saṃsāra* as being overcome by moral defilement or the complete rejection of *saṃsāra* without compassion, after observing its evil as it is in reality. Others believe that nescience is described as an obscuration herein because it is an obstruction to both compassion and wisdom.
Y68 Alternatively, as has been stated in the Mahāratnakūṭa: "His mental disposition is directed towards *nirvāṇa* but his application is directed towards *saṃsāra*"[8]. This is the unfixed *nirvāṇa* of the *bodhisattva*. In this regard, in order to turn his back on *nirvāṇa* he accepts *saṃsāra* with his mental disposition and application, just like a sentient being who has no spiritual lineage. Similarly, in order to turn his back on *saṃsāra*, he completely rejects *saṃsāra* with both his mental disposition and application directed towards entering *nirvāṇa*, just like those who belong to the spiritual lineage of *śrāvakas* etc. Thus, both the acceptance of *saṃsāra* and its rejection are obscurations in regard to the unfixed *nirvāṇa* of the *bodhisattva* because they both constitute a falling to one extreme away from *saṃsāra* as well as *nirvāṇa*. At the time that they become *tathāgatas*, *bodhisattvas* do not remain in *saṃsāra* because they have relinquished both the obscurations that consist in moral defilement and the knowable. And because the Dharma Body continues without interruption in the *nirvāṇa* devoid of the remnants of

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5 Read: *hīne 'pi vastuni*; cf. AS-Bhāṣya #142.

6 This refers to the normal state of defilement devoid of both the excessively strong and weaker degrees; cf. ibid.: *samabhāgacaritaḥ prakṛtisthaḥ saṃkleśaḥ autkaṭyamāndyavivarjitasamāvasthe kleśa ity arthaḥ.*

7 Tib. should probably read *gtoṅ bas* in place of *stoṅ pas* (cf.D221a.4).

8 Read (with de Jong p.113): *nirvāṇagataś cāsyāśayaḥ saṃsāragataś ca prayogaḥ*; this passage is found in KP #16 (p.35).

existence, they do not remain in *nirvāṇa* like *śrāvakas* and the like. Thus they are not fixed permanently in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa*.

[6] These five obscurations have been enumerated here because they cause obstruction in regard to: (a) the path of the *bodhisattva* and the *śrāvaka* etc., (b) their application, (c) the result and (d) the unfixed *nirvāṇa* [of the *bodhisattva*]. **Thus these [obscurations are elucidated] respectively,** i.e. as is appropriate. Therein, the first and the last [i.e. the 'pervading' and 'acceptance and rejection'] are obscurations **pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*.** But that which follows the first [i.e. the 'limited'] is an obscuration **pertinent to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc.** The other two [i.e. the 'excessive' and the 'equal'] are obscurations **pertinent to both.** In the above, obscuration that consists in the knowable has been described as obscuration that pertains to the *bodhisattvas*; moreover, it is known as undefiled nescience.

2. The Obscuration that Consists in the Nine Fetters to Application.

N28.13 **Furthermore,**

II.1 d — **The characteristic of moral defilement is ninefold.**

II.2 a — **The fetters are obscurations;**

The nine fetters refer to obscurations that consist in moral defilement. The obscurations that comprise these [fetters] are relevant to what?

II.2 bc — **They are relevant to anxiety, equanimity and the insight into reality;**

The fetter of attachment is an obscuration relevant to anxiety. The
N29 **fetter of repugnance is [an obscuration] relevant to equanimity because on account of this, one is unable to be even-minded in regard to the foundation of repugnance, especially something disagreeable. The remaining [fetters] are obscurations relevant to the insight into reality. How do they occur? They occur respectively...**

II.2 d — In the clear comprehension of: the false view of individuality, the foundation of the latter;

II.3 abc — Cessation, the path, the [three] jewels, gain and honour and austerity.

The fetters are obscurations[9]. The fetter of pride is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of the false view of individuality because the non-relinquishment of the latter is on account of the manifestation of intermittent and continuous self-conceit at the time of direct realization. The fetter of ignorance [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the foundation of the false view of individuality because the lack of clear comprehension in regard to the aggregates that have been appropriated is on account of that. The fetter that consists in false view [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the truth of cessation because the fear of the latter is on account of the false views of individuality and the grasping of extremes and is also due to negation by wrong view. The fetter of clinging [to false views etc.] is [an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the truth of the path because one clings to the highest purity with the wrong motive. The fetter of doubt is [an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the three jewels due to the lack of true belief in the virtues of the latter. The fetter of envy is [an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of gain and honour because one does not perceive the faults of the latter. The fetter of avarice is [an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of austerity because one covets the necessities of life.

[Sthiramati]

[1] It is not known: (a) how many aspects there are to the obscuration that consists in
Y69 moral defilement which is the obscuration pertinent to the two [i.e. *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* etc.], (b) what kind of essential nature they possess and (c) what it is they obstruct, hence he says:

II.1 d — **The characteristic of moral defilement is ninefold.**

It is the obscurations that are referred to. The characteristic of moral defilement is [equivalent to] the essential nature of moral defilement. What are these ninefold [fetters]? Hence he says: [they are]:

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9 *saṃyojanāny āvaraṇam* but Tib. has simply *sgrib pa yin*; (D6b.2).

II.2 a **The fetters etc.**

They are fetters inasmuch as they fetter [people] to various sufferings. The various sufferings which belong to the group of sense-desire, form and formlessness, refer to the painful nature of suffering, the painful nature of change and the painful nature of the formative forces as is appropriate to the three realms of existence. They begin with the fetter of attachment and conclude with the fetter of avarice. Therein, repugnance refers to aversion. Envy refers to intolerance in regard to another's success[10]. Avarice refers to miserliness concerning the necessities of life[11]; these three pertain to sense-desire. The fetter of attachment consists in the passion that pertains to the three realms of existence. Similarly, the fetters of pride, ignorance, false view, clinging [to false views etc.] and doubt all pertain to the three realms of existence. The fetter of false view comprises the false view of individuality, the grasping of extremes and wrong view. The fetter of clinging [to false views etc.] comprises the clinging to false view and to morality and vows. Doubt is disbelief in regard to the [noble] truths and the
Y70 [three] jewels. Moreover, those other secondary defilements, such as anger, are definitely **obscurations that consist in moral defilement** because they are the natural outcome of moral defilement and they are defiled. Envy and avarice are referred to as fetters because of their predominance, for it is said in a Sūtra: "O Kauśika, the gods and mankind possess the fetters of envy and avarice"[12].

[2] **The obscurations that comprise these [fetters] are relevant to what?** Hence he says:

II.2 bc **They are relevant to anxiety, equanimity and the insight into reality;**

Anxiety is included among the synonyms for despondency, hence it is said: **the fetter of attachment is an obscuration relevant to anxiety.** Since the attachment to the physical body, vitality, enjoyment and family etc. as well as to the meditative absorptions and formless [attainments] is on account of this, one does not become anxious of the three realms, although oppressed by the sufferings of *saṃsāra*. **The fetter of repugnance is [an obscuration] relevant to equanimity.** How so? Hence he says: **because, on account of this, one is unable to be even-minded,** i.e. free from formative influence, **in regard to the foundation of repugnance,** i.e., the cause of repugnance, **especially something disagreeable etc.**; it is disagreeable insofar as it is the cause of depression. It is logical that it is not

10 Cf. T-Bhāṣya: *Irṣyā parasampattau cetaso vyāroṣo lābhasatkārādhyavasitasya lābhasatkārakula-śīlaśrutādīn guṇaviśeṣān parasyopalabhya dveṣāṃśiko 'marṣakṛtaś cetaso vyāroṣa Irṣyā* (L30.20-22).

11 Cf. AS (G17): *mātsaryaṃ katamat / lābhasatkārādhyavasitasya pariṣkāreṣu rāgāṃśikaś cetasa āgrahaḥ*. Cf. also T-bhāṣya (L30.24-28).

12 Read: *Irṣyāmātsaryasaṃyojanāḥ kauśika devamanuṣyā ity uktam*; this quotation is also found in the Kośa-vyākhyā (W491.5-6).

possible to be even-minded in regard to the foundation of attachment because of the absence of what is disagreeable. However, since the foundation of repugnance consists in repugnance especially in regard to something disagreeable, one is unable to be even-minded. Hence in order to demonstrate that the latter [i.e. the fetter of repug-
Y71 nance] is a greater evil than [the fetter of] attachment, he says: "especially". When one who is engaged in meditative concentration gains equanimity of the formative forces, his mind consequently becomes even. However, if the fetter of repugnance reaches an excessive degree in such a person, then on account of the latter, he does not attain equanimity in regard to the cause of repugnance; and when that occurs the self is necessarily supported as an objective support; thus, on account of the fetter of attachment he does not find solitude. Conversely, although isolated on account of the fetter of repugnance he does not attain meditative concentration.

[3] Furthermore, the **remaining** seven **[fetters] are obscurations relevant to the insight into reality**, i.e. they are obscurations to true insight. He asks: **How do they occur?** Since this is not known he says: **They occur respectively:**

II.2 d **[In the clear comprehension] of: the false view of individuality, the foundation of the latter etc.**

The fetter of pride is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of the false view of individuality. Pride herein refers to that arrogance of mind which has the false view of individuality for its basis[13] and this is sevenfold[14] according to its differentiation as pride, excessive pride etc.[15] The clear comprehension of the false view of individuality refers to the insight into the false view of individuality through the discrimination of: (a) a self, (b) what pertains to a self, (c) the apprehending subject and (d) the apprehended object, as well as through the discrimination[16] of an own-being on the part of the *dharmas* as imagined by naive people. The fetter[17] of pride is an obscuration to that [insight] because it obstructs its arising. As to how and when this occurs, he says: **because the non-relinquishment of the latter is on account of the manifestation of intermittent and continuous self-conceit at the time of direct realization**[18]. The time of direct realization of the truth is equivalent to the condition that is conducive to penetration. In the above "intermittent" refers to that which is interrupted by the counteragent; "continuous" refers to that

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13 Cf. T-Bhāṣya: *māno hi nāma sarva eva satkāyadṛṣṭisamāśrayeṇa pravartate / sa punaś cittasyo-nnatilakṣaṇaḥ* (L28.28-29); Tib. *ṅa rgyal ni ṅa rgyal źes bya ba thams cad kyaṅ 'jig tshogs la lta ba la brten nas 'byuṅ ba'o // de ni sems kheṅs pa'i mtshan ñid do* (D158a.2).

14 Read: *saptavidham* in place of *navavidham*; Tib. *rnam pa bdun* (D222b.5). This sevenfold division is substantiated by the T-Bhāṣya (L29.4-17) where seven kinds of pride are defined.

15 Sanskrit Ms.(20a.1) begins here with the words: *mānādibhedena.*

16 Ms.(20a.1): *vikena* but Y's emendation to *vivekena* is preferred.

17 Ms.(20a.1): *saṃprayojanaṃ* which should probably be amended to *saṃyojanaṃ*; Tib.(D222b.6): *kun du sbyor ba.*

18 Read: *sāntaravyantarāsmimāna-* in place of *sāntareṇa vyantareṇa cāsmimāna-*; cf. Bhāṣya N29.8.

which is not interrupted by the counteragent. And this should be understood in regard to strong and weak counteragents [respectively]. For as long as intermittent and continuous self-conceit[19] manifests, there is no relinquishment of the false view of indi-
Y72 viduality since the arising of self-conceit is only on account of the false view of individuality.

[4] **The fetter of ignorance [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the foundation of the false view of individuality.** It is the fact that it is an obscuration that is referred to. The foundation of the false view of individuality refers to the five aggregates that have been appropriated because it arises from the objective support that consists therein; as is stated in a Sūtra:

> Certain śramaṇas or brahmanas perceive the self as the self and are notionally attached to it; it is just on the basis of these five aggregates that have been appropriated that they perceive and are notionally attached to the latter.[20]

Just what is this clear comprehension? It is the perception of the emptiness of the self and what pertains to the self[21] and the emptiness of the own-being of the *dharmas* which is imagined by naive people in regard to the aggregates as well as their perception as impermanent, painful, empty, without self or as originating etc. - this is clear comprehension of those [aggregates]. Here now he gives the reason: **because the lack of clear comprehension in regard to the aggregates that have been appropriated is on account of that.** Ignorance is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of the aggregates because, on account of ignorance, there is the absence of clear comprehension of these [as impermanent etc.] in regard to the aggregates which are obscured by aspects of permanence etc.

[5] **The fetter that consists in false view [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the truth of cessation;** the word "obscuration" remains in force. The fetter of false view comprises three false views: The false views of: (a) individuality, (b) grasping of extremes and (c) wrong [view]. In the above, the false view of individuality refers to the notion that there is a self or what pertains to a self among the five aggregates that have been appropriated. The false view that consists in the grasping of extremes concerns that same entity that has been construed as a self and refers to the notion that it is eternal or that it perishes[22]. Wrong view refers to that notion on account of which one negates an entity, whether it be cause, result, deed or an actual existent, or else wrongly construes it. The clear comprehension of the truth

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19 Read: *sāntaravyantarāsmimānaḥ*; cf. ibid.

20 This passage is also quoted in the Kośa (P282.1-3) although the wording there is slightly different. Cf. also LVP Kośa Ch.5 p.17 fn.2 where attention is drawn to several other texts which cite this same passage.

21 Read (with de Jong p.114): *ātmātmīyaśūnyatāyāḥ* in place of *ātmātmaśūnyatāyāḥ*; Tib. *bdag daṅ bdag gis stoṅ pa ñid*...(D223a.4).

22 Ms. (20a.7) begins: *dṛṣṭir nāstīti darśanaṃ*, but Y's emendation to *śāśvatadarśanam uccheda-darśanaṃ vā* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.72.

of cessation refers to [its comprehension] in accordance with the aspects such as the tranquil. Just how can [false view] be an obscuration to that [clear comprehension]? Hence he says: **because the fear of the latter [i.e. cessation] is on account of the false views of both individuality and the grasping of extremes and is also due to negation**[23] **by wrong view.** Therein, on account of the false views of individuality and the grasping of extremes one fears cessation, thinking: "I
Y73 will not exist in that [state]", also, on account of wrong view one negates it, thinking there is indeed no cessation. In this respect, on account of the false views of individuality and the grasping of extremes, one does not clearly comprehend [cessation] as tranquil, sublime and as escape[24]; yet on account of wrong view one does not comprehend it as cessation. In this way the fetter that consists in false view becomes an obscuration in the clear comprehension of cessation.

[6] **The fetter of clinging [to false view etc.] is [an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the truth of the path**[25]. Therein, the fetter of clinging refers to both the clinging to false view and the clinging to morality and vows. Clinging to false view therein refers to that notion in regard to false view and the five aggregates that have been appropriated and which are the basis of false view[26], as being pre-eminent[27] and so on. Clinging to morality and vows refers to that notion on the part of one who perceives either morality, vows, both of these or the five aggregates that have been appropriated and which are the basis of that [notion], as being [equivalent to] purity, liberation or definitive liberation. Furthermore, the clear comprehension of the path is in accordance with aspects, such as definitive liberation. Just how can the fetter of clinging be an obscuration in the clear comprehension of the path? Hence he says: **because one clings to the [highest] purity with the wrong motive**[28]; i.e. because one clings to purity as either: (a) just morality and vows, (b) an abode of pleasure pertinent to sense-desire, (c) ascetic practices or (d) the knowledge of enumerations etc. By clinging to a [false] view on account of just which one believes in purity, one clings to that same [view] as being pre-eminent. Thus, on account of the fetter of clinging [to false view etc.] one abandons the path and clings to purity with the wrong motive[29].

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23 Read: *cāpavādād iti* in place of *ca tadapavādād iti*; *tad* is most likely an elaboration inserted by the Tibetan translator and is also found in the Tib. Bhāṣya (D6b.4) but not in the Sanskrit Bhāṣya (N29.12).

24 Ms.(20b.1): *nisaraṇataś*, but Y's emendation to *niḥsaraṇataś* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.73.

25 Read: *mārgasatyaparijñāne* as per Ms.(20b.2) and Bhāṣya (N29.13) omitting *āvaraṇam iti* which is an elaboration of the Tib.

26 Ms.(20b.2): *dṛṣṭyāyaśrayeṣu*, but Y's emendation to *dṛṣṭyāśrayeṣu* is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.73.

27 Read: *agrādito* in place of *utkarṣādito*; cf. T-Bhāṣya (L29.24) which expands: *dṛṣṭiparāmarśaḥ pañcasūpādānaskandheṣv agrato viśiṣṭataḥ śreṣṭhataḥ paramataś ca yad darśanaṃ*; Tib. *mchog daṅ khyad par du 'phags pa daṅ gtso bo daṅ dam par lta ba gaṅ yin pa* (D159a.1).

28 Read: *anyathā ('gra)śuddhiparāmarśanād* in place of *anyenākāreṇa śuddhiparāmarśanād*; cf. Bhāṣya N29.14.

29 Read: *anyathā* in place of *anyena tv ākāreṇa*; Tib. *rnam pa gźan gyis* (D224a.2), cf. Bhāṣya N29.14 (= D6b.4).

[7] **The fetter of doubt [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of the three jewels**; the word "obscuration" remains in force. As to how this can be so, he says: **because of the lack of true belief in their virtues.** The fetter of doubt is perplexity in regard to the truths and the [three] jewels. There is clear comprehension in regard to the jewel of the Buddha as being the final basis for the excellence and absence of all virtues and faults [respectively][30]. There is clear comprehension in regard to the jewel of the Dharma: (a) as being the conveyance across the ocean of *saṃsāra*, (b) as having the nature of the absolute separation from all suffering[31] together with its causes and (c) as providing the understanding of the latter.
Y74 There is clear comprehension in regard to the jewel of the Sangha as: (a) the locus for the results of monkhood[32], (b) engagement in the latter and (c) the 'field' worthy of supreme veneration. By acquiring perfect faith through the perception of truth and the relinquishment of doubt[33] one truly believes in the virtues of the three jewels and since there remains no doubt that is not relinquished, the fetter of doubt is described[34] as an obscuration in the clear comprehension of the three jewels.

[8] **The fetter of envy is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of gain and honour.** Here now he gives the reason: **because one does not perceive the faults of the latter.** For the fetter of envy, which has aversion for a component, refers to the dissatisfaction of mind in regard to another's success and is pertinent to one intent upon gain and honour[35]. Clear comprehension in regard to gain and honour is [equivalent to] the awareness that these are the basis of all misfortune[36]. However, on account of envy one does not clearly comprehend gain and honour[37] as being adverse to all virtue nor as the root of various misfortunes. Hence the fetter of envy is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of gain and honour.

[9] **The fetter of avarice [is an obscuration] in the clear comprehension of austerity.** As to how this can be so, he says: **because one covets the**

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30 Read (with de Jong p.114): *sarvaguṇadoṣaprakarṣāpakarṣaniṣṭhādhiṣṭhānatvena buddharatne parijñānaṃ* in place of *sarvaguṇadoṣasya prakṛṣṭāpanītasya paryantāśrayatvena buddharatne parijñānaṃ* (cf. Y189.22).

31 Ms.(20b.6): *duḥkhātyanta-*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.73.

32 Ms.(20b.6): *śrāmaṇya*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.74.

33 Read perhaps: *vicikitsāprahāṇāc* in place of *prahīṇavicikitsāyāś*; Tib. *the tshom spaṅ ba'i phyir* (D224a.5).

34 Read: *ucyate* as per Ms.(20b.7) in place of *vacanaṃ*.

35 Read: *īrṣyāsaṃyojanaṃ hi lābhasatkārādhyavasitasya parasaṃpattau dveṣāṃśikaś cetaso vyāroṣaḥ* in place of *īrṣyāsaṃyojanaṃ hi lābhasatkārarakto 'nyasaṃpatpratighāṃśikaś cetaso vyāroṣaḥ*; Tib. *phrag dog gi kun du sbyor ba ni rñed pa daṅ / bkur sti la chags pa ste / gźan gyi phun sum tshogs pa la źe sdaṅ gi char gtogs pas sems khoṅ nas 'khrug pa* (D224a.6). Cf. T-Bhāṣya (L30.20): *īrṣyā parasaṃpattau cetaso vyāroṣo lābhasatkārādhyavasitasya lābhasatkārakulaśīla-śrutādīn guṇaviśeṣān parasyopalabhya dveṣāṃśiko 'marṣakṛtacetaso vyāroṣa īrṣyā*. For the Tib. cf. D159b.6ff.

36 Ms.(21a.1): *sarvānarthāsyadatvāvabodho* but Y's emendation to *sarvānarthāśrayatvāvabodho* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.74.

37 Read: *lābhasatkāraṃ* in place of *lābhasatkārasya*; Tib. *phrag dog gis ni rñed pa daṅ bkur sti ...mi śes pas* (D224a.7).

necessities of life. Avarice which has passion for a component refers to miserliness of mind in regard to goods and chattels on the part of one who is intent upon[38] the necessities of life. Austerity consists in the separation from from the necessities of life. Its clear comprehension is [equivalent to] the understanding that it is the foundation or basis of all virtue. However, one does not clearly comprehend it as the basis of all virtue because one is intent upon the necessities of life on account of avarice. Consequently, it is said that avarice is an obscuration in the clear comprehension of austerity.[39]

[10] In [summary of] the above, the fetters of attachment and repugnance are obscurations in the endeavour to reach an understanding of reality [but the remainder are not][40]. The remainder are obscurations to the understanding of reality for one who has [already] applied himself [in such an endeavour]. For this very reason the sequential
Y75 order of these [fetters] is given; for example, one who desires liberation[41] should, from the very beginning, necessarily cause his mind to shrink from *saṃsāra*. Following from that, he should have equanimity towards everything. After that, the false view of individuality should be clearly comprehended because it is the root of all misfortune. Then, the foundation of the latter should be clearly comprehended as consisting in suffering and its arising. Then, the cessation of the latter should be understood. Then, the path of attainment should be understood. Then, one acquires perfect faith in regard to the three jewels due to the awareness of their virtues and the vision of the truth. And since it is only on account of the force of the vision of the truth that one becomes a seer of the faults and virtues [respectively] of gain and honour as well as austerity, thus the sequential order of these obscurations should be understood in conformity with the respective cause of the *dharmas* to be obscured[42]. [Objection]: Since it is possible that obscuration can pertain to all [the fetters] at all times[43], the explanation of obscuration as restricted to each individual foundation is not tenable. [Response]: A restriction[44] to each individual foundation is not employed here; on the contrary, this explanation is chiefly in terms of close contiguity.

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38 Read: *adhyavasitasya* as per Ms.(21a.2) in place of *adhyavasito*.

39 Tib. is slightly different: *de'i phyir yo byad bsñuṅs pa la sgrib bo źes bśad* (D224b.3): "...it is said that it is an obscuration in regard to austerity".

40 As noted by Y (fn.6 p.74) the Tib. inserts: *lhag ma rnams ni ma yin no* (D224b.4) which is not to be found in the Ms.

41 Read: *mumukṣunā* as per Ms.(21a/4) in place of *mumukṣūṇām*; Tib. *thar pa 'dod pas* (D224b.4).

42 Ms.(21a.5): *āvaraṇīya*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.75.

43 Read: *nanu sarvatra sarvāvaraṇatvasaṃbhavād* in place of *nanu sarvam api sarvatra āvaraṇatvena saṃbhavād*; Tib. *thams cad la yaṅ thams cad sgrib pa ñid du sgrib pa'i phyir* (D224b.7).

44 As noted by Y (fn.2 p.75), Ms.(21a.6): *niyama* here, but *pratiniyama* in the previous sentence; however Tib. *ṅes pa* in both cases.

3. Obscuration Pertinent to *Bodhisattvas*.

a. The Obscuration to the Tenfold [Qualities] Beginning with Virtue.

N29.20 **II.3 d** **The others are relevant to the tenfold [qualities] beginning with virtue.**

Moreover, there are other obscurations that are to be known in regard to the tenfold [qualities] , beginning with virtue. Which then are the obscurations and which are the [qualities] beginning with virtue?

II.4 abcd **(i) Lack of application, [application] in regard to unworthy objects and what is produced without application; (ii) non-origination, lack of mental attention and incomplete accumulations.**

II.5 abcd **(iii) The deprivation of spiritual lineage and good friends and mental**
N30 **exhaustion; (iv) the deprivation of spiritual practice, living with stupid and pernicious people;**

II.6 abcd **(v) Disquiet, that which remains from the three and the non-maturation of wisdom; (vi) innate disquiet, laziness and carelessness.**

II.7 abcd **(vii) Attachment to existence and enjoyments and faintheartedness; (viii) lack of faith, lack of conviction and deliberation in accord with the letter.**

II.8 abcd **(ix) Lack of enthusiasm for the true Dharma, enthusiasm for gain and lack of compassion; (x) loss of what has been learnt, [learning] little and the lack of the necessary preparation for meditative concentration.**

These are the obscurations. Which are the [qualities] beginning with virtue?

II.9 abcd — The qualities beginning with virtue are: (i) virtue, (ii) enlightenment, (iii) complete acceptance, (iv) intelligence, (v) absence of error, (vi) absence of obscuration, (vii) transformation, (viii) lack of fear, (ix) lack of avarice and (x) mastery.

Which obscurations are to be known as being pertinent to each of these [qualities] beginning with virtue?

II.10 ab — The obscurations that pertain to these [qualities] are to be known in groups of three.

The three obscurations to the wholesome are: (a) lack of application, (b) application in regard to unworthy objects and (c) superficial application. The three obscurations to enlightenment are: (a) the non-arising of the wholesome, (b) lack of mental attention and (c) incomplete accumulations. Complete acceptance refers to the generation of the resolve for enlightenment. The three [obscurations] to the latter are: (a) deprivation of spiritual lineage, (b) deprivation of good friends and (c) mental exhaustion. Intelligence refers to the *bodhisattva* state. The three obscurations to the recognition of the latter are: (a) deprivation of spiritual practice, (b) living with stupid people and (c) living with pernicious people. Therein, stupid people are [equivalent to] foolish people; pernicious people are those who bear ill will. The three [obscurations] to absence of error are: (a) the disquiet of erroneous inversions, (b) whatever remains from the three obscurations such as moral defilement and (c) the non-maturation of the wisdom that brings liberation to fruition. Absence of obscuration is [equivalent to] the relinquishment of obscuration. The three [obscurations] to the latter are: (a) innate disquiet, (b) laziness and (c) carelessness. The three [obscurations] to transformation, on account of which one's mind is transformed into other modes and not into supreme and perfect
N31 enlightenment, are: (a) attachment to existence, (b) attachment to enjoyments and (c) faintheartedness. The three [obscurations] to lack of fear are: (a) a low opinion of people, (b) a lack of firm conviction in regard to the Dharma and (c) deliberation in accord with the letter as

regards its meaning. The three [obscurations] to lack of avarice are: (a) a lack of enthusiasm for the true Dharma, (b) enthusiasm for gain and honour and for veneration and (c) lack of compassion for sentient beings. The three [obscurations] to mastery, on account of which one fails to obtain supremacy, are: (a) loss of what has been learnt due to the arising of *karma* conducive to the loss of the Dharma, (b) learning little and (c) lack of the necessary preparation for meditative concentration.

[Sthiramati]

Y75.14 [1] Are the latter [i.e the obscurations that consist in the nine fetters] the only obscurations? These are common to both *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* etc. however, obscurations that pertain to the *bodhisattvas* [alone] are:

II.3 d — **The others are relevant to the tenfold [qualities] beginning with virtue.**[45]

Since it is not known as to which are the obscurations and which are the [qualities] beginning with virtue[46]**, hence he says:**

II.4 ab — **(i) Lack of application, [application] in regard to unworthy objects and what is produced without application [etc.]**

...are the obscurations. The [qualities] beginning with virtue are:

II.9 ab — **(i) Virtue, (ii) enlightenment, (iii) complete acceptance [etc.]**

...are the ten qualities. Therein virtue, which is the cause of enlightenment, consists in
Y76 **all the roots of the wholesome [*dharmas*]; enlightenment is the result of it. In the above, virtue has been listed in general terms but it is not understood by way of differentiation nor own-being, hence, in order to clearly illustrate these he elaborates:**

II.9 abcd — **...(iii) Complete acceptance, (iv) intelligence**[47]**, (v) absence of error, (vi) absence of obscuration**[48]**, (vii) transformation, (viii) lack of fear, (ix) lack of avarice [etc.]**

These are described as virtuous. Since enlightenment cannot be understood by way of own-being through words alone, he describes it as:

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45 Read: *śubhādau daśadhā 'paraṃ* in place of *anyad daśaśubhādiṣu*; cf. Bhāṣya N29.20. Ms.(21a.7): *-m āvaraṇaṃ..*

46 Read: *kin tad āvaraṇaṃ ke ca śubhādaya* in place of *āvaraṇaṃ ke ca śubhādaya*; cf. Bhāṣya N29.21 & D6b.6.

47 Ms.(21b.1): *dhīmatā*, but Bhāṣya (N30.9): *dhīmattva*.

48 Read: *-anāvṛtī* as per Ms.(21b.1) in place of *-anāvṛttau*.

II.9 d- ...(x) mastery.

[2] Some believe that since the obscurations to virtue and enlightenment are explained as independent, as are [the obscurations to] complete acceptance etc., they are discerned in this context just as independent [entities] but not as things that can be listed and explained. [This is not so]: the obscuration to arising is determined in relation to virtue and it is common to such things as the resolve for enlightenment because of the necessity for the production of that virtue. The obscuration to complete acceptance etc. and the obscuration to the basis are obscurations to complete acceptance etc. and are different [from the obscuration to virtue][49]. Also, since enlightenment is unshakable and is to be attained, both the obscuration to its maintenance and the obscuration to its attainment are respectively determined. Therefore, independence does not result here.

[3] And their sequential order in brief is as follows: Enlightenment is to be attained after perfecting the root of the wholesome in its entirety. In detail [it is as follows]: From the very beginning the resolve towards enlightenment should be generated because it is the foundation for the accomplishment of benefit for both oneself and others. Then comes spiritual practice in regard to [the six perfections], beginning with generosity, which conforms with[50] the generation of the resolve, and, on account of which, one is recognized[51] as a *bodhisattva*. After that, as the result of continual practice throughout immeasurable aeons[52] and in order to purify one's mental disposition through the collection of the accumulations of merit and direct intuition, the path of vision, which has the nature of the absence of error, should be generated as the counter-agent to error in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas*. Then the path of meditative development which is characterized by the separation from obscuration should be followed to its culminating point in order to bring about the possession of a
Y77 special purity[53]. Then, all the mundane and supramundane roots of the wholesome should, as they are collected, be transformed into enlightenment through application that transcends that of the *śrāvaka* etc. Then, one who has arrived in this condition has no fear[54] in regard to the profound and sublime explanations of the Buddha and the *bodhisattvas* because he is mentally disposed towards universal enlightenment[55].

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49 The rendering above is on the basis of the Tib. which is difficult to reconcile with the Sanskrit portion: *yaṅ dag par 'dzin pa la sogs pa la sgrib pa daṅ rten la sogs pa la sgrib pa ni yaṅ dag par 'dzin pa la sogs pa rnams kyi sgrib pa ste tha dad do* (D225a.6). A possible Sanskrit reconstruction would be: *samādānādyāvaraṇaṃ dhṛtyādyāvaraṇaṃ ca samādānādyāvaraṇaṃ / bhinnaṃ ca.*

50 Read: *cittotpādānurūpā* as per Ms.(21b.4) in place of *cittotpādanānurūpā.*

51 Read perhaps: *lakṣyate* in place of *labhyate*; Tib. *mṅon* (D225b.2). Ms.(21b.4): *la-*.

52 Read: *kalpāsaṃkhyeyābhyasāt* in place of *'saṃkhyeyakalpenābhyastaḥ*; Tib. *bskal ba graṅs med par goms par byas te* (D225b.2). Cf. Y27.8.

53 Read perhaps: *-yogakaraṇīya* in place of *-yogārthaḥ*; Tib. *daṅ ldan par bya ba'i phyir* (D225b.3).

54 Read: *nottrasyati* as per Ms.(21b.6) in place of *na trasyati*, and disregard Y's fn.2 p.77.

55 Ms.(21b.6): *mahā...yāśayatvād* with three or possibly four syllables missing; Tib. *byaṅ chub chen por bsam par mi byed pas* (D225b.4). The sense of the passage demands that the negative participle of the Tib. be dropped as noted by Y's fn.1 p.77.

Then, one who is endowed with much learning[56] and understanding teaches the sublime Dharma for the purpose of bringing sentient beings to full maturation. After that, it is said that one attains mastery, i.e. Buddhahood, when those to be trained are brought to full maturation in order to liberate them.

[4] Here the obscurations are stated as thirty, but only ten qualities to be obscured [are stated] beginning with virtue, hence he asks: **which obscurations are to be known as being pertinent to each of these [qualities] beginning with virtue?**

II.10 ab **The obscurations that pertain to these [qualities] are to be known in groups of three[57];**

In the above, the three **obscurations [to the wholesome] are: (a) lack of application,** i.e. lack of enterprise. What is the obscuration in this context? One does not apply oneself on account of any moral defilement, whether it be carelessness or laziness. Or else, one does not apply oneself to that particular condition, whether it be undefined or defiled, that possesses the 'seed' of moral defilement. It is described as the lack of application since one does not apply oneself continually or respectfully because [one's application] is insignificant but not because of an absence of application, because if the latter were the case there would be no possibility of obscuration. (b) **Application in regard to unworthy objects**[58]. Scriptural works, which are the 'doorway' (*dvāra*) to the origination of enlightenment and the roots of the wholesome which bring about enlightenment, are worthy objects (*āyatana*). Something other than the latter is an unworthy object (*anāyatana*). Application in regard to the latter is application in regard to an unworthy object[59], i.e. in regard to objects other [than worthy objects]. What is the obscuration here? The nescience or moral defilement that consists in wrong view on account of which one applies oneself to an unworthy object as well as that application is the obscuration. (c) **Superficial application.** An expedient[60] is something fundamental (*yoni*); application that is contrarywise to what-
Y78 ever expedient one possesses is superficial (*ayoniśaḥ*) application[61]. It is mentioned in this very scriptural instruction, namely:

For one who courses in passion, the meditative development of friendliness is not an expedient for the relinquishment of passion, [likewise] the meditative

56 Read: *bāhuśrutya* in place of *bahuśruta*; Tib. *maṅ du thos pa*. Ms.(21b,6): *bāhu-*.

57 Read: *trīṇi trīṇi ca eteṣāṃ jñeyāny āvaraṇāni hi* in place of *trīṇi trīṇi vijñeyāni eṣām āvaraṇāni hi*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.12.

58 Ms.(22a.2): *anātana* which has been corrected in the Ms. margin to *anāyatana*.

59 Read: *'nāyatanaprayoga* as per Ms.(22a.2) in place of *'nāyatane prayoga*.

60 Ms.(22a.3): *upāyo*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.77.

61 Ms.(22a.3): *-prayogo 'niyoniśaḥ* but Y's emendation to *prayogo 'yoniśaḥ* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.78.

development of the impure[62] is [not an expedient for the relinquishment of repugnance] for one who courses in repugnance.

Here too, superficial mental attention or application which has that for its cause is an obscuration.

[5] **The three [obscurations] to enlightenment...**; enlightenment consists in an understanding that is in accord with its object. **...are: (a) the non-arising of the wholesome,** which has already been discussed. How can its non-arising be an obscuration? When the wholesome does not exist there can be no enlightenment, hence the non-arising of the wholesome is an obscuration to enlightenment. Alternatively, that moral defilement or particular state which is an obscuration to the arising of the wholesome[63] is also [an obscuration] to enlightenment, for that which is an obscuration to the accumulations [of merit and direct intuition] is certainly also [an obscuration] to its result. **(b) Lack of mental attention,** is [equivalent to] the lack of the meditative development of [wholesome elements] that have already arisen; what is meant is: they are not augmented[64]. Even though wholesome [elements] are produced in a particular state, one is not mentally attentive time and again[65] on account of moral defilement such as laziness. This is the obscuration here. **(c) Incomplete accumulations.** Enlightenment is attained through a certain amount of accumulations. While the accumulations of merit and direct intuition are incomplete one abides in a morally defiled condition like before, or else, one has scanty accumulations. However, another believes that although no distinction is made here, non-arising is intended just as [an obscuration][66] to those elements conducive to penetration and not to others. Also, there can be a lack of mental attention to those [elements conducive to penetration] that have arisen, although one is being mentally attentive; the non-accumulation of what has been accumulated [on account of that] is described as an obscuration.

[6] **Complete acceptance refers to the generation of the resolve for enlightenment.** Complete acceptance consists in the generation of the resolve for enlightenment since the accumulations of merit and direct intuition, in their entirety, and the result of these, i.e. Buddhahood, are to be completely accepted and possessed on account of the fact that they should cause all sentient beings[67] to be established in the most excellent *nirvāṇa* realm devoid of the remnants of existence by means of this

62 Ms.(22a.4): *-aśubhābhāvaneti* but Y's emendation to *-aśubhabhāvaneti* is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.78.

63 Tib. is slightly different: *yaṅ na gnas skabs kyi bye brag gi tshe dge ba la skye ba la sgrib pa'i ñon moṅs pa gaṅ yin pa* (D226a.5-6); "...moral defilement which is an obscuration to the arising of the wholesome in a particular state...".

64 Read: *avardhanam iti* in place of *anupekṣeti*; Tib. *spel bar mi byed ces bya ba* (D226a.6).

65 Read: *paunaḥ punyena* as per Ms.(22a.6) in place of *paunapunyena*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.78.

66 Tib. inserts *sgrib pa* (D226b.1) which is not found in the Ms.

67 This passage is problematical. The above rendering is considered the most coherent of many possible interpretations and necessitates the emendation of *sarvasattvāś* to *sarvasattvāṃś*; it should also be noted that *samādeyaṃ parigrāhyaṃ ca*, is not found in the Ms. but has been inserted by Y on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.6 p.78.

[resolve for enlightenment]. Furthermore, this consists in the mental disposition to perform acts of welfare for oneself and others, i.e., it is volition accompanied by will-
Y79 power. **The three [obscurations] to the latter are**[68]: (a) **deprivation of spiritual lineage;** i.e. not having a spiritual lineage or belonging to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc. **(b) Deprivation of good friends;** i.e., although one belongs to a spiritual lineage, one does not meet with those who inspire the generation of the resolve for enlightenment[69]; or else, on account of these [people], one turns away from enlightenment, or is not strengthened by the wholesome *dharmas*. Even when one meets with good friends, there is (c) **mental exhaustion**[70] - on account of the sufferings of *saṃsāra* the anxious minds of those who have wrong insight aspire for *parinirvāṇa* as soon as possible. What are the obscurations here? (a) A defect in causes [i.e. *gotra*], (b) a defect in conditions [i.e. *kalyāṇamitra*], (c) lack of compassion for sentient beings[71] or (d) laziness, since one who lacks compassion for sentient beings is either exhausted or is lazy.

[7] **Intelligence**[72] **refers to the *bodhisattva* state,** for they are suited to the careful consideration, in every respect, of all that is to be known, because, in comparison to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* etc.[73], they naturally have keen faculties. And it is just the *bodhisattva* who possesses intelligence because of his firm conviction in the profound and sublime Dharma; others do not. The *bodhisattva* state consists in spiritual practice that is not erroneously inverted for the benefit of others[74]. **(a) Deprivation of spiritual practice**[75]; i.e. one does not engage in [the practice of] the [six] perfections etc., for, one who is 'situated in' spiritual practice[76] is known as a *bodhisattva*. **(b) Stupid people are [equivalent to] foolish people**[77]; what is meant is: people who do not investigate [phenomena] because, stupid people do not know that a particular person is a *bodhisattva* even though he is occupied with spiritual practice[78]. **(c) Pernicious people are those who bear ill will;** i.e. those who bear enmity towards *bodhisattvas*. These people

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68 Read: *tasya trīṇi (āvaraṇāni)* in place of *tadāvaraṇeṣu triṣu*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.15.
69 Read: *bodher* as per Ms.(22b.2) in place of *bodhir*; Tib. *byaṅ chub las* (D226b.5).
70 Read: *parikhedacittatā* in place of *cittaparikhedaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.16.
71 Ms.(22b.3): *sattveṣu*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.79.
72 Read: *dhīmattvaṃ* in place of *dhīmattā*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.17.
73 Read: *śrāvakādigotrakāṇāṃ* in place of *śrāvakādigotribhyas*; Tib. *ñan thos la sogs pa'i rigs can rnams pas* (D226b.7).
74 Read: *bodhisattvatāviparyastā parārthapratipattiḥ* in place of the Ms. reading of: *bodhisattvatā 'viparyastatā parārthaparāpratipattiḥ* (22b.4); Tib. *byaṅ chub sems dpa' ñid ni gźan gyi don phyin ci ma log par sgrub pa'o* (D227a.1).
75 Ms.(22b.4): *pratipatter vaidhuryaṃ* but Bhāṣya (N30.18): *pratipattivaidhuryaṃ*.
76 Read: *pratipattistho hi bodhisattvo jñāyate* in place of *pratipattivṛtto hi bodhisattvo jñeyaḥ*; Tib. *sgrub pa la gnas pa ni byaṅ chub sems dpar śes so* (D227a.2).
77 Read: *kujano mūrkhajanaḥ* in place of *kujanas tu mūḍhajana*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.19.
78 Read (with de Jong): *bodhisattvo 'yam iti na jānīte* in place of *bodhisattvopamitaṃ*; Ms.(22b.5) substantiates this reading.

fail to see the real virtues of a *bodhisattva* because they seek[79] his point of vulnerability. Having concealed the real virtues [of the *bodhisattva*] they promulgate non-existent faults after superimposing the latter upon the former because they see non-existent faults or have harmful thoughts on account of enmity. What is the obscuration here? (a) That which is adverse to the [six] perfections such as generosity, (b) nescience and (c) dislike.

[8] **The three [obscurations] to absence of error...**; error is on account of superimposition and negation[80]; its counteragent is the absence of error and is [equivalent to] the path of vision; **...are: (a) the disquiet of erroneous inversions.** Some believe that this refers to the maturation[81] of the latent impressions of
Y80 notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject. Others believe it refers to the maturation of the 'seeds' lodged in the store-consciousness of: (a) all propensities that are to be abandoned by means of [the path of] vision, or (b) undefiled nescience which is an impediment to[82] the facility for an understanding[83] of the all-pervading *dharmadhātu*. Others believe that erroneous inversion refers to the conceptual notion of the self etc. in regard to the absence of self etc. **(b) Whatever remains from the three obscurations such as moral defilement**[84]. Therein, obscuration that consists in moral defilement is the moral defilement such as passion which manifests intensely and for a long time; it is an obscuration to the absence of error because there is no opportunity for the application of the counteragent to it. Obscuration that consists in *karma* is the *karma* that brings an immediate result etc. and which leads necessarily[85] to unfortunate states of existence. Obscuration that consists in the *karma*-result is the unfortunate state of existence etc. and one who is born therein does not have the good fortune of the arising of the noble Dharma. Moreover, whatever is left as a remainder from these [three], i.e. moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth, are obscurations but they are definitely not the entire [obscurations][86]. **(c) The non-maturation of the wisdom which brings liberation to fruition**[87]; this refers to the fact that the wisdom which brings about liberation is ineffective. Some believe

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79 Read: *te hi randhrānveṣitvād bodhisattvasya bhūtān guṇān na paśyanti* in place of *te hi randhrānvayitvaṃ bodhisattvasya bhūtān guṇān na paśyati*; Ms.(22b.5): *te hi randhrānveṣitv...* Tib. *de dag glags tshol bas byaṅ chub sems dpa'i yon tan yaṅ dag pa mams ni mi mthoṅ la* (D227a.3).

80 Ms.(22b.6) line ends: *adhyāropāpavādabhrānti-* but Y's emendation to *adhyāropāpavādād bhrāntiḥ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.4 p.79.

81 Ms.(22b.7): *-puṣṭir*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.79.

82 Read (with de Jong p.114): *-pratibandhasya* in place of *pratibaddhasya*; Tib. *gegs su gyur pa* (D227a.6).

83 Read: *-pratipādana-* in place of *-bodha-* (Y80.1); Ms.(22b.7): *-dharma...prati...* Tib. *khoṅ du chud par bya ba* (D227a.6).

84 Read: *kleśādyāvaraṇatrayād* in place of *kleśādyāvaraṇānāṃ trayānāṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.20.

85 Ms.(23a.1): *niyamataṃ* but Y's emendation to *niyamanaṃ* is preferred; Tib. *ṅes pa* (D227b.1).

86 Read perhaps: *na punaḥ kṛtsnāny eveti* in place of *na punaḥ kṛtsnam*; Tib. *zad par ni ma yin no* (D227b.2). Ms.(23a.2): *na punaḥ... nyeveti* with two syllables missing.

87 Read: *vimuktiparipācinyāḥ prajñāyā* in place of *vimuktiparipācanaparijñāyā*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.21.

that this is because of the failure to attain the condition conducive to penetration. However, others say that there are two [types] of wisdom in this regard which bring liberation to fruition: (a) absence of conceptual differentiation and (b) the application of the latter[88]. The non-maturation of both of these, which respectively consists in an incapacity concerning the understanding of reality and an incapacity concerning the state that causes the latter[89], is due to the fact that the accumulations are incomplete. What are the obscurations here? (a) The maturation of the latent impressions of moral defilement that are to be abandoned by [the path of] vision[90], (b) whatever remains from the obscurations such as moral defilement, (c) nescience which is an impediment to the maturation of wisdom and (d) the non-completion of the accumulations.

[9] **Absence of obscuration is [equivalent to] the relinquishment of obscuration.** It is the relinquishment of obscuration since obscuration is relinquished on account of it. The absence of obscuration consists in the path of meditative development because this is the counteragent to obscuration. **The three**
Y81 **[obscurations] to the latter are: (a) innate disquiet.** This refers to the propensity for moral defilement that is to be abandoned by meditative development. Alternatively, this refers to the maturation of the 'seeds' that are lodged[91] in the store-consciousness, of: (a) the innate [elements] such as the false view of self and (b) undefiled nescience[92] which is an impediment to the penetration of the highest meaning of the *dharmadhātu* etc[93]. (b) **Laziness** is [equivalent to] slothfulness; this refers to the lethargy of mind that has delusion for a component[94]. (c) **Carelessness** consists in both an excessive attachment to sense-objects and an inattentiveness in regard to the wholesome. Some believe that carelessness here refers to the savouring[95] of meditative concentration. Due to disquiet and laziness in this respect, the path is not cultivated

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88 Read: *tatprāyogikī* as per Ms.(23a.3) in place of *tatprāyogikā*.

89 *tadupaniṣad-*; Tib. *de'i rgyu-* (D227b.4). Cf. MSA XI.9.

90 Read: *darśanaheyakleśavāsanāparipuṣṭiḥ* in place of *darśanaheyakleśasya puṣṭavāsanā*; Tib. *mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba'i ñon moṅs pa'i bag chags brtas pa* (D227b.5). Cf. Y79.24 = D227a.5.

91 Read: *-saṃniviṣṭabījaparipoṣaḥ* in place of *-saṃniviṣṭaṃ paripuṣṭabījam*. Although the Ms.(23a.5) substantiates Y's reconstruction, the Tib. (*...sa bon ...gnas pa yoṅs su gsos pa* D227b.7) which is identical to a near parallel passage on a previous page (Y80.2-3 = D227a.6-7), suggests the same Sanskrit construction as found in that passage.

92 *ajñānasya* (*mi śes pa'i*) is found in D contrary to Y's fn.2 p.81.

93 Read: *dharmadhātor utkarṣārthādi-* in place of *dharmadhātuprasṭhārthādi-*; Ms.(23a.5): *dharmadhāto....rthādi*; Tib. *chos kyi dbyiṅs mchog gi don la sogs pa* (D227b.7).

94 Read: *kausīdyam ālasyo mohāṃśikaś cetaso 'nabhyutsāhaḥ* in place of *kausīdyaṃ mohāṃśikād ālasyāc cittaṃ nābhyutsahate*; Tib. *le lo ni sñom las te gti mug gi char gtogs pas sems mṅon par mi spro ba* (D228a.1). Cf. T-Bhāṣya (L31.32): *kausīdyaṃ kuśale cetaso 'nabhyutsāho vīryavipakṣaḥ / kuśale kāyavāṅmanaḥkarmaṇi nidrāpārśvasayanasukham āgamya yo mohāṃśi-kaś cetaso 'nabhyutsāhaḥ*; Tib. *le lo ni dge ba la sems mṅon par mi spro ba ste / brtson 'grus kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs so // ñal ba daṅ skyes pa daṅ 'phres pa'i bde ba la brten nas gti mug gi char gtogs pas lus daṅ ṅag daṅ yid kyi las dge ba la sems mṅon par spro ba med pa gaṅ yin pa* (D161a.5).

95 Read: *āsvādanātra* as per Ms.(23a.6) in place of *āsvādanam atra*; cf. Kośa Index p.89. As noted by Y in his fn.3 p.81, *atra* is not translated in the Tib.

and due to carelessness the mind is not protected from the unwholesome. What are the obscurations here? These very three.

[10] **The three [obscurations] to transformation**[96] **on account of which one's mind is transformed into other modes;** [and is not transformed into supreme and perfect enlightenment][97]. Transformation[98] therein refers to [the transformation] of the roots of the wholesome which have already arisen and is restricted to [the transformation] by mind into Buddhahood alone. There are three obscurations to the latter. Which are these three? Those, on account of which, mind is transformed into modes[99] other than Buddhahood, i.e. into *saṃsāra* or the enlightenment of the *śrāvakas* etc., **...and not into supreme and perfect enlightenment.** And these are: **(a) attachment to existence, (b) attachment to enjoyments and (c) faintheartedness.** "Existence" refers to the five aggregates that have been appropriated. Since they are enjoyed (*bhujyante*), the sense-objects of form etc. are "enjoyments" (*bhoga*). "Attachment" is the strong desire for the latter two. "Faintheartedness" refers to a mind that lacks sublimity; i.e. one has a low opinion of oneself and thinks: "how can someone like me[100] obtain Buddhahood?" In regard to this, on account of the attachment to existence and the attachment to enjoyments, one's mind is transformed into a propitious state of existence; however, on account of faintheartedness, the mind is transformed into the *śrāvaka* vehicle etc. What are the obscurations in this regard? They are: the craving for existence and enjoyments, laziness and lack of compassion.

[11] **The three [obscurations] to lack of fear.** What is this lack of fear? It is a fearless state that consists in a firm conviction[101] in regard to emptiness and the profound and sublime Dharma of the Buddha and the *bodhisattvas*. **(a) A low**
Y82 **opinion of people;** i.e. erroneous understandings and statements about people who proclaim the way of the universal vehicle, or disbelief in the virtues of morality, meditative concentration and wisdom etc. **(b) A lack of firm conviction in the Dharma;** i.e. disbelief concerning the words of the Buddha as expounding a profound and sublime way and as having meaning that is not erroneously inverted. **(c) Deliberation in accord with the letter as regards its meaning**[102]; i.e. one understands only the verbatim meaning of 'non-arisen', 'without cessation' and 'peaceful from the beginning' etc., but the meaning that is intended in reality is not understood.

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96 Read: *pariṇates* in place of *pariṇātes*; cf. Bhāṣya N30.23.

97 D inserts the following elaboration (on *anyatra*) which is not found in the Ms. nor P: *bla na med pa yaṅ dag par rdzogs pa'i byaṅ chub tu mi bsṅo* (D228a.2-3).

98 Read: *pariṇatir* in place of *pariṇātir*; cf. fn.96 above.

99 Read: *anyatra* in place of *anye*; Tib. *gźan du* (D228a.3). Cf. Bhāṣya N30.24.

100 Ms.(23b.1): *madvidha*; contrary to Y's fn.7 p.81.

101 Ms.(23b.2): *-rmeṣv adhimuktir*; disregard Y's fn.9 p.81.

102 Read: *yathāruta-* in place of *yathāśabdaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N31.2. Note: (*vi*)*cāraṇā cārthe* here, but Bhāṣya *vicāraṇārthe*.

Therefore, there is no firm conviction in regard to the meaning of 'non-arisen' etc. What are the obscurations here? (a) Doubt and (b) nescience which is adverse to both wisdom and meditative concentration and is also adverse to a conclusive investigation[103] of the meaning that is intended.

[12] **The three [obscurations] to lack of avarice...** It is on account of the lack of avarice that one teaches the Dharma, either for the continued existence of the true Dharma, or in order to assist others. **are: (a) lack of enthusiasm for the true Dharma;** i.e. not holding it dear. It is on account of this that the true Dharma's long-lasting existence is not ensured because it is not conveyed to another's mental continuum. **(b) Enthusiasm for gain and honour and for veneration;** i.e. holding them dear. One worries that another may be equal or even superior to oneself concerning enthusiasm for the true Dharma, and consequently, one does not teach the Dharma because of fear that gain etc. will be hindered. [Alternatively], although one does not cling to gain and honour, there is: **(c) a lack of compassion for sentient beings;** i.e. one does not teach [the Dharma][104] due to an absence of compassion for sentient beings because one who lacks compassion is not affected by the sufferings of sentient beings. What are the obscurations here? (a) Lack of enthusiasm, (b) attachment to gain and honour and (c) lack of compassion.

[13] **The three [obscurations] to mastery.** Since mastery consists in the attainment of all kinds of masteries of the mind, mastery is [equivalent to] Buddhahood[105]. But since the three obscurations to the latter are not known, he says: **on**
Y83 **account of which one fails to obtain[106] supremacy.** He states that the obscurations to mastery are those on account of which supremacy is not obtained, because supremacy is dependent upon the mastery of mind. Furthermore, supremacy refers to excellence in regard to direct intuition, relinquishment and power. Alternatively, by the statement: "...those on account of which supremacy is not obtained", [supremacy] is demonstrated as a synonym for mastery[107]. What is meant is: Buddhahood[108] is not attained. **(a) The loss of what has been learnt.** [This is equivalent to] the total separation from hearing the true Dharma in the same way that[109] the loss of one's

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103 Read: *-ārthanitīraṇa-* in place of *-ārthavicāraṇa-*; Ms.(23b.4): *-ārthanitīr...* Tib. *spyod pa* (D228b.3).

104 *dharma* is omitted from the Ms. as noted by Y (cf. his fn.4 p.82) but has been inserted on the basis of the Tib. (D228b.6).

105 Read: *vaśitvasya cittasarvākāravaśitvaprāptitvād buddhatvaṃ vaśitvaṃ* in place of *vaśitvaṃ hi sarveṣāṃ cittavaśitvānāṃ prāptir buddhatvaṃ vaśitvam*; Tib. *dbaṅ ni sems kyi dbaṅ rnam pa thams cad thob pas saṅs rgyas ñid dbaṅ* (D228b.7).

106 Ms.(23b.7): *labhatva*, but Y's emendation to *labhata* as is preferred.

107 Read: *vaśitvaparyāyena pradarśitaṃ* in place of *vaśitvaparyāye nirdiṣṭaṃ*; Tib. *dbaṅ gi rnam graṅs su bstan pa ste* (D229a.2).

108 Ms.(23b.7): *vibhutvaṃ* but Y's emendation to *buddhatvaṃ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. *saṅs rgyas ñid* (D229a.2).

109 Ms.(23b.7) is partially illegible but substantiates the insertion of *tadyathā* immediately prior to *bandhubhir* (Y83.6); Tib. *źes bya ba lta bu'o* (D229a.3).

relatives is [equivalent to] the total separation from one's relatives. Furthermore, the loss of what has been learnt is due to the **arising of *karma*[110] conducive to the loss of the true[111] Dharma;** i.e. because they either abide in the attachment to their own views or they have recourse to people who are not good friends, the Sūtras of the universal vehicle are rejected by those who lack remorse saying: "these words are spoken by Māra and are the cause of unfortunate states of existence; these words are not spoken by the Buddha", and they deter other people from these [Sūtras]. They efface the writings, burn and submerge them in water and so, in various ways, there is the arising of *karma*[112] conducive to the loss of the true Dharma on account of the maturation of the 'seed' of an individual nature[113] that is deprived of hearing the true Dharma. [Alternatively], when there is no loss of what has been learnt, **(b) learning little** is referred to as an obscuration since the accumulations of direct intuition are incomplete and one who has little learning is unable to analyse the *dharmas*. And [alternatively], even if one has much learning, **(c) lack of the necessary preparation for meditative concentration**[114] is referred to as an obscuration. The lack of the necessary preparation for meditative concentration is due to: (a) the absence of any of [the qualities] beginning with will-power, or (b) the non-completion of meditative development[115] because of the absence of any of the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment. Alternatively, the lack of necessary preparation refers to the non-perfection of the Buddha's meditative concentrations such as the Vajra-like [concentration][116]. What are obscurations here? They are: (a) *karma* conducive to the loss of the Dharma, (b) learning little, (c) weakness in wisdom and (d) the secondary defilements that are adverse to meditative concentration such as spiritual indifference and restlessness.

b. The Ten [Instrumental] Causes[117].

N31.9 **Furthermore, these obscurations in regard to virtue etc. should be known according to the influence of each [respective] category, in**

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110 Read: *-karmaprabhavanāt* in place of *karmotpannād bhavati*; cf. Bhāṣya N31.6.

111 *sad* is omitted from both the Tib. Ṭīkā and Bhāṣya.

112 Read: *-karmaprabhavanam* in place of *-karmotpadyate*; Tib. *las rab tu skye* (D229a.5). Cf. Bhāṣya N31.6.

113 *ātmabhāva* but Tib.: *las* should probably read *lus* (D229a.5) and Y's fn.5 p.83 can be disregarded since Ms.(24a.3) : *paripuṣṭitaḥ*.

114 Read: *samādher aparikarmitatvaṃ ca* in place of *samādher cāparikarmitatvaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N31.6.

115 Read: *bhāvanāyā* in place of Ms. reading of *bhāvanāyām* (24a.4); Tib. *bsgom pa yoṇs su ma rdzogs pa'i phyir* (D229a.7).

116 Read: *vajropamādīnām* as per Ms.(24a.4) in place of *vrajopamādīnām*.

117 These same *daśakāraṇāni* are listed in AS (P28.12) where *kāraṇam* is defined as the "own-being of the cause" (*hetusvabhāva*).

relation to which there are ten [instrumental] causes. The ten causes are: (a) The cause for origination; for example, the eyes etc. [are the cause] for eye-consciousness, (b) The cause for continued existence; for example, the four types of food [are the cause for the continued existence] of sentient beings. (c) The cause for support refers to that which is the foundation of something; for example, the inanimate world [is the cause for the support] of the world of sentient beings. (d) The cause for manifestation; for example, sight [is the cause for the manifestation] of form. (e) The cause for modification; for example, fire etc. [is the cause for the modification] of cooked food etc. (f) The cause for disjunction; for example, the scythe [is the cause for the disjunction] of that which is to be severed. (g) The cause for transformation; for example, a gold-smith etc. [is the cause for the transformation] of gold etc. when it is transformed into things such as bracelets. (h) The cause for a belief; for example, smoke etc. [is the cause for the belief that there is] fire etc. (i) The cause for making [others] believe; for example, the logical reason [is the cause for making (others) believe] in a premise. (j) The cause for attainment; for example, the path etc. [is the cause for the attainment] of *nirvāṇa* etc.

Thus the obscuration to origination is to be regarded [as an obscuration] to virtue because of the necessity for the origination of the latter. The obscuration to continued existence is [an obscuration] to enlightenment because of the unshakability of the latter. The obscuration to support is [an obscuration] to complete acceptance because the latter is the foundation of the resolve for enlightenment. The obscuration to manifestation is [an obscuration] to the possession of intelligence because of the necessity for the promulgation of the latter. The obscuration to modification is [an obscuration] to the absence of error
N32 because the latter changes into the reverse of error. The obscuration to disjunction is [an obscuration] to the absence of obscuration because the latter is [equivalent to] separation from obscuration. The obscuration to transformation is [an obscuration] to development because the latter is characterized by the transformation of mind into enlightenment. The obscuration to belief is [an obscuration] to lack of fear because fear is due to disbelief. The obscuration to making [others] believe is [an obscuration] to lack of avarice because others are made to believe on account of lack of avarice in regard to the Dharma. The obscuration to attainment is [an obscuration] to mastery because the latter is characterized by the attainment of supremacy.

> In regard to origination, continued existence, support, manifestation, modification, disjunction, transformation, belief, making [others] believe and attainment, the causes are tenfold.
>
> The examples of these begin with the eyes, food, the ground, light and fire;
> The remainder begin with the scythe, a craftsman, smoke, the logical cause and the path.

[118]Now, from the very beginning, on account of the desire to attain enlightenment, the root of the wholesome should be generated. Then, by engendering the force of the root of the wholesome, enlightenment should be attained. Moreover, the resolve towards enlightenment is the support for the origination of the root of the wholesome. The ***bodhisattva*** is the [physical] basis of that resolve towards enlightenment. Moreover, in order to relinquish[119] erroneous inversion, the absence of erroneous inversion is to be generated by the ***bodhisattva*** who has secured the engendering of the force of the root of the wholesome and who has generated the resolve towards enlightenment. Then, all obscuration should be relinquished on the path of meditative development on account of the absence of erroneous inversion[120] on the path of vision and all the roots of the wholesome should be transformed into supreme and perfect enlightenment owing to the relinquishment of obscuration. Then, by engendering the forces of transformation, there should be no fear in regard to the profound and sublime Dharma teachings. Thus, these Dharmas should be revealed to others in full detail by one whose mind is devoid of fear and who sees the virtues of the Dharmas. Following that, the ***bodhisattva*** who has secured the engen-
N33 dering of the forces of the various virtues in this way soon arrives at supreme and perfect enlightenment, having acquired mastery over all

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118 Nagao suggests that the following paragraph of the Bhāṣya (N32.11 to 33.2) could well be a later interpolation peculiar to the Bhāṣya because it receives no comment by Sthiramati. Cf. his fn.6 p.32.

119 Read: *prahāṇāya* in place of *prahāya* on the basis of the Tib. *spaṅ ba'i phyir* (D8a.7). Cf. N's fn.9 p.32.

120 Read: *'viparyāsena* in place of *'viparyaste* on the basis of the Tib. *phyin ci ma log pas* (D8a.7). Cf. N's fn.11 p.32.

***dharmas*. This is the sequential order of [the development of the categories] beginning with virtue.**

[Sthiramati]

Y84 [1] **Furthermore, these obscurations** beginning with lack of application in regard to virtue etc., i.e. in regard to the tenfold categories concluding with supremacy, **[should be known according to the influence of each respective category], in relation to which there are ten [instrumental] causes**[121], i.e. in relation to each category[122], beginning with origination and concluding with attainment, there are ten causes, beginning with application[123] and concluding with the necessary preparation for meditative concentration, because they are contrary to those obscurations. And although they are individually differentiated here, this explanation does not differentiate [i.e. it designates them all as causes] because no distinction is made concerning causality in regard to origination and the other [nine]. **According to the influence of each [respective] category**; what is meant is: according to the predominance of the category, such as origination. For, when there is an obstruction to the cause of the origination etc. of these [categories] such as virtue, it is described as an obscuration to origination etc. For example, something, such as a wall which obscures light is described as an obscuration to eye-consciousness which is the effect of that [light]. In this way, thirty [instrumental] causes are explained[124] as the reverse of the thirty obscurations that pertain to these ten *dharmas* [i.e. virtue etc.].

[2] In this respect, **(a) the three causes for the origination** of virtue are: application, application in regard to worthy objects and proper application. Here now he provides an example: **for example, the eyes etc.** For the eyes etc. are just causes for the origination of consciousness, they do not cause continued existence etc.[125] Therein, lack of application etc. is an immediate obstruction to application etc.[126], and indirectly, is an impediment to the origination of virtue too, on account of their mutual relationship, **thus the obscuration to origination is an obscuration to virtue**, hence he says: **because of the necessity for the origination of the latter.** He shows that this is just an obscuration to origination because there is no possibility of continued existence in regard to virtue [if it has not originated].

[3] **(b) The cause for continued existence is in relation to enlightenment.** The turning about of the basis is [equivalent to] enlightenment which has thusness,

121 Read: *yatrārthe daśa kāraṇāni* in place of *yasminn arthe daśa kāraṇāni*; cf. Bhāṣya N31.9.

122 Read: *yatrārthe* in place of *yasminn arthe*; cf. ibid.

123 Read: *prayogādikāni* in place of *prayogādīni*; Ms.(24a.6): *prayogādikani*.

124 Read: *nirdiṣṭaṃ bhavati* in place of *nirdiṣṭam*; Tib. *bstan pa yin no* (D229b.5).

125 Read: *cakṣurādayo hi vijñānasyotpattikāraṇam eva na sthityādikāraṇam* as per Ms.(24b.1) in place of *cakśurādayo vijñānasyotpattikāraṇam eva [na tu] sthityādikāraṇam.*

126 Tib. omits *ādi*; cf. D229b.6.

devoid of stain, for its basis[127]. Here he gives the reason: **because of its unshakability.** It is unshakable because it remains for the duration of the world; it cannot become otherwise nor can it cease. However, the enlightenment of the *śrāvaka* etc. ceases after having accomplished its aim in his own mental continuum. The
Y85 *bodhisattvas* who with their superior mental disposition which consists in the provision of welfare and happiness for all sentient beings are engaged in accumulations, vow to remain [in the world] up until such time as there is the enlightenment characterized by the turning about of the basis for [all] sentient beings[128]; but not for the sake of mere non-rebirth, like the *śrāvakas* etc.[129] Moreover, since there can be no continued existence without origination[130], origination is also [applicable] here. Therefore, just the cause for the continued existence of enlightenment is mentioned, not the cause for origination. And since, there is no other cause for continued existence apart from this, consequently, only the latter is mentioned. Alternatively, enlightenment is [equivalent to] pure thusness and thusness does not originate because it has purity for its own-being. On the contrary, only continued existence is positively mentioned by way of these causes because of the absence of adventitious stain; origination is not [mentioned]. Furthermore, the causes for the continued existence of enlightenment[131] are: (a) the production of the roots[132] of the wholesome, (b) mental attention and (c) accumulations that are complete. And while such things as the non-origination of virtue are hindrances herein to the arising of the wholesome etc.; since they impair the continued existence[133] of enlightenment, they are described as obscurations to its continued existence. **(b) The cause for continued existence**[134]; here he gives an example: **for example, the four types of food [are the cause for the continued existence] of sentient beings,** for no new sentient beings are brought into existence by means of the [four] foods such as morsel food[135], whereas those who have already come into existence are certainly maintained[136].

[4] **The cause for support refers to...** The support is the resolve towards enlightenment because it is the foundation for all wholesome *dharmas*. Here now is an

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127 Read perhaps: *āśrayaparāvṛttir nirmalatathatāśrayā bodhiḥ* as per Ms.(24b.2), contrary to Y's fn.4 p.84, in place of *āśrayaparāvṛttir bodhiḥ / āśrayo nirmalatathatā* although this reading is in agreement with the Tib.: *byaṅ chub ni gnas gyur pa'o // de bźin ñid dri ma med pa ni gnas pa'o* (D229b.7 - 230a.1) = "The turning about of the basis is [equivalent to] enlightenment; the basis is thusness which is devoid of stain".

128 Read: *sattvānāṃ tāvad avasthātuṃ praṇidadhati* in place of *sattvās tāvad avatiṣṭhatīty ucyate*; Tib. *sems can ji srid pa de srid du gnas par smon te* (P68b.1); D: *sems* for *sems can* (230a.2).

129 Read: *anutpattimātrārthaṃ śrāvakādivat* in place of *anutpattimātratvāc chrāvakādivat*; Ms. (24b.4): *-traṃ śrāvakādivat*. Cf. Y's fn.1 p.85.

130 Read: *utpattyā vinā* as per Ms.(24b.4) in place of *utpattiṃ vinā*.

131 Ms.(24b.5): *bodheḥ*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.85.

132 Ms.(24b.5) omits *mūla* which is inserted on the basis of the Tib. (*rtsa ba*); cf. D230a.5.

133 Read (with de Jong p.114): *sthitivighātaṃ* which agrees with Ms.(24b.6) in place of *sthiti–viyātaṃ*.

134 Tib. inserts *sthitikāraṇaṃ* which is not found in the Ms.

135 Read: *kavaḍīkārādibhir* as per Ms.(24b.6) in place of *kavaḍ [illegible] dibhir*; cf. Mvy. #2284.

136 Read perhaps: *sthāpyante* in place of *vyavasthāpyante*; Tib. [illegible] *as par byed pa* (D230a.6).

example: **whatever is the foundation of something** is indeed its support[137], considering that it is supported by this. **For example, the inanimate world is [the cause for the support] of the world of sentient beings**[138]. The causes for this [support] are: (a) the spiritual lineage, (b) being endowed with good friends and (c) the absence of mental exhaustion. The deprivation of a spiritual lineage etc. is also mentioned herein as an obscuration to support because it is at odds with the cause for support, hence he says: **the obscuration to support is [an obscuration] to complete acceptance because the latter is the foundation of the resolve for enlightenment.**

Y86 [5] **The cause for manifestation is in relation to the possession of intelligence;** because of the necessity for its promulgation by the *bodhisattva.* Moreover, this refers to: (a) success in spiritual practice, (b) living with suitable people and (c) living with people who are not intent upon harm[139]. Since they are impediments to the cause for the manifestation of intelligence, the deprivation of spiritual practice and the like herein are described as obscurations to manifestation. Hence he says: **the obscuration to manifestation is [an obscuration] to the possession of intelligence because of the necessity for the promulgation of the latter.** [illegible] now is an example: **for example, sight is [the cause for the manifestation] of form**[140]; for sight[141] is the cause for the manifestation of form alone, it is not the cause for origination and the like.

[6] **The cause for modification is in relation to the absence of error. Because it has the nature of the reverse of the errors of** imputation and negation, the absence of error, which is [equivalent to] the path of vision, is described as a modification of error[142]. For example, ash etc. [is a modification] of wood etc. The three causes of this are: (a) the eradication of disquiet that consists in erroneous inversion, (b) the absence of the three obscurations such as moral defilement and (c) the maturation of the wisdom which brings liberation to fruition. **For example, fire etc. [is the cause for the modification] of cooked food etc.** For eatables such as boiled rice are different from uncooked rice etc., but belong to their series. The cause of the latter is fire etc.

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137 Read: *yad yasyādhāraṇabhūtaṃ tat tasya dhṛtiḥ* as per Ms.(24b.7) in place of *yady asyādhāraṇaṃ tatra tat tasya dhṛtir*; cf. also Bhāṣya N31.12.

138 Ms.(24b.7): *sattvalokasye-*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.85.

139 Read: *avyābādhacitta-* in place of *randracitta-*; Tib. *skye bo gnod par mi sems pa* (D230b.2). Cf. Y40.22 & D209a.5.

140 Read: *tad yathā āloko rūpasya* in place of *tad yathā rūpasyāvabhāsa*; cf. Bhāṣya N31.14.

141 Read: *āloko* in place of *avabhāso*; cf. ibid.

142 Read: *abhrāntir darśanamārgo bhrānter vikāra ucyate* as per Ms.(25a.3) in place of *abhrāntir darśanamārgaḥ / abhrānter vikāra ucyate.* The latter reading is based on the Tib. which seems confused: *'khrul pa med ni mthoṅ ba'i lam mo // 'khrul pa med pa'i 'gyur ba źes bya ba ste* (D230b.5).

[7] **The cause for disjunction is in relation to the absence of obscuration.** The obscuration that remains[143] from obscuration that is to be relinquished by means of the path of vision is relinquished on account of this, thus the absence of obscuration refers to the path of meditative development. The three causes for the latter are: (a) the eradication of innate disquiet, (b) vigour[144] and (c) the absence of carelessness. Moreover, these are causes for disjunction because they [act as] counteragents to the cause for non-disjunction. Hence he says: **the obscuration to disjunction is [an obscuration] to the absence of obscuration;** and this is an obscuration to just the counteragent for the cause for disjunction. Here now he gives the reason: **because the latter consists in the separation from obscuration.** Since one is separated [from obscuration] on account of this, it is described as disjunction.

[8] **The cause for transformation is in relation to development[145],** because
Y87 the latter is characterized by application in regard to the roots of the wholesome, i.e. in regard to universal enlightenment. Moreover, this consists in a turning aside from existence and enjoyments and the absence of faintheartedness. Consequently, the obscuration to transformation should be regarded as an impediment to the cause for transformation. For what reason? **Because the latter,** i.e. development, **is characterized by the transformation of mind[146] into universal enlightenment.**

[9] **The cause for belief is in relation to lack of fear.** This consists in: (a) the holding of people in esteem, (b) the firm conviction in the Dharma and (c) the understanding of the meaning that is intended. Since belief is on account of these qualities, **the obscuration to belief is [an obscuration] to lack of fear[147],** since [the latter] is an impediment to the cause for belief. Here now is the reason[148]: **because fear is due to disbelief** because it is on account of disbelief that one has fear of the Dharma.

[10] **The cause for making [others] believe is in relation to lack of avarice.** Moreover, this consists in: (a) enthusiasm for the true Dharma, (b) indifference towards gain and honour and veneration and (c) compassion for sentient beings. And since it is at odds with the cause for making [others] believe, **the obscuration to making [others] believe** is established as **[an obscuration][149] to lack of avarice.** Here now he provides the reason: **because others are made to believe[150] on account of lack of avarice in regard to the Dharma.** Avarice

143 Tib. (D230b.7) has simply *lhag ma dag* for *cheṣam āvaraṇam*
144 Ms.(25a.5) appears to read: *-opaghātavīryam* as noted in Y's fn.2 p.86.
145 Read: *natau* in place of *pariṇāme*; cf. Bhāṣya N32.2.
146 Ms.(25a.7): *citta-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.87.
147 Ms.(25b.1): *atrāse*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.87.
148 Read: *atraiva kāraṇam* as per Ms.(25b.1) in place of *atraiva kāraṇam āha*
149 Tib. inserts *āvaraṇa* which is omitted from the Ms. (cf. D231a.6).
150 Read: *dharmāmatsaritvena parasaṃpratyāyanād* in place of *dharmāmatsaritvena pareṣāṃ sampratyāyanatvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N32.5. Ms.(25b.2): *dharmāmatsaritvena para-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.87.

is created towards the Dharma due to lack of enthusiasm etc. for the true Dharma. Moreover, one does not teach the Dharma to others because of avarice for the Dharma. Hence the obscuration to making [others] believe is described as [an obscuration][151] to lack of avarice.

[11] **The three causes for attainment are**[152]: (a) the absence of *karma* conducive to the loss of the Dharma, (b) much learning and (c) the necessary preparation for meditative concentration. Loss of what is learnt etc. is established as **[an obscuration] to mastery** because it is at odds with these [causes]. Here now is the reason: **because the latter, i.e. mastery, is characterized by the attainment of supremacy.**

[12] However, others say that the causes for virtue etc. have the following sequential order. A mental continuum that is supported[153] by the wholesome *dharmas* is
Y88 conducive to the attainment of enlightenment; consequently, virtue is mentioned at the beginning. Immediately after that, enlightenment is mentioned. Since [the *bodhisattva*] has the ability to accomplish both of these owing to his resolve for enlightenment and since his resolve for enlightenment is the support for all the wholesome *dharmas* until [he attains] enlightenment, the resolve for enlightenment is then mentioned. When he has generated the resolve for enlightenment he applies himself to the six perfections as well as to the avoidance of stupid or pernicious people. In this way his status as a *bodhisattva* becomes publicly manifest. Hence his possession of intelligence is mentioned immediately after complete acceptance. And while applying himself in this way [the *bodhisattva*] relinquishes erroneous inversion and produces direct intuition that is not erroneously inverted. Hence the absence of error is mentioned immediately following the possession of intelligence. Moreover, this consists in the path of vision because obscuration is relinquished through the practice thereon. Hence, immediately after this, the absence of obscuration is mentioned which consists in the relinquishment of obscuration. Since the mind of one who is devoid of obscuration is transformed just into Buddhahood and not into any other [mode of being] because he is not attached to existence and enjoyments, consequently, development is then mentioned. And thus, elation arises towards the extremely profound Dharmas of the Buddha on the part of [a *bodhisattva*] who has attained such a state of being and since he is devoid of fear, the lack of fear is then mentioned. In this way, since one who has direct perception of the Dharma[154] resorts only to those expedients through which he perceives correct discipline for sentient beings, how can there be any avarice on his part? Therefore, immediately after lack of fear, lack of avarice is mentioned. Thus the *bodhisattva*

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151 Tib. inserts *āvaraṇa* which is omitted from the Ms. (cf. D231b.1).

152 Read: *prāptes trīṇi kāraṇāni* in place of the Ms. reading of *vaśitvasya trīṇi kāraṇāni* (25b.3). The Tib. *'thob pa'i byed rgyu gsum ni* (D231b.1) substantiates this reading which conforms with the general pattern of Sthiramati's quotation from the Bhāṣya; cf. N31.19.

153 *upastabdha*; the Tib. (D231b.2) *ñe bar bstan pa* should probably read *ñe bar brtan pa*.

154 Read: *dharmapratyakṣabhūtena* in place of *dharmapratyakṣeṇa*; Tib. *chos mṅon sum du gyur pa* (D231b.7).

whose obscurations are relinquished and whose virtuous qualities are complete[155] obtains mastery of mind; hence, mastery is then mentioned. This is the sequential order.

Y89 [13] Since this chapter is the section concerning obscuration[156], the causes for the origination of virtue etc. are not expressed in aphorisms[157] [in Maitreya's *kārikās*], like the obscurations are. However, a summary of the [causes for the origination of virtue etc.] that have presented themselves in this connection is provided here in verse form[158].

> **The causes are tenfold in regard to origination, continued existence, support, manifestation, modification, disjunction, transformation, belief, making [others] believe and attainment[159].**

This second verse is for the purpose of summarising the examples:

> **The examples of these begin with the eyes, food, the ground[160], light and fire;**
> **The remainder begin with the scythe[161], a craftsman, smoke, the logical cause and the path.[162]**

155 Read: *paripūrṇaśukladharmā* as per Ms.(26a.1) in place of *paripūrṇaśukladharma*; Tib. *dkar bo'i chos rnams* (D232a.1).

156 Read: *āvaraṇādhikāra iti* in place of *āvaraṇaprasaṅga iti*; Tib. *sgrib pa'i skabs yin pas* (D232a.2).

157 Read: *āvaraṇavan na sūtritāni* as per Ms.(26a.1) in place of *āvaraṇavat sūtritāni*; Tib. *sgrib pa bźin du mdor mdzad pas* (D232a.2) which should probably be amended to *ma mdzad pas*.

158 Read: *ataḥ śubhādīnām utpattikāraṇāny āvaraṇan na sūtritāni / prasaṅgāgatānāṃ tv atra ślokena saṃgrahaḥ kriyate* as per Ms.(26a.2). Although this reading is not in agreement with the Tib. which is the basis for Y's emendation, the Ms. reading is more coherent in the context. Cf. Nagao's discussion on this section in the Introduction to his edition of the Bhāṣya (N11).

159 Read: *vikāraviśleṣanatipratyayaprāyanāptiṣu* in place of *vikāraviśleṣaṇatau śraddhāgamakatā-ptiṣu*; cf. Bhāṣya N32.8.

160 Tib. omits *bhū*; cf. D232a.3.

161 Ms.(26a.3): *dātra*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.89.

162 Read: *cakṣurāhārabhūdīpavahnyādis tadudāhṛtiḥ / dātraśilpajñatādhūmahetumārgādayo 'pare //* Cf. Bhāṣya N32.9.
Note: Ms.(26a.3): *matā* in place of *apare* but the latter is preferred on the basis of the Tib. *gźan* (D232a.4).

4. The Obscurations to the Factors that Contribute to Enlightenment, the Perfections and the Spiritual Levels.

Introductory

N33.4 II.10 cd

Furthermore, the other obscurations are in regard to: (a) the factors that contribute [to enlightenment], (b) the perfections and (c) the spiritual levels.

[Sthiramati]

[1]

Y89.12 **(Verse II.10 cd is repeated)**[163]

In the above, virtue and its obscurations were explained without any specific distinction but now he explains virtue according to its differentiation in relation to the factors that contribute [to enlightenment] and also according to its differentiation as being common or not common [to all spiritual lineages].

a. The Obscurations to the Factors that Contribute to Enlightenment.

N33.6 **Now, [the obscurations]**[164] **to the factors that contribute to enlightenment are:**

II.11 abcd

(a) Lack of skill in regard to the foundation, (b) laziness, (c) the two deficiencies in meditative concentration, (d) non-engendering, (e) excessive weakness, and the defects of: (f) false view and (g) disquiet.

163 *pakṣya* in the Bhāṣya (N33.4) is replaced by *pakṣa* in the Ms.

164 Tib. inserts *āvaraṇam* (cf. D8b.3).

(a) Lack of skill in regard to the foundation is an obscuration to the applications of mindfulness. (b) Laziness is [an obscuration] to the complete relinquishments. (c) The two deficiencies in meditative concentration are [obscurations] to the bases of psychic power, namely, (i) [a deficiency] in completeness[165] due to defectiveness in either will power, vigour, mind or examination and (ii) [a deficiency] in meditative development due to defectiveness in the formative forces that facilitate relinquishment. (d) The non-engendering of [the elements] conducive to liberation is [an obscuration] to the faculties. (e) The excessive weakness of those faculties is [an obscuration] to the powers because of their contamination by adverse elements. (f) The fault of false view is [obscuration] to the limbs of enlightenment because they characterize the path of vision. (g) The fault of disquiet is [an obscuration] to the limbs of the path because they are nurtured by the path of meditative development.

[Sthiramati]

Y89.16 [1] Also the obscurations pertinent to [virtue[166] which consists in] the factors that contribute to [enlightenment are explained] according to the differentiation of the latter as:

II.11 a **(a) Lack of skill in regard to the foundation, (b) laziness etc.**

Y90 The factors that contribute to enlightenment are common in this respect because both the *śrāvakas* and *bodhisattvas* are entitled to them[167] without a specific distinction [as to activity][168]. However, the perfections and the spiritual levels, which consist in the activity pertinent to the *bodhisattvas*, are not common [to all] because only the *bodhisattvas* have sovereign power over them. Moreover, the obscuration to the result was previously described by way of the obscuration to the cause of virtue etc.; however, what is other than what was discussed previously is mentioned [now] since it is the immediate obscuration to the result [that is discussed] here. Alternatively, since such [qualities] as the lack of skill in regard to the foundation is indeed different from the lack of application etc., this difference is discussed. Alternatively, when virtue and enlightenment [were discussed in the previous section] the lack of application etc. to conduct and its result, which go together with the expedients of the *bodhisattvas* alone, were described as obscurations. Here in this section however, by means of an analysis

165 The *daṇḍa* between *dvayahīnatā* and *paripūryā* (N33.10) should be omitted, and, although both P and D: *ma rdzogs pa* (*aparipūryā*), the *ma* should be dropped. Cf. de Jong pp.114-5.

166 Tib. (D232a.5) inserts *dge ba* (*śubha*) which is not found in the Ms.

167 Read (with de Jong p.114): *tatrādhikārāt* which is substantiated by Ms.(26a.4) in placa of *tatrāvikārāt*.

168 Tib. (D232a.5) inserts *bya ba* (*kriyā / karaṇa*) which is not found in the Sanskrit.

of the factors that contribute to enlightenment etc., the lack of skill in regard to the foundation etc. should be understood as an obscuration to virtue, whether common or not common [to all spiritual lineages], that is different from the lack of application etc. Therein, enlightenment is threefold according to its differentiation among the *śrāvakas* etc. and since they conform with these [three], [those qualities] beginning with the applications of mindfulness and concluding with the path[169] are described[170] as the factors that contribute to enlightenment. The ten perfections and the ten spiritual levels [are described] in accordance with the Sūtras.

[2] **Lack of skill in regard to the foundation is an obscuration to the applications of mindfulness.** Moreover, this refers to the four applications of the mindfulness of: (a) body, (b) sensation, (c) mind and (d) the *dharmas*. The body, sensation, mind and the *dharmas* form the foundation of these [four applications of mindfulness] because they have these for their object. Therein, the body forms the foundation for notional attachment to a '[physical] basis'. Sensation forms the foundation for notional attachment to the enjoyments that belong to the self. Mind forms the foundation for notional attachment to the belief in the self. The *dharmas*[171] form the foundation for notional attachment to the defilement and purification of the self. Absence of understanding in regard to the individual and general characteristics of the body etc. is [equivalent to] lack of skill in this regard. Therein, the individual characteristic of the body refers to its nature as a composite of many impure substances[172]. The [individual characteristic] of sensation refers to its essential nature consisting in pleasure etc. The [individual characteristic] of consciousness refers to its various representations as sense-objects. The [individual characteristic] of the *dharmas* is in accordance with the context [i.e. pure or impure]. Furthermore, the general characteristic refers to the aspects such as impermanent, painful, empty and not-self. Alternatively, lack of skill in regard to the foundation refers either to: (a) lack of knowledge in regard to the body etc. in its aspects as impure, painful, impermanent and without self, or (b) conceptual differentiation [in regard to the body etc.] in terms of the aspects of purity, pleasure, permanence and a self, because nescience or wrong view are
Y91 [respective] obscurations to the applications of mindfulness. [Objection]: If the applications of mindfulness have wisdom and mindfulness for their own-being, why is only the lack of skill in regard to the foundation described as an obscuration but not also the absence of memory in regard to the foundation? [Response]: Because the activity [of mindfulness] is dependent upon wisdom; for thus, since wisdom consists in vision,

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169 Ms.(26a) line 7 begins: -*nā* as noted by Y in his fn.2 p.90, but his emendation to (*mārgaparyan*)*tā* is preferred.

170 Read: *ucyante* as per Ms.(26a.7) in place of *ucyate*.

171 Read: *dharmā* as per Ms.(26b.1) in place of *dharma*; Tib. *chos rnams* (D232b.5).

172 Read perhaps: *anekāśucidravyasaṃhatātmakatvaṃ* in place of *anekāśucidravyena saṃgṛhītātmatvaṃ*; Tib. *mi gtsaṅ ba du ma'i rdzas 'dus pa'i bdag ñid* (D232b.6).

mindfulness etc. acts upon an objective support that is attained subsequently to wisdom but does not exist independently, like wisdom. Therefore, the absence of memory is not described as an obscuration in this regard.

[3] **Laziness is [an obscuration] to the complete relinquishments.** The topic under discussion is the obscurations. Vigour receives the title of 'complete relinquishment' in this context when it is occupied with: (a) the relinquishment of adverse elements that have [already] arisen and the non-origination of those which have not yet arisen, and (b) the augmentation of the counteragent that has [already] arisen and the production of those which have not yet arisen. Although the latter cannot be differentiated, they are respectively determined as fourfold due to the differentiation in result.[173] Consequently, since the complete relinquishments consist in vigour, slothfulness is described as an obscuration.

[4] **The two deficiencies in meditative concentration are [obscurations] to the bases of psychic power.** It is described as psychic power (*ṛddhi*) since [the *bodhisattva*] becomes successful (*ṛdhyate*) by means of this. Moreover, it consists in the meditative concentrations of will-power, vigour, mind and examination. This is the base of psychic power because it is the support for the psychic powers such as travelling[174] through space and [the performance of] magical creations. Alternatively, psychic power (*ṛddhi*) is [equivalent to] moving (*ardana*)[175]; what is meant is: a power such as traveling through space. The bases of these are the bases of psychic power because they form its foundation. The latter refers to meditative concentration and is of four kinds beginning with the meditative concentration of will-power. Will-power is the essential feature in this meditative concentration of will-power because one attains meditative concentration by means of it. However, it is not that vigour and the others are absent therein for they do accompany will-power, but since they are not essential features in the latter [i.e. in the *chandasamādhi*], they are not proclaimed. The same should be said for the meditative concentrations of vigour, mind and examination. The two deficiencies in meditative concentration were described as obscurations and since these are not known, he says: **namely, (a) [a deficiency] in completeness[176] due to defectiveness in either will-power, vigour, mind or examination and (b) [a deficiency] in meditative development due to defectiveness in**
Y92 **the formative forces that facilitate relinquishment.** The deficiency in completeness in this regard is due to the absence of any one of: will-power, vigour, mind and examination, because meditative concentration does not occur due to the power of

173 The Ms.(26b.5) erroneously inserts *smṛtiḥ* at the end of this sentence since it has no coherence in the context and is not to be found in the Tib. (cf. D233a.4).

174 Ms.(26b.6): *gamana*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.91.

175 Ms. (ibid.) not clear; this reading of *ardana* is suggested tentatively as an etymological explanation. Tib. *'gro bas* (D233a.5).

176 Read (with de Jong pp.114-15): *paripūryā* in place of *aparipūrṇena*; cf. Bhāṣya N33.10.

that [absence][177]. As to the deficiency in meditative development, this is due to the absence of any one of the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment. Moreover, the latter have the nature of faith, will-power, vigour, tranquillity, mindfulness, full awareness, volition and equanimity[178]. Since mastery in meditative concentration is obtained by means of the meditative development of these formative forces that facilitate relinquishment and not by any other means, hence, because there is a deficiency in meditative development due to their absence, mastery over meditative development is not obtained. What are the obscurations here? (a) That which is adverse to will-power etc. and (b) secondary defilement that is adverse to the formative forces which facilitate relinquishment, namely, laziness, forgetfulness in regard to an objective support, indolence, excitability, the absence of formative force and the [presence of] formative force.

[5] **The non-engendering of [the elements] conducive to liberation is [an obscuration] to the faculties.** The root of the wholesome which one who is afraid of *saṃsāra*[179] produces for the sake of liberation is described as 'conducive to liberation' since the assurance of obtaining liberation is on account of that. And since faith etc. receive the title of 'faculties' when it is engendered and not otherwise, hence[180] the non-engendering of [the roots of the wholesome] that are conducive to liberation is described as the obscuration to the faculties. What are the obscurations here? They are that: (a) attachment to a new existence and (b) fear in regard to *nirvāṇa*. [which occur when the root of the wholesome] which is conducive to liberation is not generated on account of any secondary defilement[181].

[6] **The excessive weakness of those faculties is [an obscuration] to the powers.** The topic under discussion is obscuration.[182] How then can there be an excessive weakness of the faculties? Consequently, he says: **because of their contamination[183] by adverse elements;** what is meant is: they are overcome[184] by adverse elements which have the nature of lack of faith, laziness, loss of mindfulness, distraction and a weakness in wisdom[185]. The faculties are nurtured by the state

177 Read: *tadādhipatyāt* in place of the Ms. reading of *tadādhipatasya* (27a.1); Tib. *de'i dbaṅ gis* (D233b.2).

178 Ms.(27a.2): *-cetanopekṣā-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.92.

179 Ms.(27a.3): *saṃsārād*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.92.

180 A Sanskrit fragment of a portion of the Ṭīkā (Y92.15 to 93.9) was discovered among Vinītadeva's Triṃśikā-ṭīkā and published by P.S. Jaini in an article titled "The Sanskrit Fragments of Vinītadeva's *Triṃśikā-ṭīkā*" in BSOAS Vol. XLVIII/3, 1985, pp.470-92; cf. fn.96 p.492. This fragment has been used as basis for several of the following emendations.

181 Read: *yenopakleśena mokṣabhāgīyaṃ notpādyate / sā punarbhavasaktir nirvāṇe trāsaś ceti* in place of *yenopakleśena mokṣabhāgīyaṃ na ropyate / sā punarbhavasaktir nirvānabhītiś ca* on the basis of Jaini and the Tib. (cf. D233b.7). It should be noted that the Jaini reading of *nākṣipati* has been replaced by *notpādyate*; Tib.: *mi (b)skyed pa ste.*

182 Tib. omits this passage; cf. D233b.7.

183 Ms.(27a.5): *-vyavakiraṇād*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.92.

184 Read: *-ābhibhavād* in place of *-ābhibhūtād*; cf. Jaini.

185 Read: *dauḥprajñātmakena* in place of *dusprajñātmakena*; cf. Jaini.

of 'heat' and the state of the 'summit'[186]; and although these two [states] are conducive to penetration, they become excessively weak because they are overcome by adverse elements such as lack of faith. Hence there is the possibility of loss through that[187]. However faith and the like receive the title of 'powers' in the states[188] of the 'receptivity to knowledge' and the 'highest [worldly][189] realization' because the adverse elements
Y93 have been vanquished. Hence whatever excessive weakness there is in those [faculties] such as faith, when they are overcome by adverse elements in the states of 'heat' and the 'summit'[190], that is an obstruction to the powers because when it exists there is no possibility of a condition of power[191]. What are the obscurations here? Just those adverse [elements] such as lack of faith.

[7] **The fault of false view is [an obscuration] to the limbs of enlightenment.** The fact that obscuration [is the subject under discussion] remains in force here[192]. Enlightenment here is intended as [equivalent to] the path of vision and since these seven limbs of enlightenment which have the nature of mindfulness, the investigation of the Dharma, vigour, joy, tranquillity, meditative concentration and equanimity arise at the time of the relinquishment of moral defilement that is to be relinquished by means of [the path of] vision, they are described as the limbs of the latter[193] [i.e. of enlightenment]. However, if they were [described as] limbs because they are favourable to enlightenment then the applications of mindfulness and the like would also be limbs of enlightenment. How can the fault of false view be an obscuration to the limbs of enlightenment? Hence he says: **because they are nurtured by the path of vision**; what is meant is: because they are respectively determined by the path of vision. What then is this fault of false view? (a) The five imaginary views, (b) doubt, (c) ignorance, (d) the moral defilements and secondary defilements together with their associates such as passion, which have the latter [i.e. a, b & c] for their objective support. [Objection]: Is it not so that doubt and the like are also obscurations in this respect? [Response]: Admittedly these are obscurations, however, here[194] he

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186 Read: *ūṣmagatamūrdhaprabhāvitānīndriyāni* in place of *indriyāni hy uṣmagatamūrdhānā-bhyām prabhāvitāni*; cf. Jaini.

187 Jaini: *tasmin* in place of Ms.(27a.6): *tasmāt* but the latter is preferred; Tib.(D234a.2): *'di las.*

188 Read: *-āvasthayor* in place of *-āvasthāyām*; Ms.(27a.6): *-āvasthayo...* Jaini omits *avasthā*, i.e. reading simply: *kṣāntyagradharmayor.*

189 Tib. (D234a.3) inserts *laukika* (*'jig rten pa*) which is not found in the Ms.

190 Read: *atas teṣāṃ eva śraddhādīnām ūṣmagatamūrdhāvasthayor yad* in place of *tasmād yat teṣām eva śraddhādīnām uṣmagatamūrdhānāvasthāyām* on the basis of Jaini which however replaces *-āvasthayor* with *-āvasthānāt*; Tib.: *dro bar gyur pa dan / rtse mo'i dus na* (D234a.3).

191 Tib. is slightly different: "...there is no possibility of a special power"; (*stobs kyi bye brag mi srid do* D234a.4).

192 Read: *āvaraṇam ity atra vartate* in place of *āvaraṇam iti prakṛtam*; cf. Jaini; Tib. omits this statement (cf. D234a.4).

193 Y's reconstruction of: *tasyā tāni smṛtidharmapravicayavīryaprīti-* is preferred to Jaini: *tasyaitāni smṛtidharmavicayaprīti-* on the basis of Tib. (cf. D234a.5) and the general coherence of the passage.

194 Ms.(27b.3) line begins: *-ha*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.93.

annunciates the fault of false view[195] by laying the stress on its essential features, thus the absence of an exposition of these [elements, i.e. doubt etc.] is not contradictory. Moreover, of these [elements] beginning with false view, it is just the 'seed' lodged in the store-consciousness that is described as an obscuration to those [limbs of enlightenment] because it is to be relinquished[196] by means of the path of vision.

[8] **The fault of disquiet is mentioned as** the obscuration **to the limbs of the path**, which are enumerated as: correct view, correct intention, correct speech, correct action, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness and correct meditative concentration[197]. Here now he provides the reason: **because those** limbs of the path **are characterized by the path of meditative development**, because they are respectively determined by the path of meditative development. What is the fault of disquiet? In detail it refers to: (a) the innate false views of individuality and grasping of extremes together with their associated elements and (b) the moral defilements and secondary defilements of passion etc. together with their associated elements, which have the former [i.e. (a)] as well as the sense-objects for their objective supports. The 'seed' of these, which is lodged in the store-consciousness, is disquiet. However, in
Y94 brief, it refers to the impurities other than those which are to be relinquished by means of [the path of] vision. The force of those [impurities], which is lodged in the store-consciousness, is disquiet. Moreover, this is determined as an obscuration to the limbs of the path since it is to be relinquished by means of the path of meditative development. The obscuration to the factors that contribute to enlightenment has now been described.

b. The Obscurations to the Perfections.

N33.18 **The obscurations to the perfections are:**

N34 **II.12 abcd** **Obscurations to: (a) dominion, (b) propitious states of existence, (c) the non-abandonment of sentient beings, (d) the diminution of faults and augmentation of virtues, (e) guidance;**

195 Read: *dṛṣṭidoṣāpadeśa* as per Ms.(27b.3) in place of *dṛṣṭidoṣopadeśa*.

196 Ms.(27b.3): *-praheyatvād* contrary to Y's fn.3 p.93, however his rendering of *praheyatvāt tad* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.

197 Ms.(27b.4) line begins: *-ksamādhy*...; which suggests that each of the eight limbs of the path should be prefixed by *samyak*, although Tib. substantiates Y's rendering which omits *samyak*; cf. D234b.2-3.

II.13 abcd (f) liberation, (g) imperishability, (h) the continuity of virtue, (i) the assurance of [the arising of the latter] and (j) enjoyment of the Dharma and causing maturation.

Here the obscurations that pertain to the ten perfections are shown by way of the particular obscuration to the relevent result of each perfection. Of these, (a) the obscuration to dominion and sovereignty is an obscuration [to the result][198] of the perfection of generosity. (b) The obscuration to propitious states of existence is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of morality. (c) The obscuration to the non-abandonment of sentient beings is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of patience. (d) The obscuration to the diminution of faults and the augmentation of virtues is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of vigour. (e) The obscuration to the guidance of those to be trained is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of the meditative absorptions. (f) The obscuration to liberation is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of wisdom. (g) The obscuration to the imperishability of generosity etc. is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of skill in regard to expedients because its imperishability is on account of the transformation into enlightenment. (h) The obscuration to the uninterrupted emergence of the wholesome in all rebirths is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of vows because the possession of a rebirth that is favourable to this is on account of the strength of vows. (i) The obscuration to the assurance [of the arising] of those wholesome [elements] is [an obscuration to the result] of the perfection of the powers because [the *bodhisattva*] is not overcome by adverse elements on account of his powers of critical consideration and meditative development. (j) The obscuration to both the enjoyment of the Dharma for himself and causing the maturation of others is an obscuration [to the result] of the perfection of direct intuition because the understanding [by the *bodhisattva*] of the meaning of what he has learnt is not in accord with the letter.

[Sthiramati]

Y94.6 [1] Immediately following the latter [i.e. the obscurations to the factors that contribute to enlightenment], [the obscurations] to the perfections should be mentioned. Hence he

198 Tib. (D9a.2) inserts *'bras bu* which is not found in the Ms.

says: the obscurations to the perfections are:

II.12 ab **Obscurations to: (a) dominion, (b) propitious states of existence, (c) the non-abandonment of sentient beings[199] etc.**

Here the obscurations that pertain to the ten perfections are shown by way of the particular obscuration to the relevent result of each perfection. What is the reason that here avarice and the like, which exist substantially as impediments[200] to generosity etc., are not described as obscurations to the perfections although they are [described as] obscurations to the result of the relevent [perfection]? All [people] engage in generosity and the like for the sake of its result[201]; therefore, in order to generate interest in the relinquishment of avarice etc., the obscuration to the result is mentioned but the obscuration to the perfection is not. Alternatively, obscuration such as avarice which is adverse to dominion and which produces a result consisting in poverty etc., impedes a result such as dominion[202], thus it is described as an obscuration to the latter. What are the results of those [perfections]? In this respect the chief results of the perfection of generosity are dominion and sovereignty. The [chief result] of the perfection of morality is a propitious state of existence. The [chief result] of the perfection of patience is the non-abandonment of sentient beings. The [chief result] of the perfection of vigour is the diminution of faults and the augmentation of virtues. The [chief result] of the perfection of meditative absorption is guidance for sentient beings in scriptural instruction. The [chief result] of the perfection of wisdom is liberation for those who have been guided[203]. The [chief result] of the perfection of skill in regard to expedients is the imperishability of the wholesome on account of its transformation into enlightenment. The [chief result] of the perfection of vows is uninterrupted virtue. The [chief result] of the perfection of the powers is the assurance
Y95 [of the arising] of wholesome *dharmas*. The [chief result] of the perfection of direct intuition is the enjoyment of the Dharma and the maturation of sentient beings.

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199 Read: *aiśvaryasyātha sugateḥ sattvātyāgasya cāvṛtiḥ*;
in place of *aiśvaryasya sugatyāś ca sattvātyāgasya cāvṛtiḥ*
Cf. Bhāṣya N34.1. Ms.(27b.6): *aiśvaryasyā-*.

200 Read: *vibandhena* as per Ms.(27b.7) in place of *vibandhe*.

201 Read: *dānādiṣu tatphalārthaṃ sarve pravartante* in place of *tatphalārthena dānādibhyaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate*; Tib. *de'i 'bras bu'i don du sbyin pa la sogs pa la thams cad 'jug ste* (D235a.1).

202 Read: *-phalaṃ vibadhnāti* in place of *-phalapratibandhāt*; Ms.(28a.1): *-phalaṃ* Tib. *'bras bu gegs byed pas* (D235a.2).

203 Read: *teṣām avatīrṇānāṃ vimocanaṃ* in place of *tān avatīrṇān vimocayati*; Tib. *btsud pa de rnams rnam par grol bar byed pa* (D235a.4). Cf. also Bhāṣya N34.10 & D9a.3.

[2] **The obscuration to dominion and sovereignty**[204]; therein, dominion refers to an abundance of wealth and property. Sovereignty refers to the power that comes from the enjoyment of the latter. The obscuration to these two is an obscuration pertinent to the perfection of generosity because they result from that. What then is this [obscuration]? It is avarice.

[3] **The obscuration to the propitious states of existence;** a propitious state of existence refers to an excellent state of existence either among mankind or the gods[205]. The obscuration to this is an obscuration pertinent to the perfection of morality because [propitious states of existence] result from that. Moreover, this [obscuration] consists in: (a) immorality and (b) contemptible actions of body and speech.

[4] **[The obscuration] to the non-abandonment of sentient beings;** i.e. treating [even] offensive sentient beings just like those who are helpful. And this is the result of [the perfection of][206] patience; the obscuration to this is anger.

[5] **[The obscuration] to the diminution of faults and the augmentation of virtues;** the diminution of faults refers to the relinquishment of [elements] that have already arisen which cause harm to oneself and others and the non-origination of [elements] that have not yet arisen. The augmentation [of virtues][207] refers to the growth of [elements] that have already arisen which manifest for the benefit of oneself and others and the origination of [elements] that have not yet arisen. What then is the obscuration here? It is laziness.

[6] **The obscuration to the guidance of those to be trained...;** i.e. guidance in scriptural instruction for those to be trained because it is acknowledged as the cause for the attainment of the heavens and final beatitude. When respect is produced through appeasement, sentient beings effortlessly understand the scriptural instruction on account of: (a) reading the thoughts of others, (b) their psychic power[208]; and distraction is the obscuration here.

[7] **The obscuration to liberation;** liberation consists in the relinquishment of moral defilement and this comes about through scriptural instruction[209]. Since scriptural instruction comes about on account of wisdom and not by any other means,

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204 Read: *aiśvaryādhipatyāvaraṇam* in place of *aiśvaryādhipatya āvaraṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N34.7.

205 Read: *śobhanā gatiḥ sugatir / devamanuṣyoḥ* in place of *śobhanagamanaṃ sugatir / manuṣyo devaś ca*; Ms.(28a.4): *śobhanā...* Tib. *mdzes par 'gro ba ni bde 'gro ste mi daṅ lha* (D235a.7). Cf. Kośa (P235.18): *praśastā gatir asyeti sugatir devamanuṣyopapatteḥ.*

206 Tib. inserts *pāramitā* which is not found in the Ms.

207 Tib. inserts *guṇānāṃ* (*yon tan rnams*) which is not found in the Ms.

208 Read (with de Jong p.115): *ādeśanayārddhyā cāyatnena* in place of *saṃjalparddhyaprayatnena.* The first syllable of the Ms.(28a.7) is not clear but this passage seems to read: *ṛddhyā cāyatnena.*

209 Ms.(28a.7): *-anuśāsanyā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.95.

consequently, liberation is the result of the perfection of wisdom. The obscurations to this are: (a) defiled wisdom, (b) delusion and (c) a weakness in wisdom.

[8] **The obscuration to the imperishability of generosity etc.**[210]; an obscuration to the imperishability of generosity and morality etc. is an obscuration pertinent to the perfection of expedients. Moreover, as to how generosity etc. can be imperishable, he says: **because its imperishability is on account of the transfor-**
Y96 **mation into enlightenment.** The root of the wholesome such as generosity which is transformed into universal enlightenment, like Buddhahood, does not perish, . Some believe that this obscuration consists in a lack of knowledge of the expedients which characterize the transformation into universal enlightenment. Others believe that this obscuration consists in the grasping of the three components [of giving][211] which is [equivalent to] lack of skill in regard to expedients.

[9] **The obscuration to the uninterrupted**[212] **emergence of the wholesome in all rebirths**; the uninterrupted [emergence] of the wholesome is [equivalent to its emergence] day by day or moment by moment. And this is the result of the perfection of vows. As to why this is so, he says: **because the possession**[213] **of rebirth that is favourable to this is on account of the strength of vows**; for [the *bodhisattva*] takes a rebirth that is congenial to the uninterrupted emergence of generosity etc. through the strength of his vows. Obscuration to this consists in the absence of vows in relation to a rebirth favourable to generosity etc.

[10] **The obscuration to the assurance**[214] **[of the arising] of those wholesome [elements]**; assurance consists in the combining [of the three: *vīrya*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*][215] day by day and moment by moment. Here now he gives the reason: **because [the *bodhisattva*] is not overcome by adverse [elements] on account of his powers of critical consideration and meditative development.** The power of critical consideration here consists in wisdom accompanied by steadfastness. Furthermore, steadfastness is a designative *dharma* since it is a designation applicable to the innate trio of vigour[216], meditative concentration and wisdom. The power of meditative development [is mentioned here] because [the *bodhisattva*] engages in generosity etc., effortlessly, through his possession of habitual practice

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210 Read: *dānādyakṣayatvāvaraṇam* rather than *dānādyakṣayāvaraṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N34.11.

211 *trimaṇḍala* here refers to the purity of the three aspects of giving, i.e. 'giver', 'receiver' and 'gift'. Cf. MSA XVI.51 Comm. where these are discussed while explaining *nirvikalpajñāna* in the context of the *dānapāramitā*: *jñānaṃ nirvikalpaṃ yena trimaṇḍalapariśuddhaṃ dānaṃ dadāti dātṛdeyapratigrāhakāvikalpanāt* (L/B109.9).

212 Ms.(28b.2): *-nairantanantarya-*, but Y's emendation to *nairantarya* is correct.

213 Y's reading of *parigrahād* agrees with the Bhāṣya (cf. N34.14), however Ms.(28b.3): *parigrahaṇād*.

214 Read: *niyatīkaraṇāvaraṇam* in place of *niścayāvaraṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N34.15.

215 *ekīkaraṇam* (*gcig tu byed pa*) is problematical in this context; the explanation above is offered tentatively.

216 Ms.(28b.4): *vīryasa-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.96.

because he is not overcome by avarice which is the counteragent to this [power of meditative development]. What are the obscurations here? (a) The absence of critical consideration[217] and (b) weakness in meditative development.

[11] **The obscuration to the enjoyment of the Dharma for himself and causing the maturation of others**; the results are: (a) the enjoyment of the profound and sublime Dharma of the universal vehicle by one who is situated in the circles of the assembly which pertain to enjoyment[218] and (b) causing the maturation[219] of sentient beings through teaching the Dharma by acts of transformation in their various aspects[220]. Moreover, the obscurations to this are: (a) deliberation upon the meaning of what has been learnt, according to the letter[221] and (b) sluggish wisdom. And so ends the obscurations [to the perfections].

[12] Although, substantially there are six perfections herein, nominally there are ten[222]
Y97 since four perfections are constituted by the perfection of wisdom. The perfection of wisdom therein consists in supramundane direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation; the gradual relinquishment of all obscuration is on account of that direct intuition. Furthermore, the perfections of expedients, vows, the powers and direct intuition are incorporated in direct intuition that is attained subsequently to the supramundane path. How is it that the perfection of direct intuition, although it is pre-eminent, is not devoid of conceptual differentiation? Because the perfection of direct intuition consists in that direct intuition attained subsequently to the direct intuition that is devoid of conceptual differentiation and after precisely defining his understanding by means of that direct intuition[223], [the *bodhisattva*] experiences in return the enjoyment of the Dharma for himself and brings others to maturation. And since this duality [i.e. self/others = subject/object] is non-existent in [direct intuition] devoid of conceptual differentiation, consequently, the perfection of direct intuition is not without conceptual differentiation. The obscurations to the perfections have now been described.

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217 Ms.(28b.5): *-pratisaṃkhyāna-*, but Y's emendation to *-apratisaṃkhyāna-* on the basis of the Tib. is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.96.

218 Ms.(28b.5): *sāṃbhogikaparṣa-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.96.

219 Ms.(28b.6): *parikaś* with *pā* inserted in margin.

220 Read: *sāṃbhogikaparṣanmaṇḍalavyavasthitasya gambhīrodāramahāyānadharmasaṃbhogo vicitrākāraiś ca nairmāṇikakarmabhir* in place of *sāṃbhogikaparṣanmaṇḍale vyavasthāno gambhīrodāramahāyānadharmasya sambhogaś ca vicitrākārair nirmāṇakarmabhir*, Tib. *loṅs spyod pa'i 'khor gyi dkyil 'khor du rnam par gnas te / theg pa chen po'i chos zab ciṅ rgya che ba la loṅs spyod pa daṅ / sprul pa rnam pa sna tshogs kyi las kyis* (D236a.5). This passage alludes to the *trikāya* doctrine; cf. MSA IX.60 Comm.: *trividhaḥ kāyo buddhānāṃ / svābhāviko dharmakāya āśrayaparāvṛttilakṣaṇaḥ / sāṃbhogiko yena parṣanmaṇḍaleṣu dharmasaṃbhogaṃ karoti / nairmāṇiko yena nirmāṇena sattvārthaṃ karoti* (L/B47.12).

221 Read (with de Jong p.115-6): *yathārutaśrutārthavicāraṇā* in place of *yathābhūtaśrutārthavicāraṇā*. The Ms.(28b.6) supports this emendation.

222 Ms.(28b.6): *ṣaṭpāramitā / nāmato daśa*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.96.

223 Read: *tena jñānena avabodhaṃ* in place of *tajjñānāvabuddhatvaṃ*, Tib. *ye śes des khoṅ du chud pa* (D236b.2).

c. The Obscurations to the Spiritual Levels.

N34.20 Moreover, [the obscurations] to the spiritual levels are, respectively:

II.14 abcd — In regard to: (a) the meaning as all-pervading, (b) the meaning as pre-
N35 eminent, (c) the meaning as pre-eminent that flows out, (d) the meaning as devoid of possession, (e) [the meaning] as non-differentiation in mental continuum.

II.15 abcd — (f) The meaning as devoid of defilement and purification, (g) the meaning as devoid of multiplicity, (h) the meaning as neither diminished nor increased and (i) the basis of the four kinds of mastery.

II.16 abcd — This ignorance concerning the *dharmadhātu*, being a tenfold obscuration which is undefiled, [acts] in opposition to the ten spiritual levels. However, the spiritual levels are the counteragents.

Concerning the *dharmadhātu*, there is undefiled nescience in regard to the tenfold meaning, such as all-pervading, which is an obscuration to the ten respective spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* because it is adverse to each of them, namely, "in regard to the meaning as all-pervading"[224] [and so on as above]. For, (a) by means of the first spiritual level [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates the sense of all-pervading on the part of the *dharmadhātu*; on account of this he obtains in return [the realization] that self and others are equal. (b) By means of the second [he penetrates] its meaning as pre-eminent. On account of this he believes: "therefore then, in regard to equality in achievement, endeavour should be directed by us towards only the achievement of complete purification in every way"[225]. (c) By means of the third [he penetrates] the meaning as pre-eminent that flows out of that [*dharmadhātu*]. On account of this, after understanding the pre-eminent

224 *sarvatragārthe* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D9b.2.

225 This is a quotation from DS (R26.12) where *samāne 'bhinirhāre* is replaced by *samābhinirhāre*.

nature of what is learnt and which flows out of the *dharmadhātu*, he may cast himself into a fire-pit the size of the great trichiliocosm for the sake of them. (d) By means of the fourth [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of possession, for thus, even his craving for the Dharma is checked. (e) By means of the fifth [he penetrates] its meaning as non-differentiation in mental continuum by reason of the ten equalities in regard to the purity of mind and mental disposition. (f) By means of the sixth [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of defilement and purity as the consequence of his penetration [of the reality] that, regarding the [meaning][226] of dependent origination, there is no *dharma* whatsoever that is defiled or purified. (g) By means of the seventh [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of multiplicity because of the absence of the manifestation of multiplicity by way of sign in the *dharmas* of the Sūtras etc. on account of their signlessness. (h) By means of the eighth [he penetrates] its meaning as neither diminished nor increased as the consequence of his acquisition of patient acceptance in regard to non-
N36 originating *dharmas* since, in regard to defilement and purification, he fails to perceive either the diminution or augmentation of any *dharma* whatsoever[227]. (i) Mastery is fourfold: (a) mastery over the absence of conceptual differentiation, (b) mastery over the complete purification of the field, (c) mastery over direct intuition and (d) mastery over *karma*. In this respect, by means of just the eighth spiritual level he penetrates [the reality] that the *dharmadhātu* forms the basis of the first and second masteries. On the ninth [he penetrates the reality] that it forms the basis for mastery over direct intuition due to his acquisition of analytical knowledge. On the tenth [he penetrates the reality] that it forms the basis for mastery over *karma* as the consequence of his working for the welfare of sentient beings at will through his creative transformations.

[Sthiramati]

Y97.11 [1] Immediately following the latter [i.e. the obscurations to the perfections], [the obscurations] to the spiritual levels should be mentioned. Hence he says: moreover, [the obscurations] to the spiritual levels[228] are, respectively:

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226 The Tib. inserts *artha* which is not found in the Ms.; i.e., it reads: *rten cin 'brel bar 'byun ba'i don la* (D9b.5) = *pratītyasamutpādārthe*.

227 *kasyacid dharmasya* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D9b.7.

228 Read: *bhūmiṣu punar* in place of *bhūmiṣv api*; cf. Bhāṣya N34.20.

II.14 a **In regard to: (a) the meaning as all-pervading, (b) the meaning as pre-eminent[229] etc.**

In this respect there are ten spiritual levels: (1) The Joyous, (2) The Stainless, (3) The Radiance Giving, (4) The Brilliant, (5) The Very Difficult to Conquer, (6) The Face to Face, (7) The Far Reaching, (8) The Immovable, (9) The Good Discernment and (10) The Cloud of the Dharma. The particular stages of understanding in regard to the *dharmadhātu* in the sense of all-pervading etc. are described as the spiritual levels in their nature as: (a) a locus for ever increasing understanding[230] and (b) the foundation for virtues that have arisen from the latter. Others believe that in whichever state (*vihāra*) the *bodhisattva* dwells (*viharati*) for an extended period in regard to [his understanding] of the *dharmadhātu* in the sense of all-pervading etc., by virtue of the fact that he abides in that particular state it is called a spiritual level. Furthermore, the arrangement of the spiritual levels[231] [is as follows]: On the Joyous, the *bodhisattva* achieves the direct realization of the Dharma due to the arising of the path of vision. On the Stainless, [the *bodhisattva*] who has achieved the direct realization of the
Y98 Dharma[232] accomplishes a special training consisting in a superior morality that flows spontaneously because of his abstention from the immorality that stems from all subtle transgressions. On the Radiance Giving, he accomplishes a special training that consists in a superior mentality in regard to both the Dharma and *karma* that does not cease even in other rebirths. On the Brilliant, the Very Difficult to Conquer and the Face to Face [levels] he accomplishes a special training consisting in a superior wisdom which has for its objective support: (a) the factors that contribute to enlightenment, (b) the [noble] truths and (c) dependent origination. These latter trainings should be understood to have four kinds of result on the [four] remaining spiritual levels: Of these, on the Far Reaching he accomplishes with effort[233] the state of the direct intuition of the signless. On the Immovable, he accomplishes without effort the state of the direct intuition of the signless together with the purification of the 'field'. On the Good Discernment, he accomplishes the special quality of analytical knowledge and it is on account of this that he preaches the Dharma[234]. On the Cloud of the

229 Read: *sarvatragārthe agrārthe* in place of *sarvatragārtho 'grārthaś ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N34.21.

230 Read: *'dhigamāvasthāviśeṣā uttarottarādhigamasthānarūpeṇa* in place of *'dhigamād avakāśa-viśeṣā uttarottarapratipattisthānarūpeṇa*; Tib. *khoṅ du chud pa'i gnas skabs kyi khyad par rnams ni goṅ nas goṅ du khoṅ du chud pa'i gnas pa'i tshul ...gyi(s)* (D236b.5). Ms.(29a.2) is not clear.

231 Read: *bhūmīnām* in place of *bhūmibhiḥ*; Ms.(29a.3): *bhūmī-*; Tib. *sa rnams kyi* (D236b.6), although P (76a.5): *kyis*.

232 Ms.(29a.4): *-dharmā* but Y's emendation to *-dharmo* is preferred.

233 Read: *sayatnam* in place of *prayatnasahitam*; Ms.(29a.5): *-dūraṅgamāyām sa-* Tib. *'bad pa daṅ bcas pa* (D237a.2).

234 Read: *dhārmakathiko* as per Ms.(29a.6) in place of *dhārmakathito*.

Dharma [level] he achieves the special qualities of meditative concentration and [the knowledge of] mystical formulae.

[2] **Concerning the *dharmadhātu*, ...in regard to the tenfold meaning such as all-pervading,**[235]**...** The sense of all-pervading etc. in regard to the *dharmadhātu* is understood by way of the ten spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva*. **Undefiled nescience in regard to that [meaning] is a tenfold obscuration to the ten respective spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* because it is adverse to each of them,** i.e. because it is adverse to each of the spiritual levels; for the spiritual levels consist in special states[236] of supramundane meditative concentration and wisdom etc. Undefiled nescience is adverse [to these states] because it impedes their arising. Moreover, it is not just undefiled nescience that is an obscuration in this context, on the contrary, other moral defilements and secondary defilements are [obscurations] as well. For thus, everything on the Joyous [level] to be relinquished by the path of vision is an obscuration because all propensities for wrong insight in regard to the [noble] truths are relinquished by the path of vision which brings about an understanding[237] of the sense of all-pervading. Furthermore, those [propensities] to be relinquished through meditative development [are done so] by way of the remaining spiritual levels. However, those [propensities] that have not been relinquished are just like the ones that have been relinquished since they do not cause defilement on the part of the *bodhisattvas*. With reference to this very matter, a verse has been composed:

> Moral defilement becomes a limb of enlightenment for one who employs the mighty expedients and even *saṃsāra* has the nature of appeasement. Consequently, the *tathāgata* is inconceivable.

Y99 Moreover, because of the statement: "on the ten spiritual levels the ten perfections are successively more excellent", it is evident that there is also the successive relinquishment of those elements, beginning with avarice, which are adverse to each [level]. [Objection]: If other[238] moral defilement may also be an obscuration, why is only undefiled nescience described as the obscuration to the spiritual levels? [Response]: Because it is not common to everyone since it acts as an impediment[239] to the attainment of *nirvāṇa* only for *bodhisattvas*, but not for *śrāvakas* etc. Thus, the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* become liberated in spite of its [i.e. undefiled nescience's] presence,

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235 Read: *dharmadhātau daśavidhe sarvatragādyartha* in place of *sarvatragārthādiṣu daśavidhadharma-dhātuṣu*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.6.

236 Read: *-avasthāviśeṣātmakāḥ* in place of *-avakāśaviśeṣātmatā*; Tib. *gnas skabs kyi khyad par gyi bdag ñid de* (D237a.5).

237 Read: *-ārthapratipādanena* in place of *-ārthāvabodhena*; Tib. *-don khoṅ du chud par byed pa ...gyi(s)* (D237a.7). Cf. Y16.17 = D197a.2.

238 Ms.(29b.3): *yady anyo 'pi*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.99.

239 Read: *-vibandhe* as per Ms.(29b.4) in place of *vibandhair*; Tib. *gegs su (gyur gyi)* (D237b.3).

but not the *bodhisattva*; hence, it is not common to all. However, since moral defilement applies equally to *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* etc., the fact that [undefiled nescience] is an obscuration is not annulled even though there is no mention of it [in other works] since it is not posited nor rejected as an obscuration to the spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva*, considering that it is described as an obscuration to the spiritual levels and that it is not the only obscuration to the spiritual levels. Others say that since undefiled nescience pertains equally to the *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* etc., it is mentioned especially as an obscuration to the spiritual levels; however, moral defilement follows as a consequence therefore it is not mentioned. [Reply]: Although moral defilement is indeed equally applicable to the *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* etc. it therefore need not necessarily follow. Others again believe[240] that although the obscuration consisting in the nescience of the spiritual levels is an undefiled nescience pertinent to the *śrāvakas*, it does not act as an impediment to liberation because the *śrāvakas* become liberated even though the nescience in regard to the spiritual levels is present. However, [such a nescience] is defiled for the *bodhisattva* since it is the cause of an impediment to the attainment of *nirvāṇa*.

[3] Others believe this is not so:

II.16b **Being a tenfold obscuration that is undefiled.**

Y100 **Because, by means of the first spiritual level [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates the sense of all-pervading on the part of the *dharmadhātu*.** Therein, the first spiritual level refers to the first supramundane wisdom, together with its associated elements and is incorporated in the path of vision. The *dharmadhātu* is [equivalent to] emptiness since, by virtue of its being a universal characteristic, it is in one place just as it is everywhere. It is all-pervading because it extends everywhere. The statement: "since no *dharma* is to be found outside the *dharmadhātu*"[241], shows that the *dharmadhātu* is all-pervading. By "penetrates" is meant: 'realizes'. **On account of that**[242] **penetration he obtains in return [the realization] that self and others are equal**[243]. As the consequence of his insight into the fact that the emptiness in regard to self and others cannot be differentiated, he reflects upon the fact that self and others are not different [thinking]: "what is self is other", or "what is other is self". It is only because of this that the perfection of generosity is more excellent on this spiritual level, consequently, on this [level] the *bodhisattva* is just as occupied with

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240 Ms.(29b.6): *anye tv āhuḥ*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.99.

241 This is a quotation from Ch.V.19cd; read: *dharmadhātuvinirmukto* as per Ms.(30a.1) in place of *dharmadhātur vinirmukto*. Cf. also Bhāṣya N67.8.

242 Read: *yena* in place of *tena*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.11.

243 Read: *ātmaparasamatām* in place of *svaparasamatām*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.11. Ms.: *-tmapara*... (30a.2). Disregard Y's fn.3 p.100.

benefit for others as with benefit for himself. Herein are shown: (a) penetration[244], (b) the counteragent and (c) the result of the counteragent; this triad should be discerned in relation to the other spiritual levels as well.

[4] **By means of the second [he penetrates] its meaning as foremost;** the fact that he penetrates [this meaning] of the *dharmadhātu* is understood. This is due to his vision of its intrinsic luminosity. **On account of that he believes: "therefore then, in regard to equality in achievement[245], endeavour should be directed by us towards only the achievement of complete purification in every way";** he demonstrates scriptural tradition by this statement for it is said in the [Daśabhūmika] Sūtra:

> Because, when these[246] ten wholesome paths of action are cultivated in the aspect of wisdom, ...they lead up to the *śrāvaka* vehicle. Then, when they are purified to a greater degree, ...they lead up to the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle. Then, when they are purified even more[247], ...they lead to: (a) the complete purity of
> Y101 the spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva*, (b) the complete purity[248] of the perfections and (c) extensiveness in courses. Then, when they are purified to a greater degree, they lead up to the force of the ten powers[249] since they are completely purified in every way[250]... Therefore then, in regard to equality in achievement [endeavour should be directed by us...].[251]

The words "therefore then etc." signify that since [the *bodhisattva*] has this thought on the second spiritual level, therefore it is known that he penetrates the meaning [of the *dharmadhātu*] as foremost by way of the second [level]. "Achievement" is [equivalent to] effort or deed. "Complete purification in every way" is [equivalent to] the removal of both defiled and undefiled delusion in regard to the *dharmadhātu*. Consequently, the perfection of morality is more excellent on this spiritual level because the self becomes, still more so, a fit vessel[252] [for purity][253] on account of the desire for the pre-eminent meaning [of the *dharmadhātu*].

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244 Ms.(30a.3): *-tivedhaḥ* in place of *-trividhaḥ* as stated in Y's fn.4 p.100; although *pratipakṣa* is omitted, as noted by Y, it has been inserted in the Ms. margin.

245 Read: *yenāsyaivaṃ bhavati ...samāne 'bhinirhāre* in place of *tenāsyaitad bhavati ...samābhinirhāre*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.12.

246 Read: *ete* as per Ms.(30a.4) in place of *iti*.

247 Ms.(30a.5): *uttaraṃ*, however Y's emendation to *uttarataraṃ* is in agreement with DS (R26.5).

248 Ms.(30a.5): *-pariśuddhi*, however Y's emendation to *-pariśuddhyai*, which agrees with DS, is preferred.

249 Ms.(30a.5): *daśabala-* ; disregard Y's fn.3 p.101.

250 Ms.(30a.5): *pariśuddhataratvād* which agrees with Tib.: *goṅ du yoṅs su dag pas* (D238b.1), however Y's emendation to *pariśodhitāḥ sarvākārapariśodhitatvād* agrees with DS.

251 DS (R25.21ff.).

252 Read (with de Jong p.116): *ātmapātrīkaraṇāt* in place of *ātmamātrīkaraṇāt*; Tib. *bdag śin tu (rnam par dag pa'i) snod du byed pa'i phyir* (D238b.3). This reading is substantiated by the Ms.(30a.7).

253 Tib. inserts *viśuddhi* which is not found in the Ms; cf. ibid.

[5] By means of the third [he penetrates] the meaning as pre-eminent that flows out of that [*dharmadhātu*]. That he penetrates it is understood, because the statements of the Buddha are characterized by their penetration of the *dharmadhātu*; for thus[254], the Dharma teachings such as the Sūtras which flow out of the *dharmadhātu* are characterized by the power of the *dharmadhātu* known as the Dharma Body which is completely pure in every way. This is because of both the pre-eminent nature of the Dharma teachings that flow out of that[255] [*dharmadhātu*] and also the fact that they [i.e. the Dharma teachings] are the cause of the complete purification of the *dharmadhātu* on account of the pre-eminent nature of the *dharmadhātu*. **On account of that[256], after understanding the pre-eminent nature of what is learnt and which flows out of the *dharmadhātu*...**; by "on account of that"[257], [is meant]: on account of the penetration of the *dharmadhātu*; by "what is learnt" [is meant]: the Dharma such as the Sūtras that are learnt; by "after understanding the pre-eminent nature of that", is meant: after having gained knowledge of them introspectively as such through direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation; **...for the sake of them,** i.e. for the sake of hearing the statements of the Buddha, **he may cast himself into the fire-pit the size of the great trichiliocosm,** for it is said in a Sūtra:[258]

If someone were to say the following[259]: "Thus I would proclaim to you this portion of the Dharma presented by the Perfectly Enlightened One which
Y102 facilitates complete purification in the conduct of the *bodhisattva* if you were to throw[260] yourself into the great fire-pit which blazes up[261] into a single flame and you should take upon your own body the great[262] suffering of the sensation of pain". This person would think: "I would even attempt to cast myself from the Brahma-world into the great trichiliocosm world sphere[263] filled with fire[264] for the sake of just a single portion of the Dharma presented by the perfectly enlightened one which facilitates complete purification of the conduct of the *bodhisattva*, how much more [would I be inclined to cast myself] into an ordi-

254 Contrary to Y's fn.5 p.101, the Ms.(30a.7) reading is *vacanasya / tathā...*, hence *yasmāt* (Y101. 11-12) should be replaced by *tathā hi.*

255 Ms.(30b.1): *-dharmāgratādharmadhātu-* but Y's emendation to *-dharmāgratayā dharmadhātu-* on the basis of the Tib. is preferred; cf. his fn.6 p.101.

256 Read: *yena* in place of *tena*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.14.

257 Read: *yena* in place of *tena*; cf. ibid.

258 From DS (R33.15 ff.).

259 Ms.(30b.2): *sa ced iha kaścid evaṃ brūyāt* in contrast to the DS reading adopted by Y: *sa ced idaṃ kaścid evaṃ brūyāt*; Tib. *gal te la la źig de la 'di skad ces zer te* (D238b.7). Disregard Y's fns.9 & 10 p.101.

260 Ms.(30b.3): *prapātayer mahā-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.102.

261 Ms.(30b.3): *samprajvalitāyām*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.102.

262 Ms.(30b.3): *mahāntaś* but Y's emendation to *mahāntaṃ* is preferred.

263 Ms.(30b.4): *trisāhasramahāsāhasrāyām api lokadhātāv* which Y has amended to *trisāhasramahā-sāhasralokadhātāv* to agree with DS.

264 Ms.(30b.4): *agniparipūrṇāyāṃ* which has been amended by Y to *agniparipūrṇe* to agree with DS.

nary fire-pit. Moreover[265], associating with all the sufferings of the hells and places of woe[266] we should seek all[267] the Buddha Dharmas, even at the price of associating with [just] human suffering".

It is because of this that the perfection of patience is more excellent on this spiritual level since [the *bodhisattva*] endures all moral defilement[268] for the sake of what is learnt.

[6] **By means of the fourth [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of possession**[269]. It is understood that he penetrates [this meaning] of the *dharma-dhātu*. On the fourth spiritual level, because of its evenness, he penetrates [the meaning] of the *dharmadhātu* as an absence of what pertains to the self, since there is no sense of 'mine' whatsoever on the part of the *dharmadhātu*[270]. Alternatively, [the *dharmadhātu*] is not in the possession of anyone because it is not an object of all erroneous inversion; since it is free from erroneous inversion in itself, there is no possession whatsoever on its behalf. **For thus**[271]**, even his craving for the Dharma is checked**; this is a statement from scriptural tradition. In this way, due to his understanding of the *dharmadhātu*[272] through direct intuition free from conceptual elaboration, he acquires the *dharmas* consisting in the factors that contribute to enlight-
Y103 enment on the Brilliant [level] and even that craving for the Dharma of the Sūtras etc. which existed previously on the part of the *bodhisattva*, is checked. Others believe that the craving for the Dharma refers to meditative absorption, meditative concentration and the attainments. Therefore, on this spiritual level the perfection of vigour is more excellent because [the *bodhisattva*] dwells perpetually in company with the factors that contribute to enlightenment[273] when both speech and discursive thought have been transcended.[274]

[7] **By means of the fifth [he penetrates] its meaning as non-differentiation in mental continuum**[275]; it is the fact that he penetrates [this meaning] of

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265 Ms.(30b.4) appears to read: *khadāyām ātma...*, but Y's emendation to *khadāyām / api tu* is preferred.

266 *apāya* is omitted from the Tib.; cf.D239a.3.

267 Read: *sarvabuddhadharmaḥ* as per Ms.(30b.5) and Tib.(D239a.3); *sarva* is omitted from DS.

268 Read (with de Jong p.116): *sarvakleśasahanād iti* in place of *sarvakleśasahanādibhir apy abhedyāt*; Tib. *ñon moṅs pa thams cad la mi 'byid pa'i phyir* (D239a.4). Ms.(30b.5): *-sahanād iti...*

269 Read: *caturthyā niṣparigrahatārtham* in place of *caturthyā 'parigrahārtham*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.17.

270 Read: *yasmān na dharmadhātoḥ kaścid mamatāstīti* in place of *...ātmā nāstīti* as proposed by Y; Tib. *'di ltar chos kyi dbyiṅs la bdag gaṅ yaṅ med pa'i phyir ro* (D239a.5). Ms.(30b.6): *yasmān na dharmadhātoḥ kasya cit mamatāstīti.*

271 Read: *tathā hi* in place of *yasmāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.17.

272 Tib. has only *dhātu* (*dbyiṅs*) in place of *dharmadhātu*; cf. D239a.6.

273 Contrary to Y's fn.1 p.103, Ms.(31a.1): *bodhiṣakṣair* which is corrected to *bodhipakṣair* in the margin.

274 Tib. is slightly different: *lus daṅ ṅag daṅ yid kyi spyod pa las 'das par...* (D239b.1), i.e. "...when he has transcended the ways of body speech and mind"; however P omits *lus daṅ.*

275 Read: *saṃtānābhedārtham* in place of *santānābhinnārtham*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.18.

the *dharmadhātu* that is referred to. He sees the mutual[276] sameness of non-differentiation[277] between himself and the mental continuum of all the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones[278], of the past, present and future as well as that of the *bodhisattvas*. **By reason of the ten equalities in regard to the purity of mind and mental disposition[279]**; he demonstrates scriptural tradition by this statement. [The full passage reads as follows]:[280]

> By reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the Dharma of the Buddhas of the past, by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the Dharma of the Buddhas of the future[281], by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the Dharma of the Buddhas of the present, by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning morality, by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning mind[282], by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the removal of false view, doubt, perplexity and annoyance, by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the knowledge of what is the path and what is not the path, by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the knowledge of spiritual practice and renunciation[283], by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the ever increasing development of all *dharmas* that contribute to enlightenment[284] and by reason of equality in regard to the purity of mental disposition concerning the maturation of all sentient beings[285].

[The *bodhisattva*] penetrates[286] the non-differentiation in mental continuum by reason of these equalities because the Dharma Body, which is characterized[287] by a turning
Y104 about of the store-consciousness, is undifferentiated. Therefore, on this spiritual level the perfection of meditative absorption is more excellent due to the abundance of meditative development in regard to the aspects of the [noble] truths, in an absolute sense.

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276 *paramparataḥ* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D239b.2.

277 Read: *'bheda-* in place of *'bhinna-*; cf. Bhāṣya ibid.

278 Tib. inserts *bhagavatām* which is not found in the Ms.

279 Read: *daśabhir cittāśayaviśuddhisamatābhir* in place of *daśabhir viśuddhacittāśayasamatābhir*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.18.

280 From DS (R42.2 ff.).

281 The words *ca anāgatabuddhadharma-* are missing from the Ms.(31a.2) and have been inserted on the basis of the DS (R42.3).

282 Tib. (D239b.3): *sems can* (= *sattva*) but DS: *citta*.

283 Both Ms.(31a.3) and DS (R42.5): *pratipatprahāṇajñāna-* but Tib. (D239b.4): *lam śes pa* = "...knowledge of the path".

284 Ms.(31a.3): *bodhipākṣika* in place of DS: *bodhipakṣya*.

285 Line 4 of Ms.(31a) reads: *-śayasamatayā ca / (sarvasattvaparipācanaviśuddhyāśayasamatayā ca)* contrary to Y's reading of line 16 p.103. Also, the Tib. does agree with the Ms. contrary to his note at the bottom of p.103.

286 Ms.(31a.4): *pratividhyati*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.103.

287 Ms.(31a.4): *-parāvṛttila...*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.103.

[8] **By means of the sixth [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of defilement and purity;** it is the fact that he penetrates [this meaning] of the *dharmadhātu* that is referred to. The characteristic of dependent origination is defilement. The [*dharmadhātu*] is not intrinsically defiled because [defilement] is adventitious to it, nor is it purified because it is intrinsically pure. Thus he penetrates the *dharmadhātu* in the form of being understood in himself through direct intuition that is free from conceptual differentiation. Here now he demonstrates scriptural tradition: **as the consequence of his penetration[288] [of the reality] that, regarding dependent origination, there is no *dharma* whatsoever that is defiled or purified.** On the sixth spiritual level the *bodhisattva* analyses dependent origination and penetrates [the reality] in regard to the latter that no *dharma* whatsoever is defiled or purified, because: (a) the *dharmadhātu* is luminous by nature, (b) defilement is only pertinent to the limbs of dependent origination and (c) with the exception of the latter[289] there exists no other self or what pertains to a self in regard to which defilement or purity can be construed. It is only because of this that[290] the perfection of wisdom is more excellent on this spiritual level because [the *bodhisattva*] understands the profoundness of dependent origination in the sense of the absence of defilement and purity.

[9] **By means of the seventh [he penetrates] its meaning as devoid of multiplicity;** it is the fact that he penetrates [this meaning] of the *dharmadhātu* that is referred to. On this spiritual level the *bodhisattva* is victorious due to the absence of the manifestation of all signs. And since multiplicity manifests by way of the manifestation of signs, hence it is said that by means of the seventh [level] he penetrates the meaning of the *dharmadhātu* as devoid of multiplicity due to the absence of the manifestation of signs. In order to demonstrate this very meaning, he says: **because of the absence of the manifestation of multiplicity by way of sign in the *dharmas* of the Sūtras etc[291].** Up to the sixth spiritual level [the *bodhisattva*] enters the *dharmadhātu* by means of the signs of the *dharmas* [explained in] the Sūtras etc., [signs] which manifest themselves forcefully in their diversity as the [two] knowledges, i.e. that which consists in the entry into [the *dharmadhātu*] and that which is
Y105 obtained subsequently to the latter. However, on the seventh spiritual level, since he penetrates [the reality] of the absence of sign on the part of the *dharmadhātu* through direct intuition in the aspect of the uniformity of all signs, those signs do not become manifest. Consequently, on this spiritual level the perfection of expedients is more

288 Read: *prativedhāt* in place of *prativedhanāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.21.

289 The words *tadvyatirikto 'nya* are not to be found in P as noted by Y in his fn.1 p.104, however they are found in D: *gan la ...de la gtogs par bdag gam bdag gi med* (D240a.3).

290 Folios 31b & 32a are missing from the original Ms., hence it has not been possible to check this portion (Y104.15 to 106.27) of the Yamaguchi Ms. against the original.

291 Read: *nirnimittatayā sūtrādidharmanimittanānātvāsamudācarād* in place of *nimittābhāvena sūtrādidharmalakṣaṇasya nānātvāsamudācarād*; cf Bhāṣya N35.21.

excellent since he penetrates [the reality] that all signs are signless and does not contradict conventional linguistic usage which is created by signs. Also, as the consequence of his penetration of the latter, in this [level] he obtains supremacy[292].

[10] **By means of the eighth [he penetrates] its meaning as neither diminished nor increased**[293]; it is the fact that he penetrates [this meaning] of the *dharmadhātu* that is referred to, since the *dharmadhātu* is completely pure by nature because there is no difference between its stained or stainless condition. It is because of this that it is described as thusness (*tathatā*)considering that it is eternally just thus (*tathā*). Even though it is devoid of sign it does not diminish[294]; even though it possesses sign it does not increase[295]; for thus some believe that the sign itself is signless. Here now he gives the reason: **as the consequence of his acquisition of patient acceptance in regard to non-originating *dharmas*.** Thus, on the eighth spiritual level the *bodhisattva* penetrates the fact that there is neither diminution nor increase on the part of the *dharmadhātu* because he acquires patient acceptance in regard to non-originating *dharmas*. **In regard to defilement and purification, there is neither a diminution nor augmentation of any *dharmas* whatsoever**[296], because there can be no origination of new *dharmas*.

[11] **Mastery is fourfold: (a) mastery over the absence of conceptual differentiation, (b) mastery over the complete purification of the 'field', (c) mastery over direct intuition and (d) mastery over *karma*.** Because of the spontaneous absence of the manifestation of all signs therein, the *dharmadhātu* is to be known as the basis for mastery over direct intuition[297] devoid of conceptual differentiation. Even on the seventh [level] the non-manifestation of signs is possible by way of formative influence; however, here [on the eighth level] [it is possible] by way of the absence of formative influence [i.e. spontaneously][298] - that is the difference. Also, **by means of the eighth [he penetrates the reality] that it is the basis for mastery over** the complete purification of the 'field'; the topic under discussion is the fact that he penetrates [this reality] of the *dharmadhātu*[299]. The

292 Cf. DS R63.11ff.: *yasyāṃ pratiṣṭhito bodhisattvo bhūyastvena vaśavartī bhavati...*

293 Read: *aṣṭamyā 'hīnānadhikārtham* in place of *aṣṭamyā 'napakarṣānutkarṣārtham*; cf. Bhāṣya N35.22.

294 Read: *hānis* in place of *apakarṣaś*; cf. Bhāṣya N36.1 (= D9b.1).

295 Read: *vṛddhiś* in place of *utkarṣaś*; cf. Bhāṣya ibid.

296 The Tib.: *kun nas ñon moṅs pa ni bri ba med pa 'am / mam par byaṅ ba(s) na 'phel ba'i chos gaṅ yaṅ med de* (D240b/3) would suggest the following reading: *kasyacid dharmasya hānir nāsti saṃkleśe vṛddhir vā nāsti vyavadāna iti* in place of *kaś cid apacayadharmo nāsti saṃkleśe / abhyuccayo vā nāsti vyavadāna* . However, this passage is clearly a paraphrasing of the following passage from the Bhāṣya: *saṃkleśe vyavadāne vā kasyacid dharmasya hānivṛddhyadarśanāt* (N35.23); Tib. *kun nas ñon moṅs pa 'am / mam par byaṅ ba na yaṅ bri ba 'am 'phel ba mi mthoṇ ba'i phyir* (D9b.6-7). The Tib. omits *kasyacid dharmasya*; cf. my fn.227 above.

297 *jñāna* (*ye śes*) is omitted from the Ms. and is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D240b.5.

298 Tib. replaces *anabhisaṃskāreṇa* with *anābhogena* (*lhun gyis grub pa yin pas*); cf. D240b.5.

299 Read: *kṣetrapariśuddhivaśitāśrayatvaṃ cāṣṭamyā dharmadhātoḥ pratividhyatīti prakṛtam* in place of *kṣetrapariśuddhivaśitā(śrayatvaṃ cāṣṭamyā pra)tividhyatīti prakṛtam*. This passage, which is

dharmadhātu is to be understood as the basis for mastery over the complete purifi-
Y106 cation of the 'field' because [the *bodhisattva*] obtains the power to exhibit it at will to the Buddha fields and the circles of assembly[300]. Therefore, the perfection of vows is more excellent on this spiritual level due to continual endeavour in regard to the wholesome on account of the acquisition of mastery over both the absence of conceptual differentiation and the 'field'.

[12] **By means of the ninth**[301] **[he penetrates the reality] that it forms the basis for mastery over direct intuition;** the topic under discussion is the fact that he penetrates [this reality] of the *dharmadhātu*. How is this discerned that [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates [the *dharmadhātu*] as the basis for mastery over direct intuition by the ninth [level]? **Due to his acquisition of analytical knowledge**[302]. Since, on this level, he acquires analytical knowledge consisting in: (a) the Dharma, (b) meaning, (c) grammatical analysis and (d) a ready intellect, which are not obtained by others. Hence here, it is discerned that the penetration of the *dharmadhātu* is the basis of mastery over direct intuition. Therefore, the perfection of the powers is more excellent on this spiritual level because [the *bodhisattva*] possesses the special power of wisdom.

[13] **By means of the tenth**[303] **[he penetrates the reality] that it forms the basis of mastery over *karma*;** it is the fact that he penetrates [this reality of the *dharmadhātu*] that is referred to.[304] How is this understood? Hence he says: **as the consequence of his working for the welfare of sentient beings at will through his creative transformations.** Through this resolve[305] on the tenth spiritual level [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates [the reality] that the *dharmadhātu* is the basis of mastery over *karma*. On account of this he obtains supremacy in regard to the actions of a *tathāgata*. For thus, like the *sugata*, through his Transformation Bodies he acts at will doing what is to be done at the appropriate time[306] for the sentient beings abiding in the infinite world-spheres of the ten directions. Therefore, the perfection of direct intuition is more excellent on this spiritual level because [the *bodhisattva*]

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omitted from the Tib., is most likely a partial quotation of the following passage from the Bhāṣya: *prathamadvitīyavaśitāśrayatvaṃ dharmadhātāv aṣṭamyaiva bhūmyā pratividhyatīti* (N36.3). It should be noted that the portion of this passage in parentheses above is missing from the Ms.(32a.1) and has been reconstructed by Y; cf. his fn.5 p.105.

300 Read: *buddhakṣetraparṣanmaṇḍalasaṃdarśanaśaktipratilambhāt veditavyam* in place of *buddha-kṣetra(pariśodhana)parṣanmaṇḍalasaṃdarśanaśaktipratilambhāt* (Y106.1); Tib. *saṅs rgyas kyi źiṅ daṅ 'khor gyi dkyil 'khor kun du bstan pa'i mthu brñes pas ...rig par bya'o* (D240b.6).

301 *navamyā* but Bhāṣya (N36.4): *navamyām*.

302 Read: *pratisaṃvillābhāt* in place of *pratisaṃvitprāpteḥ*, cf. Bhāṣya N36.5.

303 *daśamyā* but Bhāṣya: *daśamyām* (N36.5).

304 Tib. omits this sentence; cf. D241a.2.

305 *niścayenānena* but Tib. has simply *anena* (*'dis*); cf. D241a.3.

306 Ms.(32a.5): *tasmin kva* as noted by Y, but his emendation to *tasmin kāle* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.106.

possesses the distinctive ability to both enjoy the Dharma and bring sentient beings to maturation.

[14] In this way the ten spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* are respectively determined as the counteragents to undefiled nescience which is an obscuration to each single spiritual level and is also an impediment to the complete purification, in every respect, [which facilitates] the tenfold penetration of the *dharmadhātu* and which is relevant to these spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* as has [just] been described. The peculiar nature of the ninth and tenth spiritual levels is revealed through their results but not through a peculiar penetration of a different objective support[307], because [the *bodhisattva*] in these states reaches a condition which cannot be defined. The purpose
Y107 of the penetration of the meaning of all-pervading etc. is [for the attainment of] a state of excellence of the ten perfections, respectively, on the ten spiritual levels. Therefore, these obscurations to the spiritual levels that have been described are also said to be obscurations to the state of excellence of the perfections. Alternatively, it is said in a Sūtra that the purpose of penetrating[308] the meaning [of the *dharmadhātu*] as all-pervading etc. is [to attain] the result such as the attainment of meditative concentration which is distinguished by [the attainment of] ever-increasing spiritual levels and which culminates in direct intuition in regard to all aspects.

5. The Totality of Obscuration.

N36.8 **However, in total:**

II.17 abcd **Obscuration that consists in moral defilement and obscuration that consists in the knowable have now been elucidated - these are all the obscurations in this regard. Liberation is considered as being due to their extinction.**

For the liberation from all obscuration is considered as being due to the extinction of this twofold obscuration.

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307 Ms.(32a.7): *nāvaraṇabheda-* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.106; however his emendation to *na tv alambanabheda-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. (cf. D241a.6-7).

308 Ms.(32b.1): *prative..yojana...*; Y's emendation to *prativedhaprayojanam* is accepted on the basis of the Tib. *rab tu rtogs pa'i dgoṅs pa* (D241b.2).

[Sthiramati]

Y107.7 [1] All the obscurations, which are of various kinds, have been described in the above. In order to demonstrate that they are [all] included within two obscurations, he says: **however, in total...**

II.17 ab **Obscuration that consists in moral defilement and obscuration that consists in the knowable has now been elucidated.**

As to how this is understood that in total there are only two and that a third does not exist, he says:

Y108 II.17 c **These are all the obscurations in this regard.**

The ellipsis is that [all] are included[309]. It is understood that all obscuration is included within the two obscurations; another, i.e. a third, does not exist. Consequently, all obscuration is included herein, hence **liberation from all obscuration is considered as being due to the extinction of this twofold obscuration,** consisting in both moral defilement and the knowable which comprise all obscuration. What is meant is: one should relinquish all obscuration[310].

[2] Although obscuration to the Buddha level has not been elucidated, is it also included in these [two]? [It is included, however] its inclusion is not due to its direct mention but rather is due to its intrinsic nature. Moreover, it has certainly been mentioned because of the statements about the pervading obscuration; otherwise it would be just a limited obscuration. Alternatively, in order to include[311] the obscuration to the Buddha level, he says:

II.17 cd **These are all the obscurations in this regard. Liberation is considered as being due to their extinction[312].**

Because there can be no liberation in the absence of the extinction of the obscuration to the Buddha level. Hence it has been illustrated that the latter [i.e. obscuration to the Buddha level] is also an obscuration, just like the remaining obscurations. However, undefiled nescience which is a condition of extraordinary subtlety and the latent impressions of moral defilement are described as obscurations to the Buddha level. Therefore, it has been elucidated in this way because it cannot be examined differently due to its extraordinary subtlety.

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309 Read: *antargatānīti* in place of *atrāntargatānīti*; *atra* is not found in the Tib. nor in the Ms., contrary to Y's reading,

310 Read perhaps: *sarvāvaraṇāni prajahīhi* in place of *sarvāvaraṇānāṃ prahāṇam*; Tib.: *sgrib pa thams cad spoṅ* (D241b.4).

311 Ms.(32b.4): *-saṃgrahā...* contrary to Y's fn.6 p.107.

312 Read: *yatkṣayān* in place of *tat kṣayād*; cf. Bhāṣya N36.10.

The Summary Meaning of Obscuration.

N36.14 **The summary meaning of the obscurations: Extensive obscuration refers to the pervading. Minute obscuration refers to the limited. Obscuration to application refers to the excessive. Obscuration to attainment refers to the equal. Obscuration to the special attainment refers to acceptance and rejection. Obscuration to correct application refers to the ninefold obscuration consisting in moral defilement. Obscuration to the [instrumental] causes refers to [the obscuration] to virtue etc. and is due to the influence of the tenfold causal categories[313]. Obscuration to the entry into reality refers to [the obscuration] to the factors that contribute to enlightenment. Obscuration to supreme virtue refers to [the obscuration] to the perfections. Obscuration to the state of excellence of the latter refers to [the obscuration] to the spiritual levels. The complete collection of obscurations refer to the two types in total.**

[Sthiramati]

Y108.8 **Extensive obscuration refers to the pervading;** i.e. obscuration that consists in both moral defilement and the knowable which pertains to the spiritual lineages of the *bodhisattva*. **Minute obscuration refers to the limited;** i.e. only obscuration that consists in moral defilement and which is pertinent to the spiritual lineages of the *śrāvaka* etc. **Obscuration to application refers to the excessive;** this pertains only to those who course in passion etc. and it is on account of this that application is not attained. **Obscuration to attainment refers to the equal**[314]; this pertains to those who course in equal shares for it acts as an impediment to attainment. **Obscuration to the special attainment refers to acceptance and rejection**[315] pertains to those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva* because it is the obscuration to a special understanding. The special understanding consists in [the attainment of] the *nirvāṇa* [in which the *bodhisattva* is] not permanently fixed and this should be understood as a special result. **Obscuration to correct application refers to the ninefold characteristics of moral defilement**[316]; since it is

313 The Tib. is slightly different: "Obscuration to the causes is an obscuration to the tenfold [qualities] such as virtue and is due to the influence of the causal categories". *rgyu la sgrib pa ni dge ba la sogs pa mam pa bcu la sgrib pa gaṅ yin ste / rgyu'i don gyi skabs kyi phyir* (D10a.4); cf. Nagao's fn.7 p.36.

314 Read: *samam* in place of *samānam*; cf. Bhāṣya N36.16.

315 Read: *ādānavivarjane* in place of *ādānaprahāṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N36.16.

316 *navadhākleśalakṣaṇam* but Bhāṣya (N36.17): *navadhākleśāvaraṇam*.

stated that the nine fetters are obscurations. The way in which these become obscurations to correct application has [already] been described. **Obscuration to the [instrumental] causes refers to [the obscuration] to virtue etc. and is due to the influence of the tenfold causal categories**[317]; because it acts as an obscuration by causing obstruction[318] to the cause of virtue etc., it is described as an obscuration to the [instrumental] causes. **Obscuration to the entry to reality refers to [the obscuration] to the factors that contribute to enlightenment**[319]; for [the *bodhisattva*] enters reality by means of these. **Obscuration to supreme virtue refers to [the obscuration] to the perfections**[320]; because
Y109 there is no virtue superior to this. **Obscuration to the special state of excellence of the latter refers to [the obscuration] to the spiritual levels**; because only the perfections which form the basis of supramundane excellence are described as the spiritual levels. **The complete collection of obscurations refer to the two types in total**; i.e. obscuration that consists in moral defilement and obscuration that consists in the knowable because all obscurations are included in these two.

The statements of summary meaning are for the purpose of ease in comprehension and retention since [a treatise] which has been summarized is comprehended and retained with ease.

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317 Read: *-hetvarthādhikārād* in place of *hetvadhikārād*; Tib. *rgyu'i don gyi skabs kyi phyir* (D242a.5). Cf. Bhāṣya N36.18.

318 Read: *-vibandhakārakadvāreṇa āvaraṇaṃ vartata iti* in place of *-vibandhadvāreṇa āvaraṇaṃ bhavatīti*; Tib.*gegs byed pa'i sgo nas sgrib par 'gyur bas* (D242a.5).

319 *bodhipakṣeṣv* but Bhāṣya (N36.19): *bodhipakṣyeṣv*.

320 Ms.(33a.2): *-āvaraṇaṃ yat*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.108.

Chapter Three

Reality

Introductory

N37 With reference to reality, he says:

III.1 abcd — There is: (a) basic reality, (b) the reality of characteristic, (c) that characterized by the absence of erroneous inversion, (d) the reality that consists in cause and result and (e) that of the gross and the subtle;

III.2 abcd — (f) Well-established reality, (g) the reality of the sphere of purity, (h) the reality of the aggregation, (i) that which is characterized by differentiation and (j) the tenfold reality of the skills which [act] in opposition to the false view of self.

There are ten kinds of reality, namely, (a) the basic reality, (b) the reality of characteristic, (c) the reality free from erroneous inversion, (d) the reality of cause and result, (e) the reality of the gross and the subtle, (f) well-established reality, (g) the reality of the sphere of purity, (h) the reality of the aggregation, (i) the reality of differentiation and (j) the reality of the skills. Moreover, the latter [which act] as the counteragents to the ten kinds of self-grasping should be understood as being tenfold, namely, skill in the aggregates, skill in the elements, skill in the sense-fields, skill in dependent origination, skill in the possible and the impossible, skill in the sense faculties, skill in the times, skill in the [four] truths, skill in the vehicles and skill in the conditioned and the unconditioned.

[Sthiramati]

Y110 [1] Immediately following the explanation of the obscurations is the appropriate place for the explanation of reality since it was listed immediately after [the obscurations]. Hence [Vasubandhu] says: **with reference to reality, [Maitreya] says...** There are various kinds of reality, consequently, without an understanding of their differen-

tiation the essential nature of the realities is difficult to understand. Hence, in order to clearly illustrate the differentiation of the realities at the beginning, he says:

III.1 a **There is: (a) basic reality, (b) the reality of characteristic etc.**

In detail, there are ten kinds of reality.

[2] [Some say][1] the statement about **the basic reality** is for the sake of showing that the other realities are included there within the basic reality. The statement about **the reality of characteristic** is for the sake of overcoming the faults that have entered into clear comprehension, relinquishment and realization in regard to basic reality[2]. The statement about **the reality free from erroneous inversion** is for the sake of demonstrating the expedients for withdrawal from *saṃsāra*. The statement about **the reality of cause and result** is for the sake of showing the 'going forth' by means of the *śrāvaka* vehicle for one who has become weary [of *saṃsāra*] because the *śrāvaka* goes forth by virtue of his penetration of the four noble truths and [his progress in] meditative development. The statement about **the reality of the gross** is for the sake of showing the expedients for the accomplishment of knowledge of all aspects. The statement about **the reality of the subtle** is for the sake of showing the expedients for the relinquishment of all obscuration. The statement about **well-established reality** is: (a) for the sake of showing the expedients which facilitate the explanation of the extremely well-defined[3] Dharma and (b) for the sake of showing the expedients for the refutation of all counter-arguments. The statement about **the reality of the sphere of purity** is for the sake of showing the differences in purity according to its differentiation with regard to spiritual lineage, sense faculty and mental disposition, although equal [i.e. non-differentiated] with regard to the *dharmadhātu*. The statement about **the reality of aggregation** is for the sake of showing the expedients for entry into defilement and purity in all aspects. The statement about the **reality of differentiation** is for the purpose of showing the capacity for reversal of all uncertainty, beginning with [uncertainty in regard to] thusness. The statement about
Y111 **the reality of the skills** is for the sake of showing the expedients[4] for the establishment of non-substantiality after having checked self-grasping, in all its modes.

[3] However, others say that the basic reality, which is pertinent to *bodhisattvas*, is not common [to the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*]. The second reality is the counteragent

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1 Tib. (D242b.3) inserts *kha cig na re* which is not found in the Ms.

2 Read: *-sākṣātkaraṇapraviṣṭadoṣaprahaṇārtham* in place of *-sākṣātkaraṇasaṃprayuktasya doṣaprahaṇārtham*; Tib. *mṅon sum du byed pa la źugs pa'i ñes pa gźom pa'i phyir* (D242b.4). Cf. MSA.XI 8-12 comm.

3 Ms.(33a.7): *avyavasthita* but Y's emendation to *suvyavasthita* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.110.

4 Read: *-vyavasthānopāyasaṃdarśana-* in place of *-vyavasthānasāmarthyasaṃdarśana-*; Tib. *rab tu gźag pa'i thabs bstan pa* (D243a.2), however P: *mthu* for *thabs* which is in accord with Y.

to incorrect application[5] only in respect to the former [i.e. the *bodhisattvas*]. The third reality is conformable to correct application. The fourth reality is common to both *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. The fifth reality is an expedient for accomplishment[6]. The sixth reality is common to people in general. The seventh reality is not common to the latter. The eighth reality consists in the totality of the knowable. The ninth reality refers to intrinsic nature. The tenth reality refers to the eradication of the root of defilement.

[4] In brief, these ten realities are the basis of all the statements of the *tathāgatas* with hidden meaning. In detail, reality is immeasurable. Some believe that because it is conformable with reality the conventional too is described as a reality in this context. Others believe that these are all realities because they are not disconsonant with the modes as described, considering that, that which is not disconsonant with a particular mode, is a reality as such.

1. The Basic Reality

N37.17 **In the above, the basic reality refers to:**

III.3 a **The three natures;**

[Namely], the imaginary, the other-dependent and the perfected, because the other realities are respectively determined in relation to these. Why is reality considered in relation to the three natures?

N38 **III.3 bcd** **(a) That which is eternally non-existent, (b) that which exists but not as a reality and (c) that which both exists and does not exist as a reality; these are thus considered [as the realities] in relation to the three natures.**

(a) Since that which is characterized as the imaginary is eternally non-existent, it is a reality in relation to the imaginary nature because it is not erroneously inverted. (b) Since that which is characterized as the other-dependent exists, but not as a reality[7] because it consists in error,

5 Ms.(33b.2): *-pratipakṣatvād dvitīyam* but Y's emendation to *-pratipakṣatattvam dvitīyam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.111.

6 Both D (243a.3) and P (83a): *sgrib pa* which should probably read *sgrub pa*. Cf. the first explanation of *audārikatattvam* (Y110.15-16 = D242b.5-6).

7 *na ca tattvato* but Tib. (D10b.5): *yaṅ dag pa ma yin te* = *abhūta*.

it is a reality in relation to the other-dependent nature. (c) Since that which is characterized as the perfected both exists and does not exist as a reality, it is a reality in relation to the perfected nature.

[Sthiramati]

Y111.19 [1] **In the above, the basic reality refers to:**

III.3 a **The three natures**[8] **etc.**

Since these have not been established, he says: **the imaginary, the other-dependent and the perfected.** In order to demonstrate[9] the reason why the three natures are described as comprising the basic reality, he says: **because the other realities are respectively determined in relation to these.** What is meant is: the other realities, such as that of characteristic, are included within that [basic reality].

Y112 [2] Why should these three natures be studied? Some believe that it is in order to demonstrate: (a) conventional usage, (b) the absolute and (c) the basis of the latter. Others believe it is in order to demonstrate: (a) erroneous inversion, (b) the cause of that and (c) the objective support that acts as the counteragent to these. Others believe it is in order to demonstrate the foundation of: (a) relinquishment, (b) clear comprehension and (c) realization so as to facilitate separation from obscurations on the part of the *bodhisattva*. Others believe that it is for the sake of the error-free understanding of the nature of the perfection of wisdom, which is profound by nature, by way of the three natures. For it is stated as follows in two verses from the Abhidharmasūtra[10]:

> Teachings about magical creations and the like are in relation to the world[11]; teachings about non-existence are in relation to the imaginary; however, teachings about the perfected pertain to the four kinds of purity - these are: intrinsic purity, immaculate purity, the purity of the objective support and the purity of the path, for, the pure *dharmas* are incorporated in these four.

[The teachings from the Sūtras about magical creations etc. are in relation to the world[12], i.e. the other-dependent nature, because, like a magical creation etc., it is a false appearance. The teachings about non-existence are in relation to what does not exist, i.e. the imaginary nature. The teachings about the perfected are in relation to the

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8 Read: *svabhāvas trividha* in place of *trividhaḥ svabhāva*; G. Nagao has shown that this statement forms part of the third verse. Cf. Bhāṣya N37, fn.10.

9 Ms.(33b.5): *pradarśanayan* but Y's *pradarśayan* is correct.

10 These two verses are also quoted in MSG; see Tome 1, L38 & Tome 2, L122.

11 *bhūte*; Tib. (D243b.2): *byuṅ rten*.

12 *byuṅ pa* probably a contraction of *'byuṅ pa'i rten*; cf. ibid.

fourfold purities. In regard to the fourfold purities: (a) intrinsic purity refers to 'thusness' etc. [intrinsic to] the stained state, (b) immaculate purity refers to the latter in the stainless state (c) the purity of the path, which consists in the attainment [of the understanding] of emptiness etc., refers to the factors that contribute to enlightenment etc., (d) the purity of the objective support for the generation of the path refers to the Dharma teachings, such as the Sūtras, which flow out of the *dharmadhātu* because the origination of the path is dependent upon these. Thus the abridged meaning of these two verses is that all pure *dharmas* are included in these four purities.][13] Others believe that the natures are admitted as threefold[14] in order to demonstrate that they are the respective objects of mundane, supramundane and the direct intuition attained subsequently to the latter[15].

[3] **Why is reality considered in relation to the three natures?** For 'reality'
Y113 has the sense of being 'not erroneously inverted', thus what is intended by this question: "why is reality considered in relation to the three natures?", is: why is that which is not erroneously inverted considered in relation to the three natures?

III.3 ab **The three natures [refer to]: (a) that which is eternally non-existent[16] etc.**

That which is characterized as the imaginary is eternally non-existent. That [object] in regard to which naive people have notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject and also to the signified and signifier, like in a dream, has[17] an imaginary nature because its essential nature does not exist. Hence[18], since it has both the nature of a non-*ens* and is without error, that which is characterized by the imaginary does not exist. Consequently, only non-existence is described as the reality in relation to the imaginary nature **because it is not erroneously inverted.** Here he shows the meaning of reality as 'not erroneously inverted'.

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13 This section in parenthesis which comments on the two verses from the Abhidharma-sūtra is not found in the Sanskrit version of the Ṭīkā but appears only in the Tib. The full passage reads as follows: *byuṅ ba gźan gyi dbaṅ gi ṅo bo ñid la ltos nas mdo las sgyu ma la sogs pa bstan te / de ni sgyu ma la sogs pa bźin du log par snaṅ ba'i phyir ro // med pa kun brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid la ltos nas med pa bstan to // rnam par dag pa rnam pa bźi la ltos nas yoṅs su grub par bstan to // rnam par dag pa rnam pa bźi la raṅ bźin gyis rnam par dag pa ni dri ma daṅ bcas pa'i dus kyi de bźin ñid la sogs pa'o // dri ma med pas rnam par dag pa ni de dag ñid dri ma med pa'i dus na'o // stoṅ pa ñid la sogs pa 'thob pa'i lam rnam par dag pa ni byaṅ chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa'o // lam skyed pa'i phyir dmigs pa rnam par dag pa ni chos kyi dbyiṅs kyi rgyu mthun pa bstan pa'i chos mdo'i sde la sogs pa ste / de la brten nas lam skye ba'i phyir ro // 'di ltar rnam par dag pa 'di bźis rnam par byaṅ ba'i chos thams cad bsdus te tshigs su bcad pa gñis kyi don mdor bsdus pa'o* (D243b.3 - 6).

14 Read: *svabhāvaṃ trayopādānam ity anye* in place of *trayopādānaṃ svabhāvatvam ity anye*; Ms. (34a.1): *svabhāva tryopādāna ... kim.*

15 Cf. T-Bhāṣya Verse 22 comm. (L40).

16 Read: *svabhāvas trividho 'sac ca nityam* in place of *trisvabhāvo hy asau nityam*; cf. N's fn.10 p.37.

17 Ms.(34a.2): *pravartate / asac ca sa* but Y's emendation to *pravartate sa* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.113.

18 Read: *ato 'sad-* in place of *tasmād asad-*; Ms.(34a.2): *svabhāvaḥ / a...*;Tib. *de'i phyir* (D244a.2).

[4] **That which is characterized as the other-dependent exists but not as a reality**[19]. That which is characterized by the imaginary, i.e. the apprehended object and apprehending subject etc., does exist since it is the basis of conventional [linguistic] usage. However, because it does not exist in its nature as apprehended object and apprehending subject etc. it does not exist as a reality as such. In order to clearly illustrate this, he says: **because it consists in 'bare' error.** This is what is being said: that which appears[20], like the material cause of a magical creation, does exist; the way in which it appears, like a magically created man etc., i.e. in the aspect of apprehended object and apprehending subject, does not exist as such - hence it is [described as] error. **It is a reality in relation to the other-dependent nature**[21]. That which exists in a different way is manifested in the aspect of something non-existent in relation to itself. That it is because it is not erroneously inverted is understood here also because this is the subject under discussion.

[5] **That which is characterized as the perfected both exists and does not exist as a reality**[22]. That which is characterized by the perfected is a reality that both exists and does not exist. It exists because it has the nature of the existence of the non-existence of the duality; and it does not exist because it has the nature of the non-existence of the duality. It is a reality because it is the objective support for purity. It **is a reality in relation to the perfected nature**; it is the fact that this is because it is not erroneously inverted that is referred to.

2. The Reality of Characteristic

N38.9 **What is the reality of characteristic?**

III.4 abcd & 5 ab **Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to: (a) the *dharmas* and the personal entity, (b) the apprehended object and apprehending subject and (c) existent and non-existent [entities] do not arise due to the knowledge of this the reality-characteristic.**

19 Read: *paratantralakṣaṇaṃ sac ca na ca tattvata* as per Ms.(34a.3) in place of *paratantralakṣaṇaṃ sat / na ca tattvata*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.4.

20 Read: *yat tat khyāti* as per Ms.(34a.4); cf. Y's fn.4 p.113.

21 Read: *etat paratantrasvabhāve tattvam* in place of *tad dhi paratantrasvabhāve tattvam*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.5.

22 Read: *-sadasattattvataś ceti* in place of *-sadasattattvam iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.6.

Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas* do not arise due the knowledge of this the reality-characteristic in relation to the imaginary nature. Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject do not arise due to the knowledge of this the reality-characteristic in relation to the other-dependent nature. Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to existent and non-existent [entities] do not arise due to the knowledge of this the reality-characteristic in relation to the perfected nature. This non-erroneously inverted (reality-)characteristic[23] in relation to the basic reality is described as the reality of characteristic.

[Sthiramati]

Y114 [1] Since the reality of the three natures has been described but its characteristic has not, or else, since the reality of characteristic was [initially] mentioned immediately following basic reality and it has not been established, he asks: **what is the reality of characteristic?** Hence he says:

III.4 ab — **Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to: (a) the *dharmas* and the personal entity etc.**

Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas* do not arise due to the knowledge of this[24] the reality-characteristic in relation to the imaginary nature. Views that consist in imputation refer to the notional attachment to the self and to the *dharmas* of form etc. as existing[25] in an absolute sense and which, being separate[26] from consciousness in the appearance of these, form its objective supports. The view that consists in negation refers to the notion that they [i.e. self and *dharmas* etc.] do not exist even by way of conventional [linguistic] usage. Others say that the view that consists in negation is that which rejects consciousness as an appearance of the personal entity and the *dharmas*; this should be thought of as the rejection of the apprehending subject[27]. Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas* do not arise due to the discrimination of a particular characteristic - [this is] the reality-characteristic in relation to the imaginary nature which should be understood as being devoid of imputation and negation is that characteristic. And this is a reality as conventional usage but not by way of own-being because the views that consists in

23 Tib. *mtshan ñid kyi de kho na* (D11a.2) = *lakṣaṇatattvam.*
24 Read: *yasya jñānān* in place of *yajjñānān*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.13.
25 Ms.(34b.1): *santīty*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.114.
26 Read: *-vyatiriktās* as per Ms.(34b.1) in place of *-vyatiriktasya.*
27 Read perhaps: *-pratikṣepo 'pavādadarśanam iti / grāhakapratikṣepa iti cintyam etat* in place of *-parihāro ...etat*; Tib.: *spon pa ni skur pa 'debs par lta ba'o zes zer te/'dzin pa spon pa 'di ni bsam dgos pa* (D244b.3).

imputation and negation in regard to the *dharmas* and the personal entity do not arise, i.e. they are not produced, due to the awareness that they are imaginary.

[2] **Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject...**; the erroneous appearance of apprehended object and apprehending subject is [respectively] grasped as *dharma* and personal entity if one is notionally attached to their existence as a reality - the impu-
Y115 tation in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject occurs in this way. Now if one is notionally attached to the non-existence of both the apprehending subject and apprehended object alike, then the negation in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject [occurs][28]. **Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject do not arise due to the knowledge of this** characteristic, **the reality-characteristic in relation to the other-dependent nature** which should be known as devoid of imputation and negation. Furthermore, the latter does not exist insofar as its nature as apprehended object and apprehending subject is imaginatively constructed[29], but it does exist insofar as it forms the basis for the conventional usage in regard to it. Due to clear comprehension thus, the views that consist in imputation and negation do not arise in regard to the other-dependent.

[3] **Views that consist in imputation and negation in regard to non-existent [entities]**[30]**...**; certain people say that if one perceives emptiness as something existent, then this is [equivalent to] the view that imputes existence. Conversely, if [one perceives emptiness] as something non-existent, then this is [equivalent to] the view that it is not an existent. Moreover, both of these views in regard existent and non-existent [entities] **do not arise due to the knowledge of this** characteristic[31] **the reality-characteristic in relation to the perfected nature.** Some believe that[32] this [i.e. the reality-characteristic] is, in its own-being, free from both existence and non-existence because views about existence and non-existence in regard to the perfected nature do not arise as the consequence of its knowledge. Others again say that the notion that the emptiness of essential nature is [equivalent to] the non-existence of the duality[33] is [to succumb to] the extreme of the imputation of exis-

28 Ms.(34b.4): *grāhyagrāhakasyāpy abhāvam*, but Y's emendation to *grāhyasyeva grāhakasyāpy abhāvam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib; cf. his fn.3 p.114.

29 Ms.(34b.5): *tat punar grāhya-*, but Y's emendation to *tat punar kalpitayā grāhya-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.

30 Read: *bhāvābhāvasamāropāpavāda-* in place of *bhāvābhāvayoḥ samāropāpavāda-*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.16.

31 Read: *etad ubhayam api bhāvābhāvadarśanaṃ yasya lakṣaṇasya jñānān na pravartate* in place of *etad ubhayam api bhāvābhāvadarśanam / yasya lakṣaṇasya jñānān na te bhāvābhāvadarśane pravartete*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.115 since this passage is included in the Tib. Bhāṣya quotation which follows.

32 Ms.(34b.7): *pravartate ity eke anye* contrary to Y's fn.4 p.115, however his emendation to *pravartata* is preferred.

33 Ms.(34b.7): *dvayābhāvasvarūpaiva* but Y's emendation to *dvayābhāvaḥ svarūpeṇa* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.5 p.115.

tence[34] because there is the imputation of an existent essential nature to that which in its nature is free from both existence and non-existence. Conversely, the notion that this [i.e. the non-existence of the duality] does not exist by way of an essential nature consisting in the non-existence of the duality which is free from both existence and non-existence and is the sphere of direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation[35] is [to succumb to] the extreme of the negation of non-existence. Others[36] believe that both of these explanations should be reflected upon because of the intimate connection, individually, of existence and non-existence with the views that consist in imputation and negation. In this context, existence refers to the existence of the non-existence of the duality. If one grasps the latter as a definite *ens*, then existence is imputed. If one
Y116 grasps it as a definite non-*ens*, then it is negated. Moreover, non-existence refers to the non-existence of the duality. If one grasps this in terms of annihilation, then non-existence is imputed as an absolute non-existence. Now if one grasps it just by way of the duality, then there is negation because it is manifested as a non-existent duality. Alternatively, if one grasps it as having an existent essential nature, then there is imputation. Conversely, if one grasps it purely as a non-*ens*, then defilement and purification are negated. This avoidance of the two extremes[37] is [equivalent to] the reality characteristic in relation to the perfected nature. [Objection]: Is it not so that the characteristic of the three natures has already been mentioned in the above? [I.e. Ch.I.5 cd]: "[The three natures] ...are taught on account of the object, the imagination of what is unreal and the non-existence of the duality [respectively]". [Response]: In the latter, the 'characteristic' refers to the own-being (*svabhāva*) but here it refers to the mark (*cihna*) hence its mention here is not tautologous [as is evident in such statements as]: "...this the reality-characteristic due to the knowledge of which the two [views] do not arise", that is to say, the views that consist in imputation and negation in relation to the personal entity etc. do not arise due to the knowledge of this[38] the characteristic of the basic reality.

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34 Ms.(34b.7): *śūnyatety abhāva-* but Y's emendation to *śūnyateti bhāva-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib; cf. his fn.6 p.115.

35 Read: *bhāvābhāvavimuktenāpi ca dvayābhāvasvarūpeṇa nirvikalpajñānagocareṇāsau nāstīti* in place of *bhāvābhāvavimuktena dvayābhāvasvarūpeṇa nirvikalpajñānagocareṇāpi nāstīti*; Tib. *de dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa las rnam par grol ba gñis su med pa'i raṅ bźin rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes kyi spyod yul du yaṅ med do że na* (D245a.5).

36 Ms.(35a.1): *apare / bhāvo*; disregard Y's fn.9 p.115.

37 Read: *antadvayavivarjanaṃ* in place of *antadvayavighātanaṃ*; Ms.(35a.3): *antadvayaviva-* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.116. Tib.(D245b.2) *spaṅs pa* for *vivarjanaṃ*.

38 Read: *-darśanāni yajjñānān na pravartante* in place of *-darśanaṃ yajjñānān na pravartate*; Ms. (35a.5): *-nān na pravartante*.

3. The Reality Free from Erroneous Inversion.

N38.21 The reality free from erroneous inversion consists in [the knowledge of] the impermanent, the painful, the empty and the insubstantial because these [act as] the counteragents to the erroneous inversion of permanence etc. How do they relate respectively[39] to [the threefold] basic reality?[40] They should be understood by way of the impermanence [of what is impermanent] etc.

III.5 cd — An impermanent object is: (a) a non-existent object, (b) characterized by coming into being and passing away;

III.6 ab — and (c) stained and stainless, respectively, in relation to basic reality.

N39 For the three natures consist in basic reality. In relation to these [three] respectively, there are three kinds of impermanent object: (a) the object as non-existent, (b) the object as coming into being and passing away and (c) the object as stained and stainless[41].

III.6 cd — Suffering is stated as being due to: (a) appropriating, (b) the characteristic and lastly is considered as being: (c) on account of association.

In relation to [the threefold] basic reality, respectively[42]. Suffering is: (a) due to appropriating, i.e. due to the appropriating of notional attachment to the personal entity and the ***dharmas***, (b) due to the characteristic, i.e. due to the characteristic of the threefold nature of suffering and (c) due to association, i.e. due to the association with suffering. Thus should [suffering] be understood[43] in relation to that [threefold] basic reality, respectively.

III.7 ab — Emptiness is considered as: (a) non-existence, (b) existence as something other and (c) intrinsic nature;

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39 Tib. omits *yathākramam*; cf. D245b.2.

40 Read: *tatra mūlatattve (yathākramaṃ) katham* in place of *mūlatattve yathākramaṃ katham ca tatra* on the basis of the Tib; cf. N's fn.6 p.38.

41 The Tib. and Sanskrit versions of this passage differ slightly. The translation here is on the basis of Nagao's emendation which accords essentially with the Tib.: *trayo hi svabhāvā mūlatattvaṃ teṣu yathākramaṃ trividho 'nityārtho 'sadartho utpādavyayārthaḥ samalāmalārthaś ca.* Cf. N's fn.1 p.39.

42 This statement is omitted from the Tib. Cf. D11a.5.

43 *veditavyam* is omitted from the Tib. Cf. D11a.6.

Since the imaginary characteristic does not exist in any mode whatsoever the very non-existence is its emptiness. Since the other-dependent characteristic does not exist in the manner in which it is imagined but is not non-existent in every respect, its existence as something other is emptiness. Since the perfected characteristic has emptiness for its own-being its very intrinsic nature is emptiness.

III.7 cd — Insubstantiality is explained as: (a) the absence of characteristic, (b) the difference of characteristic from that [which is imagined] and (c) the individual characteristic.

Since the very characteristic of the imaginary nature does not exist the very absence of characteristic is its insubstantiality. Since the characteristic of the other-dependent does exit, but not in the manner in which it is imagined, the characteristic - which is a characteristic different from that [which is imagined] - is its insubstantiality. However, since the perfected nature consists in insubstantiality, the individual characteristic[44] itself is its insubstantiality.

The three kinds of impermanence have now been revealed in relation to the threefold basic reality as the impermanence of: (a) a non-existing object, (b) the impermanence of what comes into being and passes away and (c) the impermanence of what is stained and stainless.

The nature of suffering is threefold: (a) suffering due to appropriating, (b) suffering due to the characteristic and (c) suffering due to
N40 association. Emptiness is threefold: (a) the emptiness of what is non-existent, (b) the emptiness of what exists as something other and (c) the emptiness of own-being. Insubstantiality is threefold: (a) insubstantiality as the absence of characteristic, (b) insubstantiality as a different characteristic and (c) insubstantiality as the individual characteristic.

[Sthiramati]

Y116.15 [1] Immediately following the reality of characteristic[45], the reality free from erroneous inversion should be stated because the latter was listed immediately after the former; hence he says: **the reality free from erroneous inversion.** For the permanent, the painful, the empty and the insubstantial[46] are described as

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44 Read: *svalakṣaṇam* in place of *prakṛtir* on the basis of the Tib. Bhāṣya (D11b.2): *raṅ gi mtshan ñid*; this is also repeated in the Tib. Ṭīkā (D247a.5). Cf. III.8 a.

45 Ms.(35a.5): *lakṣatattva-*, but Y's emendation to *lakṣaṇatattva-* is preferred.

46 Read: *-ānātmatā* in place of *-ānātmano*; cf. Bhāṣya N38.22.

the reality free from erroneous inversion **because they [act as] counteragents**[47] **to the erroneous inversion of permanence,** pleasure, purity and the substantiality. Previously, the inclusion of the other realities within the basic reality was asserted, hence he asks: how **do the latter relate to basic reality? As the impermanence [of what is impermanent] etc**[48]. The impermanent etc. refers to the modes of the impermanent, the painful, the empty and the insubstantial - the state (*-tā* of *anitya-tā*) of that is impermanence etc. In order to demonstrate that the reality free from erroneous inversion is included within the basic reality, he says:

[2]

III.5 c **An impermanent object is: (a) a non-existent object etc.**

Y117 **For there are three kinds of impermanent object: (a) the object as non-existent, (b) the object as coming into being and passing away and (c) the object as stained and stainless;** that which exists eternally as such is permanent; the inverse of this is impermanent; **...in relation to these [three], respectively.** With regard to these: (a) the imaginary nature is impermanent in the sense of the impermanence of something eternally non-existent; others believe that this is to be understood according to the rules of grammatical analysis, i.e. the impermanent (*anitya*) is always non-existent (*asannitya*). (b) The other-dependent nature is impermanent in the sense of impermanence characterized by coming into being and passing away every moment, because it arises from causal conditions, and because there is no causality when it passes away. (c) The perfected nature is impermanent in the sense of adventitious impermanence[49] which is characterized by both the possession of stain and stainlessness, although it consists in a *dharma*[50] that does not change.

[3]

III.6 c **Suffering is stated as being due to: (a) appropriating, (b) the characteristic etc.**

Suffering[51] is threefold: (a) the suffering due to appropriating, (b) the suffering due to the characteristic and (c) the suffering due to association. Of these, the imaginary nature consists in **suffering** that is **(a) due to appropriating.** There is suffering since suffering is appropriated (*upādīyate*) either in the present life or in other lives on account of the absence of clear comprehension. And in order to demonstrate the manner in which suffering is appropriated on account of this absence of clear compre-

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47 *-pratipakṣatvād* here but Bhāṣya (N38.21) *-pratipakṣeṇa.*

48 *anityāditā* both here and in Tib. Ṭīkā, but Bhāṣya (N38.22): *anityatāditā.*

49 Tib. omits *anitya*; cf. D246a.3.

50 Ms.(35b.2): *-dharmāpi*, but Y's *-dharmo 'pi* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.: *chos yin du zin kyaṅ* (D246a.3).

51 Ms.(35b.2): *duḥkham iti* but Y's emendation to *duḥkham api* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.117.

hension, he says: **due to the appropriating of notional attachment to the personal entity and the *dharmas*.** There is the notional attachment to the personal entity and the *dharmas* since one becomes notionally attached to the personal entity and the *dharmas* through 'grasping' an entity on account of this [absence of clear comprehension]. This [appropriating] belongs to the imaginary nature because it has 'fallen' into duality. It is described in this way because the continuation of suffering is due to the notional attachment to the imaginary nature[52]. The imaginary itself is not suffering because it does not exist[53]. Alternatively, since the imaginary nature is appropriated in the nature of an entity on account of the notional attachment to the personal entity and the *dharmas*, thus the imaginary nature consists in the suffering that is due to grasping.

[4] The other-dependent nature is referred to as the suffering that is **(b) due to the characteristic.** For **the threefold nature of suffering** refers to the suffering of suffering, the suffering of change and the suffering of the formative forces. Moreover,
Y118 since these three sufferings are the sufferings that pertain to the other-dependent[54], they are [described as] the suffering that is due to the characteristic.

[5] The perfected nature consists in suffering that is: **(c) due to association.** The word "**and**" has a conjunctive sense. How is it due to association? He says: **due to the association with suffering.** The other-dependent nature consists in suffering; the real nature of the latter is described as suffering because even though perfected it is also associated with suffering. **[Thus should suffering be understood] in relation to that [threefold] basic reality, respectively.** In this regard, the suffering that is on account of grasping consists in the imaginary. [The suffering] that is on account of the characteristic consists in the other-dependent. [The suffering] that is on account of association consists in the perfected.

[6]

III.7 ab — **Emptiness is considered as: (a) non-existence, (b) existence as something other and (c) intrinsic nature;**

Emptiness is threefold: (a) emptiness as non-existence, (b) emptiness as an existence as something other and (c) emptiness as intrinsic nature. Therein, emptiness as non-existence pertains to the imaginary nature. In order to clearly illustrate just this[55], he says: **since the imaginary characteristic, like the essential nature of horns on a hare**

52 Tib. is slightly different: "...because notional attachment to the imaginary nature is the ground for the continuity of suffering". *kun brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid la mṅon par źen pa ni sdug bsṅal gyi rgyun gyi rgyu yin pas* (D246a.6).

53 Ms.(35b.4): *nāpi*, but Y's emendation to *tadabhāvāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. Cf. his fn.4 p.117.

54 Ms.(35b.6): *paratantraduḥkhatā*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.118.

55 Read: *etad eva* as per Ms.(36a.1) in place of *etat*.

etc., **does not exist** as the existing apprehended object **in any mode whatsoever** through direct perception or inference; **the very non-existence is its emptiness**[56]. The emptiness of what exists as something other pertains to the other-dependent [nature]. In order to clearly illustrate just this, he says: **since the other-dependent characteristic does not exist in the manner in which it is imagined** by naive people, i.e. in the nature of the duality, **but is not non-existent in every** respect. Moreover, the mode in which it does exist is understood through mundane direct intuition that is pure; therefore **its existence as something other is emptiness**[57]. The emptiness as intrinsic nature pertains to the perfected [nature], hence he says: **since the perfected characteristic has emptiness for its own-being**; because it has the non-existence of the duality for its own-being; therefore, its very **intrinsic nature is emptiness**, i.e. its very **own-being**.

[7]

III.7 c — **Insubstantiality is explained as: (a) the absence of characteristic**[58] **etc.**

Insubstantiality is threefold: (a) insubstantiality as the absence of characteristic, (b) insubstantiality as a difference of characteristic[59] and (c) insubstantiality as the individual characteristic. Of these, the absence of characteristic itself is an insubstantiality
Y119 because there is the absence of the characteristic of a nature that is imaginary. This is why he says: **since the very characteristic of the imaginary nature does not exist, the very absence of characteristic is its insubstantiality**[60], i.e. he shows that it does not exist in any other mode. Insubstantiality as a difference in characteristic pertains to the other-dependent, because, **the characteristic of the other-dependent does exist**, in the nature of an entity, **but not in the way in which it is imagined** by naive people, i.e. as the duality; **the** other-dependent **characteristic - which is a characteristic different from that**, i.e. dissimilar to the imagined characteristic - **is its insubstantiality**. Thus, its insubstantiality is shown to be an imaginary substantiality[61]. Insubstantiality as the individual characteristic[62] is pertinent to the perfected since **the perfected nature consists in insubstantiality** because it has the non-existence of the apprehended object and apprehending

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56 Read: *pratyakṣānumānaprakāreṇa na kenacid sattvaṃ grāhyam astīty abhāva evāsya śūnyateti* in place of *pratyakṣānumānākāreṇa yenāpi sattvaṃ grāhyaṃ nāsti / abhāvatvāt tacchūnyateti*; Tib. *mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gaṅ gis kyaṅ yod par gzuṅ du med de / dṅos po med pa ñid pas de'i stoṅ pa ñid* (D246b.5). Cf. Bhāṣya N39.10 (= D11a.6).

57 Read: *tasyātadbhāvaḥ śūnyateti* in place of *atadbhāvāt tacchūnyateti*; cf. Bhāṣya N39.12.

58 Read: *alakṣaṇaṃ ca nairātmyaṃ* in place of *alakṣaṇād hi nairātmyaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N39.14.

59 Ms.(36a.3): *vilakṣaṇa-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.118.

60 Read: *lakṣaṇam eva nāstīty alakṣaṇam evāsya nairātmyaṃ* in place of *lakṣaṇāsattvād alakṣaṇam eva tannairātmyaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N39.16.

61 Ms.(36a.6): *parikalpitena*, but Y's emendation to *parikalpitātmatvena* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.119

62 Read: *svalakṣaṇanairātmyaṃ* as per Ms.(36a.6) in place of *svalakṣaṇaṃ nairātmyaṃ*; Tib. *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis bdag med pa* (D247a.4).

subject as its nature; hence by saying: **the individual characteristic itself is its insubstantiality,** he shows that the perfected *dharma* has insubstantiality for its own-being[63].

[8] Just what difference is there between these two terms, i.e. emptiness and insubstantiality? Some believe that wherein something does not exist, the former is empty of the latter; however, if something is not the substance (*ātman*), i.e. the own-being of something else, on account of this, the latter is insubstantial (*anātman*) - this is the difference between the two. Others again believe that although there is no difference in reality, there is a difference according to the way in which they are respectively determined, since that wherein something does not exist is insubstantial because of the absence of own-being on its part, however, in the former case, its emptiness is on account of the absence of the perfected nature within it.

[9] In order to demonstrate that they [act as] the counteragents to the extremes of imputation and negation and also that they consist in adventitious stain the **three kinds of impermanence have now been respectively revealed**[64] **in** relation **to the threefold basic reality as: (a) the impermanence of a non-existing object, (b) the impermanence of what comes into being and passes away and (c) the impermanence of what is stained and stainless.** The reality free from erroneous inversion[65] is described in this way, concluding with the statement: **insubstantiality is threefold.**

4. The Reality of Cause and Result.

N40.5 **The reality consisting in cause and result is [equivalent to] the [noble] truth of suffering, its origination, its cessation and the path [to the latter] in relation to that same basic reality. How does the threefold basic reality consist in the [four] truths beginning with suffering? Because the latter are characterized by impermanence etc.**

III.8 b **Hence it is considered as the truth of suffering;**

The truth of origination [is considered] through the threefold categories of origination. The threefold categories of origination are:

63 Read: *pariniṣpannasya dharmasya* in place of *pariniṣpannaṃ dharmaṃ*; Tib. *yoṅs su grub pa'i chos la* (D247a.5).

64 Read: *paridīpitā* in place of *saṃdarśitā*; cf. Bhāṣya N39.20.

65 Read: *aviparyāsatattvam* as per Ms.(36b.2) in place of *aviparyāsattvam*.

III.8 cd — (a) latent impression, (b) manifestation and (c) non-separation.

Origination as latent impression refers to the latent impressions of the notional attachment to the imaginary nature. Origination as manifestation refers to *karma* and moral defilement. Origination as non-separation refers to the non-separation of thusness from obscuration.

The truth of cessation [is considered] through the three kinds of cessation. The three kinds of cessation are:

III.9 ab — Considered as: (a) non-origination by way of own-being, (b) non-origination by way of the duality and (c) the two extinctions of stain;

Non-origination by way of own-being, non-origination by way of the apprehended object and apprehending subject and the two extinctions of stain are stated as cessation through critical consideration and also as thusness. These are the three kinds of cessation, namely, cessation by way of own-being, cessation by way of the duality and cessation by way of intrinsic nature.

How is the truth of the path respectively determined in relation to the threefold basic reality?

III.9 cd & 10 a — In relation to their: (a) clear comprehension, (b) renunciation and (c) realization as attainment; this is
N41 stated as the truth of the path.

I.e. in relation to: (a) the clear comprehension of the imaginary [nature], (b) the clear comprehension and renunciation of the other-dependent [nature] and (c) the clear comprehension of the perfected [nature] and its realization as attainment . Thus it should be understood that the establishment of the truth of the path in this regard is in relation to clear comprehension, renunciation and realization.

[Sthiramati]

[1] Since the reality of cause and result should be discussed immediately after the
Y120 latter [i.e. the reality free from erroneous inversion], he says: **the reality consisting in cause and result ...in relation to that same basic reality**[66]. Therein, concerning the side of defilement, the truth of suffering is [equivalent to] the reality of

66 Read: *phalahetumayan tattvaṃ tatraiva mūlatattve* in place of *mūlatattve phalahetutattvam*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.5.

the result; the truth of origination is [equivalent to] the reality of the cause. Moreover, concerning the side of purification, the truth of cessation is [equivalent to] the reality of the result and the truth of the path is [equivalent to] the reality of the cause. In this way the four truths, beginning with suffering, are [equivalent to] the reality of cause and result. It has been said that [this reality] **is [equivalent to] the truth**[67] **of suffering, its origination, its cessation and the path [to the latter]** in relation to that same basic reality[68].

[2] And since it is not discerned how basic reality pertains to the own-being of the truth of suffering etc. he asks: **how does the threefold basic reality consist in the [four] truths beginning with suffering?** Hence he says: **because the latter are characterized**[69] **by impermanence etc.**

III.8 b **Hence**[70] **it is considered as the truth of suffering;**

In detail, it is said that the impermanent, the painful, the empty and the insubstantial are the characteristics of the truth of suffering and, as a totality, these exist individually in the imaginary etc. Hence, the imaginary etc. are intended, individually, as the truth of suffering.

[3] **The truth of origination [is considered]** as the threefold basic reality, respectively,[71] **through the threefold categories of origination.** Since their origination is not understood, he says: **the threefold categories of origination are:**

III.8 cd **(a) latent impression, (b) manifestation and (c) non-separation.**

The three kinds of origination are: (a) origination as latent impression, (b) origination as manifestation and (c) origination as non-separation. Of these, **the origination as latent impression** should be understood as the imaginary nature; hence he says: **...refers to the latent impressions of the notional attachment to the imaginary nature.** Since, although the imaginary nature does not exist, the *dharmas* that consist in the mundane respectively determine the latent impressions of both conceptual differentiation and moral defilement[72] on account of notional attachment to its existence; however, the [*dharmas* that consist in the] supramundane and which are without notional attachment, do not. Consequently, the imaginary nature is described
Y121 as origination as latent impression. **Origination as manifestation** should be

67 Read: *-satyatvam* in place of *satyāni*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.6.

68 Read perhaps: *tatraiva mūlatattve* in place of *mūlatattve*; Tib. *rtsa ba'i de kho na ñid la.* Cf. ibid.

69 Read: *-lakṣaṇam* in place of *-lakṣaṇena*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.7

70 Read: *ato* in place of *tato*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.8.

71 Read: *mūlatattvaṃ yathākramaṃ samudayasatyam* in place of *mūlatattvaṃ samudayasatyaṃ yathākramam*; Ms.(36b.5): *mūlatattvaṃ ya-*.

72 *kleśa* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D248a.2.

understood as the other-dependent [nature][73]; manifestation refers to the acquisition of a substantial nature. That which comes into being from something else is [described as] "origination as manifestation", because it originates from this. Furthermore, as to its essential nature, he says: ...**refers to *karma* and moral defilement** and these two consist in the other-dependent nature because they have the nature of substantial entities. **Origination as non-separation refers to [the non-separation] of thusness**[74]; how so? Hence he says: **[its] non-separation from obscuration.** This is what is being said: [thusness] receives the title "origination" since: (a) suffering originates as long as thusness is not separate from obscuration, or (b) thusness - which is not separate from obscuration -
is the real nature of origination.

[4] **The truth of cessation** which consists in basic reality **[is considered] through the three kinds of cessation** and since these are not discerned, he says: **the three kinds of cessation are:**

III.9 ab **Considered as: (a) non-origination by way of own-being, (b) non-origination by way of the duality and (c) the two extinctions of stain;**

Therein, non-origination by way of own-being refers to the imaginary [nature] since it is an absolute non-origination because it is devoid of own-being, like the son of a barren woman. **Non-origination by way of the apprehended object and apprehending subject** refers to the other-dependent; moreover, since this is absolutely devoid of the essential nature[75] of an apprehended object and apprehending subject, it is non-origination by way of a nature that consists in an erroneous duality. **And the two extinctions of stain** refer to the perfected; the word "and" has the conjunctive sense. But since these [extinctions] are not discerned, he says: ...**are stated as cessation through critical consideration and also as thusness**[76]. Stain is twofold: (a) obscuration such as passion and (b) the imaginary. Therein, when the 'seed' has been extracted from its basis through direct intuition that is without impurity, an extinction [is achieved] which consists in the absolute non-origination of the stain of passion etc. - this is cessation through critical consideration. By means of direct intuition into the absence of the duality which belongs to the sphere of thusness, an extinction [is achieved] which consists in the non-origination of the stain of the imaginary; this is thusness. Both of these consist in the perfected nature. These three

73 *svabhāva* is omitted from the Ms.

74 Read: *tathatāyā iti* in place of *tathateti*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.13.

75 Ms.(37a.4): *-rūpābhyām*, but Y's emen[illegible]ion to *-svarūpābhyām* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn. 3 p.121.

76 Read: *pratisaṃkhyānirodhatathatākhyaṃ* in place of *pratisaṃkhyānirodhas /tathatā cocyata*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.18.

kinds of cessation are to be discerned in relation to basic reality, beginning with the imaginary, according to their respective enumeration. However others believe that the extinction[77] of these dual stains consisting in moral defilement and the imaginary are described as thusness on account of the penetration of thusness because of the state-
Y122 ment: **cessation by way of the duality and cessation by way of intrinsic nature.** Intrinsic nature refers to thusness because this refers to the intrinsic luminosity of mind. Hence, since it has thusness for its objective support, this cessation is described as cessation by way of intrinsic nature, [whereas] cessation alone[78] is [described as] cessation through critical consideration. Others believe that cessation is [equivalent to] thusness inasmuch as [suffering] has ceased in the latter[79]. Furthermore, since cessation consists in non-origination, after collecting together all [elements] that have non-origination etc. for their own-being, they are described as the truth of cessation. The inclusion of the truth of cessation within basic reality has now been described.

[5] However, since the truth of the path should be included immediately after the latter, he asks: **how is the truth of the path respectively determined in relation to the threefold basic reality?**[80] Hence the statement beginning with:

III.9 c — **In relation to their: (a) clear comprehension [(b) renunciation]**[81] **etc.**

i.e. in relation to: (a) the clear comprehension of the imaginary [nature]; since the imaginary nature is absolutely non-existent there is only its clear comprehension and not its renunciation, for the renunciation of what does not exist is not tenable. **(b) In relation to the clear comprehension and renunciation of the other-dependent [nature],** for the other-dependent is to be understood as not existing in the manner in which it appears but not as non-existent in its whole nature, like the imaginary; also, because *karma* and moral defilement have the nature of entities[82], it [i.e. the other-dependent] is to be renounced. **And (c) in relation to the clear comprehension of the perfected [nature] and its realization as attainment.** For the perfected should be clearly comprehended as being characterized by both the exemption from existence and non-existence and as the turning about of the

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77 Ms.(37a.6): *-śāntir iti malaśānti-* but Y's emendation to *-śāntis tathatety ucyate* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.121.

78 Read: *niruddhimātram* as per Ms.(37a.7) in place of *niruddhamātram*.

79 Ms.(37a.7): *pratisaṃkhyānirodho nirodhyate 'syām*, but Y's emendation to *nirodhaḥ / nirodhyate* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.122.

80 Read: *trividhe mūlatattve* as per Ms.(37b.1) and supported by Bhāṣya N40.20 in place of *trividhamūlatattve.*

81 Read: *parijñāyāṃ [prahāṇe ca]* in place of *parijñānaṃ [prahāṇaṃ ca]*; cf. Bhāṣya N40.21.

82 Read: *vastvātmatvāt* in place of *bhāvātmatvāt*; Tib. *dños po'i bdag ñid yin pas* (D249a.1); cf. Y121.3 (= D248a.3ff).

basis[83]. Since the turning about of the basis is to be realized as the liberated Dharma Body, emptiness should be clearly comprehended. Cessation should be realized through the realization as attainment. Others believe that there are two aspects to both [clear comprehension and realization] because clear comprehension is twofold: (a) clear comprehension as knowledge and (b) clear comprehension as renunciation[84]. Therein, the first and the third [natures] are to be clearly comprehended through clear comprehension as knowledge but the second [nature] should be clearly comprehended as both. Realization also is twofold: (a) realization as knowledge and (b) realization as attain-
Y123 ment. Therein, although all three [natures] are to be realized through realization as knowledge only the third is [to be realized] through realization as attainment. **Thus it should be understood that the establishment of the truth of the path in this**, i.e. within basic reality, **is in relation to clear comprehension, renunciation and realization**[85]; but not because it is included therein [i.e. within basic reality]. In this [section] the following are revealed through the four truths: (a) defilement, (b) that from which it originates, (c) the purification of these two and (d) that from which this originates. However, their sequential order is in accordance with one's intuitive understanding.

5. Gross and Subtle Reality.

N41.7 **The reality of the gross and the subtle refers to the conventional and absolute truth. How should this be understood in relation to basic reality?**

III.10 bc **The gross [should be understood] by way of: (a) designation, (b) knowledge and (c) utterance;**

For the conventional is threefold: (a) conventional as designation, (b) conventional as knowledge and (c) conventional as utterance. Through these [three], the conventional truth should be known in relation to [the threefold] basic reality, respectively.

III.10 d **However, the absolute [should be understood] by way of the one.**

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83 Read: *-lakṣaṇataḥ parijñeya āśrayaparivṛttitaś ca* in place of *-lakṣaṇataḥ parijñeya āśrayaparā-vṛttitāyāś ca*; Ms.(37b.3): *-lakṣaṇamataḥ parijñeyaḥ / āśrayapari-*. Tib. (D209a.2): *mtshan ñid daṅ gnas gyur pa ñid du yoṅs su śes par bya.*

84 Ms.(37b.4): *jñānaparijñā prah*[illegible]*ṇaparijñā ca*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.122.

85 Read: *parijñāprahāṇasākṣātkriyāyāṃ mārgasatyavyavasthānam iti* in place of *parijñānaprahāṇa-sākṣātkaraṇair mārgasatyaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N41.3.

The absolute truth is to be understood as being due to the one, i.e. due only to the perfected nature. But how can that be absolute?

III.11 ab — Because the absolute is considered as threefold, i.e. by way of: (a) object, (b) attainment and (c) spiritual practice;

(a) The absolute as object is thusness, considering that it is the object of the highest direct intuition. (b) The absolute as attainment is *nirvāṇa*, considering that it is the highest object. (c) The absolute as spiritual practice is the path, considering that the highest is its object.

How can both the unconditioned and the conditioned be described as the perfected nature?

III.11 cd — The two [are considered] by way of perfection that is unchanging and free from erroneous inversion.

The unconditioned is perfected insofar as it is [equivalent to] unchanging perfection. The conditioned, which is incorporated in the truth[86] of the path, [is perfected] insofar as it is [equivalent to]
N42 perfection free from erroneous inversions because of the absence of erroneous inversion in regard to the entity that is the object of knowledge.

[Sthiramati]

Y123.9 [1] **The reality of the gross and the subtle**[87]; gross reality refers to **conventional truth**; subtle reality refers to **absolute truth**. Since, at the beginning, [the *bodhisattva*] brings beings to maturity by means of the gross but liberates those who have reached maturity by means of the subtle, the gross is [explained] prior to the subtle which follows. This statement is contradictory to the congruity of a verse [i.e. III.1d]. Therein conventional truth refers to gross reality because it is the domain of non-concentrated knowledge; absolute truth refers to subtle reality because it is the domain of concentrated knowledge. Alternatively, [the former] refers to the gross because it is the domain of consciousness and [the latter] refers to the subtle because it is the domain of direct intuition. Since it has been asserted that all the realities are intended as being included within basic reality, he asks: **how should this be understood in relation to basic reality?** Hence he says:

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86 *satya* is omitted from the Tib. (cf.D12b.2).

87 Read: *audārikasūkṣmatattvaṃ punar iti* in place of *audārikaṃ tattvaṃ sūkṣmaṃ ceti*; Ms. (37b.6): *audārikasū-*. Cf. Bhāṣya N41.7.

[2]

III.10 bc — **The gross [should be understood] by way of: (a) designation, (b) knowledge and (c) utterance**[88]**;**

In relation to the basic reality, the gross reality is to be understood by way of designation, knowledge and utterance[89]. In order to clearly illustrate just this, he says: **for the**
Y124 **conventional is threefold.** Respectively determining the form of a non-existing object, i.e. calling it a water-pitcher or a cloth[90] is (a) **the conventional as designation.** Others believe that the conventional as designation refers to the articulation by way of the name as distinct from the essential nature of form, sensation and conceptualization etc. Others believe that the conventional as designation is that which is conventionally expressed as form or sensation, depending upon verbal articulation. It is the imaginary nature because, like mind and the mental concomitants[91], it is non-existent.

[3] (b) **The conventional as knowledge.** The conventional as knowledge refers to that[92] conceptual differentiation on account of which one becomes notionally attached to forms etc. and water pitchers etc.[93] in accordance with their respective determination as having the nature of entities as if they were external realities, although they are not external to the appearances in consciousness.

[4] **And (c) the conventional as utterance.** The word "and" has a conjunctive sense. The conventional as utterance refers to the demonstration of the perfected [nature] through its synonyms such as emptiness, thusness, the possession of stain and stainlessness etc.[94], although it transcends conceptual differentiation and verbal description.

[5] **The conventional truth should be known in relation to the [threefold] basic reality, respectively, through these three aspects of the conventional.** The "conventional" refers to the conventional [linguistic] usage. "Designation" refers to verbal expression. The conventional as designation refers to the conventional

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88 Read: *prajñaptipratipattitas / tathodbhāvanayodāraṃ /* in place of *prajñaptiḥ pratipattitā / udāram udbhāvanaivam /.* Cf. Bhāṣya N41.9.

89 Read: *prajñaptitaḥ pratipattita udbhāvanayā cāudārikatattvaṃ* in place of *prajñaptiḥ pratipattir udbhāvanā cāudārikatattvaṃ*; Ms.(38a.2): *-ḥ pratipattita udbhāvanayā cāudārikatvam.*

90 Ms.(38a.2): *ghaṭa iti,* but Y's emendation to *ghaṭaḥ paṭaś ceti* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.124.

91 Ms.(38a.3): *caittadasatvāt,* but Y's emendation to *cittacaittavad asattvāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.124.

92 Read perhaps: *vikalpyaḥ* as per Ms.(38a.4), however Y's reading of *vikalpaḥ* is supported by the Tib.: *rnam par rtog pa.*

93 Read: *rūpādīn ghaṭādīṃś ca* in place of *rūpādayo ghaṭādayaś ca.*

94 Read: *śūnyatātathatāsamalanirmalety evam ādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ* in place of *śūnyatātathatā-samalanirmalādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ*; Ms.(38a.5): *śūnyatātathatāsamalānirmalety evam ādibhiḥ paryāyaiḥ.*

[linguistic] usage through verbal expression alone in the absence of an object; therefore, the conventional truth is imaginary since it consists in the conventional as designation because the object does not exist. "Knowledge" refers to the notional attachment to an object although it does not exist. The conventional usage that results from that [knowledge] is the conventional as knowledge; furthermore, this refers to the conceptual differentiation that pertains to notional attachment. Therefore, the conventional truth consists in the other-dependent as it consists in the conventional by way of knowledge. "Utterance" is that which [provides] a clear indication of the *dharmadhātu* - which is inexpressible - through words such as 'thusness'. The conventional usage in regard to the *dharmadhātu* by means of that [utterance] is the conventional as utterance.
Y125 Hence, conventional truth consists in the perfected [nature] since it consists in the conventional as utterance. Of these, the conventional as designation and utterance should be understood as respective determinations [that occur] as comprised by the circumstances but not in terms of own-being. Conventional truth has now been described.

[6] Now the absolute truth should be mentioned, hence he says:

III.10 d — **However, the absolute [should be understood] by way of the one.**

For it is impossible that the absolute can belong to the imaginary and other-dependent [natures]; however, **absolute truth is to be understood as being due to the one, i.e. due to just the perfected nature**[95]. But, for what reason is that perfected [nature] described[96] as **absolute?** Hence he says:

[7]

III.11 ab — **Because the absolute is considered as threefold, i.e. by way of: (a) object, (b) attainment and (c) spiritual practice**[97]**;**

For the absolute is threefold: (a) the absolute as object, (b) the absolute as attainment and (c) the absolute as spiritual practice[98]. Of these, **(a) the absolute as object is thusness,** for the supramundane direct intuition is highest; thusness is described as the highest object (***paramārtha***) considering that[99] it is the object (*artha*) or [sense] object (*viṣaya*) of that [direct intuition], just like an object of the sense faculties. In order to demonstrate this, he says: **considering that it is the object of the highest direct intuition.** What is meant is: because it is determined as being an

95 Read: *ekasmāt pariniṣpannād eva svabhāvād veditavyaṃ* in place of *ekataḥ pariniṣpannasvabhāvo veditavyaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N41.15.
96 Ms.(38b.2): *ucyata*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.125.
97 Read: *-prapattyā* as per Ms.(38b.2) and Bhāṣya (N41.17) in place of *-prayatyā*.
98 Read: *pratipattiparamārthaś* in place of *prayatiparamārthaś*; cf. ibid.
99 Ms.(38b.2): *iti kṛtvā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.125.

objective support. [However], since it is not something that is separate from direct intuition, at the time [of being intuited] it does not become an objective support, like the appearances as representation-only; for example, apart from their mere representation as form etc., the appearances as form etc. do not exist for those [objects] for which representation-only is allowed[100].

[8] (b) **The absolute as attainment is *nirvāṇa*;** thusness which is absolutely devoid of stain is the characteristic of the turning about of the basis. How can this be the absolute? Hence he says: **considering that it is the highest object**[101], i.e. considering that it is both an object (*artha*) and is the highest (*parama*), it is the highest object (*paramārtha*). It is the highest in this regard because it is foremost among the unconditioned and conditioned *dharmas*; it is an object in the sense that it is the aim of the path. For thus, the attainment of *nirvāṇa* is the aim of the path but *nirvāṇa* is the object [i.e. the aim] because it is free from all harmful faults since that which is accompanied by fault is described as a non-object.

Y126 [9] (c) **The absolute as spiritual practice is the path;** why is this? **Considering that the highest is its object;** object (*artha*) here means [sense]-object (*viṣaya*) or aim (*prayojana*)[102]; the object is thusness, the aim is *nirvāṇa*. [Objection]: If it is described as the highest[103] on account of the object, would there not be a reciprocal dependence [i.e. the path is highest on account of the object and the object is highest on account of the path]? [Response]: If there is reciprocal dependence[104], what fault is there? [Objection]: there can be no positive determination. [Response]: This will not be so because there is reciprocal dependence as in the case of a lion and a forest[105].

[10] **How can both the unconditioned, namely *nirvāṇa*, and the conditioned, namely the path, be described as the perfected nature?**[106] For absolute truth has been explained as the perfected nature, however, it is not tenable that the path be perfected considering that it has no non-existent previous and subsequent portions. Therefore, the path is not [equivalent to] absolute truth and if it is not perfected it cannot be included within absolute truth. Hence he says:

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100 Ms.(38b.4): *kṣamate*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.125.

101 Read: *paramo 'syārtha iti kṛtvā* in place of *arthasya parama iti kṛtvā*; cf. Bhāṣya N41.21.

102 Ms.(38b.6): *viṣayaḥ prayojanaṃ vārthaḥ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.126.

103 Read perhaps: *parama ucyamāne* in place of *parama ucyamānaḥ*; Tib. *dam pa źes bya na* (D250b.4).

104 Read perhaps: *anyonyasamarthane sati* in place of *anyonyasamarthanaṃ sat*; Tib. *gcig la gcig brten par gyur na* (D250b.5).

105 This maxim applies to things which mutually aid or protect each other; it is explained (as *vanasiṃhanyāyaḥ*) in Colonel G.A.Jacob: A Handful of Popular Maxims, Delhi: Nirājanā; first printed in three parts: 1900-1904, reprint: 1983. Cf. p.73.

106 Tib. is slightly different: the words *nirvāṇākhyaṃ* and *mārgākhyaṃ* are omitted and this quotation from the Bhāṣya is found at the very end of the paragraph; cf. Ṭib. Ṭīkā: D250b.5.

III.11 cd **The two [are considered] by way of perfection that is both unchanging and free from erroneous inversion**[107].

An alternate [objection]: how can the unconditioned, namely *nirvāṇa*, and the conditioned, namely the path, be described as the perfected nature? For the perfected refers to thusness and since it is devoid of the characteristic of the duality that pertains to the other-dependent, the condition of perfection on the part of both *nirvāṇa* and the path is not tenable. [Response]: this objection is not tenable[108] since the non-existence of the duality therein refers to the perfected, however, it is only the non-existence of the duality that is [referred to as] the perfected, thus what is other than this is not refuted. And hence the two perfected [natures] other than this which comprise the absence of change and the absence of erroneous inversion are also referred to as perfected. The uncondi-
Y127 tioned refers to *nirvāṇa* and thusness. **The unconditioned is perfected insofar as it is [equivalent to] unchanging perfection** because it cannot be otherwise. **The conditioned, which is incorporated in the truth of the path** and not elsewhere, is perfected **insofar as it is [equivalent to] perfection free from erroneous inversion.** As to why this is so, he says: **because of the absence of erroneous inversion in regard to the entity that is the object of knowledge;** i.e. since erroneous inversion never occurs in regard to the object of knowledge. Therefore, the path is also perfected and consequently, due to the differences in intended meaning, [the assertion] that the perfected [nature] pertains to both the conditioned and the unconditioned is not contradictory.

6. The Well Established Reality.

N42.3 **How is the well established reality respectively determined in relation to basic reality? Well established reality is twofold: (a) that which is generally established and (b) that which is established through reasoning. In this respect:**

III.12 a **That which is generally established results from the one;**

It results from the imaginary nature. There is a similarity in the perspective of all worldlings insofar as their intellects enter into familiarity

107 Read: *nirvikārāviparyāsaparinişpattito* in place of *ananyathāviparyāsaparinişpattito*; cf. Bhāṣya N41.22.

108 Read: *tad idam acodyayogyam* in place of *tad idam anupālambhayogyaṃ*; Ms.(39a.2): *tad idam aco-*.

with conventional symbols in regard to entities; thus [they share beliefs] such as: "this is definitely earth and not fire, and this is definitely form and not sound".[109]

III.12 b **That which is established through reasoning results from the three;**

Based upon the three means of valid knowledge, an entity is established through reasoning which consists in the proof of logical possibility by those who are wise, i.e. learned in argumentation, and the dialecticians, [i.e. the examiners][110].

[Sthiramati]

Y127.9 [1] **In this respect**[111]:

III.12 a **That which is generally established results from the one**[112];

It results just **from the imaginary [nature]**[113] because of the impossibility [of its establishment] in accordance with verbal description since it does not result from something other. However, its essential nature is not known, hence he says: **in regard to entities** etc.; the **conventional symbol** refers to knowledge which connects the name and the possessor of the name. **Familiarity...**; this refers to the endeavour and perspective that is repeatedly oriented towards that [conventional symbol][114]. **Insofar as their intellects enter into the latter two**[115]; just what does this entry into familiarity with conventional symbols by the intellect refer to? It refers to memory. This is what is being said: **there is a similarity in the perspective of all worldlings**, i.e. those who know the treatises and those who do not, in regard to things that are conventionally expressed, insofar as their intellect is in conformity with their memory which has familiarity with the conventional symbol.
Y128 **Thus [they share beliefs] such as: "this is definitely earth...**[116]**"** This

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109 An almost identical passage is found in BB (Dutt 25.5ff.).

110 Tib.(D12b.4) inserts *mimāṃsakānām* (*spyod yul can dag*) which is not found in the Sanskrit Bhāṣya; cf. N's fn.2 p.42.

111 As noted by Y (cf. his fn.1 p.127), the first portion of the Bhāṣya (i.e. *prasiddhatattvaṃ mūlatattve kathaṃ vyavasthāpyate / dvividhaṃ hi prasiddhatattvaṃ / lokaprasiddhaṃ yuktiprasiddhaṃ ca*) has not been glossed by Sthiramati which could indicate that a portion of the Ṭīkā is missing.

112 Read: *ekasmād* as per Ms.(39a.5) in place of *ekasyād.*

113 Tib. inserts *ṅo bo ñid* (D251a.5) as does Bhāṣya; cf. N42.6.

114 Read: *tatra punaḥ punaḥ prayogadarśanam* in place of *tadvāraṃvāraṃ prayogadarśanam*; Tib. *de la yaṅ daṅ yaṅ du sbyor źiṅ lta ba* (D251a.6).

115 Read: *tatrānupraviṣṭayā* in place of *tatrānupraveśayā*; cf. Bhāṣya N42.6.

116 Read: *vyavahṛtavastuni kasmiṃs cid darśanatulyatā bhavati pṛthivy eveyam ityādīty* in place of *vyavahṛtabhāve kva cid iyaṃ bhūmir ityādidarśanaṃ samānam iti*; Tib. *tha sñad du brtags pa'i dṅos po gaṅ la la 'di ni sa yin no źes bya ba la sogs par lta ba mthun pa yin no źes* (D251a.7). Cf. Bhāṣya N42.6.

is the generally established[117] reality considering that it is just thus as it is generally established.

[2]

III.12 b **That which is established through reasoning results from the three;**

Since reasoning[118] is carried out in regard to the threefold natures, the reality that is well established through reasoning is respectively determined through the three natures. In order to demonstrate this since it is not known, he says: that **...by those who are wise, i.e. learned in argumentation...** Therein, those who are wise refers to those who are learned in argumentation[119]. **The dialecticians** refers to the examiners; after thinking about the explanation of the former [i.e. those who are learned in argumentation], the latter term [i.e. dialecticians] is stated[120]. Alternatively, those who are wise are the seekers for what is wholesome. Those who are learned in argumentation are those whose skill is complete in regard to the non-contradictory meaning of the four types of reasoning which consist in: (a) consideration, (b) cause and effect, (c) [proof of] logical possibility and (d) real nature[121]. The dialecticians are those who have the capacity for conjecture and exclusion and are the authors of the treatises that are free from erroneous inversion for they are based upon the scriptural statements of the *tathāgatas*. The examiners are learned in their own and other's treatises and are scrutineers of virtues and faults. However, some people do not read "examiners", consequently, they query just who these "wise ones" are when it is said: 'on the part of those who are wise'. Hence[122], [Vasubandhu] says: "those who are learned in argumentation". Moreover, the latter are of two types because they can be situated on the level of dialectic or on the level of meditative development; therefore, the dialecticians are specified. Since certain of these people are investigators of what is generally established[123], he says: **based upon the three means of valid knowledge.** What is meant is: since there is no contradiction with the three means of valid knowledge[124]. The three means of valid knowledge are: (a) direct perception, (b) inference and (c) scriptural tradition. Direct perception in this context refers to: (a) the

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117 Ms.(39a.7): *lokaprasiddhaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.127.

118 Ms.(39a.7): *yuktiḥ*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.128.

119 Ms.(39b.1) erroneously inserts the following statement here: *tatra santo ye yuktārthapaṇḍi-tānām ityādi.*

120 Y's reconstruction of *pūrvasya vyākhyānā(śayasya paścād vacanam uktam...)* cannot be correct, however a suitable Sanskrit reconstruction is difficult to formulate. In any case the Tibetan gives a clear enough indication of what is intended: *sṅa ma bśad par bsams* (P: *bsam*) *nas tshig phyi ma brjod do* (D251b.2-3).

121 Cf. MSA (B/L161.7) where these four types of reasoning are also discussed.

122 *ata* (Y128.14) is not found in the Ms. and has been inserted on the basis of the Tib. *de'i phyir* (D251b.5).

123 Read: *teṣāṃ ca kecid lokaprasiddhānusāriṇa iti* in place of *teṣāṃ ca kaścid lokaprasiddhānusaraṇa iti*; Tib. *de dag las kyaṅ kha cig ni 'jig rten gyi grags pa'i rjes su 'braṅ bas na* (D251b.6).

124 Ms.(39b.4): *-āvirodhena*, but Y's emendation to *-āvirodhenety arthaḥ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.128.

experiencing of pleasure and pain and the like which arises from the five sense faculties and (b) mental [perception][125]. Inference refers to the knowledge of the meaning that is to be inferred through the three types of [inferential] mark.[126] Scriptural tradition refers to the words of trustworthy people; moreover, trustworthy people are those who are free from the causes of falsehood. Alternatively, he says: "based upon the three means of valid knowledge" because the probandum that has been established can be proved for others by means of the reason and example established through direct perception, inference and scriptural tradition. **An entity is established[127] through reasoning which consists in the proof of logical possibility**; logical possibility refers to the three types of [inferential] mark because they are the means of substantiating the probandum. The term: "proof of logical possibility" (*upapattisādhana*) is a *tatpuruṣa* compound. The three types of [inferential] mark are mentioned because the substantiation of that [proof] is on account of these. Reasoning
Y129 is the means, through the specific formulation of which, all that pertains to the three types of [inferential] mark is stated. Alternatively, the logical possibility is that which is not possible otherwise. The reasoning that consists in its proof refers to the [train of thought] that connects the component parts of a syllogism - thus is the resolution of the term: "reasoning that consists in the proof of logical possibility" (*upapattisādhanayukti*), Alternatively, it may be resolved as: 'the reasoning that consists in the proof is logically possible' [i.e. as a *karmadhārya* compound]. The term: "logical possibility" is employed in order to distinguish this from the other reasonings of proof[128]. In this way, based upon the three means of valid knowledge, an entity consisting in either of the three natures which is established through the reasoning of the proof of logical possibility is described as well established through reasoning[129]. The well established reality has now been described.

125 Ms.(39b.4): *mānasañ ca*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.128.

126 The "mark" (*liṅga*) is the 'middle term' which determines the character of a syllogism and also makes the inference valid or invalid. The three types are: (a) positive and negative (*anvayavyatireki*), (b) purely positive (*kevalānvayi*) and (c) purely negative (*kevalavyatireki*); cf. Tarka-saṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 2nd Edition, 1974, pp.40 & 281-89.

127 Read: *prasiddhaṃ vastu* in place of *prasiddhabhāva*; cf Bhāṣya N42.11.

128 Read: *anyābhyaḥ sādhanayuktibhyo* in place of *anyasādhanayuktibhyo*; Ms. (39b.7): *anyābhya-*. Tib. *sgrub pa'i rigs pa gźan dag las* (D252a.4).

129 Read: *yat prasiddhaṃ vastu trayāṇāṃ svabhāvānām anyatamat yuktyā prasiddham ucyate* in place of *yaḥ prasiddhabhāvas trayāṇāṃ svabhāvānām anyatamo yuktiprasiddha ucyate*; Tib. *gaṅ grags pa'i dṅos po ṅo bo ñid gsum gyi naṅ nas gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba ste rigs pas grags pa źes bya'o* (D252a.4). Cf. Bhāṣya N42.10 ff.

7. The Reality of the Sphere of Purity.

N42.13 There is the reality of the twofold sphere of purity: (a) the sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement and (b) the sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in the knowable. This [reality] is:

III.12 cd — A twofold sphere of purity; it is proclaimed as being due just to the one.

It is due just to the perfected nature for the other natures do not belong to the sphere of the two pure direct intuitions.

[Sthiramati]

Y129.10 [1] Since the domain of purity should be mentioned immediately following the latter [i.e. the well established reality], he says: **there is the twofold reality of the sphere of purity.** Now, in order to demonstrate this twofold mode, he says: **(a) the sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement and (b) the sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in the knowable.** The purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement is [equivalent to] the relinquishment of obscuration that consists in moral defilement[130]. The term: *kleśāvaraṇaviśuddhijñāna* may be interpreted either as [a dative or locative *tatpuruṣa* compound, i.e.:] the direct intuition: (a) leading to the purification of obscuration consisting in moral defilement, or (b) in regard to the purification of obscuration consisting in moral defilement. What is meant is [the direct intuition]: (a) that has the purification of obscuration consisting in moral defilement for its aim, or (b) that causes that [purification]. The words: "the sphere of that direct intuition for the purification of obscuration consisting in moral defilement" refer to [direct intuition which has the purification of that] for its object.[131] The sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in the knowable should also be described in this way.

[2] Of these, obscuration that consists in moral defilement refers to all moral defilements and secondary defilements that are to be relinquished by the paths[132] of vision and meditative development. Hence the domain of the direct intuition in regard to vision, meditative development and what relates to these two which is the reality of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*[133] is described as the truth of suffering, its origination,

130 Ms.(40a) line 2 begins: -*varaṇaprahāṇam* although Y's reading (p.129.13) would indicate that these two words are fully reconstructed.

131 Read: *viṣayam* in place of *viṣaya*.

132 Ms.(40a.3): *mārga*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.129.

133 Ms.(40a.3): *pratyekabuddhānām*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.129.

Y130 its cessation and the path [to the latter]. This is the sphere of the direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement. The knowable refers to that which is to be known and this, collectively, comprises the five branches of learning. These are stated as the learning in regard to: (a) subjectivity, (b) grammatical analysis, (c) logic, (d) medicine and (e) all arts and crafts. The obscuration that consists in the knowable refers to undefiled nescience which is an impediment to direct intuition in regard to these. The purification of that is [the knowledge] comprised in the spiritual level that is [equivalent to] the course of firm conviction which conforms with supramundane direct intuition and [the knowledge] comprised in the eleven spiritual levels beginning with the 'Joyous'. Moreover, [this purification] refers to the knowledge that is attained subsequently to that [knowledge in the eleven levels]. This is present within the mental continuum of the *bodhisattvas* and *tathāgatas*, and, since its objective support is thusness because this has the sense of being all-pervading etc., the reality of the sphere of direct intuition for the purification of obscuration that consists in the knowable is [equivalent to] thusness. [Objection]: Since the twofold sphere of purity has already been explained by way of the description of both the reality of the cause and result and the reality of the subtle, is it not so that their enumeration again here is unnecessary? [Response]: It is not unnecessary because the reality of the cause and result and of the subtle were formerly mentioned in order to define them as entities. However, in this context, it concerns the mode in which obscuration is purified, hence, this [reality] is explained.

[3] This twofold sphere of purity is proclaimed as being due to just the one, i.e. it is **due just to the perfected nature.** Here now he provides the reason: **for the other natures do not belong to the sphere of the [two][134] pure direct intuitions[135].** What is the reason? Because unreal imagination [which is equivalent to the other-dependent nature] is stained on account of its possession of the two stains that comprise disquiet, and the imaginary [nature] does not exist. However, since real nature is the domain of the twofold direct intuition, the reality of the domain of purity[136] is determined as being just due to the perfected [nature]. The reality of the sphere of purity has now been described.

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134 *dvaya* is omitted from the Ms.(cf. 40a.7) but is found in the Tib. Ṭīkā (D252b.7) and in the Bhāṣya (N42.17).

135 Bhāṣya is slightly different: *na hy anyasvabhāvo viśuddhijñānadvayagocaro bhavati* (N42.16 ff.).

136 Ms.(40b.1): *-ddhiviṣayatattvaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.130.

8. The Inclusion Reality.

N42.19 **How should the inclusion reality be understood in relation to the threefold basic reality?**

III.13 ab	**There is the inclusion of: (a) the causal-sign, (b) conceptual differentiation and (c) the name, within the two;**

N43 **From the point of view of the five categories, according to which is appropriate, there is the inclusion of the causal-sign and conceptual differentiation by way of the other-dependent [nature] and [the inclusion] of name by way of the imaginary [nature].**

III.13 cd	**There is the inclusion of correct direct intuition and true reality by way of the one.**

There is the inclusion of thusness and correct direct intuition by way of the perfected nature.

[Sthiramati]

Y131 [1] However, since the inclusion reality is to be mentioned immediately following the latter [i.e. the reality of the sphere of purity], he asks: **how should the inclusion reality be understood in relation to the threefold**[137] **basic reality?** In order to demonstrate that the inclusion reality is included within the threefold basic reality, he says:

III.13 ab	**There is the inclusion of: (a) the causal-sign, (b) conceptual differentiation and (c) the name, within the two;**

These are included within the two: (a) the other-dependent and (b) the imaginary [natures]. Therein, the inclusion reality comprises five categories, hence he says: **from the point of view of the five categories, according to which is appropriate...**[138] Five categories should be understood as being included within basic reality, according to which is appropriate, but not according to sequential order. Now, the five categories are: (a) the causal-sign, (b) the name, (c) conceptual differentiation, (d) thus-

137 Ms.(40b.1): *trividhe*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.131.

138 In the Ms.(40b.2) this passage reads as follows: *tatra saṃgrahatattvaṃ pañcavastūnīty ata āha yathāyogaṃ pañcavastūny ārabhyeti*, however the Tib. has simply: *de la bsdu ba'i de kho na ci rigs su sbyar ro źes bya ba ni* (D253a.3).

ness and (e) correct direct intuition. These five categories are described as the inclusion reality because all that is knowable is included within these five categories. In this respect, some believe that the causal-sign refers to the store-consciousness, defiled mind and the actual consciousnesses. It is [described as] the "causal-sign" because it exists as a reciprocal cause. The "name" is an expression or indication of just that causal-sign although it is inexpressible, like [a gesture such as] the winking of the eye. "Conceptual differentiation" refers to mind and the mental concomitants associated with all the three realms [of existence] which consist in conceptual differentiation, as both own-being and particular, of the causal-sign as has just been described. "Thusness" refers to emptiness. "Correct direct intuition" consists in the supramundane and has thusness for its objective support. Now, as to their sequential order: the causal-sign comes first therein because it is the foundation for the designation as the defilement; then comes the name because it is designated as the defilement; then comes conceptual differentiation because as soon as it has a name, then conceptual differentiation [occurs] in regard to that entity designated as a defilement; then comes
Y132 thusness and correct direct intuition because that defilement is checked on account of thusness and correct direct intuition. Others believe that the meaning of these five categories [is evident] in this verse:

> Error is the cause of error; the cause of that is disquiet. Therefore, the cause of the latter is error[139]. But knowledge in this regard[140] is intrinsically tranquil.

Therein, the cause of error[141], which is incorporated in the internal consciousnesses of sight etc., is external and internal error which are incorporated in form and the like and sight and the like. Furthermore, the cause of this external and internal error[142] is disquiet and this is a latent impression of the store-consciousness. The cause of this latent impression[143] is none other than the external and internal error. As a consequence, verbal expression in regard to it manifests and it is due to verbal expression that the latent impression is lodged in the store-consciousness. The term "intrinsically tranquil" refers to thusness because the *dharmadhātu* is intrinsically undefiled[144]. The

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139 Read: *bhrānti* in place of *bhānti*.

140 Ms.(40b.6): *tatra*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.132.

141 Ms.(40b.7): *bhrānter nimittaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.132.

142 Read: *tasyā punas tu bāhyādhyātmikāyā* in place of *tasyā bāhyādhyātmikāyā*; Ms.(40b.7) substantiates this reading although it is partially illegible. Disregard Y's fn.4 p.132.

143 Ms.(41a.1): *tasyā a-*, but Y's emendation to *tasyā vā(sanāy...)* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.5 p.132.

144 Read: *prakṛtyasaṃkliṣṭatvād* on the basis of the Tib. in place of *prakṛtyākliṣṭatvād* which is also not supported by the Ms.(41a.1); the Tib. is slightly different: "The term "intrinsically tranquil" refers to thusness, i.e. to the *dharmadhātu*, because it is intrinsically undefiled", *raṅ bźin gyis źi ba źes bya ba ni de bźin ñid de / raṅ bźin gyis kun nas ñon moṅs pa med pa'i phyir chos kyi dbyiṅs* (D253b.4).

words "...but knowledge in this regard", refer to that direct intuition included in the path which has thusness for its objective support.

[2] **Of these, there is the inclusion of the causal-sign and conceptual differentiation by way of the other-dependent [nature]**[145], because they are produced through causes and conditions, **and [the inclusion] of the name by way of the imaginary [nature].** The name is included by way of the imaginary [nature] because no object exists in keeping with its name; thus, by connection, there is inclusion of name by way of the imaginary [nature] but its inclusion is not by way of own-being. And if it is said that the imaginary nature in not included in the five categories beginning with the causal-sign because it is established as being devoid of own-being, such a statement is not contradicted because in that context there is the desire to state inclusion in terms of own-being.[146]

[3]

Y133 III.13 cd **[There is the inclusion] of correct direct intuition and true reality etc.**

Reality that is eternal or pure is true reality[147], i.e. thusness. Correct direct intuition refers to: (a) the direct intuition that has emptiness for its objective support and is free from the duality and (b) the purified mundane [knowledge] that is attained subsequently to the latter. **I.e. there is the inclusion of thusness and correct direct intuition by way of** just the one, i.e. **the perfected nature** because it is perfected on account of its perfection that is respectively without change and is free from erroneous inversion. The inclusion reality has now been described.

9. The Reality of Differentiation.

N43.5 **How should the reality of differentiation be understood in relation to basic reality? The reality of differentiation is sevenfold: (a) the reality of continuance, (b) the reality of characteristic, (c) the reality of representation, (d) the reality of arrangement, (e) the reality of wrong spiri-**

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145 Read: *nimittavikalpayoḥ paratantreṇa saṃgrahaḥ* in place of *nimittavikalpadvayasya paratantreṇa saṃgṛhītaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N42.21.

146 This passage evidently aims to reconcile the differing views held by the various Yogācāra schools concerning the relationship of the five *vastu* with the three *svabhāva*. For example, the Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (D22b.2) asserts that none of the five *vastu* are included in the *parikalpita svabhāva*, i.e. the first four are included in the *paratantra* and only *tathatā* is *pariniṣpanna*. Cf. J.D.Willis: A Study of the Chapter on Reality... (pp.75-83) for a discussion on this matter. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Nanjio p.227.11) on the other hand apportions both *nāma* and *nimitta* to the *parikalpita*, *vikalpa* to the *paratantra* and *saṃyagjñāna* and *tathatā* to the *pariniṣpanna*. Cf. also Siddhi (p.537 ff.) where the five *vastu* and three *svabhāva* are discussed in the context of the *nimittabhāga* / *darśanabhāga* dichotomy.

147 Tib. omits *satattvaṃ*; cf. D253b.7.

tual practice, (f) the reality of purification and (g) the reality of correct spiritual practice. [148] And these seven have been explained in the Sandhinirmocana Sūtra as [the sevenfold] thusness[149]. Of these:

III.14 a The reality of continuance is twofold;

Basic reality should be understood as being characterized by the imaginary and other-dependent [natures]. Inasmuch as it is the reality of continuance, similarly it is:

III.14 b Arrangement and wrong course;

The realities of arrangement and wrong spiritual practice should be understood[150] similarly as comprising two [of the three] kinds of basic reality.

III.14 cd The one consists in: (a) the characteristic, (b) the representation, (c) purification and (d) correct spiritual practice.

The four realities beginning with that of the characteristic consist in the one basic reality which is characterized by the perfected.

[Sthiramati]

Y133.8 [1] Now[151], the variety [of the realities] that are found in relation to the reality of differentiation and the way they are incorporated within basic reality is not known, hence he asks: **how should the reality of differentiation be understood in relation to basic reality?** Hence he replies: **the reality of differentiation is sevenfold.** As to which these are, he says: **(a) the reality of continuance, (b) the reality of characteristic etc.** The seven types of thusness described in the Sandhinirmocana Sūtra, beginning with the thusness of continuance and concluding with the thusness of correct spiritual practice are [equivalent to] these described here as the sevenfold reality of differentiation, beginning with the reality of continuance and concluding with the reality of correct spiritual practice. Therein, the reality of continuance refers to the beginningless and endless nature of *saṃsāra*; and this is also

148 The Sanskrit text of the Bhāṣya includes a passage of text here which is partly incoherent and does not appear relevant to the context. It is not found in the Tibetan or Chinese versions, nor is it acknowledged in the Ṭīkā, hence it has been omitted from the translation. It reads as follows: *tatra pravṛttitattvāditrividham / anavarāgreṣv eti saṃsāraḥ tathatācittasaṃkleśāt sattvāḥ saṃkliśyanta iti sarvaṃ duḥkhādisatyaṃ ca yathāsaṃkhyaṃ.* Cf. N's fn.4 p.43.

149 Cf. SN L99 & 219: #20.2. Cf. also MSA XIX.44 (comm.) which follows the SN description quite closely and also describes them as seven types of *tathatā*.

150 Tib. inserts *veditavyam* (*rig par bya*) which is not found in the Sanskrit; (cf. D13a.4).

151 Ms.(41a.4): *idān-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.133.

[equivalent to] the thusness of continuance because by no means does [*saṃsāra*] have a beginning. The reality of characteristic is [equivalent to] the insubstantiality of the personal entity and the ***dharmas***; and since it is not something other this is also [equivalent to] the thusness of characteristic[152]. **(c) The reality of representation** is [equivalent to] the state of mere-representation of the *dharmas*. Others believe that the reality of representation refers to the direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation because this is the basis of representation[153]. And since the reality of repre-
Y134 sentation is not something other, it is also described as the thusness of representation. **(d) The reality of arrangement** is [equivalent to] the truth of suffering because the formative forces are arranged [i.e. established] in suffering; and this is [equivalent to] thusness considering that it is eternally just thus. **(e) The reality of wrong spiritual practice** is [equivalent to] the truth of origination and this refers to the continuance that is on account of the perception of virtue in regard to those formative forces. **(f) The reality of purification** is [equivalent to] the purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement[154] and this refers to thusness and the truth of cessation. Others believe that the nature of the turning about of the basis, i.e. the nature of cessation[155], is [equivalent to] the truth of cessation. **(g) The reality of correct spiritual practice** is [equivalent to] the truth of the path. Others believe that the reality of representation[156] is a fundamental application and that the reality of correct spiritual practice and the reality of representation are [equivalent to] just the truth of the path. Moreover, since these three realities are eternally just thus, they are described as thusness.

[2] **Of these;**

III.14 a **The reality of continuance is twofold;**

Basic reality[157] should be understood as being characterized by the imaginary and the other-dependent [natures]. Continuance therein refers to the continuity of creatures who have no beginning, and since this [continuity] does not exist, it consists in the imaginary nature. However, these [creatures] consist in the other-dependent nature because their continuity is constituted by causes. In this way, both the continuance and those for whom there is continuance are explained as the

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152 Read: *ananyathātvāt ca tad eva lakṣaṇatathatā* in place of *ananyathātvāc ca dvividhalakṣaṇatathatā* which is not substantiated by the Ms.(41a.7) nor by the Tib. which reads: *gźan du mi 'gyur pa'i phyir de ñid mtshan ñid kyi de bźin ñid* (D254a.4).

153 The Tib. is slightly different: "...the reality of representation refers to direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation or the basis of representation"; *rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes sam / rnam par rig pa'i gnas 'di ni rnam par rig pa'i de kho na* (D254a.5).

154 Ms.(41b.1): *kleśajñeyāva(raṇa)* but *jñeya* is not found in the Tib. (cf. D254a.7).

155 *nirodhātmatā* is not found in D (cf. D254a.7).

156 *vijñaptitattvaṃ* is not found in the Ms.(41b.2) and has been inserted on the basis of the Tib. (cf. D254b.1).

157 Read: mūlatattvam in place of *mūlatattve*; cf. Bhāṣya N43.13.

reality of continuance. Alternatively, the beginningless production of moral defilement, *karma* and rebirth is described as the continuance of *saṃsāra* and this is characterized by notional attachment to the imaginary nature, hence, the reality of the twofold continuance is described as basic reality.

[3] Similarly it is:

III.14 b **Arrangement and wrong course**[158]**;**

Wrong course is [equivalent to] wrong spiritual practice; these [should be understood] similarly as comprising two [of the three] kinds of basic reality.
Y135 Since suffering and its origination are constituted by causes and conditions and because they have the imaginary [nature] for their object, the realities of arrangement and wrong spiritual practice are incorporated in these two [of the threefold basic realities].

[4]

III.14 cd **The one consists in: (a) the characteristic, (b) the representation, (c) purification and (d) correct spiritual practice**[159]**.**

[The one consists in] the reality of characteristic, the reality of representation, the reality of purification and the reality of correct spiritual practice. These four realities consist in just the one basic reality, namely, the perfected nature. Therein, the reality of characteristic and the reality of purification are perfected insofar as they consist in the perfection[160] that cannot be otherwise. The reality of representation and the reality of correct spiritual practice are perfected insofar as they consist in the perfection that is free from erroneous inversion.

[4] Herein, the sameness of sentient beings is shown through the three realities of continuance, arrangement and wrong spiritual practice. The sameness of the *dharmas* [is shown] through the two realities of characteristic and representation. The sameness of enlightenment [is shown] through the reality of purification. The sameness of wisdom is demonstrated through the reality of correct spiritual practice. Hence it is said:

> The sameness of sentient beings is proclaimed through the three, but the sameness of the *dharmas* through the two. Thus the sameness of enlightenment and wisdom is demonstrated singly.

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158 Read: *sanniveśakupannatā* in place of *sanniveśaḥ kupannatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N43.15.

159 Read: *ekaṃ lakṣaṇavijñaptiśuddhisamyakprapannatā* in place of *ekaṃ lakṣaṇavijñaptau śuddhiḥ sampratipannatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N43.18.

160 Read perhaps: *-pariniṣpattyā* in place of *-pariniṣpannatvāt*;Tib. *yoṅs su grub pas* (D254b.7). Cf. the following sentence.

10. The Reality of the Skills.

N44.2 The reality of the skills is said to act as the counteragent to false views. What are the tenfold false views concerning the self [which manifest] in regard to the aggregates etc.?

III.15 abcd & 16 ab — The false views concerning the self [which manifest] in regard to these [aggregates etc.] are in relation to: (a) oneness, (b) causality, (c) an experiencer, (d) an agent, (e) independence, (f) sovereignty, (g) permanence, (h) a basis for defilement and purification, (i) a *yogi* and (j) release and non-release.

There are ten kinds of skill that act as the counteragents to these ten kinds of adherence to the belief in a non-existent self which manifests in regard to the aggregates etc. These [adherences] are: (a) The adherence to the belief in its oneness. (b) The adherence to the belief in its causality. (c) The adherence to the belief in its nature as an experiencer. (d) The adherence to the belief in its nature as an agent. (e) The adherence to the belief in its independence. (f) The adherence to the belief in its sovereignty. (g) The adherence to the belief in its permanence. (h) The adherence to the belief in its defilement or purification. (i) The adherence to the belief in its nature as a *yogi*. (j) The adherence to the belief in its release or non-release.

How can this tenfold reality of skills be included within basic reality? Because the aggregates etc. are included in the three natures. How are they included?

III.16 cd — The former are [included] within the latter by way of: (a) the imaginary, (b) conceptual differentiation and (c) real nature.

Form is threefold: (a) Imaginary form, i.e. the imaginary nature that belongs to form. (b) Conceptually differentiated form, i.e. the other-dependent nature that belongs to form since it is in relation to that [nature] that [an entity] is conceptually differentiated as form. (c) Form as real nature, i.e. the perfected nature that belongs to form. The aggregates, such as sensation, and also the elements and sense-fields

etc. should be construed in the same way as form [has been construed above]. Thus, since the aggregates etc. are included within the three natures the tenfold reality of skills should also be understood in relation to basic reality. Although it has been stated that the skill in the aggregates etc. acts as the counteragent to the ten kinds of false view in regard to the self, the meaning of the aggregates etc. has not been stated. This will now be discussed.

[Sthiramati]

Y135.19 [1] The reality of the skills was listed immediately after the reality of differentiation[161], so in order to clearly illustrate this he says: **the reality of the skills is said to act**
Y136 **as the counteragent to false views**[162]. Moreover, since it is not known as to how the tenfold false views concerning the self [manifest] in regard to the aggregates etc., he asks: **which are the tenfold false views concerning the self [that manifest] in regard to these**[163] **[aggregates etc.]?** Hence he says:

III.15 abcd & 16 ab — **The false views concerning the self [which manifest] in regard to these [aggregates etc.] are in relation to: (a) oneness, (b) causality, (c) an experiencer, (d) an agent, (e) independence, (f) sovereignty, (g) permanence, (h) a basis for defilement and purification, (i) a *yogi* and (j) release and non-release.**[164]

It is the fact that [these false views arise] in regard to the aggregates etc. that is referred to. **However, these ten kinds of adherence to the belief in a non-existent self**[165]**...**; this says that there is the adherence to the belief in what is non-existent

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161 Ms.(42a.1): *prabhedatattva-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.135.

162 Read: *kauśalyatattvaṃ darśanapratipakṣeṇety uktam* in place of *kauśalyatattvam ātmadṛṣṭipratipakṣatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.2. Y has erroneously taken this passage as a verse which he names III.15ab (cf. his fn.5 p.135). The Tib. also has it in verse form as a duplication of III.2cd, however, in the Sanskrit it is evident that it is intended as a paraphrased version of that verse. Cf. N's fn.1 p.44.

163 Read: *katham eṣu* as per Ms.(42a.2) in place of *katham etad*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.1.

164 Read: *ekahetutvabhoktṛtvakartṛtvavaśavartane /*
ādhipatyārthanityatve kleśaśuddhyāśraye 'pi ca //
yogitvāmuktamuktatve ātmadarśanam eṣu hi /
in place of: *ekahetutvabhoktṛtve kartṛtvavaśavartane //*
adhipatyarthanityatve kleśaviśuddhiniśraye /
yogyamuktamuktatve eteṣu hy ātmadarśanam //
Ms.(42a.2): *ekahetutvabhoktṛtvakartṛtvavaśavartane /*
ā-
Cf. Bhāṣya N44.4-6.

165 Read: *eṣa tu daśavidha ātmāsadgrāha* in place of *eṣa tu daśavidhātmāsaṃgrāha*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.7.

because the self does not exist.[166] [Objection]: If the self does not exist how do these adherences which are dependent upon the other, i.e. the apprehended object, manifest, when they are devoid of an object? [Response]: But they are not devoid of an object; **they manifest in regard to the aggregates** etc. Therefore, it is said that **there are ten kinds of skill** in regard to the aggregates etc. **which act as the counteragents to these**[167]. How does this adherence [manifest] in regard to just the aggregates etc. although the self cannot be positively determined to exist? Because, when it is closely examined through reasoning, the self that is separate from the aggregates etc. cannot be discerned; indeed all the deeds and essential nature that belong to the self, which those who believe in the self maintain, manifest only in regard to the aggregates etc. Hence it is evident that it is just the aggregates etc. which form the substratum for the adherence to the belief in the self. Since this adherence to the self, on the part of those who are notionally attached to the self[168], manifests in these ten forms and not in others, the skills in regard to the aggregates etc. should be understood as the counteragent to all adherence to the belief in the self. **These [adherences] are**[169]: (a) **The adherence to the belief in its oneness**; this is due to the adherence to the belief in the self as a whole entity among the five aggregates that have been appropriated. The skill in the aggregates acts as the counteragent to this. (b) **The adherence to**
Y137 **the belief in its causality**; the adherence to the belief in causality in regard to the self is because sight and the like promote [such an adherence]. The skill in regard to the elements (*dhātu*)[170] acts as the counteragent to this. The adverse [adherence] and its counteragent should be stated similarly in regard to the other [sense faculties]. Alternatively, the adherence to the belief in its causality[171] [is also explained as] the notion that everything proceeds from the self; i.e. the adherence to the belief in its causality refers to the volition that consists in the notion that the self is the cause of virtuous and non-virtuous action for which there is an agreeable or disagreeable result in this birth[172]. (c) **The adherence to the belief in its nature as an experiencer**; [the notion that] the self is the agent of experience because it consists in volition, but the 'manifest' and 'unmanifest' [of the Sāṃkhya][173] is an object of experience because it does not consist in volition. Alternatively, the adherence to the belief in its nature as an experiencer refers to the notion that an internal agent of virtuous and non-

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166 Read: *ātmano 'bhāvād asadgrāha ity āha* as per Ms.(42a.3) in place of *ātmano 'sattvād asaṃ grāha ity āha*.

167 Read: *yasya pratipakṣeṇa* in place of *teṣām pratipakṣatvena*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.7.

168 Read: *ātmābhiniveśinām* as per Ms.(42a.5) in place of *ātmābhiniveśānām*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.136.

169 Read: *yad uta* in place of *tathā hi*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.8.

170 Ms.(42a.6): *dhātukau-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.137.

171 Ms.(42a.7): *-tutvagrāha*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.137.

172 Read: *yasya ceṣṭam* in place of *yasyeṣṭam*; Ms.(42a.7): *yasya ceṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ ceha janmani phalaṃ tasya śubhāśubhasya karmaṇa ātma hetu........tvagrāhaḥ*. Disregard Y's fns.3, 4 & 5, p.137.

173 Cf. Y's fn.6 p.137.

virtuous actions is the experiencer of the result of those [actions]. (d) **The adherence to the belief in its nature as an agent**; the belief that the self is the agent[174] of properly performed and wrongly performed actions. Alternatively, the adherence to the belief in its agency refers to the notion that the self possesses instrumentality etc.[175] (e) **The adherence to the belief in its independence**[176]; [the notion that] the self exerts influence of its own accord; i.e. the notion that it is the self that holds sway. Alternatively, the adherence to the belief in its independence refers to the notion that it exerts an influence in the production of the result which is in conformity[177] with the cause. (f) **The adherence to the belief in its sovereignty**; the notion that the self is the ruler, the master, or the *īśvara*. Alternatively, the adherence to the belief in its sovereignty refers to the notion that the self rules over activity that conforms with the result[178]. (g) **The adherence to the belief in its permanence**[179]; the notion that, although it is impure in terms of the five entities beginning with cause, the self is definitely permanent, otherwise there would be the imputation of
Y138 action not performed and the loss of action that has been performed[180] [i.e. if there is no *ātman*, an action performed by A would be imputed to B and the result of an action performed by A would not be obtained by A] and similarly there would be an absence of memory and recognition. (h) **The adherence to the belief in its defilement and purification**; because [one would believe that] it is the basis of defilement and purification. (i) **The adherence to the belief in its nature as a *yogi***; *yoga* is the fixation of the mind upon the self or the suppression of the breath and the mind. *Yoga* is the special union of self with mind - a *yogī* means one who has it [i.e. *yoga*]. And (j) **the adherence to the belief in its release and non-release**; i.e. the conceptual differentiation that the self is liberated from a previous [state of] bondage[181].

174 Read: *karteti* in place of *kartreti*; Ms.(42b.1) is not clear but does not support *kartṛtva* as per Bhāṣya, cf. N44.9. Tib. *byed par* (D255b.5).

175 *ādi* is omitted from the Tib. (cf. D255b.5).

176 Read: *svatantragrāha* in place of *svatantratvagrāha*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.9.

177 Tib. omits *anurūpa*; cf. D255b.6.

178 Ms.(42b.2): *phalasyaiva vā ā-*, but Y's emendation to *phalānurūpasyaiva vā* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.10 p.137.

179 Read: *nityatvagrāha* in place of *śāśvatatvagrāha*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.10.

180 Read: *anyathā hy akṛtābhyāgamaḥ kṛtavipranāśaś ca* in place of *anyathā tv akṛtam abhyāgamaḥ kṛtasya nāśaś ca*; Tib. *gźan du na ma byas pa daṅ phrad pa daṅ / byas pa chud zos pa daṅ* (D255b.7). Ms.(42b.3): *anyathā hy akṛtābhyāgamaḥ kṛ-*. On *akṛtābhyāgama* and *kṛtavipranāśa*, see Jacques May: Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madyamakavṛtti, p.286, fn.1044 and also Walpola Rahula: Compendium..., p.52.

181 Ms.(42b.4): *ātmano bandha-*, but Y's emendation to *ātmanaḥ pūrvabandhād* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.138.

[2] **How is this tenfold [reality of]**[182] **the skills included within basic reality?**[183] Because skill refers to proficiency[184] in regard to the aggregates etc. How can this be included within the three natures? This question is posed by one who thinks this to be impossible[185]. **Because the aggregates etc. are included in the three natures.** The fact that [the aggregates] relate to the domain of the skills is shown by the word "skill", but they do not relate to skill alone; hence the reality of the skills should be understood as being included therein by way of connection, but not by way of own-being. Just as the truth of the path, which consists in the reality of the cause and result, is said to be included within the three [natures]. Although this may be so, it is not known just how they are included, hence it is asked: **how are they included?**[186] Hence he says:

III.16 cd — **The former are [included] within the latter by way of: (a) the imaginary, (b) conceptual differentiation and (c) real nature.**[187]

It is the fact that the aggregates etc. are included within these three natures that is referred to. In this context, the inclusion of the aggregates is to be elucidated firstly because they were listed prior to the elements etc. and since they pertain to form, he says: **form is threefold.** How so? As: (a) imaginary form, (b) conceptually differ-
Y139 entiated form and (c) form as real nature. What is **(a) imaginary form**[188] therein? It **is the imaginary nature belonging to form;** i.e. that which, with the exception of its perception by way of name, is imagined in this regard as the own-being of the sense-object. Because this is absolutely non-existent it is described as imaginary. (b) **Conceptually differentiated form, i.e. the other-dependent nature belonging to form;** what is meant is: it is dependent upon causes and conditions. But why is this described as conceptually differentiated form? Hence he says: **since it is in relation to that [nature] that [an entity] is conceptually differentiated as form.** Due to a failure in clear comprehension[189] on account of their lack of insight into reality, people are notionally attached to form because of the fact that they perceive consciousness - in the appearance of form[190] - just as form [i.e. as matter,

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182 Ṭīkā omits *tattva* which is found in Bhāṣya; cf. N44.12.

183 Read: *katham idaṃ daśavidhaṃ kauśalya(tattva)ṃ* in place of *etad daśavidhaṃ kauśalyaṃ kathaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.12.

184 Ms.(42b.5): *vaicakṣanyaṃ* contrary to Y's fn.4 p.138, however, D: *mkhas pa yin na* (256a.3) which would support a reading of *vaicakṣanye*.

185 Ms.(42b.5): *-āvayataḥ* contrary to Y's fn.5 p.138.

186 Read: *katham antarbhūtā* in place of *katham antarbhavanti*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.14.

187 Read: *parikalpavikalpārthadharmatārthena teṣu te* in place of *vikalpakalpitārthena dharmatārthena tatra te*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.15.

188 Read: *parikalpitaṃ rūpam* in place of *parikalpitarūpam*; cf. N44.16.

189 Ms.(43a.2): *aparijñāta*, but Y's emendation to *aparijñāya* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.139.

190 Read: *rūpapratibhāsavijñāne* in place of *rūpakhyātavijñāne*; Tib. *gzugs su snaṅ ba'i rnam par śes pa la* (D256b.2).

pure and simple], as for instance, one grasps at a self among the aggregates. Therefore, it is said that form is conceptually differentiated in relation to the other-dependent [nature]. **(c) Form as real nature. i.e. the perfected nature that belongs to form.** This refers to emptiness whose nature is devoid of both imaginary form and conceptually differentiated form. **The aggregates, such as sensation, and also the elements and sense-fields etc.**[191] **should be construed in the same way as form [has been construed above]**, i.e. in the same way that form is included in the three natures after having differentiated it as threefold. [By "etc." is meant]: the aggregates that consist in sensation, perception, the formative forces and consciousness, as well as the elements, the sense-fields, the limbs of dependent origination, the worthy and unworthy objects, the sense faculties, the three times[192], the four truths, the three vehicles and both the conditioned and the unconditioned. Moreover, [all] that pertains to sensation etc. and the elements etc., individually, are to be included in the three natures after distinguishing them as threefold according to the differences in their essential natures as imaginary[193], conceptually differentiated and real nature.

[3] Therein, in the same way that [an entity] in the appearances of form is imagined as the apprehended object, [so too] that absolutely non-existent existence of apprehending subject and apprehended object, which is imagined in relation to the appearances of sensation etc., is [described as] imaginary sensation, up to and concluding with imagi-
Y140 nary consciousness. Conceptually differentiated sensation, up to and concluding with conceptually differentiated consciousness, refers to that [sensation] in regard to which the conceptual differentiation as apprehending subject and apprehended object is performed. Sensation as real nature refers to the perfected nature pertinent to sensation; it is to be understood in the same way [for the other aspects] up to and concluding with consciousness as real nature. In detail, it should be stated in the same way, according to the circumstances, in regard to the elements and sense-fields etc.

[4] An entity that is to be nominally designated as form or sensation, and so on up to and concluding with the conditioned and unconditioned, should also be understood as consisting in the imaginary, the other-dependent and the perfected[194] natures. How so? The imaginary consists therein because [an entity] is designated as of the essential nature of form etc. The other-dependent [consists therein] since it is this which is the support for the designation because it depends upon other causal conditions. That which is absolutely devoid of an entity of form etc. is the perfected.

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191 Read: *skandhā dhātvāyatanādayaś ca* as per Ms.(43a.3) in place of *skandhadhātvāyatanādayaś ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N44.19. Tib. *phuṅ po rnams daṅ / khams daṅ skye mched la sogs pa la yaṅ* (D256b.4).

192 Ms.(43a.4): *arthatrayam*, but Y's emendation to *kālatrayam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.139.

193 Ms.(43a.4): *-svabhāvabhe-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.139.

194 Ms.(43a.7): *-paratantraniṣpanna-*, but Y's emendation to *-paratantrapariniṣpanna-* is preferred.

[5] [Objection]: Since only the other-dependent [nature] is nominally described as an entity of form etc.[195] and the imaginary is not, the conceptual differentiation of the imaginary is meaningless. [Response]: It is not meaningless because the essential nature of form etc. is superimposed on that [i.e. the imaginary nature] since the object does not exist in exactly that way in which[196] the name is used in regard to it; however, naive people are notionally attached to its essential nature. [Objection]: Why is it that one is attached to it but not[197] as an object [existing] in reality? [Response]: Because there is the exclusion from the relation of 'signified' and 'signifier' on the part of the name and the object be they similar or dissimilar; i.e. if the words for trees etc. and their objects were not different by nature then the name's capacity to signify would be excluded, like the object, because it would not be distinct from the essential nature of the object. And the object's capacity to be signified would disappear because it would not be distinct from the essential nature of the name, due to the absence of a specific cause [i.e. which causes the existence of that which is to be signified]. Alternatively, since there would be one 'signifier'[198] belonging to the name and a different 'signified' belonging to the object, there would be an endless series of statements. Moreover, if there were numerous names for the one object and numerous objects for the one name[199], there would be multiple essential natures; however, it is untenable that the one
Y141 [entity] can have multiple natures[200]. Moreover, a 'signifier' of non-existence would not exist, like the object, because the object would be [of the nature of][201] a non-existent; alternatively, if the name were to exist its object would also exist. In regard to dissimilarity, there would be no ascertainment of [the existence of] an object conformable with a word, since in this regard a 'tree' is only a word, it is not an object. However, the object is not a 'tree' nor is it a 'non-tree'. Therefore, the object of the word 'tree' is not the sphere of the knowledge of the 'tree' because the object of that [word] does not have the nature of a tree. In this way[202] there is the exclusion of the word and the object from the relation of 'signified' and 'signifier'. In regard to disparity, there would be no determination of 'signified' and 'signifier' because of the absence of a determining cause.

[6] There is a theory that the name may generate the object or cause it to become manifest. In this regard, [the name] does not generate [the object] because the name is applied to the object only after it has arisen. This would lead to the conclusion that,

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195 Ms.(43b.1): *-pādi-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.140.

196 Read: *yathā yathā hi* as per Ms.(43b.1) in place of *yathā hi*.

197 Read: *na tu* in place of *na tv api*; Tib. *de 'aṅ log par mṅon par źen pa yin gyi yaṅ dag pa'i don du ma yin par ci mṅon źe na* (D257a.5).

198 Ms.(43b.3): *vānyad vācakam*; disregard Y's fns. 6 & 7 p.140.

199 Ms.(43b.3): *nāmnaś*; disregard Y's fn.9 p.140.

200 Read perhaps: *anekarūpatā ayogyā* in place of *bahusvarūpatvam ayogyam*; Tib. *du ma'i ṅo bor mi ruṅ ṅo* (D257b.1). Cf. previous sentence.

201 Tib. omits *rūpa*; cf. D257b.1.

202 Read: *evaṃ ca* in place of *tadvidhaṃ ca*; Ms.(43b.5): *-vaṃ ca*. Tib. *de ltar* (D257b.2).

although [the object] has [already] arisen, it would be generated again and again because the name is applied again and again. Nor does [the name] cause [the object] to become manifest because the name is applied after the object is apprehended and it is not tenable that it would cause the manifestation of what has not been apprehended[203], i.e. another person who does not know an object will not apprehend it with the same name; also, it is not tenable that that same [name] can cause both the manifestation and the non-manifestation of the same object. Lamps etc. which cause things to become manifest do not cause the manifestation of a manifest[204] object in dependence upon knowledge[205]. Also, since no determining cause of manifestation is seen in regard to manifest[206] pots and clothing etc., all objects would be caused to manifest by all names. Moreover, there would be no determination by way of smell etc.[207] because axes and water etc. are considered to be agents that generate smell etc., but not things that cause manifestation. Therefore, it is evident that the notional attachment to the 'signified' and 'signifier', like the notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject[208], is meaningless.

[7] **Thus, since the aggregates etc. are included within the three natures, the tenfold reality of the skills should also be understood in relation to basic reality. Although it has been stated that the skill in the aggregates etc.[209] acts as the counteragent to the tenfold false views in regard to the**
Y142 **self, the meaning of the aggregates etc.,** in regard to which the skill in the aggregates etc. is the counteragent to the adverse views regarding self[210], **has not been stated, hence this will now be discussed.**

a. The Meaning of the Aggregates.

N45.2 **III.17 ab** **At the beginning [they are considered] in the sense of: (a) multiple, (b) collected and (c) disparate;**

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203 Read perhaps: *cāgṛhītasya* as per Ms.(43b.6) in place of Y's emendation to: *ca gṛhītasya*. The Tib. is worded differently: "...because, if the name is applied after the object is apprehended, it is not tenable that it should cause the manifestation of what has [already] been apprehended": ...*'di ltar don rtogs nas miṅ 'dogs na rtogs zin pa la ni gsal bar bya ba mi rigs so* (D257b.4).

204 *vyaṅgam* but the Tib. (D257b.6):*gsal bar bya ba* would suggest a reading of *vyaṅgyam*.

205 Read: *vyupattyapekṣā* as per Ms.(43b.7) in place of *vyutpattyapekṣayā*.

206 *vyaṅgaṃ*, and again the Tib. would suggest a reading of *vyaṅgyaṃ*; cf.fn.294 above.

207 Ms.(43b.7): *gandhāditi rane-*, but Y's emendation to *gandhādito niyam(ābhāvaḥ)* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.5 p.141.

208 Disregard Y's fn.6 p.141 since this passage is found in D; cf. 257b.7.

209 *skandhādikauśalyam*; however both P and D: *phuṅ po la sogs pa'i don* = *skandhādyartham*.

210 This passage is problematical; the first syllable of the line of the Ms.(44a.2) appears to read: *dhā*, but Y's emendation to *(vipa)kṣa* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.142.

Now at the beginning these, i.e. the aggregates, should be understood in a threefold sense: (a) In the sense of 'multiple'; in detail it is said: "any form belonging to the past, present or future..." (b) In the sense of 'collected'; i.e. [the same scriptural reference continues]: "...after collecting all that [form] together..." And (c) in the sense of 'disparate'; because the characteristic of form etc. is respectively determined as separate. For 'aggregate' (*skandha*) has the sense of 'heap' (*rāśi*) and thus is it generally understood in the sense of a 'heap'.

[Sthiramati]

[1]

Y142.4 **III.17 ab** **At the beginning [they are considered] in the sense of: (a) multiple, (b) collected and (c) disparate;**

The term: "at the beginning"[211] refers to the fact that [the aggregates] are stated initially. **Now at the beginning these, i.e. the aggregates** are described and they **should be understood in a threefold sense: (a) In the sense of 'multiple'**[212]; [in detail it is said]: **"any form**[213] **belonging to the past,** present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or exalted, distant or near..."[214]; thus [they should be understood] in the sense of 'multiple' because numerous substantial entities of the past etc.[215] are described by the word 'aggregate'. The aggregates [should be understood]: **(b) in the sense of 'collected'** because of the scriptural statement: **"...after collecting ...together..."**. By "after collecting ...together" is meant: after making into one[216]. **(c) In the sense of 'disparate'**; it is the aggregates that are referred to. The word "and" has a collective sense, i.e. this belongs with the previous two statements: i.e. in the sense of 'multiple' and in the sense of 'collected'. Here now he gives the reason: **because the characteristic of form etc.**[217], belonging to the aggregates, **is respectively determined as separate,** from the characteristic of sensation etc. The words "separate" and "disparate" are synonyms. What is the reason that in this context the meaning of the aggregates is respectively determined in terms of these three aspects? **For 'aggregate' (*skandha*)**

211 *ādita* is not found in the Ms.(44a.2) but has been inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.1 p.142.
212 Read: *anekārthena* in place of *anekārtho*; cf. Bhāṣya N45.3.
213 Read: *yat kiṃcid rūpam* in place of *yat kiṃ ca rūpam*; cf. Bhāṣya N45.4.
214 This passage which is also cited in the Kośa (P13.5 ff.) is from Saṃyutta-nikāya; cf. LVP Kośa I p.35, fn.2.
215 Read: *atītānādīnām* as per Ms.(44a.3) in place of *atītānāgatādīnām*; Tib. *'das pa la sogs pa* (D258a.3).
216 Read: *ekīkṛtya* as per Ms.(44a.4) in place of *ekīkṛtyam*
217 Read: *rūpādilakṣaṇasya* in place of *rūpalakṣaṇena*; cf. Bhāṣya N45.6.

has the sense of 'heap' (*rāśi*)[218], hence, and thus is it generally under-stood, i.e. established. Thus, what is generally understood as 'multiple', 'collected' and 'disparate' is described as a 'heap'. The aggregates of sensation etc. are to be
Y143 understood in the same way as the aggregates of form. Therein, an act of skill in regard to the meaning of the aggregates is described as the counteragent to the adherence to the belief in a unique self, namely, such as that all this that has been and will be in the future is none other than the *puruṣa* [of the Sāṃkya]. How so? Because form etc., differentiated as belonging to the past etc. and collected together as a unity, is designated as the aggregate of form etc. Moreover, the aggregates are respectively determined as threefold as counteragents to three kinds of confusion; the three kinds of confusion are: (a) confusion in regard to singularity, (b) confusion in regard to the conventional and (c) confusion concerning the mixture of characteristics.

b. The Meaning of the Elements.

N45.9 **III.17 cd** **The next is considered in the sense of the 'seed' of: (a) the apprehending subject, (b) the apprehended object and (c) the perception of the latter.**

What is next? The elements. In the above, (a) the sense of the 'seed' of the apprehending subject refers to the elements of sight etc.; (b) the sense of the 'seed' of the apprehended object refers to the elements of form etc.; and (c) the sense of the 'seed' of the perception of the latter refers to the elements of sight-consciousness etc.

[Sthiramati]

Y143.8 [1] The elements were listed immediately after the aggregates, therefore, he gives the meaning of the elements immediately following the meaning of the aggregates.

III.17 cd **The next is considered in the sense of the 'seed' of: (a) the apprehending subject, (b) the apprehended object and (c) the perception of the latter.**

The word "next" in this context[219] refers to the elements since they were listed immediately after the aggregates; this is why the author of the commentary also says: **what is next? The elements.** 'Element' (*dhātu*) has the sense of 'seed' (*bīja*); accordingly,

218 Ms.(44a.5): *rāśyartho*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.142.
219 Ms.(44b.1): *'tra*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.43.

when there is gold[220] it is said to be the element gold - the 'seed' of gold is thus understood. Moreover, this is distinguished as threefold because of the difference in result: (a) the element that consists in the apprehending subject, (b) the element that consists in the apprehended object and (c) the element that consists in the perception of the latter. **In the above, (a) the sense of the 'seed' of the apprehending subject refers to the element of sight etc.**[221]; the element of sight is the first of the elements which begin with sight and conclude with mind. They are [described as] apprehending subjects because they form the basis for the perception of sense-objects
Y144 of form etc. They are described as elements because they are the cause of [the elements of] sight etc. of the same genus. **(b) The sense of the 'seed' of the apprehended object refers to the elements of form etc.**, concluding with the nonsensuous element. Because they are the objects of sight-consciousness etc.[222] they are [described as] apprehended objects. These too are described as elements because they are thus causes [in the production] of the form etc. of a similar nature. **(c) The sense of the 'seed' of the perception of the latter refers to the elements of sight-consciousness etc.**; the perceptions in regard to form etc. are those which begin with sight-consciousness and conclude with mind-consciousness because they have the knowledge of form etc. for their own-being. These too are described as elements because they are causes [in the production] of the sight-consciousness etc. of a similar nature, i.e. beginning with the element of sight-consciousness and concluding with the element of mind-consciousness.

[2] However, others say[223] that the store-consciousness, imbued with [the latent impressions of][224] the *karma* of notional attachment to sight etc., is the 'seed' of those respective [elements] of sight etc. Similarly, the store-consciousness, imbued with[225] [the latent impressions of][226] the *karma* inherent to the notional attachment to form etc., is the 'seed' of those respective [elements] of form etc. Likewise, just the store-consciousness, imbued with [the latent impressions of] the *karma* inherent to the notional attachment to sight-consciousness etc., is the 'seed' of those respective [elements] of sight-consciousness etc. [Objection]: If this is so, the following should be reflected upon: it would be just the store-consciousness that is signified by the word "element" and not [the faculty of] sight etc. [Response]: The elements have been respectively determined in this threefold sense as 'seed' in order to remove confusion concerning: (a) the agent, (b) the deed and (c) the *karma*. In this respect, the former

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220 D: *dper na gser yod pa'i rdo rje la...*, but *rdo rje la* should be omitted as per P; cf. P102a.
221 Ms.(44b.2): *-bījārthaś cakṣur-*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.143.
222 Ms.(44b.3): *cakṣurādijñāna-*, but Y's emendation to *cakṣurādivijñāna-* is preferred; cf. his fn.8 p.143.
223 Ms.(44b.5): *anye tv āhuḥ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.144.
224 Tib. (D259a.2) inserts: *vāsanā* (*bag chags*) which is not found in the Ms.
225 Read: *vāsikam* as per Ms.(44b.5) in place of *vāsitam*.
226 Again, *vāsanā* is found only in the Tib. (cf. D259a.2).

[element of] sight etc. is the cause of just the latter [element of] sight etc. and there is nothing else, a self or another cause, in regard to this. Consequently, the removal of the adherence to the belief in causality in regard to the self is due to skill in the elements.

c. The Meaning of the Sense-Fields.

N45.14 **III.18 ab** **The next [is considered] as the medium of origination for the experience of: (a) sensation and (b) the discrimination of an object;**

What is next? The sense-fields. Of these, the six internal sense-fields [are considered] in the sense of the medium of origination for the experience of sensation. The six external [sense-fields are considered] in the sense of the medium of origination for the experience of the discrimination of an object.

[Sthiramati]

Y144.19 [1] The meaning of the sense-fields should be mentioned immediately following the meaning of the elements, hence he says:

III.18 ab **The next [is considered] as the medium of origination for the experience of: (a) sensation and (b) the discrimination of the object;**[227]

Since there are numerous [topics] apart from the elements such as the sense-fields and dependent origination and also because of the general nature of the word "next", he poses the question: **what is next?** This word "next", as a matter of course, stands just for the sense-fields because they were listed immediately following the elements, thus in order to show this, he says: **it refers to the sense-fields. Of these, the**
Y145 **six internal sense-fields [are considered] in the sense of the medium of origination for the experience of sensation**[228]. **The six external sense-fields [are considered] in the sense of the medium of origination for the experience of the discrimination of the object.** The medium of origination (*āyadvāra*) is equivalent in meaning to sense-field (*āyatana*). Origination (*āya*) is

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227 Read: *veditārthaparicchedabhogāyadvārato 'param*
in place of: *vedanārthaparicchede bhogāyadvāratāparam*; Cf. Bhāṣya N45.14.

228 Read: *veditopabhogāyadvārārthena* in place of *vedanopabhogāyadvārārthena*; cf. Bhāṣya N45 15.

[equivalent to] an arrival; they are sense-fields (*āyatanāni*) insofar as they propagate (*tanvanti*) that [which originates] among the experience of sensation and the discrimination of an object. This differentiation as internal and external is according to the difference in the medium of origination for an experience either as sensation or conceptualization. Sensations are either pleasurable, painful or neither pleasurable nor painful. Because the latter are partaken of (*upabhujyate*), they are [described as] enjoyment (*upabhoga*); what is meant is: they are experienced (*anubhūyate*). Only the internal sense-fields[229] are described as the medium of origination[230] for that experience of sensation because, although the sense-objects are the medium of the origination of that [sensation], the support[231] i.e. sight etc., is the basis on account of the fact that: (a) it is helpful or obstructive, (b) it consists in clear comprehension in regard to that [sensation] and (c) it is specific, since the experience of sensation [occurs] by means of it when there is sight etc. and [the experience of sensation] does not [occur] when there is no [sight etc.][232]. The discrimination of an object refers to conceptualization (*saṃjñā*) because it has the nature of the apprehension of the sign of the object. This consists in the experience of sense-objects[233] because it has the nature of the knowledge of objects. The external sense-fields are described as the medium of origination for those [conceptualizations]; but not the internal [sense-fields], for, even if they were the medium of origination for those [conceptualizations], in the absence of a sense object, there is no experiencing of the discrimination of the object[234] even if the internal sense-fields of sight etc. do exist. The sense-fields should be known because they are the medium of origination for both sensations and the discrimination of objects together with their associated elements.

[2] The two apprehendings are very important. Furthermore, apprehending is very important because it consists in the experience of the result of *karma* and also because it consists in the discrimination of objects. Since there is the conceptual differentiation of an agent of experience on account of the experience of sensation and the discrimination of objects, the sense-fields are respectively determined[235] in a twofold sense. Thus, skill in the sense-fields [leads to the understanding that] the agent of experience consists in the internal sense-fields and the object of experience consists in the external sense-fields. And since no other[236] agent of experience exists, the adherence to the belief in the self as the agent of experience is checked.

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229 Ms.(45a.3): *evāyatanāny*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.145.

230 Read: *vedanopabhogasyāyadvāram* as per Ms.(45a.3) in place of *vedanopabhogasyāyad dvāram*.

231 Read: *adhiṣṭhānānām* in place of *āśrayāṇām*; cf. Y145.25-26.

232 Cf. Kośa P34 and LVP Kośa I pp.95-96.

233 Read: *viṣayāṇām upabhogaḥ* in place of *viṣayam upabhuṅkte*; Tib. *yul rnams la ñe bar spyod do* (D259b.4).

234 Ms.(45a.5): *'rthaparibhedo-*, but Y's emendation to *'rthaparicchedo-* is preferred.

235 Read: *āyatanavyavasthānaṃ* in place of *āyatane vyavasthānaṃ*; Ms.(45a.6): *āyatana-*; Tib. *skye mched rnam par gźag pa* (D259b.7).

236 Tib. omits *anyo*; cf. D260a.1

[3] [Objection]: The assertion that was made above is not tenable, i.e. that because the sense-fields of sight etc. are helpful or obstructive it is just the support of that
Y146 [sensation] which is conventionally expressed as the agent of experience - because, on account of the denial of [the existence of] form, the sense-fields of sight etc. would also not exist, like the self. [Response]: This censure is not appropriate because it is only imaginary form that is denied here, not conceptually differentiated form. In the above, the internal sense-field is the store-consciousness which undergoes a special transformation on account of its projection by the *karma* that is imbued with the conceptual elaborations of sight etc. The external sense-field is the appearance as form etc. and belongs to the actual consciousness which has the latter [i.e. the store-consciousness] as its cause. The appearance as a common object and the[237] appearance as sentient beings belong to the store-consciousness and are described as the external sense-field because they are the predominant-causal conditions in the arising of the actual consciousness which appears as the apprehended object and apprehending subject. However, it is not because these [external sense-fields] consist in the sense object.

[4] [Objection]: Is it not so that this [interpretation] conflicts with the words of the Sūtras which state that sight-consciousness and the like are produced in dependence upon the two [i.e. sense faculty and external object]? The appearance as form etc.[238] is different from consciousness and it is not tenable that it alone can be the causal condition for the arising of just itself because of the existence of the arisen and the non-existence of the non-arisen states[239], and because action in regard to itself is contradictory. Therefore, form and the like should necessarily be acknowledged as being different from their appearances in consciousness. [Response]: This censure is not appropriate because consciousness in the appearance of form etc. deposits the (causal) latent impression[240] in the causal consciousness for the arising of a consciousness of a similar nature; and due to a transformation in the latent impression, consciousness in the appearance of form etc. is born again. In this way, consciousness, when it has deposited a latent impression in the nature of an appearance of form etc.[241], is described as the causal condition for consciousness, hence there is no contradiction with the Sūtras. Thus, the meaning of 'support', too, is appropriate for the appearance as form etc. because it is the causal condition for consciousness in (the aspect of)[242] its own appearance. Alternatively, that which is innate to consciousness is established as

237 Ms.(45b.2): *-bhāsaḥ / yaś ca*

238 Ms.(45b.3) substantiates (*rūpādipratibhā*)*so*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.146.

239 Ms.(45b.3): *-āvasthayoḥ samatvād abhāvāt*, but Y's emendation to *-āvasthayor bhāvād abhāvāc ca* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.146.

240 Read: *pratyayavāsanām* as per Ms.(45b.4) although *pratyaya* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D260a.7.

241 Ms.(45b.4): *vijñānanirbhā-*, but Y's emendation to *vijñānaṃ rūpādinirbhā*(*sātmakatvena*) is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.146.

242 *ākāra* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D260b.1.

the objective support-causal condition by those who hold to the [existence of the] external object by way of connection with the fact that the existence or non-existence of consciousness is due to the existence or non-existence of that [causal condition for the objective support] although there is no relation of producer and produced. Similarly,
Y147 here too, although the appearance of form etc. and consciousness do not have[243] the relation of that which is produced and producer, they are respectively determined as the causal condition and the possessor of the causal condition because there is no fallacious reasoning regarding the existence or non-existence of consciousness as being due to the existence or non-existence of that [causal condition for the objective support].

[5] [Objection]: There would be no actual correspondence with an example for both the appearance of form etc. and consciousness because they cannot be differentiated. [Response]: This is not so because they are figurative differences[244]; for example, the consciousness of dreams, magical creations and cities of Gandharvas and the like, although ultimately undifferentiated, is respectively determined in the relation of that which is supported and the supporter just as it is (conventionally)[245] differentiated in the aspects of apprehended object and apprehending subject because it is the basis for the conceptual differentiation of apprehended object and apprehending subject. Likewise, there is no contradiction in the other cases too. Moreover, the relation of that which is supported and the supporter is, in all cases, only expressed figuratively; it does not actually exist. Because, whether consciousness has or has not arisen, it does not take a sense-object as objective support due to the fact that this [object] passes away immediately upon origination since [in the former case] it does not continue to exist at the time of the act of supporting and because [in the latter case] it does not exist. Also, the sense-object is not tenable as the objective support whether it has or has not arisen or has both [arisen and not arisen], because: (a) it does not continue to exist when it has arisen and (b) that which has not arisen does not exist, since the act of supporting devoid of a foundation is not tenable. An objective support for the presently existing consciousness is meaningless since it is through the mere fact of its existence that the relation of cause and result is determined[246] as the relation of that which is supported and the supporter because it is established as having the nature of that [which is supported]. Also, [the objective support] for that [consciousness] which is in the process of arising is meaningless because it does not [yet] exist. [Objection]: [an objective support for that consciousness] in the process of arising is not meaning-

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243 Read: *rūpādinirbhāsasya vijñānasya cāsaty* as per Ms.(45b.6) in place of *rūpādinirbhāsasya vijñānasya asaty*, although the Tib. does not support this rendering: *gzugs la sogs pa snaṅ ba'i rnam par śes pa ...med* (D260b.2). Cf. Y's fn.5 p.146.

244 Read: *(sādṛ)śyaṃ / na bhedopacārāt* as per Ms.(45b.7); disregard Y's fn.1 p.147.

245 *vyavahāra* is inserted on the basis of the Tib. (cf. D260b.4) and is not found in the Ms.

246 *vyavasthāpyate* is inserted on the basis of the Tib. (cf.D260b.7) and is not found in the Ms. Cf. Y's fn.5 p.147.

less because when the sense-object really exists, consciousness acquires the nature of an appearance as the latter. [Response]: If the appearance as the object were caused by an object that is external to consciousness, then the consciousness of things belonging to the past, the future or to dreams would be devoid of aspect (*nirākāra*), or else would not exist because of the non-existence of the object of those [things belonging to the past etc.]. An effect cannot be produced by causal conditions that are deficient[247] since this would transcend the bounds of logic[248] and the assertion that something non-exis-
Y148 tent can possess a causal condition is also not tenable. Moreover, the external object is not the causal condition of the objective support for consciousness since the latter exists even without the former. Therefore, all consciousness of people who have ophthalmia is to be acknowledged as having no dependence on an objective support that consists in the external object.

d. The Meaning of Dependent Origination.

N45.19 **The meaning of dependent origination:**

III.18 cd **[It is considered in the sense of] the absence of both imputation and negation in regard to cause, result and activity.**

Dependent origination [is considered] in the sense of the absence of both the imputation and negation of cause, result and efficacy. In this respect, (a) there is the imputation of causality due to imagining that the formative forces etc. have dissimilar causes. (b) There is the negation of causality due to imagining that [the latter] are devoid of causality. (c) There is the imputation of result due to imagining that the formative forces etc., together with the self, manifest from causal conditions such as ignorance. (d) There is the negation of result due to imagining that the formative forces etc., which have ignorance etc. for their causal conditions, do not exist. (e) There is the imputation of efficacy due to imagining that ignorance etc. is instrumental in the production of the formative forces etc. (f) There is the negation of efficacy due to imagining that [the latter] are devoid of power. The absence of both imputation and negation should be understood as being due to the non-existence of these [conditions].

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247 Ms.(46a.4): *-kalaiḥ*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.147.
248 Ms.(46a.4): *'tiprasaṅgāt*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.147.

[Sthiramati]

Y148.6 [1] Since the meaning of dependent origination should be mentioned immediately after the meaning of the sense-fields, he says: **the meaning of dependent origination:**

III.18 cd **[It is considered in the sense of] the absence of both imputation and negation in regard to cause, result and activity.**[249]

It means: arisen from causal conditions that are inactive, impermanent and have power; as has been stated in a Sūtra: "when this exists, there is that. Due to the arising of this, that is produced - in detail: the formative forces have ignorance for their causal condition." In order to illustrate that in this context dependent origination is considered by way of the refutation of the imputation and negation of cause, result and efficacy, he says: **dependent origination [is considered] in the sense of the absence of both the imputation**[250] **and negation of cause, result and efficacy.** "Efficacy" is stated by the word: "activity".

[2] **In this respect, there is the imputation of causality...**; this is due to imagining that the *puruṣa*, the *īśvara*, the atom[251] or the *pradhāna* etc. possess causality, having rejected ignorance etc. [as the cause]. In order to demonstrate this, he says: **...due to imagining that the formative forces etc.**, concluding with old-age and death, **have dissimilar causes.** "Dissimilar" refers to the notion that something permanent such as the *puruṣa* can be the cause of the formative forces etc. which are impermanent; what is meant is: 'different' [i.e. that a cause can produce something that is of a completely different nature to itself]. Alternatively, a cause is considered to require a modification of its essential nature, like the seed in relation to the sprout etc., but there can be no modification of essential nature on the part of that which is permanent. The imputation of causality is due to imagining causality in regard to a [result that is] dissimilar [to its] cause.

Y149 [3] **There is the negation of causality due to imagining that [the latter] are devoid of causality**[252]**...**; if one agrees that the formative forces etc. are produced without a cause, ignorance etc. is excluded as the cause of the formative forces etc.[253]

249 Ms.(46a.5): *-ānaropānavādataḥ*, but Y's emendation to *-ānaropānapavādataḥ* is correct; cf. his fn.1 p.148 & Bhāṣya N45.20.

250 Read: *asamāropā-* in place of *anāropā-*; cf. Bhāṣya N45.21.

251 Tib. *ātman* (*bdag*) in place of *aṇu*; cf. D261a.7.

252 Read: *nirhetukatvakalpanād* in place of *'haitukakalpanād*; cf. Bhāṣya N46.1.

253 Ms.(46b.2): *saṃskārādihetutvam apoḍham*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.149.

[4] **There is the imputation of result**[254] **due to imagining that the formative forces etc., together with the self, manifest from causal conditions such as ignorance.** Some believe that the formative forces etc. manifest from causal conditions such as ignorance if the self exists, but do not [manifest] if it does not exist. Thus, there is the imputation of result if the self is imputed upon the result such as the formative forces[255]. Others believe that the imputation of result is due to imagining that the formative forces etc., together with the self, manifest from causal conditions such as ignorance, either by being intimately connected with a substantial[256] self or by being an agent that is beneficial or obstructive[257] to the latter.

[5] **There is the negation of result due to imagining that the formative forces etc., which have ignorance for their causal condition, do not exist**[258]; for example[259], there are heretics who negate good conduct, bad conduct and other worlds [i.e. subsequent rebirths] believing that there is no good conduct, there is no bad conduct and there are no other worlds.[260]

[6] **There is the imputation of efficacy due to imagining that ignorance etc. is instrumental in the production of the formative forces etc.** If it is imagined that in the production of the formative forces etc. ignorance etc. can cause the nature of an entity to become something other[261], then there is imputation of efficacy.

[7] **There is the negation of efficacy due to imagining that [the latter] are devoid of power.** There is the negation of efficacy due to imagining that the formative forces are devoid of power although they have the capacity for origination through the mere [imputation of the] existence of ignorance etc.

[8] **The absence of both imputation and negation should be understood as being due to the non-existence of these [conditions].** The absence of imputation and negation should be understood as being due to the absence of that imputation and negation in regard to cause, result and efficacy[262]. Thus, whether [this belief relates] to a self separately[263] from ignorance etc. or to something else, this skill
Y150 in dependent origination should be understood as the counteragent to the adherence to the belief in an agent. For, there is no self nor anything else in this regard, apart from

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254 Ms.(46b.2): *phalasamāropaḥ*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.149.

255 Read: *saṃskārādiphaleṣv ātmasamārope phalasamāropa ity* in place of *saṃskārādiphaleṣv ātmasamāropa ity*; Tib. *'bras bu 'du byed la sogs par bdag sgro 'dogs na 'bras bu la sgro 'dogs pa źes bya'o* (D261b.3-4).

256 Ms.(46b.3): *ātmadravya-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.149.

257 Ms.(46b.3): *-opaghāta-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.149.

258 Read: *phalāpavādo na santy avidyādipratyayāḥ saṃskārādaya iti kalpanāt* in place of *phalāpavādaḥ saṃskārādīnām avidyādipratyayāpravṛttikalpanād*; cf. Bhāṣya N46.2-3.

259 Ms.(46b.4): *-thā*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.149.

260 Read: *nāstikānāṃ nāsti* as per Ms.(46b.4) in place of *nāsti*; Tib. *med pa mams* (D261b.6).

261 The parentheses mentioned by Y in his fn.7 p.149 are not found in the Ms. However, the text, from *nāsti duścaritaṃ* to *saṃskārāṇām* (Y149.12-17), is written in a different hand.

262 Ms.(46b.5): *hetuphalakri-*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.149.

263 Ms.(46b.6): *-vyatireṇa-*, but Y's emendation to *-vyatirekeṇa-* is correct.

ignorance, which is the agent of pure or impure actions. There is no other agent of consciousness apart from the formative forces. And this should be stated in all cases [i.e. each of the twelve *nidāna*], according to the respective circumstances, because the formative forces etc. arise from ignorance etc. which is inactive, impermanent and has power.

e. The Meaning of the Possible and the Impossible.

N46.8 III.19 abcd

The next [is considered] in the sense of an other-dependence in relation to: (a) what is not desired, (b) what is desired, (c) purity, (d) concurrent births, (e) sovereignty, (f) complete attainment and (g) behaviour.

The possible and the impossible should be understood in the sense of a sevenfold dependence upon something other. Of these, (a) there is dependence upon something other in relation to what is not desired due to falling into wretched states of existence, although not desiring it, on account of bad conduct. (b) There is dependence upon something other in relation to what is desired due to the attainment of propitious states of existence on account of good conduct. (c) There is dependence upon something other in relation to purity because of not bringing suffering to an end by not relinquishing the five hindrances and so on up until not having cultivated the seven limbs of enlightenment. (d) There is dependence upon something other in relation to concurrent births of the two existing simultaneously, i.e. of two *tathāgatas* or two *cakravartins*, since they cannot be born into the one world sphere. (e) There is dependence upon something other in relation to sovereignty since women cannot become *cakravartins* etc. (f) There is dependence upon something other in relation to complete attainment since a woman cannot become perfectly enlightened, whether it be individual enlightenment or supreme enlightenment. (g) There is dependence upon something other in relation to behaviour because one endowed with [sound] views does not engage in [violent][264] behaviour, such as

264 Tib. omits *upakrama*; cf. D14b.2.

murder, in contrast to the behaviour of ordinary people. This can be followed up in detail through a perusal of the Bahudhātuka Sūtra[265].

[Sthiramati]

Y150.7 [1] The meaning of the possible and the impossible should be mentioned immediately following the meaning of dependent origination, hence he says:

III.19 abcd **[The next (is considered) in the sense of an other-dependence in regard to]: (a) what is not desired, (b) what is desired, (c) purity etc.**[266]

The possible and the impossible should be understood in the sense of a sevenfold dependence upon something other. In the above "possible" is [equivalent to] 'cause'. "Iimpossible" is [equivalent to] 'absence of cause'. As has been stated in this verse [from Dhammapada, 223]:

> One ought speak the truth and not be angry; one ought give to a beggar even from a little[267]. Through these three proprieties here in this world one ought proceed to the presence of the gods.

It is understood that [proprieties (*sthāna*)] are [equivalent to] causes. Alternatively, propriety (*sthāna*) is [equivalent to] possibility (*sambhava*) and impropriety (*asthāna*) is [equivalent to] impossibility (*asambhava*). The skill in these is [equivalent to] skill in the possible and the impossible. "Dependence upon something other" (*pāratantrya*) is the state (*bhāva*) of being dependent upon something other (*paratantrasya*); what is meant is: resting upon something other (*parāyattatā*). Although this is sevenfold it is included within the three other-dependencies of *karma*, defilement and rebirth.

[2] **Of these, there is dependence upon something other in relation to what is not desired...**; what is not desired refers to the wretched states of existence. In order to demonstrate that the attainment of these [states of existence] rests
Y151 upon bad conduct[268] and is a dependence upon something other, he says: ...**due to falling into wretched states of existence, although not desiring it**[269], **on account of bad conduct,** including actions of body speech and mind, such as the taking of a life, together with their preparation and consequences. The wretched states

265 Majjhima Nikāya, 115; cf. N's fn. 13 p.46.

266 The Tib. includes all four *pādas* of this verse.

267 The Ms.(18a.1) suggests a reading of *dadyād alpāc ca yācitaḥ* in place of *dadyād alpo 'pi yācitaḥ*; Tib. *sloṅ la chuṅ yaṅ sbyin bar bya* (D262a.6). For further discussion on this verse, see F.Bernhard: Udānavarga, XX.16 p.274 and J.Brough: The Gāndhārī Dhammapada, 281 p.262.

268 Tib. omits *duścaritāyattatvaṃ*; cf. D262b.1.

269 Ms.(18a.3): -*ānicchādito*, but Y's emendation to -*ānicchato* is correct; cf. Bhāṣya N46.11.

of existence refers to the hells, the Pretas and animals[270]. Because of the extreme suffering[271] in these [states], there is no desire on the part of anyone to attain rebirth there. Since actions are powerful and are the cause of wretched states of existence, on account of the power of actions alone, one whose conduct is bad attains rebirth in such places although not desiring it.

[3] **There is dependence upon something other in relation to what is desired due to the attainment of propitious states of existence on account of good conduct;** what is desired refers to the attainment of the propitious states of existence. The propitious states of existence are those of the gods and mankind. Good conduct consists in: (a) abstention from the taking of life etc. together with the preparation and consequences of the latter, (b) acts of generosity, respect and honour etc. towards teachers, preceptors and those who possess virtue etc. and (c) the special virtues of love and compassion and the like. There is dependence on something other since rebirth in the propitious states of existence is dependent upon good conduct alone, for even those who seek it do not attain a propitious state of existence in any other way apart from [the practice of] good conduct.

[4] **There is dependence upon something other in relation to purity...;** purity refers to the relinquishment of moral defilement[272]. **...[by not relinquishing] the five hindrances,** i.e.: (a) the desire for sensual pleasure, (b) malice, (c) torpor and drowsiness, (d) excitability and remorse and (e) doubt; they are five after combining torpor and drowsiness as one, and similarly, excitability and remorse. Non-specifically, they are hindrances (*nivaraṇāni*) since they hinder (*nivṛṇvanti*) the wholesome side. Specifically, they are hindrances since they respectively conceal: (a) the joy of setting forth[273] [from the household life], (b) correct spiritual practice for one who is inspired in the right way by fellow *brahmacarins* towards the actions of body and speech that conform to that [correct spiritual practice], (c) the absence of faintheartedness at the time of meditative calm, (d) the absence of distraction at the time of exertion and (e) the state of spontaneity at the time of meditative calm and penetrating insight. **...By not relinquishing;** i.e. by not abandoning[274], those [hindrances] **and so on up until not having cultivated the seven limbs of enlightenment.** He says: "concluding with" because this is an exposition of the final member, that is to say, the foundations of mindfulness[275], the complete relinquishments[276], the bases of psychic

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270 Ms.(18a.3): *pretās tiryañcaś ca*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.151.

271 Ms.(18a.3): *ekānta duḥkhatvān* which Y has amended to *ekāntena*; however, the Tib.: *śin tu sdug bsṅal ba'i phyir* would suggest a reading of *suduḥkhatvān*.

272 Ms.(18a.6-7): *viśuddhiḥ kleśaprahāṇaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.151.

273 Tib. omits *pravrajya*; cf. D262b.6.

274 Ms.(18a.7): *aprahāṇāyātyaktvā*, but Y's emendation to *aprahāyātyaktvā* is correct; cf. Bhāṣya N46.13.

275 Ms.(18b.1): *smṛtyupasthāna-*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.151.

276 Read: *-prahāṇa-* in place of *-prahāna-*.

Y152 power, the faculties and the powers are also included. **...Because of not bringing suffering to an end.** The end of suffering refers to that [state] where suffering is non-existent and this is *nirvāṇa*[277]. That this is not brought about is [equivalent to] its non-attainment; what is meant is: one does not attain *nirvāṇa*. Alternatively, the end of suffering refers to the fact that one does not create the suffering pertinent to rebirth, for one does not create such[278] suffering as that from which other suffering is entailed. The dependence upon something other in regard to purity refers to the fact that it is subject to the relinquishment of the five hindrances.[279]

[5] There is dependence upon something other in relation to concurrent births of two *tathāgatas* or *cakravartins*[280], existing simultaneously. What is meant is: both together; **...i.e. of two *tathāgatas* or two *cakravartins*, since they cannot be born into the one world sphere.** Some schools believe that with regard to the two *tathāgatas*, the world-sphere of 3,000 million worlds is meant; however, [the world-sphere that consists in] the four continents [is meant] in regard to the two *cakravartins*. Others believe that the world consisting in the four continents [is meant] in regard to the two *tathāgatas* as well.[281] For the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, display their perfect enlightenment and *parinirvāṇa* in the world-sphere of 3,000 million worlds through the influence of the Dharma Body, in each world consisting in four continents, by means of the Transformation Body[282]. For thus, the aim of the *bodhisattvas*, i.e. the possession of death and rebirth[283] in one of the worlds that consist in the four great[284] continents in the Tuṣita realms or among mankind[285], is the same in regard to the other worlds that consist in the four continents. Therefore, they believe that the Venerable One, who was perfectly enlightened already in the Akaniṣṭha realm, displays by means of the Transformation Body: (a) his birth and passing away in all of the worlds consisting in the four continents which are included in the [world-sphere of][286] 3,000 million worlds and in the Tuṣita realms and (b) everything such as
Y153 the possession of rebirth among mankind. In this respect the dependency on something other in regard to concurrent existences refers to the fact that the birth of a Buddha and a *cakravartin* depends on unequal productive *karma*[287].

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277 Ms.(18b.1): *nirvāṇa / tasya* however a small section of the folio is missing directly above this passage hence the *anusvāra* should be inserted; disregard Y's fn.1 p.152.

278 Read: *tādṛśaṃ* as per Ms.(18b.2) in place of *tādṛśyaṃ*.

279 Tib. is slightly different: "The dependence upon something other in regard to purity is due to its being subject to..."; *...la rag lus pa'i phyir rnam par dag pa gźan gyi dbaṅ ñid* (D263a.4).

280 *tathāgatacakravartinor* is inserted after the Tib. and is not found in the Ms.; cf. Y's fn.3 p.152

281 Ms.(18b.3): *evetyaty apare*, but Y's emendation to *evety apare* is correct.

282 Ms.(18b.4): *nirmāṇakāyena*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.152.

283 Ms.(18b.4): *cyutijanmaparigrahe*, but Y's emendation to *-parigraho* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.6 p.152. Note: Tib. omits *cyuti*.

284 Tib. omits *mahā*; cf. D263b.1.

285 Ms.(18b.4): *manyeṣyeṣu*, but Y's emendation to *manuṣyeṣu* is correct.

286 *lokadhātāv* is inserted on the basis of the Tib.

287 Read: *cāsamasaṃvartanīya* which accords with the Ms.(18b.6) and D: *mñam par 'gyur ba ma yin pa* (D263b.2) in place of *ca samasaṃvartanīya-*.

[6] **There is dependence upon something other in relation to sovereignty since women**[288] **cannot become *cakravartins* etc.** Because it is only in the body of a man that the *karma* conducive to [rebirth as] a *cakravartin* has the power to provide the [appropriate] *karma* result, for a woman[289] does not have the capacity to enjoy the [seven] 'jewels' such as a wife.[290] The word "etc." refers to *śakra* [i.e. Indra] etc.

[7] **There is dependence upon something other in relation to complete attainment since a woman**[291] **cannot become perfectly enlightened, whether it be individual enlightenment or supreme enlightenment.** "Attainment" refers to the realization of: (a) Buddhahood or (b) *pratyekabuddha*-hood. The dependence on something other in this context refers to its attainment by a man and its non-attainment by a woman[292], because, like a rhinoceros [i.e. a *pratyeka-buddha*], [a woman] is not suited to: (a) become a teacher in the three realms and (b) have no contact [with people], respectively. Furthermore, [women] are vulnerable to all kinds of rogues and are unfit for perfect enlightenment without a teacher due to their scant wisdom.

[8] **There is dependence upon something other in relation to behaviour because one endowed with [sound] views does not commit [violent] behaviour such as murder**[293]**, in contrast to the behaviour of ordinary people.** One endowed with [sound] views is [equivalent to] one who has insight into the truth. "Murder"[294] refers to the taking of a life. By the word "etc.", the taking of what is not given and the like are referred to. Those [acts] such as murder which have the acts of body and speech for their own-being do not manifest on the part of one who has insight into the truth[295] because such a person has relinquished the moral defilement which causes the arising of bad conduct such as murder[296] by means of the path of vision. These [acts] do manifest on the part of ordinary people since they do

288 Read: *striyāś* in place of *striyā*; cf. Bhāṣya N46.16.

289 Read: *strī* as per Ms.(18b.7) in place of *strīḥ*.

290 The seven *ratna* of the Cakravartin are: wheel, elephant, horse, riches, wife, 'treasurer' (*gṛhapati*) and minister. For a full list of references see LVP Kośa II p.203, fn.2. Cf. also BHSD p.450b.

291 Read: *striyāḥ* which accords with Bhāṣya N46.17 in place of *stryā*; Ms.(18b.7): *striyā*

292 Read: *aprāptiḥ striyāḥ* in place of *na tu striyaḥ*; Tib. *bud med kyis 'thob par mi 'gyur te* (D263b.4-5).

293 Read: *vadhādy-* as per Ms.(47a.1) in place of *bādhādy-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.153.

294 Read: *vadhaḥ* as per Ms.(47a.1) in place of *bādhaḥ*.

295 Read: *te vadhādayaḥ kāyavākkriyāsvabhāvā dṛṣṭasatyasya* in place of *te badhādayaḥ kāyavāk-kriyāsvabhāvāḥ / dṛṣṭisampannasya*; contrary to Y's fn.5 p.153, Ms.(47a.2): *-ḥ kāyavākkriyā-svabhāvā dṛṣṭasatyasya*. The Tib. is slightly different: "those [acts] such as murder which have the acts of body and speech for their own-being do not manifest on the part of one who is endowed with [sound views]" *gsod pa la sogs pa de dag ni lus daṅ ṅag gi bya ba'i raṅ bźin no // ...lta ba phun sum tshogs pa daṅ ldan pa ni kun tu mi spyod do* (D263b.7ff.).

296 Read: *vadhādi-* in place of *bādhādi*.

not relinquish these [moral defilements]. Furthermore, they do not relinquish the latter due to the fact that the path which [acts] as the counteragent to them has not arisen.

[9] Thus, the skill in the possible and the impossible is associated with a dependence upon something other in relation to what is not desired etc. and is the counteragent to the adherence to the belief in the independence of the *puruṣa* and the *Īśvara* etc. For, if there were no dependency whatsoever, [people] should not fall into wretched states of existence on account of bad conduct. It should be stated similarly in regard to the other cases as well.

f. The Meaning of the Faculties.

N46.22 **There are twenty-two kinds of faculties:**

III.20 ab **[These are considered] as being for the purpose of: (a) perception, (b) duration, (c) continuity, (d) experience and (e) the two purities.**

N47 **[They are considered] as being for the purpose of [the five beginning with] perception and concluding with the two purities, since they exercise a dominant influence in regard to these [five]. For, (a) there is the dominant influence of the six beginning with sight in relation to the perception of sense-objects of form etc. (b) [There is the dominant influence] of the vital faculty in relation to duration since death does not occur on account of its dominant influence. (c) [There is the dominant influence] of the female and male faculties in relation to the continuation of the family because these [faculties] exercise a dominant influence in the procreation of offspring. (d) [There is the dominant influence] of the faculties of sensation in relation to experience since one experiences the result of wholesome and unwholesome action. And (e) [there is the dominant influence] of faith etc. in relation to mundane purity; [there is the dominant influence] of the faculty of understanding what has not been understood etc. in relation to supramundane purity.**

[Sthiramati]

Y154.3 [1] Since the meaning of the faculties should be mentioned immediately following the explanation of the meaning of the possible and the impossible, he says: there are **twenty-two kinds of faculties,** i.e. beginning with the faculty of sight and

concluding with the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge. Moreover, in this context "faculty" (*indriya*) has the sense of 'dominant influence' (*ādhipatya*). As to which has dominant influence where, he says:

III.20 ab **[These are considered] as being for the purpose of: (a) perception, (b) duration, (c) continuity, (d) experience and (e) the two purities.**[297]

In this [verse] the word "dominant influence" is to be understood as having been omitted for metrical reasons; properly[298] [it should read]: "as being for the purpose of exercising a dominant influence upon: ...(e) the two [purities]". Therefore, the author of the commentary says: **since they exercise a dominant influence in regard to these [five].** The expression: "for the purpose of" (*artha*) in the statement: "for the purpose of perception", signifies 'aim' (*prayojana*). He shows that the faculty therein is for the purpose of perception[299]. The same should be stated, respectively, in other cases as well. "in regard to these" [means] in regard to the perception of the object etc. It is a dominant influence since it is a superior power; what is meant is: the dominant influence is [equivalent to] causality.

[2] The **sense-objects of form etc.** are those beginning with form and concluding with the non-sensible. The **perception** of the latter consists in sight-consciousness etc. In relation to these, **there is the dominant influence of the six beginning with sight.** It is described as a faculty since it is a superior power over colour etc.[300] because sight is the basis for the consciousness which differentiates form/colour (*rūpa*) without exception. However, the colour blue cannot be the objective support for the consciousness of the colour yellow etc.[301] In detail, the same should be stated, respectively, with regard to hearing etc.

[3] **[There is the dominant influence] of the vital faculty in relation to duration.** The vital faculty, which is pierced by the latent impressions of previous *karma*[302] when there is no interrupting condition in the *karma* result continuum, consists in the capacity for rebirth in each subsequent moment which corresponds to each preceding moment. Here now he gives the reason for the fact that there is the

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297 Read: *-bhogaśuddhidvayārthataḥ* as per Ms.(47a.4) in place of *-bhoge śuddhidvayārthataḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N46.23.

298 Read: *yuktitaḥ* in place of *yuktau*; Tib. *rigs pa las* (D264a.4).

299 Read: *grahaṇaprayojananimittam* as per Ms.(47a.5) in place of *grahaṇaprayojanam nimittam* Tib. is slightly different and omits *tatrendriyam iti darśayati*: *'dzin pa'i dgos pa ste ched (pa) yin la* (D264a.5) = "...the purpose of perception being the cause".

300 Cf. Kośa (P38.3): *kaḥ punar indriyārthaḥ / idi paramaiśvarye / tasya indantīti indriyāṇi / ata ādhipatyārtha indriyārthaḥ.*

301 The first few syllables of line 7 (47a) are illegible; the line begins: *-sya vijñānasyā-*. Perhaps a better reading than Y's would be: *pītādirūpasya vijñānasyā-*.

302 Ms.(47a.7): *karmakarmavāsanā-*, but Y's emendation to *pūrvakarmavāsanā-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.5 p.154.

Y155 dominant influence of the vital faculty with regard to duration[303]: **since death does not occur on account of its dominant influence.** The absence of death is [equivalent to] the continuance of the homogeneous groups projected by previous *karma.* Food and the like are not faculties even though they are instrumental in the maintenance of life because, in spite of their presence, there is no continued existence when life is extinguished and also, because in the realm of form and the formless realm, the presence of continued existence is due only to the vital faculty, even though there is no bodily nutriment. Moreover, in this case the dominant influence of contact etc. in relation to continued existence is not tenable because the maintenance of sentient beings in the conditions of the attainment of cessation and non-consciousness and also in [induced] non-consciousness is possible, even though contact etc. is absent.

[4] **[There is the dominant influence] of the female and male faculties in relation to the continuation of the family**[304]. Since there is no break in the continuation of the family when a son is born the continuation of the family refers to the birth of a son. Now, in order to demonstrate this, he says: **because of their dominant influence in procreation.** A certain part of the faculty of touch receives the title: "female" or "male faculty" because it exerts a particular dominant influence. Where there is the establishment of the family , there is the presence of the female faculty and the male faculty and by virtue of these there is no break in the continuity of the family. Moreover, the family is established among the gods dwelling in [the realm of] form if the female faculty and the male faculty are present, but not if they are not present. For, there is no dominant influence in this respect on the part of *gandharvas* etc. because there is no capacity for the procreation of sons on the part of eunuchs etc. who have no female or male faculties[305], even if the *gandharvas* etc. are present[306]. Furthermore, food and the like are not faculties because they are not enumerated among animate things although they are dominant influences [of sorts].

[5] **[There is the dominant influence] of the faculties of sensation in relation to experience**; the fact that this is a dominant influence is understood. How so? Hence he says: **because one experiences the result of wholesome and unwholesome action.** The faculties of sensation are five: pleasure, pain, gladness, sadness and equanimity. It is [through the dominant influence] of these that one experiences the result of wholesome and unwholesome *karma* because they have the nature of experience, but name / form (*nāmarūpa*) have no dominant influence over them because they are [only] the ground for sensation. And the state of having them

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303 Ms.(47b.1): *-ne jL..ndriyasyādhipatyam*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.154.

304 Ms.(47b.2): *kula-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.155.

305 Read: *strīpuruṣendri-* in place of *strīpuṣendri-*.

306 For a full discussion on the significance of the *gandharvas* in child-conception, cf. O. H. De A. Wijesekera: "Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba" in UCR April 1945.

[i.e. *nāmarūpa*] as the ground refers to sensation because of the predominance of the *karma*-result.

Y156 [6] **Mundane purity** refers to the relinquishment of the mundane moral defilement. In regard to this [there is **the dominant influence**] **of faith etc.**, i.e. of the five faculties of faith, vigour, mindfulness, meditative concentration and wisdom; that these are dominant influences remains in force because they are characterized by the mundane path since they are the counteragents to lack of faith etc. Others believe that it is because they are characterized by [the elements] that are conducive to liberation.

[7] **[There is the dominant influence] of the faculty of understanding what has not been understood etc. in relation to supramundane purity.** The fact that this is a dominant influence remains in force. Supramundane purity refers to the relinquishment of moral defilement by means of the supramundane path. In relation to this, there is the dominant influence of three: (a) the faculty of understanding what has not been understood, (b) the faculty of understanding and (c) the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge, for these three are respectively incorporated in the paths of: (a) vision, (b) meditative development and (c) the adept. Therein, with reference to which is appropriate according to their differences in being based on the preliminary stage [of the first *dhyāna*][307] etc., these nine faculties, i.e. the five beginning with faith as well as mind, happiness, gladness and equanimity, are called: (a) the faculty of understanding what has not been understood, on the path of vision, (b) the faculty of understanding, on the path of meditative development and (c) the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge[308], on the path of the adept.

[8] However, this arrangement is different for the *yogācāra* - the faculty of understanding what has not been understood and the faculty of understanding comprise ten faculties, i.e., there are ten after adding 'sadness' to the nine mentioned above. However, the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge[309] comprises only nine. In this regard, on the path of preparation which consists in the aids to insight[310], and on the fifteen moments of the path of vision, there is the faculty of mind and the five beginning with faith and any one of the faculties of happiness, gladness, sadness and equanimity[311], as is appropriate according to their differences in being based on the preliminary stage [of the first *dhyāna*] etc. Furthermore, the faculty of sadness[312] should be understood as being included because of the longing for supreme deliverance that follows after the aids to insight, at the time of preparation. These tenfold faculties, according to which is appropriate, are described as the faculty of under-

307 *anāgamya*; cf. Siddhi fn.1 p.489 and LVP Kośa VI p.228.
308 Read: *ājñātāvīndriyam* as per Ms.(48a.2) in place of *ājñābhāvīndriyam*.
309 Ms.(48a.3): *ājñātāvīndriyam*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.156.
310 Ms.(48a.3): *nirvedha-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.156.
311 Ms.(48a.4): *-pekṣendriyāṇām*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.156.
312 Ms.(48a.4): *daurmanasyendriyam*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.156.

standing what has not been understood since they manifest in order to understand a reality that was not previously[313] understood. The same ten kinds of faculties are described as comprising the faculty of understanding on this the path of one who is
Y157 still in training, i.e. extending from the sixteen moments of the path of vision up until the vajra-like meditative concentration, because there is nothing to be known that was not previously known. On the path of the adept, the remaining [faculties] with the exception of the faculty of sadness receive the title [collectively]: 'the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge'. Since it is the faculty pertinent to one who possesses perfect knowledge it is [described as] the faculty of the possession of perfect knowledge[314]. In this way the adherence to the belief in a dominant influence in regard to the *puruṣa*, the *nārāyaṇa* or the *īśvara* is checked for one who is skilled in the faculties.

g. The Meaning of the Times.

N47.8 III.20 cd

The next [is considered] in the sense of the experience of the result and the cause and likewise their non-experience.

What is next? The three respective times: the past time [should be known] in the sense of the experience of the result and cause. The future time [should be known] in the sense of the non-experience of the result and cause. The present time should be known in the sense of the experience of the cause and the non-experience of the result.

[Sthiramati]

Y157.9 [1] The meaning of the three times[315] should be mentioned immediately after the meaning of the faculties, hence he says:

III.20 cd

The next [is considered] in the sense of the experience of the result and the cause and likewise their non-experience.[316]

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313 Tib. (D265b.4) inserts *sṅon* (*pūrva*) which is not found in the Ms.

314 Read: *ājñātāvina indriyam ājñātāvīndriyam iti* in place of *ājñābhāvīndriyam iti ājñātāvīndriyam ucyate*; Ms.(48a.6): *-indriyam ājñātāvīndriyam iti*. Tib. *kun śes pa daṅ ldan pa'i dbaṅ po yin pas kun śes pa daṅ ldan pa'i dbaṅ po źes bya'o* (D265b.6). Disregard Y's fn.3 p.157.

315 Ms.(48a.6): *adhvatrayārtho*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.157.

316 Read: *phalahetūpayogārthanopayogāt tathāparam*
in place of *phalahetūpayogatvād anābhogāt tathāparam*; Cf. Bhāṣya N47.8.

The cause therein refers to the cause of rebirth; the result is that which is incorporated in the rebirth. The experience of the cause is the imparting of the result; the experience of the result is the expiration of what has been experienced. And since such a cause and its result pertain to the past, he says: **the past time [should be known] in the sense of the experience of the result and cause**[317]. **The future time [should be known] in the sense of the non-experience of the result and cause**[318] in that same mode. Furthermore, the **present**[319] **time**, i.e. the present rebirth, **should be known in the sense of the experience of the cause**, because the cause has produced a result; **and in the sense of the non-experience of the result**, because this result follows the present rebirth. The determination of the times should be understood as referring to momentariness, for the existing entities,
Y158 at every instant, possess the nature of cause and result[320]. Therein, the experience of the cause is due to the production of its own result. The experience of the result is due to the destruction of the effect[321] immediately following its birth. Thus the subject under discussion is the fact that the past time [should be understood] in the sense of the experience of the result and the cause; the future time [should be understood] in the sense of the non-experience of the result and the cause. The non-experience of the result and its cause should be known as being due to: (a) the non-production[322] of the effect and (b) the absence of the destruction of what has not come into being [illegible] statement: [the present time should be understood] in the sense of the experience of the cause and the non-experience of the result [means]: (a) the experience of the cause is due to the production of the effect and (b) the non-experience of the result is due to the non-destruction of the effect. In this way, the adherence to the belief in the self as something permanent is checked for one who is skillful in the times because he does not perceive anything other apart from the times[323].

h. The Meaning of the Four Truths.

N47.13 **III.21 abcd** **The next is considered in the sense of: (a) sensation together with its cause, (b) the practice caused by the**

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317 Read: *phalahetūpayogārthenātīto* in place of *phalasya taddhetoś copayogārthenātīto*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.9. Ms.(48a.7): *phalahetūpa-*.

318 Read: *phalahetvanupayogārthenānāgato 'dhvā* in place of *phalasya hetoś cānupayogārthenānāgato 'dhvā*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.10.

319 Read: *pratyutpannaḥ* in place of *vartamānaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.11.

320 Ms.(48b.1): *hetuphalabhā-*; disregard Y;s fn.9 p.157.

321 Read: *kāryasya* as per Ms.(48b.2) in place of *phalasya*.

322 Read: *anutpādanāt* as per Ms.(48b.2) in place of *anutpādāt*.

323 Ms.(48b.3): *adhva-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.158.

latter, (c) the appeasement of these and (d) the counteragent.

What is next? The four truths. Of these, the truth of suffering [is considered] in the sense of sensation together with its cause, considering that [it is said]: "whatever sensation is, in this context it [has the characteristic] of suffering". Furthermore, the cause of sensation should be known as the *dharmas* that pertain to sensation. The truth of origination [is considered in the sense] of the practice caused by that, i.e. the practice caused by the truth[324] of suffering. The truth of cessation [is considered] in the sense of the appeasement of the [first] two. The truth of the path [is considered] in the sense of the counteragent.

[Sthiramati]

Y158.10 [1] The meaning of the four truths should be mentioned immediately following the meaning of the three times, hence he says:

III.21 ab **[The next is considered] in the sense of: (a) sensation together with its cause, (b) the practice[325] caused by the latter etc.[326]**

It is generally known that sensation has the sense of suffering; also, according to this statement from a treatise[327]: "whatever sensation is, in this context it [has the characteristic] of suffering". With regard to the respective determination of the [four] truths, all sensation together with its cause, be it pleasurable and accompanied by impurity, painful, or neither pleasurable nor painful, means the truth of suffering; in order to demonstrate this the author of the commentary says: **of these, the truth of suffering [is considered] in the sense of sensation together with its cause.** Why is it that all sensation is [equivalent to] suffering? He says: **considering that[328] [it is said]: "whatever sensation is, in this context it [has the characteristic] of suffering".** These sensations are [equivalent to] suffering since they have the nature of: (a) the suffering of suffering, (b) the suffering of change and (c) the suffering of the formative forces, respectively. Alternatively, [sensation is equivalent to] suffering on account of just the fact that it has the nature of the suffering of the formative forces. **Furthermore, the cause of sensation should be known as the *dharmas* that pertain to sensation.** The *dharmas* that pertain to

324 Tib. omits *satya*; cf. D15a.2.
325 Read: *-prapattitaḥ* as per Ms.(48b.4) in place of *pratipattitaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.13.
326 Read: *vistaraḥ* in place of *vitaraḥ*.
327 Cf. LVP Kośa VI p.131 where this passage is discussed.
328 Read: *kṛtvā* in place of *vacanād*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.16.

sensation are those consisting in the sensations of pleasure, pain, and neither pleasure nor pain. In this way the five aggregates are explained as the truth of suffering.

[2] **The truth of origination [is considered in the sense] of the practice caused by the latter**[329]. The truth of suffering is referred to by "the latter". That
Y159 practice on account of which suffering is brought into being consists in the truth of origination. Moreover, the latter, which has the activities of body, speech and mind for its essential nature, is preceded by the cause of the craving for sensation and the *dharmas* that pertain to sensation. In brief, it has been said that the truth[330] of origination consists in the *karma*[331] that is the source of becoming.

[3] **The truth of cessation [is considered] in the sense of the appeasement of the [first] two.** The [first] two are the truths of suffering and of origination. The words: "in the sense of the appeasement..."[332] are [equivalent to] 'in the sense of the non-production...'. Thus, since it is characterized by the non-origination of suffering together with its causes, cessation is described as being twofold: (a) as possessing a remaining substratum in the sense of the appeasement of origination and (b) as not possessing a remaining substratum in the sense of the appeasement of suffering.

[4] **The truth of the path...**, i.e. the way leading to the cessation of both suffering and its origination **[is considered] in the sense of the counteragent** to these same two which have been referred to, i.e. suffering and its origination. In this way, since one who is skillful in the truths has an understanding of defilement and purification alone, his adherence to the belief in defilement and purification other than this is checked because [he understands that] it does not exist.

i. The Meaning of the Three Vehicles.

N47.22 **III.22 abc** **The next are to be known because one goes forth through the knowledge of virtues and faults and [through direct intuition] devoid of conceptual differentiation [learnt] from others or by oneself;**

329 Read: *tannimittapratipattitaḥ* in place of *tan nimittaṃ pratipattitaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N47.17-18.
330 Tib. omits *satyam*; cf. D266b.5.
331 Ms.(49a.1): *karma*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.159.
332 Ms.(49a.1): *śama-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.159 in this context. As has been already noted, the Ms. does not often distinguish between *śa*, *ṣa* and *sa*.

[The next are] the three vehicles, respectively. Of these, the *śrāvaka* vehicle [should be known] because one goes forth [as a mendicant], having learnt from others through the knowledge of the virtues and faults of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*. The *pratyekabuddha* vehicle [should be known] because one goes forth on one's own, without having learnt from others, through that same [knowledge]. The universal vehicle should be known because one goes forth on one's own through direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation.

[Sthiramati]

Y159.15 [1] The meaning of the three vehicles is illustrated immediately following the meaning of the truths, hence he says:

III.22 ab- **...Through [the knowledge] of virtues and faults and [direct intuition] devoid of conceptual differentiation**[333] **etc.**

The word "knowledge" is understood with both, i.e. (a) as the knowledge of virtues and faults and (b) as the direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation. Alternatively, the words '[knowledge that consists in] conceptual differentiation' can be regarded as having been omitted from (a). It should be mentioned that in (a) above [the word "knowledge" has the sense of] the knowledge of virtues and faults after distinguishing it as [being learnt] from others or on one's own. Since that which is devoid of conceptual differentiation is only learnt by oneself, in the commentary he says: **respectively. Of these, ...through the knowledge of the virtues and faults of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*.** The word "*nirvāṇa*" in this context includes both the path and cessation, as does the word "tranquillity". Therein, the knowledge of virtue in relation to *nirvāṇa* refers to knowledge that is: (a) in the aspects of tranquillity
Y160 etc.[334] in regard to cessation and (b) in the aspects of definitive liberation etc. in regard to the path[335]. Although *saṃsāra* has the nature of both suffering and its origination, therein, the knowledge of faults in relation to *saṃsāra* refers to knowledge that is: (a) in the aspects of impermanence and suffering etc. and (b) in the aspects of origination and causal conditions etc. **Having learnt from others...**; i.e. having learnt of the virtues and faults of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*, as have been described[336] from the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* etc.. **Because one goes forth [as a mendicant]...**; i.e. because one departs from *saṃsāra*, the ***śrāvaka* vehicle [should be known]**; i.e. because

333 Ms.(49a.3): *guṇadośāvikalpena*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.159.

334 Ms.(49a.5): *śāntyādy-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.159.

335 Ms.(49a.5): *mārge*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.159.

336 Read: *nirvāṇasaṃsārayor yathoktān dośān guṇāṃś ca śrutvā* as per Ms.(49a.6) in place of *nirvāṇasaṃsārayor gunān yathoktān dośāṃś ca śrutvā*; in the Ms. *gunān* has been added in the margin.

one goes forth relying on the utterances of others. By the term "*śrāvaka* vehicle", he shows that it is distinct from the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle.

[2] Through that same knowledge of the virtues and faults of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* **because one goes forth on one's own, not having learnt[337] from others[338]**, i.e. from the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, **the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle [should be known].** By the words: "on one's own, not having learnt from others"[339], [he shows that] it is distinct from the *śrāvaka* vehicle.

[3] **Through direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation...**; direct intuition is devoid of conceptual differentiation because it penetrates the ineffable real nature of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*; **the universal vehicle should be known because one goes forth** just **on one's own** without having learnt from others. In this context, the term "direct intuition" distinguishes this from the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle.

[4] However, others believe: (a) the *śrāvaka* vehicle is [described as] a going forth through the direct intuition which has the insubstantiality of the personal entity for its object and consists in an absence of conceptual differentiation in regard to virtues and faults, after having learnt from others, (b) the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle [is described as] a going forth on one's own without dependence upon[340] learning [from others] and (c) the universal vehicle is described as a going forth on one's own through direct intuition which is devoid of conceptual differentiation, having the insubstantiality of the *dharmas* for its object and leading to the *nirvāṇa* [in which the *bodhisattva* is] not permanently fixed. However this explanation[341] is contradicted by the commentary.

In this way the adherence to the belief that the self is a *yogi* is checked for one who possesses skill in the three vehicles due to the observation that there is just *yoga*.

j. The Meaning of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned.

N48.6 III.22 def **The final [topic] is declared as being due to: (a) the causal-sign in accompaniment with both its designation**

337 Ms.(49a.7): *-ddhā* but Y's emendation to (*śru*)*tvā* is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.160.

338 Read: *parato* as per Ms.(49a.6) in place of *parabhyo*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.3.

339 *parato* is inserted on the basis of the Tib. and is not found in the Ms.

340 Ms.(49b.1): *nirapekṣasya* which Y amends to *nirapekṣayā*; cf. his fn.5 p.160.

341 Read: *vyākhyānam* as per Ms.(49b.2) in place of *ākhyānam*; Tib. *rnam par bśad pa*.

and cause and (b) tranquillity together with its object.

[The final topic] refers to the conditioned and the unconditioned. The words: "in accompaniment with its designation" in this [verse] refer to the name-group etc. The "cause" refers to that in which the 'seeds' are incorporated, i.e. the store-consciousness. The "causal-sign" refers to that in which the support, the body and experience are incorporated. Those [elements] that are incorporated in the actual consciousnesses are: (a) mind, (b) apprehending and (c) conceptual differentiation. This the causal-sign, in accompaniment with both its designation and cause together with its associated elements, is to be known as the conditioned. Therein, "mind" refers to the aspect of mental activity that is eternal; "apprehending" refers to the five groups of consciousness; "conceptual differentiation" refers to the mind-consciousness because it is this that conceptually differentiates.

The unconditioned refers to: (a) cessation which is [equivalent to] tranquillity and (b) the object of tranquillity, i.e. thusness. [Therein, tranquillity refers to both cessation and the path, considering that the former [i.e. cessation] consists in tranquillity and tranquillity is on account of the latter [i.e. the path]. Thusness is the object of tranquillity (*praśamārtha*), considering that it is the object of tranquillity (*praśamasya artha*)][342] because thusness is the objective support of the path. Tranquillity belongs to the path because tranquilization [occurs] on account of it.

Thus, it is in these meanings that the knowledge in regard to the aggregates etc. should be known as the skill in the aggregates etc.

[Sthiramati]

Y160.23 [1] Now, in order to clearly illustrate the meaning of the conditioned and the unconditioned, he says:

Y161 **III.22 def**

The final [topic] is declared as being due to: (a) the causal-sign in accompaniment with both its designation and cause and (b) tranquillity together with its object.[343]

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342 The passage marked by parenthesis (N48.15-17) is not found in the Tib. Bhāṣya (cf. D15a.7) although portions of it are glossed by the Ṭīkā; cf. Nagao's fn.7 p.48.

343 Read: *saprajñaptisahetukāt / nimittāt praśamāt sārthāt paścimaṃ samudāhṛtam //* in place of: *saprajñaptisahetukam / nimittaṃ praśamaḥ sārthaḥ paścād eva prakāśitam //* Cf. Bhāṣya N48.6.

What is this that is listed as the final [topic]? He says: **it refers to the conditioned and the unconditioned because this was listed at the very end. Therein, the conditioned is determined as being due to the causal-sign in accompaniment with its designation and cause; whereas, the unconditioned is determined as being due to tranquillity together with its object.** Moreover, in order to clearly illustrate the designation, cause and causal-sign since they are not known, he says: **The words: "in accompaniment with its designation"**[344] **refer to the name-group etc.** The name-group and sentence-group consist in the designation since the own-being and particular of things are designated through the name-groups and sentence groups[345]; but the syllable-group consists in the designation because it causes the manifestation of the latter two. **The "cause" refers to that in which the 'seeds' are incorporated, i.e. the store-consciousness.** The latter, which is endowed with the latent impressions of all impure *dharmas* and is not the imparted result, is incorporated in the truth of origination. Consequently, in order to distinguish this from the imparted result, he says: "that in which the 'seeds' are incorporated". **The "causal-sign" refers to that in which the support, the body**[346] **and experience are incorporated.**[347] It is the store-consciousness that is referred to. **The [elements] incorporated in the actual consciousnesses are: (a) mind, (b) apprehending and (c) conceptual differentiation**[348]. The "support" in the above refers to the inanimate world, i.e. the store-consciousness in the appearance of the latter. It is incorporated[349] as the support since it is incorporated in its nature as the support. The "body"[350] refers to the physical body together with the faculties, i.e. the store-consciousness in the appearance of the latter. It is that in which the body is incorporated; what is meant is: it possesses the body for its nature. It is that in which experience is incorporated - this has already been described in the above. It consists in experience[351] since the other consciousnesses experience these two [i.e. the body and experience] as being the dominant entities[352]. Alternatively, it is experience (*bhoga*) since food and drink and the like are experienced (*bhujyate*). That within which experience is incorporated is the [store]-consciousness in the appearance as the latter. **This the causal-sign, in accompaniment with both its designation and cause together with its associated elements, is to be known as the conditioned**

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344 Read: *saprajñaptir* in place of *prajñaptir*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.8.

345 Cf. LVP Kośa II p.238.

346 Ms.(49b.5): *-deha-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.161.

347 Cf. MSA XI.40 comm.

348 Read: *pravṛttivijñānasaṃgṛhītāś ca manaudgrahavikalpaḥ* in place of *pravṛttivijñānasaṃgṛhītaṃ manaudgrahavikalpam*; cf Bhāṣya N48.10.

349 *pratiṣṭhāsaṃgṛhītam* is omitted from the text of the Ms.(49b.6) but has been added to the Ms. margin.

350 Ms.(49b.6): *pratiśṭhādehabhoga-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.161.

351 Ms.(49b.7): *-vāḥ* but Y's rendering of (*bhog*)*aḥ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D268a.4-5.

352 Cf. MSA XI.40 comm.

since it is included in the other-dependent nature. "Together with its associated
Y162 elements"[353] refers to the mental concomitants; he shows that the conditioned is not solely these. But to what does the causal-sign belong? To the name-group etc. because these clearly indicate the own-being and particular of that [causal-sign] and since it is in conformity with these [i.e. the name-group etc.], the causal-sign belongs to the [elements] called mind, apprehending and conceptual differentiation, i.e. the mind and mental concomitants[354] of those who are notionally attached to the own-being and the particular.

[2] Some believe that mind, apprehending and conceptual differentiation[355] consist in the causal-sign which belongs to the store-consciousness because the nourishment of the latent impressions occurs there. Others again believe that since it designates the own-being and particular, the sign belongs to the designation and consists in conceptualization (*saṃjñā*) because of the statement[356] that it has the nature of the apprehension of the sign. The store-consciousness which incorporates the support, the body and experience is the causal-sign of the foundation because there is the nourishment of the latent impressions [therein]. Mind, apprehending and conceptual differentiation are also the causal-sign of the objective support because they create the objective support-sign[357]; and since it creates the sign in both cases, the causal-sign belongs to both the objective support and the supporter[358].

[3] **Therein, "mind" refers to the aspect of mental activity**[359] **that is eternal**; that which eternally thinks (*manyate*) in terms of 'me' and 'mine' is described as mind (*manas*). It is associated with: (a) delusion regarding the self, false view of the self, affection for the self and self-conceit and (b) the five all-pervading [*dharmas*], i.e. sensation, conceptualization, volition, contact and mental attention. **"Apprehending" refers to the five groups of consciousness** because they have the characteristic of 'seizing' the essential nature of the sense-object. Since the latter are to be understood intuitively and cannot be stated, they are described as 'apprehending'. **"Conceptual differentiation" refers to mind-consciousness because it is this which conceptually differentiates**[360] the characteristic of the *dharmas* as individual or universal. All[361] of these, the causal-sign in accompaniment with its designation and

353 Read: *sasaṃprayogaś* in place of *saṃprayogaś*; Tib. *mtshuṅs par ldan pa daṅ bcas pa* (D268a.6)
354 Ms.(50a.1): *cittacaittānām*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.162.
355 Read: *manaudgrahavikalpaś* in place of *manaudgrahavikalpaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.10.
356 Tib. omits *iti vacanāt*; cf. D268b.2.
357 Ms.(50a.3): (*ālambanani*)*mittīkarakaraṇārthena* but Y's reading of *ālambananimittīkaraṇārthena* agrees with the Tib.: *dmigs pa mtshan mar byed pa'i phyir* (D268b.2).
358 Ms.(50a.3): *ālambanānālambana-*; but Y's emendation to *ālambanālambaka-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.162.
359 *mananākāram* here but Bhāṣya (N48.12) *manyanākāram*.
360 Read: *tasya vikalpakatvād* in place of *tasya vikalpitvād* (Y162.19); cf. Bhāṣya N48.13-14.
361 Tib. omits *sarvam*; cf. D268b.6.

cause, consist in the conditioned because they are brought about through *karma* and moral defilement.

[4] **The unconditioned refers to: (a) cessation which is [equivalent to] tranquillity and (b) that which is the object of tranquillity, i.e. thusness.** It is appropriate that cessation has tranquillity for its essential nature because it is characterized by the appeasement of suffering together with its causes. Why is thusness
Y163 described as the object of tranquillity? **Considering that it is the object of tranquillity.** If thusness[362] has no connection whatsoever with cessation, how can it be the object of tranquillity? **Because thusness is the objective support of the path.** How is it that **tranquillity belongs to the path? Because tranquilization**[363] **[occurs] on account of it.** *Nirvāṇa* is [equivalent to] tranquillity because it consists in tranquillity, and since tranquilization[364] [occurs] on account of this [i.e. the path], **tranquillity refers to ...the path.** Thus, from analysing[365] the resolution of the compound (i.e. *praśamārtha*) [it is evident that] both *nirvāṇa* and the path are referred to through the single expression "tranquillity". But does the truth of the path consist in the conditioned or the unconditioned? It consists in the conditioned because it is to be produced[366]. If one were to say that it consists in the unconditioned because: (a) it is not brought about through *karma* and moral defilement and (b) it is characterized by the unconditioned, there would be no fault in this. **Thus it is in these meanings that the knowledge in regard to the aggregates etc. should be known as the skill in the aggregates etc.**

> **At the beginning [they are considered] in**
> **the sense of: (a) multiple, (b) collected and**
> **(c) disparate.** (III.17 ab)

In detail, this should be stated in every case.

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362 Read: *tathatāyā* as per Ms.(60a.6) in place of *tathatayā*.
363 Read: *praśamanāt* in place of *praśamakaraṇāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.17-18.
364 Read: *praśamanāt* in place of *praśamakaraṇāt*; cf. ibid.
365 Ms.(50a.7): *-bhedād ekābhidhānena*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.163.
366 Ms.(50a.7): *saṃskṛtaṃ saṃskṛtam utpādyatvāt* but Y's emendation to *saṃskṛtam utpādyatvāt* is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.163.

The Summary Meaning of Reality.

N48.22 **The summary meaning of reality. In brief, reality is twofold: (a) mirror reality and (b) visible reality. Mirror reality in this regard is**
N49 **[equivalent to] basic reality because the others are visible therein. Visible reality is ninefold: (a) the visible reality free from illusory notions; (b) the visible reality free from erroneous inversion**[367]**; (c) the visible reality of going forth by means of the *śrāvaka* vehicle; (d) the visible reality of going forth by means of the universal vehicle because it brings about maturity by way of the gross and liberates by way of the subtle; (e) the visible reality of the refutation of opponents because they are refuted through reasoning based upon example; (f) the visible reality of the lucid explanation of the universal vehicle; (g) the visible reality of entry into the knowable in all aspects; (h) the visible reality of the lucid explanation of true thusness and (i) the visible reality of entry**[368] **into all intended meanings in regard to the foundation for the adherence to the belief in the self.**

[Sthiramati]

Y163.15 **The summary meaning of reality**[369]**. In brief, reality is twofold**[370]; in detail, it has been described as tenfold. Hence in brief, it is twofold[371]: **(a) mirror reality and (b) visible reality. Mirror reality in this regard is [equivalent to] basic reality**; moreover, this consists in the three natures. As to why it is described as "mirror reality" **because the others**, i.e. the reality of characteristic etc., **are visible therein**[372]. **Visible reality** which was explained previously as the reality of characteristic etc. **is ninefold**. Why is it described as visible
Y164 reality? Because it is visible within basic reality. **(a) The visible reality free from illusory notions**; i.e. the reality of characteristic, for the freedom from illusory notions [comes about] on account of this because there is neither imputation nor negation in regard to: (a) the personal entity and the *dharmas*, (b) the apprehended object and apprehending subject and (c) existence and non-existence. **(b) The visible reality free from erroneous inversion**[373]; i.e. that which is characterized by

367 *aviparyāsa-* but Tib.: *phyin ci log gi gñen po* = *viparyāsapratipakṣa* (D15b.2).

368 Tib. replaces *praveśa* with *rtogs pa* (=*adhigama/prativedha* etc.)

369 Read: *tattvasya piṇḍārthaḥ* in place of *tattvapiṇḍārthaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.22.

370 Read: *samāsato dvividhaṃ tattvam* in place of *samāsataḥ tattvaṃ dvividham*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.22.

371 Tib. inserts: "What are these two?" (*rnam pa gñis po ji lta bu że na* D269a.5).

372 Read: *tatra darśanāt* in place of *taddarśanāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N48.23.

373 Although both the Tib. Bhāṣya (D15b.2) and Ṭīkā (D269a.7) reinforce Y's rendering of *viparyāsapratipakṣa-*, I have retained the reading as found in the Sanskrit Bhāṣya (N49.1-2).

the absence of erroneous inversion, for this is the counteragent to erroneous inversion[374] such as the notion of permanence. (c) **The visible reality of going forth by means of the *śrāvaka* vehicle**; i.e. the reality of cause and result. The going forth of the *śrāvaka* is via meditative development and the penetration of the four noble truths. (d) **The visible reality of going forth by means of the universal vehicle**; i.e. the reality of the gross and the subtle. One goes forth via the universal vehicle **because it brings** beings to **maturity by way of the gross**, i.e. by way of conventional truth, **and because it liberates them by way of the subtle**, i.e. by way of ultimate truth[375]. (e) **The visible reality of the refutation of opponents**, i.e. well established reality. How so? He says: **because they are refuted through reasoning based upon example**[376]; examples are generally accepted when refuting an opponent. It is reasoning since it is based on words[377] that are well established through reasoning. (f) **The visible reality of the lucid explanation of the universal vehicle**; i.e. the reality of the sphere of pure direct intuition, for this refers to the sphere of the pure direct intuition[378] of both obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable[379] and comprises the lucid explanations of other scriptural traditions - this is the universal vehicle. (g) **The visible reality of entry into the knowable in all its aspects**; i.e. the reality of inclusion. Moreover, this refers to the five categories because with reference to them, one enters into all that is knowable. (h) **The visible reality of the lucid explanation of true thusness**[380]; i.e. the reality of differentiation, for the lucid explanation of both the true thusness and the unaltered thusness of things is on account of this. (i) **The visible reality of entry by way of all intended meanings**[381] **in regard to the foundation for the adherence to the belief in the self**; i.e. the reality of the skills, for, on account of this [the *bodhisattva*] enters by way of all interpretations in regard to the foundation for the adherence to the belief in the self. The adherence to the belief in a self among the aggregates etc. arises in accordance with the ten interpretations as were previously described[382].

The statements concerning the summary meaning of the realities are for the purpose of: (a) facilitating [mental] retention since one can supply the text by means of its meaning and (b) the removal of confusion and frustration because frustration is not

374 Read: *-viparyāsa-* as per Ms.(50b.4) in place of *-viparyāya-*.
375 Ms.(50b.5): *-satyena*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.164.
376 Read: *dṛṣṭāntasaṃniśrayeṇa* in place of *dṛṣṭāntaṃ niśritya*; cf. Bhāṣya N49.4.
377 *śabda* is omitted from the Tib. which reads: "...since it is established through reasoning"; cf. D269b.3.
378 Read: *-jñānagocaram* in place of *-jñānagocarasya*; Tib. *ye śes kyi spyod yul gyi* (D269b.4).
379 Ms.(50b.6): *kleśajñeyāvaraṇa-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.164.
380 Read: *avitathatathatābhidyotana-* in place of *avitathatathatā abhidhyotana-*.
381 Read: *-ābhisaṃdhi-* in place of *-ābhiprāya-*; cf. Bhāṣya N49.7.
382 Cf. Y136.16.

Y165 generated[383] on the part of one who has thoroughly understood the subject from beginning to end. Also, confusion does not arise due to the understanding of the explanations as they are listed.

Reality has now been described.

383 Read: *na ...upajāyate* as per Ms.(51a.2) in place of *na ...upajñāyate.*

Chapter Four

1. The Meditative Development of the Counteragent
2. The State Therein.
3. The Attainment of the Result.

Prologue.

[Sthiramati]

Y166.2 [1] The Meditative Development of the Counteragent, as well as the State Therein and the Attainment of the Result should be mentioned immediately following the exposition of Reality, hence the Fourth Chapter is undertaken in order to clearly illustrate these [subjects]. The State Therein and the Attainment of the Result are stated because: (a) they were [initially] listed immediately after[1] Reality and (b) they are subject to the Meditative Development of the Counteragent.

1. The Meditative Development of the Counteragent.

Introductory.

N50.3 **The meditative development of the counteragent which is [equivalent to] the meditative development of the factors that contribute to enlightenment should now be mentioned.**

[Sthiramati]

Y166.7 [1] In order to demonstrate that in a Sūtra, the factors which contribute to enlightenment are asserted as being counteragents, he says: **the meditative development of the counteragent which is [equivalent to] the meditative development of the factors that contribute to enlightenment**[2]... For they are described as counteragents since they gain strength while being cultivated for the relinquishment of adverse obscuration as described [in Chapter II]. Furthermore, they number thirty-seven, [beginning with] the four applications of mindfulness up until the noble eight-limbed path. The meditative development of these is synonymous with: (a) their promotion, (b) their generation, (c) their practice and (d) their repetition[3]. **[These] should now be mentioned** because they were listed immediately after Reality.

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1 Ms.(51a.4): *tattvānamtantaram*, contrary to Y's fn.2, but his emendation to *tattvānantaram* is correct.

2 Read: *bodhipakṣya-* as per Ms.(51a.5) in place of *bodhipakṣa-*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.3.

3 Read: *bahulīkriyeti* as per Ms.(51a.6) in place of *bahulā kriyeti*; Tib. *lan maṅ du bya ba* (D270a.4).

a. The Four Applications of Mindfulness.

N50.5 Now, in regard to these, at the beginning:

IV.1 abcd — The meditative development of the applications of mindfulness leads to the comprehension of the four truths and is due to: (a) disquiet, (b) the cause of craving, (c) the foundation [of the latter] and (d) the absence of confusion.

(a) Disquiet is made manifest through the body; one comprehends the truth of suffering through the investigation of the latter because [the body] is characterized by the formative forces together with disquiet; for, disquiet consists in the painful nature of the formative forces - on account of this the Noble Ones regard all impure entities in terms of suffering. (b) The cause of craving is sensation; through the investigation of this, one comprehends the truth of origination. (c) Mind is the foundation for the notional attachment to the self; through the investigation of this, one comprehends the truth of cessation due to the removal of the fear of self-annihilation. (d) Through the investigation of the *dharmas* one comprehends the truth of the path due to the absence of confusion concerning the *dharmas* pertinent to defilement and purification. Hence the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness is established at the beginning for the comprehension of the four truths.

[Sthiramati]

Y166.15 [1] Why is the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness described firstly and not the other, i.e. the meditative development of the factors that contribute to enlightenment? He says: Now, in regard to these, in the beginning:

IV.1 a — ...Due to: (a) disquiet, (b) the cause of craving[4] etc.

Y167 "In regard to these" [means]: in regard to the meditative development of the factors that contribute to enlightenment. The word "now" has the sense of sequential order. Now, at the beginning, the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness is mentioned and [the meditative development of] the others [are mentioned] subse-

4 Read: *dauṣṭhulyāt tarṣahetutvād* in place of *dauṣṭhulyatṛṣṇāhetutvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.6.

quently. Because they are not aware of the virtues and faults of *nirvāṇa*[5] and*saṃsāra* [respectively] on account of their notional attachment to something pleasurable, pure, permanent and substantial among the formative forces, naive people delight[6] in enjoyment and existence and are fearful of the meaning of *nirvāṇa*[7]. Moreover, this lack of awareness in regard to virtues and faults and the notional attachment to the pleasurable etc. are checked because of the insight into the truths. Hence, in order to encourage them to shrink from *saṃsāra* and to bring them face to face with *nirvāṇa*, just the **meditative development of the applications of mindfulness** is mentioned at **the beginning for the comprehension of the four truths.**

[2] **Disquiet is made manifest through the body.** Disquiet (*dauṣṭhulya*) is [equivalent to] uneasiness (*duḥsthitatā*) because, while it is formatively influenced every day, the body is certainly changed; hence disquiet is made manifest through the body. Consequently, **one comprehends the truth of suffering through the investigation of the body.** As to why this is so, he says: **because [the body] is characterized by the formative forces together with disquiet**[8]. Since the formative forces, accompanied by disquiet, are the characteristic, i.e. the own-being, of the truth of suffering and disquiet is made manifest through the body, therefore, one comprehends the truth of suffering through the investigation of the body. However, since disquiet is not understood, he says: **for, disquiet consists in the painful nature of the formative forces.** Formative force refers to the arising of states [of existence]; and since it is the foundation of all ruin, it is disquiet. And this consists in suffering because it is repugnant to the Noble Ones. As has been said:

> This rebirth is unfortunate, for when there is birth, there are the enemies of old-age, death, disease, misfortune, murder, bondage and so on. These misfortunes would not occur if the body[9] did not originate, [just as] there would be no destruction through fire, wind and forest fires if trees did not arise.

On account of this, i.e. it is on account of the painful nature of the formative forces, and not on account of the painful nature of change nor the painful nature of suffering, because: (a) the latter two do not pervade and (b) they are the causes of the
Y168 painful nature of the formative forces. **The Noble Ones regard all impure entities in terms of suffering**[10] but not [entities] that are free from impurity because

5 Ms.(51a.7): *nirvāṇa-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.167.

6 Read: *abhinandanaṃ* in place of *abhimandanaṃ*; Tib. *mṅon par dga' źiṅ* (D270a.7).

7 Ms.(51b.1): *nirvāṇārthe* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.167.

8 Read: *tasya sadauṣṭhulyasaṃskāralakṣaṇatvād* in place of *talllakṣaṇasya hi sadauṣṭhulyasaṃskāra-tvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.9.

9 Read perhaps: *bahubhayo* in place of *avināśo*; Tib. (D270b.5): *'jig(s) maṅ* - literally: "that which is susceptible to many dangers"; this would appear to be an epithet for the physical body.

10 Read: *āryā duḥkhataḥ paśyanti* in place of *āryair duḥkhatvenālokitaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.10-11. This passage is omitted from the Ms. and has been inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.1 p.168.

the truth of the path is the counteragent to the arising[11] of rebirth. However, ordinary people[12] do not [regard impure entities in terms of suffering] because their mental disposition is impaired by erroneous inversion[13]. The following is stated in a Sūtra too: "In brief, suffering consists in the five aggregates that have been appropriated." Others believe that the painful nature of the formative forces is [equivalent to] the lack of pliability (*akarmaṇyatā*). Others again believe that disquiet does not consist in the lack of pliability[14]. What is the reason? The state of being accompanied by impurity should necessarily be acknowledged as having arisen from a causal 'seed' because the lack of pliability[15] is accompanied by impurity, however sometimes, even without a 'seed' [lack of pliability] exists in the mental continuum of an *arhat* due to a defect in diet, or environment[16] etc. and this does not have the capacity to become disquiet because it is free from impurity. Hence, it is the 'seed' of an impure *dharma* which lodges in the store-consciousness and is considered as disquiet in this context. This body, accompanied by [sensations that are] pleasurable, painful and neither pleasurable nor painful, is the result of that ['seed']. Therefore, disquiet is made manifest through the body which comes into being every moment accompanied by the state[17] of pleasure etc. The term ["made manifest"] is equivalent in meaning to 'made evident'. For example, a seed that has slipped into a crack in the floor of a granary [manifests][18] through its sprout. Therefore, one comprehends the truth of suffering through the investigation of the body. Here now he gives the reason: "because [the body] is characterized by the formative forces together with disquiet"[19]. What is meant is: because [suffering] consists in the formative forces together with their 'seeds'. For, the painful nature of the formative forces is described as disquiet[20] because: (a) it is associated with the disquiet of both the painful nature of change and the painful nature of suffering and (b) it is the cause of these two[21]. Hence, on account of the painful nature of the formative forces the Noble Ones regard all impure entities in terms of suffering[22]. In this way one comprehends the truth of suffering through the application of the mindfulness of the body.

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11 *skye ba* (*utpatti*) is only found in P.

12 Read: *pṛthagjanā* in place of *pṛthagjanair* assuming this sentence follows the same construction as Bhāṣya N50.10-11.

13 Ms.(51b) line 6 begins: *-yatvāt / sūtre 'py...*; cf. Y's fn.2 p.168.

14 Cf. Siddhi pp. 608 & 642 where *dauṣṭhulya* and *akarmaṇyatā* are discussed in depth.

15 Read: *akarmaṇyatāsāsravatvād* in place of *akarmaṇyatā sāsravatvād*; Tib. *las su mi ruṅ ba'i zag pa daṅ bcas pa'i phyir* (D271a.2).

16 Tib. inserts *daṅ gnas* (D271a.2) which is not found in the Ms.

17 Read perhaps: *-avasthā-* in place of *-avakāśa-*; Tib. *gnas skabs* (D271a.4).

18 Tib. inserts *mṅon pa* (D271a.5) which is not found in the Ms.

19 Read: *tasya sadauṣṭhulyasaṃskāralakṣaṇatvād* in place of *tallakṣaṇasya hi sadauṣṭhulyasaṃskāra-tvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.9.

20 *dauṣṭhulyam* but Tib. *'du byed kyi sdug bsṅal* = *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* (D271a.6).

21 Ms.(52a.2) reads simply: *kāraṇatvāc*, but Y's emendation to *tatkāraṇatvāc* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.168.

22 Read: *āryā duḥkhatayā paśyanti* in place of *āryair duḥkhatvenālokitam*; Tib. *'phags pa rnams kyis sdug bsṅal ñid du gzigs* (D271a.7) which is parallel to Bhāṣya N50.10 & D15b.7.

[3] **The cause of craving is sensation.** The intended meaning here is that it arises from contact which consists in ignorance, because [sensation] that is free from
Y169 impurity does not cause such[craving]. In this respect, a pleasurable sensation is the cause of the craving for connection with that [sensation] and non-separation from it. A painful [sensation] is the cause of the craving for separation from that [sensation] and non-connection with it. [A sensation that is] neither pleasurable nor painful is the cause of: (a) craving for the delight in that state and (b) craving for connection with that [sensation] and non-separation from it[23] in regard to any attainment. Even a painful sensation is a cause of craving for pleasure since it is said that: "one who has made contact[24] with a painful sensation rejoices in the pleasure of sensual delight." **One comprehends the truth of origination through the investigation of this.** While investigating sensation by way of essential nature, cause, effect, impermanence[25] and suffering, one indeed comprehends the truth of origination. What is meant is: one understands that craving is the effect of these [sensations]. In a Sūtra, craving is described as the truth of origination; in detail it is said: "What is the origination of suffering? It is the craving which leads to further existence and which is accompanied by the passion for joy."[26] In this way one comprehends the truth of origination through the application of the mindfulness of sensation.

[4] **Mind is the foundation for the notional attachment to the self.** Since there is no other self that is distinguished by the quality of permanence etc., the objective support for the notional attachment to the self is mind alone. Therefore, **through the investigation of this, one comprehends the truth of cessation,** i.e. as tranquillity. Here now he provides the reason: **due to the removal of the fear of self-annihilation.** For the notional attachment to the self is checked by investigating impermanence etc. in regard to mind, and its perception as suffering arises. Hence, due to the removal of the fear of self-annihilation, one comprehends the truth of cessation as tranquillity[27] because it is [equivalent to] the annihilation of suffering alone. In this way one comprehends the truth of cessation through the application of the mindfulness of mind[28].

[5] **Through the investigation of the *dharmas*, one comprehends the truth of the path due to the absence of confusion concerning the**

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23 Ms.(52a.4): *tatsaṃyogaviyoga-*, but Y's reading of *tatsaṃyogāviyoga-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.: *de daṅ phrad ciṅ mi 'bral bar* (D271b.2).

24 Ms.(52a.4) is not clear but substantiates a reading of *spṛṣṭaḥ*; cf. Y's fn.1 p.169.

25 Ms.(52a.5): *kāraṇato 'nityato* but Y's emendation to *kāraṇataḥ kāryato 'nityato* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.169.

26 Read: *tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagateti* in place of *tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikānandā rāgasahagateti*; Ms.(52a.6): *-kā nandīrāgasahagateti*. Tib. *yaṅ 'byuṅ ba'i sred pa dga' ba'i 'dod chags daṅ ldan pa* (D271b.4). Disregard Y's fn.3 p.169. Cf. Mahāvastu III p.332.5-6 and J.J.Jones: The Mahāvastu, Vol. III, p.324.

27 Ms.(52b.1): *-nāvataratīti*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.169.

28 Ms.(52b.1): *cittasmṛty-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.169.

dharmas pertinent to defilement and purification. Therein, the *dharmas* that pertain to defilement are the moral defilements and the secondary defilements; but those that pertain to purification, i.e. love and friendliness etc., are the counteragents to the
Y170 moral defilements and secondary defilements[29]. Having become aware of the nature of the [respective] adverse elements and counteragents to those [*dharmas*] that pertain to defilement and purification, one comes face to face with the expedient for the absolute relinquishment of all distress, i.e. the truth of the path. In this way one comprehends the truth of the path through the application of the mindfulness of the *dharmas*.

[6] "Comprehension" in the above refers to the understanding of the characteristic of truth in regard to each of the [four] truths. Therein, the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness of the body refers to [its understanding] as: (a) impermanent, painful, empty and insubstantial, (b) having many impure substances for its own-being, (c) the 'seed' of the impure, (d) the outflow of the impure, (e) the cause of continued existence of impurity, (f) a modification into impurity, (g) the absence of essence, like a mass of foam, (h) a state of existence and (i) a place of birth. Furthermore, the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness of sensation, mind and the *dharmas* refers to [their understanding] as: (a) impermanent, painful, empty and insubstantial, (b) an individual characteristic, (c) a universal characteristic[30], (d) a cause, (e) a result, (f) a realm of existence, spiritual level and state of existence, (g) wholesome, unwholesome and undefined and (h) adverse elements and counteragents. For the *bodhisattvas* however, the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness for the purpose of the relinquishment of conceptual differentiation is both in this way [as described] and is also in the aspect of non-perception. Although the applications of mindfulness have wisdom for their own-being, the term "applications of mindfulness" is so-called because [the wisdom elements] are applied by the force of mindfulness, or, mindfulness is applied by means of these [wisdom elements][31].

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29 P (117a) and D (272a.2-3): *rnam par byaṅ ba rnams ni ñe ba'i gñen por gyur ba rnams te / mi sdug pa daṅ byams pa la sogs pa.* This should be amended to: *rnam par byaṅ ba rnams ni ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñe ba'i ñon moṅs pa'i gñen por gyur ba rnams te / sdug pa daṅ.* Cf.Y's fn.1 p.170.

30 *sāmānyalakṣaṇato* (*spyi'i mtshan ñid daṅ*) is found in the Tib. (D272a.5), but is omitted from the Ms.

31 Cf. LVP Kośa VI.161.

b. The Four Correct Exertions[32]

N50.18 **Then, the meditative development of the correct exertions [is described] because:**

IV.2 abcd — **When there is the clear comprehension of adverse elements and their counteragents, in every respect, a fourfold vigour arises for their [respective] removal and encouragement[33].**

When there is clear comprehension of the adverse elements and their counteragents, in all modes, through the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness a fourfold vigour arises for : (a) the removal of the adverse elements and (b) the production of their counteragents. In detail, these are for the relinquishment of the evil unwholesome *dharmas* that have already arisen.

[Sthiramati]

Y170.18 [1] Immediately following the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness, the **meditative development of the correct exertions** is described. As to why, he says: **because...**

IV.2 a — **When there is the clear comprehension of adverse elements etc.**

...Through the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness. Although no distinction is made, it is to be understood that it is just through the
Y171 meditative development of the application of the mindfulness of the *dharmas*. **When there is clear comprehension of the adverse elements and their counteragents, in all modes**[34]; i.e. [in modes such as] the relinquishment of the realms of existence and spiritual levels and in aspects of the universal characteristic etc., and also, according to their differentiation as: impure, without impurity, realm of existence, spiritual level, one still in training and the adept etc.[35] **For: (a) the removal of the**

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32 The interchangeability of the two terms *samyakprahāṇa* and *samyakpradhāna* is noted in BHSD (pp.308 & 389). For the sake of consistency I have translated both terms as "correct exertion" here because it is essentially their vigorous and effortful nature that is brought out in this context.

33 Nagao notes that *tadapāyāya* is to be resolved as *tadapāya-āya* although the Tib. translator reads it as a Dative form of *apāya* (*de dag spaṅ phyir*). Cf. N50, fn.3.

34 Read: *sarvaprakāraṃ* as per Ms.(52b.7) in place of *sarvaprakāra-*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.21.

35 Read: *dhātubhūmiprahāṇaiḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇādyākārais tathā sāsravānāsravadhātubhūmi-śaikṣāśaikṣādibhedena ca* in place of *dhātubhūmyavakāśaiḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇādyākārais tathā sāsravānāsravadhātubhūmiśaikṣāśaikṣādyākārais tathā āsravānāsravadhātubhūmiśaikṣāśaikṣā-dibhedena ca*; Tib. *khams daṅ sa'i spaṅs pa daṅ / spyi'i mtshan ñid la sogs pa'i rnam pa daṅ / de bźin du zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / zag pa med pa daṅ / khams daṅ / sa daṅ / slob pa daṅ / mi slob*

adverse elements; the removal of adverse elements[36] here signifies the breaking of the continuity of those that have already arisen and the non-generation of those that have not yet arisen. **And (b) the production of their counteragents**[37]; the production of their counteragents is [equivalent to] the continuing supply of those that have already arisen and the generation of those that have not yet arisen. **A fourfold vigour**[38] **arises**[39], i.e. a fourfold vigour arises according to its differentiation as an adverse element or counteragent, which has already arisen or has not yet arisen. **In detail, these are for the relinquishment of the evil, unwholesome *dharmas* that have already arisen.** By this he shows the fourfold arising of vigour in accordance with scriptural tradition. The term "in detail" refers to additional text; this is the additional text: For the relinquishment [of evil unwholesome elements that have already arisen][40] one generates will-power, makes endeavour, undertakes with vigour, 'seizes' the mind and strives with correct effort. Thus, in detail: one generates will-power for the non-production of the evil, unwholesome *dharmas* that have not yet arisen. Similarly, in detail: one generates will-power for the production of the wholesome *dharmas* that have not yet arisen. For the maintenance, increase, [non-deprivation][41] and completion of the wholesome *dharmas* that have already arisen, one generates will-power, makes endeavour, undertakes with vigour, 'seizes' the mind and strives with correct effort. The maintenance of those that have arisen refers to their non-decrease[42]. Increase is [equivalent to] continuous production; completion is [equivalent to] culmination. By the words: "one generates will-power", he shows that it is an earnest application of the meditative development of vigour[43]. By "one makes endeavour" is meant: one focuses on the body and mind for the relinquishment of laziness[44]. "One undertakes with vigour", in order to dispel both indolence and excitabil-
Y172 ity. How does one undertake? By 'seizing' the sluggish mind through the mental attentions directed towards the *dharmas* that are both perceptible[45] and agreeable. When the mind is enhanced[46] it strives with correct effort towards just that objective

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pa la sogs pa'i bye brag gis (D272b.2). Y's rendering appears to follow P which is clearly incorrect.

36 *vipakṣāpagamo* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D272b.3.

37 Read: *pratipakṣopagamāya ca* in place of *pratipakṣāgamāya ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.22.

38 Read: *vīryaṃ caturdhā* in place of *vīryacaturdhā*; cf. Bhāṣya N50.22.

39 *pravartate*, but Bhāṣya *saṃpravartate* (cf. N50.23).

40 Tib. inserts: *sdig pa mi dge ba'i chos skyes pa rnams* (D272b.5) which is not found in the Ms.

41 *asaṃpramoṣāya* is not found in either P or D; presumably it has been inserted here by Y because it is traditionally included with this group (cf. Mvy. #961)

42 Read: *aparihāṇiḥ* as per Ms.(54a.4) in place of *aparihāriṇiḥ*; Tib. *yoṅs su mi ñams pa* (D272b.7).

43 Read perhaps: *sagauravavīryabhāvanāprayogaṃ* in place of *sagauravodyuktavīryasamṛddhiṃ*; Tib. *gus par brtson 'grus bsgom pa'i sbyor ba* (D273a.1). Cf. Y172.20. Y's reconstruction here is probably based on P: *gus par brtson 'grus brtson pa'i 'byor ba* (118b.1).

44 Tib. is slightly different: "...while relinquishing laziness"; *...le lo spaṅs te* (D273a.1).

45 Ms.(54a.5): *saṃvejanīya-*, but Y's emendation to *saṃvedanīya-* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.172.

46 Read: *uddhate citte* in place of *uddhataṃ cittam*; Tib. *sems rgod par gyur na* (D273a.2).

support; what is meant is: it holds fast through the mental attentions directed towards the *dharmas* that are both perceptible and agreeable[47]. Thus it is shown that the correct exertions[48] have the nature of vigour and they are [described as] correct exertions (*samyakpradhāna*) since they correctly (*samyak*) hold (*dhārayanti*) body, speech and mind by means of these [correct exertions].

c. The Four Bases of Psychic Power.

N51.2 IV.3 abcd

The pliability of stability in the context of the latter leads to power in all matters - it follows from the cultivation of the eight formative forces for the relinquishment of the five faults.

The pliability of the stability of mind in the context of that meditative development of the vigour for the removal and production of those [*dharmas*][49] consists in the four bases of psychic power because they are the causes of mental power in all subjects. Stability, which refers to the stability of mind here, should be known as meditative concentration. Hence, the bases of psychic power follow immediately after the correct exertions. Furthermore, this pliability is to be known as following from the meditative development of the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment leading to the relinquishment of the five faults.

[Sthiramati]

[1]

Y172.8 IV.3 a

The pliability of stability in the context of the latter[50] etc.

The pliability of the stability of mind in the context of the latter, i.e. in the context of that meditative development of vigour for the removal and

47 Tib. omits: *saṃvedanīyapramodanīyadharmamanaskārair*; cf. D273a.2.

48 Read: *samyakpradhānāni* as per Ms.(54a.6) in place of Y's *samyakprahāṇāni* which is in agreement with the Tib. (D273a.2). Cf. my fn.32 above.

49 *tadapāyāya*; the Tib. translator has again misunderstood this compound by translating it as *de spaṅ ba'i phyir* (D16a.5). Cf. my fn.33 above.

50 Read: *karmaṇyatā sthites tatra* in place of *sthitikarmaṇyatā tatra*; cf. Bhāṣya N51.2.

production of adverse elements and their counteragents[51]; pliability[52] is [equivalent to] the capacity for mental power in all subjects and this pliability comes about under the influence of will-power, vigour, mind and examination. Hence he says: **pliability consists in the four bases of psychic power.** Psychic power is [equivalent to] mental power in all subjects such as the higher knowledges. These are the bases of psychic power in the sense that they are the support for it - what is meant is: the bases of psychic power are the causes of psychic power[53]. Hence he says: **because they are the causes of mental power.** Moreover, they are: (a) the base of psychic power associated with the formative force that facilitates relinquishment and which consists in the meditative concentration of will-power. (b) The base of psychic power associated with the formative force that facilitates relinquishment and which consists in the meditative concentration of vigour. (c) The base of psychic power associated with the formative force that facilitates relinquishment and which consists in the meditative concentration of mind. (d) The base of psychic power associated with the formative force that facilitates relinquishment and which consists in the meditative concentration of examination. Of these, (a) the meditative concentration of will-power occurs when one attains single-pointedness of mind while earnestly engaging in the meditative development of vigour under the influence of will-power. (b) The meditative concentration of vigour occurs when one attains single-pointedness of mind while undertak-
Y173 ing with vigour due to continual application. (c) The meditative concentration of mind occurs when one attains single-pointedness of mind while holding the mind on mind alone owing to the 'seed' of previous meditative concentration. (d) The meditative concentration of examination occurs when one who has thoroughly analysed the objective support attains single-pointedness of mind. **Stability, which refers to the stability of mind here, should be known as meditative concentration;** the reference to meditative concentration is for the purpose of distinguishing this from those [states] characterized by the conditioned elements. The pliability of mind[54] pertinent to one who has undertaken with vigour consists in the four bases of psychic power; **hence**[55]**, the bases of psychic power are explained immediately following the correct exertions. Furthermore, this pliability** - as to its purpose[56] and cause, he says: - **is to be known as following from**[57] **the medi-**

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51 Read: *tasyāṃ vipakṣapratipakṣāpāyāgamavīrya-* as per Ms.(54a.7) in place of *tasyāṃ vipakṣāpagamavīrya-*; cf. Bhāṣya N51.4. The Tib., which is the basis of Y's emendation, is most likely incorrect as the result of the mis-reading as noted above (cf. my fns. 33 & 49).

52 Tib. (D273a.4) inserts *las su ruṅ ba ñid* (= *karmaṇyatā*) which is not found in the Ms.

53 Read: *tasyāḥ pratiṣṭhārthena ṛddhipādā ṛddhipādā ṛddhihetava ity arthaḥ* as per Ms.(54b.1) in place of *tasyāḥ pratiṣṭhārthena ṛddhipādā ṛddhihetava ity arthaḥ* and contrary to Y's fn.6 p.172; it appears that the Tib. translator has abbreviated this passage; cf. Y's fn.6.

54 Ms.(54b.4): *cittasthi-*, but Y's emendation to *cittakar*(*maṇyatā*) is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.1 p.173.

55 Read: *ataḥ* in place of *tata*; cf. Bhāṣya N51.6.

56 Read: *kiṃprayojanā* as per Ms.(54b.5) in place of *kiṃprayojanam.*

57 Ms.(54b.5): *-bhāvanānvayā*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.173.

tative development of the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment leading to the relinquishment of the five faults. The term "following from" is [equivalent in meaning to] 'cause'[58].

The Five Faults.

N51.10 **Which are the five faults? He says:**

IV.4 abcd — **(a) Laziness, (b) the forgetting of instructions, (c) indolence and excitability[59], (d) the absence of formative influence and (e) formative influence - these are considered as the five faults.**

In the above, indolence and excitability are made one fault. The absence of formative influence is a fault at the time of the tranquillization of indolence and excitability. Formative influence [is a fault] at [the time of] tranquillity.

[Sthiramati]

Y173.11 [1] Since these five faults are not known, he asks: **which are the five faults?**[60] In order to demonstrate them he says:

IV.4 ab — **(a) Laziness, (b) the forgetting of instructions, (c) indolence and excitability[61] etc.**

Since these faults number six, he says: **in the above, indolence and excitability are made one fault** - thus there are five. Of these, laziness is a fault at the time of application because the absence of application is on account of it. The forgetting of instructions is a fault on the part of one who has undertaken [to act] because the absence of the concentration of mind is on account of it. Indolence / excitability is a fault on the part of one whose mind is concentrated because the absence of pliability of mind is on account of this. **The absence of formative influence is a fault at**

58 The Tib. for this final section (Y173.7-9) is slightly different: "...what is its cause? Hence he says: **...is to be known as following from the cause which is the meditative development of the formative forces for the relinquishment of the five faults** (cf. D273b.3).

59 Read: *uddhavaḥ* as per the Ms. in place of *uddhataḥ*; cf. N's fn.5 p.51.

60 Read: *katame pañca doṣāḥ* in place of *ka ete pañca doṣāḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N51.10.

61 Read: *uddhavaḥ* as per Ms.(54b.6) in place of *udbhavaḥ*. Cf. also N's fn.5 p.51 of the Bhāṣya where he rejects his Ms. reading of *uddhavaḥ*, although this reading is probably correct.

the time[62] of [the tranquillization of][63] indolence and excitability; the absence of formative influence is [equivalent to] indifference because the absence of the tranquillization of these two is on account of that. Formative influence [is a fault] at [the time of] tranquillity; [the word] "fault" remains in force. Formative influence consists in volition, for it is said that tranquillity is due to the attainment of 'sameness'(*samatā*) which is because of the removal of indolence and excitability.

The Eight Formative Forces that Facilitate Relinquishment.

N51.16 **How are the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment respectively determined for the relinquishment of those [faults]? Four are for the relinquishment of laziness, namely: (a) will-power, (b) effort, (c) faith and (d) quiescence. Moreover, these should be known sequentially as:**

IV.5 ab — **(a) The basis, (b) that which is based on it, (c) the cause of the former and (d) the result;**

(a) Will-power is the basis of effort. (b) Effort is that which is based [on will-power]. (c) Faith is the cause of that basis, i.e. will-power, because there is an eagerness in one who has firm belief. (d) Quiescence is the result of that which is based [on will-power], i.e. effort, because one who undertakes with vigour attains a special meditative concentration.

N52 **There are four remaining formative forces that facilitate relinquishment, namely, (a) mindfulness, (b) full awareness, (c) volition and (d) equanimity which are the counteragents to the [other] four faults as enumerated. Furthermore, they should be known sequentially, beginning with mindfulness:**

IV.5 cdef — **(a) the non-loss[64] of the objective support, (b) the understanding of indolence and excitability, (c) the formative influence for the removal of the latter and (d) the employment of meditative calm when appeasement occurs.**

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62 -*avasthāyām* here, but Bhāṣya (N51.14): *kāle*; Tib. *tshe* here (D273b.6) but Bhāṣya (D16a.7): *dus na*.

63 Tib. Ṭīkā omits *praśamana*; cf. D273b.6 and also Y's fn.5 p.173.

64 Read perhaps: *'sampramoṣo* for metrical reasons in place of *'sammoṣo*; cf. Nagao's fn.3 p.52.

(a) Mindfulness is the non-loss of the objective support. (b) Full awareness is the understanding of indolence and excitability when there is no loss of mindfulness. (c) Volition is the formative influence for the removal of the latter [two] after they have been understood. (d) The employment of meditative calm refers to the equanimity of mind that occurs when that indolence and excitability are appeased.

[Sthiramati]

Y174.4 [1] [The term]: 'formative forces that facilitate relinquishment' (*prahāṇa-saṃskārāḥ*)[65] is [resolved as]: 'formative forces that lead to relinquishment (*prahāṇāya saṃskārāḥ*) [i.e. as a *tatpuruṣa* compound]. They are for the relinquishment of what? For the relinquishment of the five faults that have just been described. If so, then this should be stated: **How are the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment respectively determined for the relinquishment of those**[66] **[faults]? Of these, four are for the relinquishment of laziness, namely: (a) will-power, (b) effort, (c) faith and (d) quiescence.** Will-power therein is [equivalent to] eagerness; effort is [equivalent to] vigour; faith is [equivalent to] firm belief; and quiescence is [equivalent to] pliability. Just how are they respectively determined as leading to the relinquishment of laziness? Hence he says: **moreover, these should be known sequentially as:**

IV.5 ab **(a) The basis, (b) that which is based on it, (c) the cause of the former and (d) the result;**

Hence he shows that they are conducive to the relinquishment of laziness because they arise[67] one from the other. **(a) Will-power is the basis of effort. (b) Effort is that which is based [on will-power],** because eagerness is preceded by effort. **(c) Faith is the cause of that basis**[68]**, i.e. will-power...** How so? He says: **...because there is an eagerness in one who has firm belief**, for, one who possesses faith in regard to the cause and result is eager to act. **Quiescence is the result of that which is based [on will-power], i.e. effort.** How so? He says: **...because one who undertakes with vigour attains a special meditative concentration**; for the attainment of a special meditative concentration is the cause of quiescence. Hence quiescence is described as the result of effort because one who undertakes with vigour attains a special meditative concentration.

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65 *prahāṇasaṃskārāh* is inserted on the basis of the Tib. and is not found in the Ms; cf. Y's fn.1 p.174.

66 Read: *eṣām* in place of *teṣām*; cf.Bhāṣya N51.16.

67 *prabhāvitatvād*; Tib. *'byuṅ bas* (D274a.2).

68 Read: *tasyāśrayasya cchandasya* in place of *tasyāśrayacchandasya*; Ms.(55a.4): *-yasya cchanda-sya*. Cf. Bhāṣya N51.20-21.

For thus, joy arises in one who has undertaken with vigour due to the absence of the fault of conceptual differentiation that consists in disquiet[69]. The quiescence of body and mind that results from a joyous mind has the characteristic[70] of pliability; consequently, it is described as: "the attainment of a special meditative concentration". Y175 Moreover, in this context, it is vigour together with its cause and result that is described as the counteragent[71] to laziness.

[2] [**The remaining four formative forces that facilitate relinquishment, namely: (a) mindfulness, (b) full awareness, (c) volition and (d) equanimity are] the counteragents to the [other] four faults as enumerated.** Of these, mindfulness is the counteragent to the forgetting of instructions. Full awareness is [the counteragent] to indolence and excitability. Volition is [the counteragent] to the absence of formative influence. Equanimity is [the counteragent] to formative influence; in this context it is the equanimity that consists in the formative forces that is to be understood. Moreover, since he wishes to discuss the characteristic of mindfulness etc. here, he says: **furthermore, they should be known sequentially, beginning with mindfulness.** [mindfulness refers to:]

IV.5 c **(a) non-loss of an objective support etc.**

(a) Mindfulness is the non-loss of an objective support; what is meant is: the expression of the content of an instruction conducive to the stability of mind[72]. **Full awareness is the understanding of indolence and excitability when there is no loss of mindfulness**, for, one for whom mindfulness is present possesses full awareness; this why he says: "when there is no loss of mindfulness". **After they are understood**, i.e. indolence and excitability; what is meant is: [full awareness] arises effortlessly due to the coupling of the two, i.e. meditative calm and penetrating insight. By "equanimity" is meant: the absence of formative influence in regard to other objects. This is what is being said: one for whom mindfulness is present understands the sluggish or excited mind, as it is in reality, when instruction [is given]; and in order to be rid of indolence and excitability he formatively influences that [mind]. Also, due to the disappearance of both indolence and excitability, equanimity is created . Thus the meditative calm that belongs to the mind of such a person

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69 Ms.(55a.5): *dauṣṭhulyavitarkādyaprakṣālavigamā-*, but Y's emendation to *dauṣṭhulyavikalpa–doṣavigamāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.174.

70 Read: *-lakṣaṇā* as per Ms.(55a.6) in place of *-lakṣaṇatā*.

71 Read: *-pratipakṣatvenoktam* as per Ms.(55a.6) in place of *-pratipakṣenoktam*.

72 Read [Y175.6-8]: te punah smṛtyādayo veditavyā yathākramam iti / [smṛtir] ālambane 'sam(pra)moṣa IV.5 c iti *vistaraḥ* / *smṛtir ālambane 'sampramoṣa iti cittasthāpanīya*avavādavastvabhilapanam ity arthaḥ
in place of: te punah smṛtyādayo veditavyā yathākramam iti / smṛtir ālambane 'sammoṣa iti *vistarīkṛta ālambanam iti cittasthāpanīyam* āvavādavastv abhilapanam ity arthaḥ.
Cf. Ms.(55a.7-55b.1): ...*yathākramam ālambane asammoṣa i- -yavavādavastv abhilapanam* contrary to Y's fn.3 p.175. The Tib. replaces *avavādavastvabhilapanam* with *gdams ṅag yid kyis brjod* (D274b.1).

is [described as] pliability. Moreover, in regard to the inherent meaning of the statement "the stability of pliability", the suffix of state [i.e. the *tā* of *karmaṇyatā*] is just like 'hard-ness' etc. [i.e. the *-tva* of *khakkhaṭa-tva*][73].

d. The Five Faculties.

N52.11 **The five faculties beginning with faith [were listed] immediately after the bases of psychic power. How are they respectively established?**

IV.6 abcd **When the elements that are conducive to liberation are fostered, it is due to the influence of: (a) will-power, (b) application, (c) non-loss[74] of the objective support, (d) non-diffusion and (e) analysis.**

The words: "from the influence of" remain in force [in each case]. When the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation has been fostered by the bases of psychic power in one who has mental pliability, it is due to: (a) the influence of will-power, (b) the influence of application, (c) the influence of the non-loss of the objective support, (d) the influence of non-diffusion and (e) the influence of thorough analysis. The five faculties beginning with faith should be known in sequential order.

[Sthiramati]

Y176 [1] It is the fact that **the five faculties beginning with faith were** described **immediately after the bases of psychic power** that is referred to. **How are they respectively established?** The intended meaning is: in what sense [are they respectively established]? Hence he says:

IV.6 ab **When the elements that are conducive to liberation are fostered, it is due to the influence of: (a) will-power, (b) application etc.**

73 *svapeṭa-* is incorrect. The Ms.(55b.3) is not clear although the first syllable is definitely *kha*. For *khakkhaṭatva* cf. Mvy. #1842; this sentence is omitted from the Tib.

74 Read perhaps: *'sampramoṣa*; cf. fn.64 above.

The words: **"due to the influence of"**[75] **remain in force [in each case]**; by this statement he shows that the term "influence" employed here, i.e. in the phrase "it is due to the influence of: (a) will-power, (b) application...", remains in force for each subsequent [faculty] as well. **When the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation has been fostered**[76] **by the bases of psychic power in one who has mental pliability...**; the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation finds a support in the mental continuum[77] of one who has mental pliability. **...It is due to: (a) the influence of will-power** etc., concluding with **(e) the influence of thorough analysis**; but not in one who does not have mental pliability. Moreover, this mental pliability comes about through the bases of psychic power. Therefore, immediately after the bases of psychic power, the five faculties beginning with faith are respectively determined as being due to the influence of the fostering of the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation. It is actually faith that is referred to by the term "will-power" in the statement: "...from the influence of will-power", for, the effect is expressed figuratively here in regard to the cause [i.e. will-power is the cause of faith]. Just as, for example, [the eating of] yoghurt and melon [which is the cause] is [figuratively described as] a sudden fever. Alternatively, belief, serene faith, and eagerness respecively with regard to existence, the possession of virtue[78] and ability are the characteristics of faith. Hence, through the reference to will-power[79] in this context, it is actually faith as characterized by eagerness that is referred to and not will-power. **(b) The influence of application**; it is application (*prayoga*) since one applies oneself (*prayujyate*) by means of this. By the word 'application', it is vigour that is intended. **(c) The influence of the non-loss**[80] **of the objective support**; i.e. due to the influence of the faculty of mindfulness. The faculty of mindfulness is characterized by the distinct expression of the objective support[81]. **(d) The influence of non-diffusion**; i.e. due to the influence of the faculty of meditative concentration, for, non-diffusion consists in the faculty of meditative concentration because this is characterized by single-pointedness of mind. **And**
Y177 **(e) the influence of thorough analysis**; i.e. due to the influence of the faculty of wisdom because the faculty of wisdom has the nature of the thorough analysis of the *dharmas*. The word "and" shows that **the five faculties beginning with faith**[82] **should be known in sequential order** because they are the influences in the

75 Read: *ādhipatyata* as per Ms.(55b.4) and Bhāṣya N52.15 in place of *adhipatyata*

76 Read: *karmaṇyacittasyāropite mokṣabhāgīye kuśalamūla iti* in place of *karmaṇyacittasya mokṣabhāgīyakuśalamūlaropaṇasyeti*; cf. Bhāṣya N52.15-16.

77 Read: *cittasaṃtāne* as per Ms.(55b.5) in place of *cittasaṃdhāne*; Tib. *sems kyi rgyud la* (D274b.6).

78 Tib.: *yon tan can* (D275a.2).

79 Ms.(55b.7): *cchanda-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.176.

80 Read: *-asampramoṣa-* in place of *-asaṃmoṣa-*; cf. Bhāṣya N52.17.

81 Ms.(57a.1): *-mbanābhilapana-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.176.

82 Ms.(57a.2): *pañca śraddhā-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.177.

fostering of the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation[83]. One who has faith undertakes with vigour in order to escape from the prison of *saṃsāra*, and, since one who has undertaken with vigour[84] accomplishes the three teachings, the faculties of mindfulness, meditative concentration and wisdom follow in sequential order. Thus, at the level of application on the path of vision, the faculties are considered to be of central importance.

[2] However, others believe that faith etc. are not faculties because they influence the nourishment of the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation. Rather, they are described as faculties because when the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation is nourished, faith etc. exercise influence. It is in order to demonstrate just this that he says: "due to the influence of will-power", faith is a faculty; the latter is to be supplied. Application is [equivalent to] performance. Not forgetting [or non-loss; *asaṃmoṣa*; *asaṃpramoṣa*] is [equivalent to] the non-disappearance of the objective support. Non-diffusion is [equivalent to] non-dispersion. Analysis[85] is [equivalent to] thorough analysis. The mental concomitants called vigour, mindfulness, meditative concentration and wisdom are termed faculties because of their influence over application, non-forgetfullness, non-diffusion and thorough analysis. However, the following should be stated in this regard: when the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation has been nourished there is no difference in own-being, in comparison with the unnourised state[86], between the influence of will-power etc. and faith etc.[87] because at that time they are established as faculties due to their influence over it [i.e. the root of the wholesome].

e. The Five Powers.

N52.21 **These same [elements], i.e. faith etc., are described as the powers when they possess power. Moreover, their possession of power is:**

IV.7 a — **due to the curbing of adverse elements;**

83 Disregard Y's fn.1 p.177 since the Ms.(57a.2) does not substantiate the reading of *pakṣabhāgīya-*.

84 Ms.(57a.2): *ārabdhavīryasya*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.177.

85 Read: *vicayaḥ* in place of *pravicayaḥ* since this passage seems to be explaining the individual terms listed in verse IV.6 cd.

86 Read: *'ropitāvasthātaś* as per Ms.(57a.5) in place of *ropitāvasthātaś*.

87 The Tib. is worded differently: "When the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation is either nourished or unnourished, there is no difference in own-being between the influence of will-power etc. and faith etc." *thar pa'i cha dan mthun pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba bskyed pa dan ma bskyed pa gñis kyi dus na 'dun pa la sogs pa dban byed pa dan / dad pa la sogs pa ran bžin du bye brag tu gyur pa gan yan med de* (D275b.3).

N53 When they are not intermixed with adverse elements such as lack of faith. Why is there an initial and subsequent explanation of faith etc.? Because:

IV.7 b — the latter is the result of the former;

For, one who possesses faith undertakes with vigour in regard to cause and result. Mindfulness is present for one who has undertaken with vigour ; the mind of one for whom mindfulness is present becomes concentrated; one whose mind is concentrated understands [phenomena] as they are in reality. The faculties that pertain to the elements which are conducive to liberation, and which have been nourished, have now been described.

Now, should the elements that are conducive to penetration be known as being in the state of a 'faculty' or in the state of a 'power'?

IV.7 cd — The elements conducive to penetration are in twos, i.e. both faculties and powers.

The [state of] heat and the summit are faculties; the receptivities and highest mundane realizations are powers.

[Sthiramati]

Y177.22 [1] **These same [elements], i.e. faith etc., which are discussed immediately after the faculties, are described as the powers when they possess power.** Moreover, their possession of power is due to what? Hence he says:

IV.7 a — **Due to the curbing of adverse elements;**

Y178 Because the adverse elements are curbed. In order to demonstrate just this, he says: **when these faculties such as faith are not intermixed with adverse elements such as lack of faith**, i.e. with lack of faith[88], laziness, forgetfulness, distraction[89] and lack of full awareness which are adverse to faith etc.; what is meant is: they do not intermingle [with adverse elements] because, being extremely attenuated they do not manifest time and again - at that time they are described as 'powers'. These faculties are intermixed with adverse elements at that time because the elements that are adverse to them have not been erased.

[2] If the faculties are possessed of adverse elements that have not been subdued, how then, can faith etc. be described as 'faculties' by way of the influence of mundane purity in [Chapter III.10 titled] 'The Reality of the Skills'? Because in that section the faculties

88 Ms.(57a.7): *iti / āśraddhya-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.178.

89 Ms.(57a.7): *-vikṣepa-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.178.

are intended as being without differentiation but here they are differentiated in order to demonstrate the differentiation of the root of the wholesome which is conducive to penetration - therefore there is no contradiction. Only hence does he say: "these same faculties ...are described as 'powers'".

[3] **For, one who possesses faith undertakes with vigour in regard to the cause and result**[90]; i.e. he connects the cause with its respective result and vice versa. Thus, because of his faith in the result, one who possesses faith undertakes with vigour in regard to the cause. **Mindfulness is present for one who has undertaken with vigour** because it depends upon the latter[91]. **The mind of one for whom mindfulness is present becomes concentrated,** i.e. it becomes single-pointed because there is no distraction. **One whose mind is concentrated understands [phenomena] as they are in reality;** i.e. the wisdom that is assisted by meditative concentration becomes pure. **The faculties that pertain to the elements which are conducive to liberation, and which have been nourished**[92]**, have now been described.**

[4] The elements which are conducive to penetration follow immediately after the elements which are conducive to liberation and the powers follow immediately after the faculties, hence this should be stated: **should the elements conducive to penetration be known as being in the state of a 'faculty' or in the state of a 'power'**[93]? Similarly, do the essential natures of the faculties and the powers consist
Y179 in the elements that are conducive to penetration, or are their essential natures separate from them? Hence, [answering] all of these [questions] he says:

IV.7 cd **The elements conducive to penetration are in twos: both faculties and powers.**

Alternatively, in the same way that the elements that are conducive to liberation are characterized by the meditative development of the counteragent, or are characterized by faith etc., so too are the elements that are conducive to penetration; consequently, he says: "the faculties that pertain to the elements which are conducive to liberation, and which have been nourished[94], have now been described etc." Hence he then says: "the elements conducive to penetration are in twos".

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90 Read: *hetuphalaṃ* as per Ms.(57b.2) in place of *hetuphale*; cf. Bhāṣya N53.4.
91 *tatparatvāt* is omitted from the Tib. (cf. D276a.2).
92 Read: *avaropitamokṣa-* in place of *ropitavimokṣa-*; cf. Bhāṣya N53.6.
93 Ms.(57b.4): *balāva-*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.178.
94 Read: *avaropita-* in place of *ropita-*; cf. Bhāṣya N53.6.

[5] **The [states of] heat[95] and the summit are faculties;** they are definitely faculties because these [roots of the][96] wholesome are feeble since it is untenable[97] that there are powers[98] among them. **The receptivities and highest mundane realizations are powers.** The receptivities and highest mundane realizations are definitely powers for it is impossible that these can be faculties because of their strength. Moreover, faith etc. are threefold according to their differentiation as weak, middling and strong. The weak and middling of these are the faculties and the strong are the powers. Those that are weak are the [states of] heat; the middling are the summits. However the strong therein are divided into four: the weak, the middling and the strong are, respectively, the weak, middling and strong receptivities; while the strongest of the strong are the highest mundane realizations. Moreover, all[99] of these elements that are conducive to penetration[100], together with their associated elements, have meditative concentration and wisdom for their essential nature; the aspect of heat in the latter is the [state of] heat. For example, from the rubbing together of kindling sticks, heat is produced which is the first mark of the arising (*utpatti-cihna*) of the fire which has the capacity to burn that [fuel]. Similarly, the [state of] heat is so-called[101] because its nature precedes the 'fire' of the noble path which has the capacity to
Y180 consume the 'fuel' of all moral defilement. The summit [is so-called] since it extends up until the summit away from fickle roots of the wholesome. The receptivities [are so-called] because they consist in perseverance in the meaning of the [four] truths. The highest mundane realizations are so-called because they are accompanied by impurity and also because they are foremost among the other impure *dharmas*. Their pre-eminence is due to the fact that the origination of the path of vision occurs immediately after [the realization of] them. Moreover, they are momentary, [whereas] the other elements that are conducive to penetration are continuous. In the above, the root of the wholesome [the realization of] which is conducive to liberation, should be known as the *yoga* that destroys the power that causes *saṃsāra* to come into being. [The realization of] those conducive to penetration [should be known] as the *yoga* that generates the power for the arising of *dharmas* that are not accompanied by impurity.

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95 Ṭīkā: *uṣmagatāni* but Bhāṣya (N53.10): *uṣmagataṃ*.

96 Tib. (D276a.7): *rtsa ba* which is not found in the Ms.

97 Ms.(57b.6): *asvatantratvād* but Y's emendation to *ayuktatvād* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.179.

98 Tib. omits *balānām*; cf. D276a.7.

99 Ms.(56a.1): *sarvāṇy e-* but Y's emendation to *sarvāṇi* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D276b.3.

100 Ms.(56a.1): *nirvedha-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.179.

101 Ms.(56a.2): *ucyante* but Y's emendation to *ucyate* is preferred.

f. The Seven Limbs of Enlightenment.

N53.13 The limbs of enlightenment follow immediately after the powers. How are they established?

IV.8 abcd (a) The limb of the basis, (b) the limb of own-being, (c) the limb of setting forth is the third, (d) the limb of advantage is the fourth and (e) the limb of the absence of defilement is considered as threefold.

The limbs of enlightenment refer to the limbs that lead to enlightenment on the path of vision. Of these, (a) the limb of the basis of enlightenment refers to mindfulness. (b) The limb of own-being refers to the analysis of the *dharmas*. (c) The limb of setting forth refers to vigour. (d) The limb of advantage refers to delight. (e) The limb of the absence of defilement which is threefold refers to: quiescence, meditative concentration and equanimity. But why is the limb of the absence of defilement taught as threefold?

N54 IV.9 ab It is taught by way of: (a) the underlying cause, (b) the basis and (c) the own-being;

(a) The underlying cause of the absence of defilement refers to quiescence because defilement is caused by disquiet and [quiescence] is the counteragent to the latter. (b) The basis refers to meditative concentration. (c) The own-being refers to equanimity.

[Sthiramati]

Y180.10 [1] Since the path of vision arises immediately after the highest [mundane] realizations and because it is characterized by the limbs of enlightenment, he says: the limbs of enlightenment follow immediately after the powers. How are they established[102]? The intended meaning is: for what purpose are they established? Hence he says:

IV.8 a (a) The limb of the basis, (b) the limb of own-being etc.

The limbs of enlightenment refer to the limbs that lead to enlightenment on the path of vision. It is [described as] vision (*darśana*) since [the aspirant] has

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102 Read: *teṣāṃ kathaṃ vyavasthānam* in place of *katham etāni vyavasthāpyanta*; cf. Bhāṣya N53.13.

the perception, for the very first time, of a reality that was previously unseen; and since it causes the attainment of the noble spiritual levels it is the path (*mārga*); hence it is described as the path of vision (*darśana-mārga*). For, in the state of [the realization of] the elements that are conducive to penetration[103], the [four] truths are perceived as though concealed by a fine silken cloth; [whereas] in the state of the path of vision, it is as though that [cloth] has been removed. In the above, enlightenment[104], which refers to the perfect comprehension of reality, consists in the direct intuition that is free from conceptual differentiation. With regard to that, the six beginning with mindfulness are [described as] its limbs because they are in conformity with enlightenment. However, the analysis of the *dharmas* is [equivalent to] enlightenment because it has the nature of understanding[105] and it is a 'limb' because it is a 'companion' to the others[106]. Another [school] believes that the analysis of the *dharmas*, which is included in the path that brings an immediate result (*ānantarya-mārga*), is [only] a limb of enlightenment but that [analysis] which is included in the path of liberation (*vimukti-mārga*) is [equivalent to] enlightenment.

Y181 [2] **Of these, (a) the limb of the basis of enlightenment**[107] **refers to mindfulness;** because the absence of distraction in regard to an objective support is through the force of mindfulness. **(b) The limb of own-being refers to the analysis of the *dharmas*;** because enlightenment has direct intuition for its own-being[108]. **(c) The limb of setting forth refers to vigour;** because the level of ordinary people is completely transcended through vigour. **(d) The limb of advantage refers to delight;** because the benefits to body and mind[109] are on account of this. **(e) The limb of the absence of defilement which is threefold refers to: quiescence, meditative concentration and equanimity** because these are counteragents to defilement. Alternatively, it is because they are differentiated as the underlying cause, the basis and the own-being of the absence of defilement.

[3] **But why is the limb of the absence of defilement taught as threefold?** The intended meaning is: in what sense is it taught as threefold? Hence he says:

103 Ms.(56a.6): *nirvedha-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.180.

104 Read: *bodhir nirvikalpam* as per Ms.(56a.6) in place of *bodhinirvikalpam*.

105 Ms.(56a.7): *-nabodhātmakatvād* but Y's reading of *(ava)bodhātmakatvād* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D277a.4.

106 Tib.: *de dag gis grogs su gyur pas*; cf. D277a.4.

107 Ms.(56a.7): *bodher ā-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.181.

108 Tib. omits *jñāna* reading simply: "because this is the own-being of enlightenment"; *byaṅ chub kyi ṅo bo ñid yin pa'i phyir* (D277a.5).

109 Ms.(56b.1): *kāyacittā-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.181.

IV.9 ab — **It is taught by way of: (a) the underlying cause, (b) the basis and (c) the own-being;**

(a) The underlying cause of the absence of defilement refers to quiescence[110]; the absence of defilement is [equivalent to] purification. The underlying cause (*nidāna*) is [equivalent to] the cause [*kāraṇa*]. As to why it is the underlying cause, he says: **because defilement is caused**[111] **by disquiet and because [quiescence] is the counteragent to the latter.** This is what is being said: [quiescence] is the underlying cause of the absence of defilement because it is the counteragent to the underlying cause of defilement. Disquiet consists in physical and mental inefficiency; when this exists, mind becomes distracted because single-pointedness of the mind is impossible. Moreover, defilement, such as passion, arises in one whose mind is distracted; thus, disquiet is the cause of defilement. The counteragent to that disquiet is quiescence. How so? Because quiescence brings about physical and mental efficiency[112]. In this way quiescence is determined to be the underlying cause of the absence of defilement. **(b) The basis refers to meditative concentration.** The mind is concentrated in one whose body and mind are assisted by quiescence; when the mind becomes concentrated, one understands [phenomena] as they are in reality and moral defilement is relinquished because one sees them as they are in reality. Thus, the basis of the absence of defilement is meditative concentration. (c) **The own-being refers to equanimity** because this is the counteragent to: (a) mind's unevenness, (b) mind's absence of meditative calm and (c) mind's state of
Y182 effort[113], all of which are conformable to the defiled condition. Thus, the own-being of the absence of defilement is equanimity.

[4] However, others believe that when defilement which is to be relinquished through vision has been relinquished by means of the paths of relinquishment[114], wisdom is generated[115] that is free from the encumbrances of that defilement, is pure in its own-being, is incorporated in the path of liberation[116] and is positively determined in regard to the knowable. That wisdom is described as equanimity in this context since one shows equanimity in thinking: "there is extinction in regard to extinction", because what is to be done has been done.

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110 Read: *asaṃkleśasya nidānaṃ praśrabdhir* in place of *praśrabdhir asaṃkleśanidānam*; cf. Bhāṣya N54.2.

111 Bhāṣya (N54.2): *hetutvāt*, but Ṭīkā (Ms.56b.3): *hetukatvāt* which is preferred.

112 Read: *karmaṇyatāyā āpādanāt* in place of *karmaṇyatāpādanāt*; Ms.(56b.7): *karmaṇyatāyā 'pādanāt*. Tib. *las su ruṅ bar 'gyur te* (D277b.4).

113 Read: *cittasābhogāvasthitāyāś* as per Ms.(56b.6) and contrary to Y's fn.5 p.181, in place of *cittābhogāvasthitāyāś*; Tib. *sems rtsol ba daṅ bcas pa'i...* omitting *avasthita* (cf. D277b.6).

114 Read: *prahāṇamārgair darśanaheye* as per Ms.(56b.7) in place of *prahāṇair mārgair darśanaheye* disregarding Y's fn.1 p.182; Tib. *spoṅ ba'i lam rnams kyis mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba'i*...(D277b.7).

115 Ms.(56b.7): *prajāyate*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.182.

116 Ms.(56b.7): *vimuktivimārga-* but Y's reading of *vimuktimārga* is correct.

g. The Eight Limbs of the Path.

N54.6 The limbs of the path follow immediately after the limbs of enlightenment. How are they respectively established?

IV.9 cd & 10 ab — The eightfold limbs of the path consist in: (a) accurate determination, (b) the attainment [of others], (c) the threefold confidence of others and (d) the counteragent to adverse elements;

On the path of meditative development, the limb for the accurate determination of the path of vision[117] is mundane correct view which is obtained subsequently to the supramundane - by means of this, one accurately determines one's own understanding. The limbs for the attainment of others are correct intention and correct speech because their attainment is on account of speech together with that which causes its arising. The limbs for the confidence of others are threefold: correct speech, correct action and correct livelihood, for, by means of these respectively:

IV.10 cd — It is considered that another is informed in regard to vision, morality and austerity.

One has confidence in wisdom on account of correct speech[118], i.e. on account of discussion and certainty in regard to doctrinal disputation. [One has confidence] in morality on account of correct action because one does not perform action that should not be performed. [One has confidence] in austerity on account of correct livelihood because of the Dharma and also because one's desire for garments etc. is in moderation.

The limb that is the counteragent to adverse elements is threefold: correct effort, correct mindfulness and correct meditative concentration, for, these are respectively:

IV.11 ab — The counteragents to: (a) moral defilement, (b) secondary defilement

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117 Read: *bhāvanāmārge darśanamārgasya paricchedāṅgam* which accords with both the Tib. Ṭīkā (cf. D278a.4) and Bhāṣya (D17b.3) which reads: *bsgom pa'i lam gyi tshe mthoṅ ba'i lam la ...yoṅs su gcod pa'i yan lag ste* (D17b.3).

118 Omit *tasya* (N54.15) since it is not found in the Tib. Bhāṣya nor in the Ṭīkā.

and (c) what is adverse to supremacy;

For the adverse elements are threefold: (a) the moral defilement to be abandoned by meditative development, (b) the secondary defilements of
N55 **indolence and excitability and (c) that which is adverse to supremacy and is an obstruction to the achievement of the special qualities. Here, correct effort is the counteragent to the first, since the meditative development of the path is on account of that. Correct mindfulness [is the counteragent] to the second, because one who has properly applied mindfulness in regard to the causal-signs of tranquillization etc., is free from indolence and excitability. Correct meditative concentration [is the counteragent] to the third because one achieves the qualities such as the higher knowledges with the meditative absorptions for a basis.**

[Sthiramati]

Y182.8 [1] **The limbs of the path follow immediately after the limbs of enlightenment. How are they respectively established?** The path of meditative development follows immediately after the path of vision and since the limbs of the path are included therein, the limbs of the path are described immediately following the limbs of enlightenment. In what sense are they respectively established? Hence he says:

IV.9 c **...(a) Accurate determination, (b) the causing of attainment**[119] **etc.**

The eight limbs of the path[120], beginning with correct view, are respectively established as being adverse to [the eight beginning with] false view and concluding with false meditative concentration. Their sequential order is in accordance with their order of efficacy[121]; in detail, they consist in the path of meditative development. It is the path of meditative development (*bhāvanā-mārga*) since it is cultivated (*bhāvyate*) through the frequent exercise of meditative development (*niṣevaṇa-bhāvanā*).

[2] **On that path of meditative development, the limb for the accurate determination of the path of vision** which is cultivated through meditative development that has been attained **is mundane correct view**; it is mundane since it is accompanied by conceptual differentiation. It is determined [as such] even for one who has entered the path because such a person has acquired the capacity for its

119 Read: *paricchedo 'tha samprāptiḥ* in place of *paricchedaḥ prāpaṇaṃ ca*; cf. Bhāṣya N54.7.

120 Ms.(58a.2): *mārgāṇāṃ* which is amended to *mārgāṅgānāṃ* in the Ms. margin.

121 Read: *kāritrānukrameṇa* as per Ms.(58a.2) in place of *kārikānukrameṇa*; Tib. *byed pa'i rim gyis* (D278a.4).

arising; however, the supramundane is devoid of conceptual differentiation[122]. Although devoid of conceptual differentiation[123], it is described as correct view since it is the basis of correct view; hence he says: **...which is obtained subsequently to the supramundane.** What is meant is: [correct view] is obtained, i.e. has arisen, subsequently, i.e. through the force of[124], the supramundane path of vision. But what
Y183 is its object? Hence he says: **...by means of this, one accurately determines one's own understanding,** i.e. one's understanding of the path of vision insofar as one thinks: "I understand thus". It is described as correct view because it has the path of vision for its object.

[3] **The limbs for the attainment of others;** in detail: the limbs for the attainment of others **...are correct intention and correct speech** because, by means of correct speech and correct intention, others attain [the realization of] a reality that has been accurately determined through correct view. Hence he says: **because their attainment is on account of speech together with that which causes its arising;** for, correct intention causes the arising of [correct] speech because of this statement from a Sūtra: "one does not utter a word without having conjectured and deliberated".[125] Moreover, one who is concentrated should be known as being endowed with these two [qualities] because he acquires the capacity to produce them; however, one who is concentrated neither speculates nor speaks.

[4] **The limbs for the confidence of others are threefold: correct speech, correct action and correct livelihood.** How so? He says: **for, by means of these,** i.e. by means of correct speech[126], action and livelihood, **respectively:**

IV.10 cd **It is considered that another is informed[127] in regard to vision, morality and austerity.**

On account of correct speech etc. Discussion refers to the teachings of the Dharma; **certainty concerning doctrinal disputation** refers to the formulation of objections and refutations in regard to spiritual realization, together with others. **One has confidence in wisdom on account of that discussion and certainty concerning doctrinal disputation;** i.e. due to the injunction of others[128] a reality is understood on account of those [i.e. discussion etc.] inasmuch as one thinks: "this

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122 Read: *lokottarā tu nirvikalpā* in place of *lokottarāt tu nirvikalpāt*; Tib. *'jig rten las 'das pa ni rnam par mi rtog pa'o* (D278a.5).

123 Read: *nirvikalpā saty api* in place of *nirvikalpasya sato 'pi*; Tib. *rnam par mi rtog par gyur kyaṅ* (D278a.5).

124 *balena* is not found in the Tib.

125 Cf. LVP Kośa II, p.174.

126 *vāk* is omitted from the Ms. and is included on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D278b.4.

127 Read: *paravijñaptir iṣyate* in place of *paravijñaptikā matā*; cf. Bhāṣya N54.14.

128 *pareṣāṃ niyogād* is not found in the Tib.; cf. D278b.5.

statement has meaning which is unimpaired[129], thoroughly ascertained, without contra-
Y184 diction and is crystal clear". **[One has confidence] in morality on account of correct action;** [the words]: "one has confidence" remain in force. Why [does one have confidence in morality...]? He says: **because one does not perform action that should not be performed.** Correct action is contrary to evil conduct; hence, one who is endowed with[130] this does not perform action that should not be performed, even for the sake of his life. Consequently, since such a person possesses morality that is pleasing to the Noble Ones, one has confidence in him. **[One has confidence] in austerity on account of correct livelihood;** [the words]: "one has confidence" are understood. Why [does one have confidence in austerity...]? He says: **because of the Dharma and also because one's desire for garments etc.[131] is in moderation.** Correct livelihood refers to the normal behaviour of body and speech which is devoid of the faults of hypocrisy etc. for the sake of the necessities of life. On account of this, one has confidence in austerity and one's cravings for the necessities of life is certainly relinquished because such a person desires garments etc. according to propriety and in moderation just for the sake of the continued existence of the basis [i.e. the physical body][132]. In this regard, one has no pride on account of correct view because of clear comprehension of one's own understanding [of phenomena] as it is in reality. One speaks with the roar of a lion through the speech which is caused to arise[133] by way of correct intention. By means of correct speech[134], action and livelihood, one manifests one's individual status [i.e. as a *śramaṇa* or *brahmacāri* etc.].

[5] **The limb that is the counteragent to adverse elements is threefold**[135] and since these are not known, he says: **correct effort, correct mindfulness and correct meditative concentration.** As to which adverse elements these are the counteragents, he says: **for these**[136] **are, respectively:**

IV.11 ab **The counteragents to: (a) moral defilement, (b) secondary defilement and (c) what is adverse to supremacy;**

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129 Read: *tattvam adhigataṃ tam asaṃsaktaṃ* in place of *tattvam adhigataṃ tathā hy upaśama-saṃsaktaṃ*; *upaśama* is not found in the Tib. and it seems to have been expunged from the Ms.(cf. 58b.1). The reading of *asaṃsaktaṃ* is substantiated by the Tib. *thogs pa med pa* (cf. D278b.5 & 6).

130 Read: *samanvāgato* as per Ms.(58b.2) in place of *saṃbandhāgato*; Tib. *dań ldan pa* (D278b.7).

131 Ms.(58b.3): *cīvarādyeṣaṇād iti*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.184.

132 *āśraya*; Tib. *lus* (D279a.2).

133 Read: *samutthāpitayā vācā* in place of *samutthāpitavācā*; Ms.(58b.4): *-tayā vācā*. Tib. *kun nas bslań ba'i tshig gis* (D279a.3).

134 Ms.(58b.5) omits *vāk* which is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D279a.3.

135 Read: *tridhaiva* as per Ms.(58b.5) in place of *trividhā*; cf. Bhāṣya N54.18.

136 Read: *eṣāṃ* as per Ms.(58b.6) & Bhāṣya (N54.19) in place of *teṣāṃ*.

Here, correct effort [is the counteragent] **to the first.** For, moral defilement that is to be relinquished by means of meditative development is the first adverse element; correct effort is the counteragent to that. How so? He says: **since the meditative development of the path is on account of that,** i.e. is on account of correct effort. Correct effort is [equivalent to] vigour which is taken possession of by correct view and remains in meditative concentration free from indolence and excitability[137]. By means of this, with the aim of relinquishing the moral defilements which are to be relinquished through meditative development, one cultivates the path as the counteragent to them; thus, correct effort is described as the counteragent to the first because it causes the accomplishment of correct meditative concentration. In the
Y185 context of that same meditative development of the path, **correct mindfulness** [is the counteragent] **to the second,** i.e. secondary defilement which is characterized by indolence and excitability; [the term] "counteragent" needs to be supplied. Why [is correct mindfulness the counteragent]? He says: **because one who has properly applied mindfulness in regard to the causal-signs of tranquillization etc. is free from indolence and excitability**[138]; by the word "etc."[139] the causal-sign of exertion and the causal-sign of equanimity are also to be understood. Tranquillization in this regard is due to the appeasement of the causal-sign of distraction. The causal-sign (*nimitta*) of tranquillization etc. is [equivalent to] the cause (*kāraṇa*) of tranquillization etc. With regard to this, when mind is excited or is suspected of becoming excited, mental attention directed towards an entity that is apt to cause a 'shuddering'[140] is the causal-sign of tranquillization. When mind is sluggish or is suspected of becoming lethargic, mental attention directed towards an entity that is apt to cause delight is the causal-sign of exertion. When the path is devoted exclusively to tranquillity or is devoted exclusively to insight[141], or when it combines both of these, the impassive mental attention directed towards that which is defiled[142] by the former two secondary defilements is the causal-sign of equanimity. That which is adverse to supremacy[143] which consists in the qualities such as the higher knowledges is undefiled nescience[144] which consists in the obscuration to the attainments. **Correct meditative concentration** [is the counteragent] **to the third;** [the word] "counteragent" is to be supplied. As to why [it is the counteragent to the third], he

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137 Read: *layauddhatyavigatasamādhyavasthānam* in place of *layauddhatyavigataṃ samādhyava–sthānam* on the basis of the Tib.: *byiṅ ba daṅ rgod pa daṅ bral ba'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin gyi dus* (D279a.6).

138 Read: *layauddhatyābhāvād* in place of *layauddhatyavigamāḍ*; cf. Bhāṣya N55.4.

139 Read: *ādiśabdena* in place of *ādiśabdaḥ*; Tib. *sogs pa źes bya ba'i sgras ni* (D279b.1).

140 Ms.(53a.2): *saṃvenīya-* with *ja* added in the Ms. margin contrary to Y's fn.1 p.185.

141 Read: *vidarśanaikāntike* as per Ms.(53a.3) in place of *vipaśyānaikāntike* disregarding Y's fn.3 p.185.

142 Read: *tadubhayopakleśenopakliṣṭe* in place of *tadubhayopakleśānupakliṣṭe*; Tib. *ñe ba'i ñon moṅs pa de gnis kyis ñe bar ñon moṅs par gyur pa la* (D279b.4).

143 Ms.(53a.4): *vibhutvasya*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.185.

144 Ms.(53a.4): *akliṣṭam ajñānam*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.185.

says: because one achieves[145] the qualities such as the higher knowledges with the meditative absorptions for a basis. For, meditative absorption is the basis for the achievement of all the special qualities - thus it is the counteragent to the obscuration to the attainments[146], being adverse to the achievement of the qualities such as the higher knowledges. Therefore, he has stated that: (a) dissociation from obscuration that consists in moral defilement is by way of correct effort, (b) the complete purification of meditative concentration is by way of correct mindfulness and (c) separation from obscuration to the attainments[147] is by way of correct meditative concentration.

h. The Differentiation[148] of the Meditative Development of the Counteragent.

N55.7 That meditative development of the counteragent should be known summarily as threefold:

IV.11 cd & 12 ab — Meditative development as: (a) conformable but erroneously inverted, (b) erroneous inversion accompanied by connection and (c) not erroneously inverted and free from the connection with erroneous inversion;

(a) Although erroneously inverted, it conforms with the absence of erroneous inversion; (b) although not erroneously inverted, it is connected with erroneous inversion; and (c) it is not erroneously inverted and is free from connection with erroneous inversion. These relate respectively to the state of: (i) ordinary people, (ii) those in training and (iii) the adepts. However, for the *bodhisattvas*:

IV.12 cd — A distinction is made in terms of: (a) objective support, (b) mental attention and (c) attainment.

For, the objective supports of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are the body etc. belonging to their own mental continuum. [The objective

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145 Read: *-ābhinirhārād* in place of *-ābhinirharaṇād*; cf Bhāṣya N55.5.

146 Read: *samāpatti-* in place of *samādhy-* on the basis of the Tib. *sñoms par 'jug pa-* (D279b.6) and also because of statement (c) below; cf. Y185.19.

147 Read: (*samāpattyāvara*)*ṇavigamam* in place of (*samāpattyāva*)*raṇena viṣamam*; Ms.(53a.6): -*ṇavigamam*. Tib.: *sñoms par 'jug pa'i sgrib pa daṅ bral ba'o* (D279b.7).

148 N's *prabheda* is adopted here rather than Y's *samāsa*.

supports] for the ***bodhisattvas*** are [those things] belonging to their own mental continuum as well as that of others. The ***śrāvakas*** and ***pratyekabuddhas*** are mentally attentive of their body etc. in the aspects of impermanence etc. However, the ***bodhisattvas*** [are mentally attentive] in the manner of non-perception. The ***śrāvakas*** and ***pratyekabuddhas*** cultivate the applications of mindfulness etc. only insofar as they lead to the dissociation of the body etc. The ***bodhisattvas*** do not [cultivate the latter] for the purpose of dissociation, nor for non-dissociation, [they cultivate them] up until the [attainment of the] ***nirvāṇa*** in which they are not permanently fixed.

The meditative development of the counteragent has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y185.21 [1] **That meditative development of the counteragent should be known summarily as threefold,** according to its differentiation as: (a) an undertaking, (b) something obtained and (c) completion; however, in detail it is of various kinds. How so?

Y186 **IV.11 c** **[Meditative development as]: (a) conformable but erroneously inverted etc.**

In this respect, **(a) although erroneously inverted, it conforms with the absence of erroneous inversion.** The absence of erroneous inversion refers to the path of vision because it has reality for its object and since it conforms with the latter, it conforms with the absence of erroneous inversion. Moreover, this is the meditative development of ordinary people, thus, it is erroneously inverted because it does not have reality for its object; i.e. because ordinary people have not relinquished moral defilement in its entirety. How can it conform with the absence of erroneous inversion when it is erroneously inverted? Because it has arisen[149] from the latent impressions of what is learnt which flows out of the extremely pure *dharmadhātu*. And this begins with the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness and concludes with the meditative development of the powers. **(b) Although not erroneously inverted, it is connected with erroneous inversion.** This is equivalent to the meditative development of the limbs of enlightenment and the meditative development of the path, and is pertinent to those still in training. It is not erroneously inverted because it has reality for its object and it is connected with erroneous inversion because of the presence of moral defilement which is to be relinquished through meditative development. **(c) It is not erroneously inverted and**

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149 Read: *utpannatvāt* in place of *utpannāt*; Tib. *byuṅ ba'i phyir* (D280a.3).

is free from connection with erroneous inversion. This refers to the meditative development of the path pertinent to the **adepts**, i.e. the *arhats*[150]. It is not erroneously inverted because it has reality for its object; it is not connected with erroneous inversion and is pertinent to the *arhat* because he has relinquished all stain.

[2] Now, in order to demonstrate the distinction between the meditative development of the counteragent for the *bodhisattvas* in contrast to that of the *śrāvakas* etc., he says: **however, for the *bodhisattvas*:**

IV.12 cd — **A distinction is made in terms of: (a) objective support, (b) mental attention and (c) attainment.**[151]

Therein, there is a distinction[152] in terms of objective support, for, the **objective supports**, i.e. the body, sensation, mind and the *dharmas*, **of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are the body etc. with its own mental continuum.** However, the objective supports, i.e. the body, sensation, mind and the *dharmas*, for **the *bodhisattvas* are [those things] belonging to their own mental continuum as well as that of others.** Why do they have different objective supports? Because it is with reference to just their own benefit that the *śrāvakas* etc. engage in the meditative development of the counteragent; however, for the *bodhisattvas*, it is with reference to both their own benefit and that of others. **In the aspects of impermanence etc.**; i.e. in the aspects of the impermanent, the painful, the empty and the insubstantial. Why is the mental attention of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* [applied] thus in [the aspect of] the impermanent etc.? In order to generate aversion for the latter because one who is not averse does not dissociate from
Y187 them. **The *bodhisattvas* [arementally attentive] in the manner of non-perception**; what is meant is: in the modes of the non-perception of the imaginary nature. Why are they mentally attentive in this way? In order to relinquish all conceptual differentiation - this is said to be peculiar to them. Not only are they mentally attentive in the manner of non-perception but also in the aspects of the impermanent etc. Thus, a distinction is made because of the differences in their mental attention. **Only insofar as they lead to the dissociation of the body etc.** The dissociation of the body etc. refers to the *nirvāṇa* without a remaining substratum and the relinquishment of moral defilement which has it (i.e. the body) for its objective support. **The *bodhisattvas* do not [cultivate the latter] for the purpose of dissociation, nor for non-dissociation.** What is the reason? For, those who are absolutely dissociated or not dissociated from the body etc. would not have the capacity to

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150 Read: *iyam arhatām aśaikṣa-* in place of *iyam aśaikṣa-*; Tib. *'di ni dgra bcom pa mi slob pa'i* (D280a.5).

151 Read: *ālambanamanaskāraprāptitas tadviśiṣṭatā* in place of *ālambanād viśiṣṭā sā manas-kārāc ca prāptitaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N55.13.

152 Read: *viśiṣṭatā* in place of *viśṭṣatā*.

provide benefit for sentient beings, just like those whose moral defilement has been extinguished [i.e. who are absolutely dissociated] and ordinary beings [i.e. who are absolutely non-dissociated]. If it leads neither to dissociation nor non-dissociation[153], why then do they cultivate[154] the counteragents? Hence he says: **[they cultivate them] on account of the fact that they lead to the attainment of the *nirvāṇa* in which one is not permanently fixed**[155]. What is this *nirvāṇa* [in which the *bodhisattva* is] not permanently fixed? While [the aspirant] is in the *bodhisattva* state - since it is the basis for mastery over *karma* and rebirth - although he is reborn in *saṃsāra* on account of his compassion, he is without defilement there owing to the strength of his wisdom. This is called[156] the unfixed *nirvāṇa* of the the *bodhisattva*. Although he is stationed in *saṃsāra*, he is not defiled like ordinary people are, nor does he [attain] the *nirvāṇa* devoid of substratum[157], like the *śrāvakas* etc. Moreover, in the *tathāgata* state he is not permanently fixed in *saṃsāra* because he has relinquished the obscuration that consists in both moral defilement and the cognizable. Nor is he permanently fixed in the *nirvāṇa* devoid of a remaining substratum because there is no interruption to the Dharma Body, for, as long as the world exists, he performs benefit for others through the Enjoyment and Transformation Bodies. In this way a distinction is made between the *bodhisattva* and the *śrāvaka* etc. concerning the meditative development of the counteragent according to differences in objective support, mental attention and result. **The meditative development of the counteragent has now been described.**

153 *nāvisaṃyogāya* is inserted on the basis of the Tib. and is not found in the Ms.; cf. Y's fn.1 p.187.

154 Read: *bhāvayantīty* in place of *bhāvayatīty*; cf. Bhāṣya N55.18.

155 Read: *yāvad evāpratiṣṭhitanirvāṇāya* in place of *yenaiva apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇārthaṃ bhāvayati*; cf. Bhāṣya N55.19.

156 Read: *abhidhīyate* as per Ms.(59a.1) in place of *vidhīyate*; Tib. *brjod* (D281a.1).

157 Read: *nirupādāne* as per Ms.(59a.2) contrary to Y's fn.2 p.187 in place of *nirupādāno*.

2. The State Therein.

N56.2 Which are the states in regard to the latter?

IV.13 abcd

(a) The causal state, (b) that called 'arrival', those named: (c) 'preparatory' and (d) 'result', (e) that with duties to be performed, (f) without duties to be performed and (g) that of excellence, (h) the superior and (i) the unsurpassable.

IV.14 abcd & 15 a

[The states] are listed in relation to: (a) firm conviction, (b) entry, (c) setting forth, (d) prophecy, (e) teaching, (f) consecration, (g) attainment, (h) benefit and (i) performance of duty.

Of these, (a) the causal state is that which pertains to an individual stationed on a spiritual lineage. (b) The arrival state pertains to one whose resolve for enlightenment has been generated. (c) The preparatory state is subsequent to the generation of the resolve when the result has not been attained. (d) The state of result [occurs when the latter] has been attained. (e) The state with duties to be performed pertains to one who is still in training. (f) The state without duties to be performed pertains to the adept. (g) The state of excellence pertains to one endowed with the special qualities of the higher knowledges etc. (h) The superior state pertains to the *bodhisattva* who has entered the spiritual levels above the *śrāvaka* etc. (i) The unsurpassable state pertains to the Buddha because there is no state that is superior to that.

(a) The state of firm conviction pertains to the *bodhisattvas* on all the spiritual levels consisting in the course of firm conviction. (b) The state of entry [pertains to those] on the first spiritual level. (c) The state of setting forth, on the six spiritual levels subsequent to the latter. (d) The prophetic state, on the eighth spiritual level. (e) The state of teacher, on the ninth. (f) The state of consecration, on the tenth. (g) The attainment state refers to the Dharma Body of the Buddhas. (h) The state of benefit refers to the Enjoyment Body. (i) The state of the performance of duty refers to the Transformation Body.

Moreover, all of these various states, in short, should be known as:

IV.15 bcd **Threefold in relation to the *dharma-dhātu*: (a) impure, (b) impure and pure and (c) purified, as is appropriate.**

Of these, (a) the impure state is inclusive of the causal state, up until
N57 **the preparatory. (b) The state that is both impure and pure pertains to those still in training. (c) The purified state pertains to the adepts.**

IV.16 ab **Hence is the respective establishment of individuals considered, as is fitting;**

Hence, from the differentiation of their states, as is fitting, the establishment of individuals should be known in this way: "this [person] is stationed in a spiritual lineage; that [person] has arrived" etc. The states have now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y188.2 [1] The state therein is described immediately following the meditative development of the counteragent, hence he asks: **which are**[158] **the states in regard to the latter?** The words "in regard to the latter", signify: in regard to that meditative development of the counteragent; hence he says:

IV.13 a **(a) The causal state, (b) that called 'arrival' etc.**

Of these, (a) the causal state is that which pertains to an individual stationed in a spiritual lineage. What is meant is: the spiritual lineage is the cause, i.e. the 'seed'. In this respect, one who abides in a spiritual lineage, but not among those whose resolve has been generated, is the person who is meant in this context as being stationed in a spiritual lineage; furthermore, such a one enters into the higher states and does not turn back. Some [schools] claim that the spiritual lineage has the root of the wholesome for its essential nature because certain roots of the wholesome are said to consist in the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* and so forth, up until certain others are said to consist in the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*. Others again believe that, with reference to the state of the ordinary person[159], the differentiation of the faculties is said to consist in the spiritual lineage and they claim that the spiritual lineage refers to a capacity of the 'seed' of mind. When this exists, then, in the

158 Read: *katamā* in place of *kā*; cf. Bhāṣya N56.2.
159 Ms.(59a.5): *pṛgjanya-* which has been correctly amended to *pṛthagjana-* by Y; cf. his fn.2 p.188.

state of the ordinary person[160] and in the state of the one still in training, it is described as the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka* and so forth up until its description as the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*. However, one who is in the state of the adept is described as a *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* or a Buddha[161] and there is no spiritual lineage on his part because of his pre-eminent state. Moreover, that [i.e. the spiritual lineage] is differentiated as threefold according to one's differentiation as *śrāvaka* etc. and is sixfold according to its differentiation as determinate and indeterminate[162].

[2] (b) **The arrival state pertains to one whose resolve for enlightenment has been generated.** Such a person can be one of three types belonging respectively to either the spiritual lineage of the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha* or the *tathāgata*
Y189 because he generates the resolve for the enlightenment[163] of either the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha* or the Perfectly Enlightened One. Since he arrives in the preparatory [state] when the latter has originated, because it consists in the roots of preparation, its generation is described as the state of arrival in preparation. (c) **The preparatory state is subsequent to the generation of the resolve, when the result has not been attained.** It is described as preparatory since, for one whose resolve for enlightenment[164] has been generated, it is the expedient which causes the attainment of the first result by practising the wholesome roots[165], beginning with generosity and morality and terminating in the meditative development of the powers. Why are the causal and arrival states described as the states that comprise the meditative development of the factors that contribute to enlightenment? Because they are causes of the latter. Only because of this is it said that the generation of the resolve due to the spiritual lineage has ever increasing results etc.[166]. (d) **The state of result [occurs when the latter] has been attained;** i.e. when the first result [has been attained] for preparation is undertaken for the sake of the result; hence, the state of result follows immediately after the preparatory [state]. (e) **The state with duties to be performed pertains to one still in training[167]** because he has not completely attained the results since there are duties still to be performed for the attainment of the other results[168]. (f) **The state without duties to be performed pertains to**

160 Ms.(59a.6): *pṛthagjanāvasthāvasthāyāṃ* but Y's reading of *pṛthagjanāvasthāyāṃ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D281a.7.

161 Ms.(59a.6): *śrāvaka ity ucyate buddha iti vā*, but Y's emendation to *śrāvaka ity ucyate pratyekabuddha iti buddha vā* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.188 & errata p.141.

162 Line 7 of Ms.(59a) begins: *-dena ṣaḍvidhaṃ bhavati*; there is no evidence of the extra syllables mentioned by Y in his fn.4 p.188.

163 Ms.(59a.7): *-bodhiṣūtpādāt*, but Y's emendation to *-bodhiṣu cittotpādāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.5 p.188.

164 *bodhi* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D281b.3.

165 *mūla* is not found in the Ms. and is inserted on the basis of the Tib.

166 This is a quotation from the Bhāṣya of the next section (*phala-prāpti*); cf. N57.19.

167 This explanation for *sakaraṇīyāvasthā* (Y189.9-11) is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D281b.5.

168 Read: *phalāntaraprāptiṃ prati karaṇīyasadbhāvāt* as per Ms.(59b.3) in place of *phalāntaraprāpti–pratikaraṇīyasadbhāvāt*.

the adept. For, he is an adept insofar as being free from the passion that pertains to the three realms of existence. It is the state without duties to be performed because such a one has completely attained the results since there are no duties still to be performed for the attainment of the other results. **(g) The state of excellence pertains to one endowed with the special qualities of the higher knowledges etc.** When there is the state of an *arhat*, one is endowed with the special qualities such as the higher knowledges, [therefore], the state of the perfection of the special qualities of the higher knowledges etc. is distinguished from other [states] and is described as the state of excellence. **(h) The superior state pertains to the *bodhisattva* who has entered the spiritual levels above the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha***[169]. Owing to the acquisition of the supramundane path which penetrates[170] both the insubstantialities and is occupied with benefit for oneself and others, the state of the latter is described as the superior state because it is superior to other vehicles. **(i) The unsurpassable state pertains to the Buddha.** What is the reason?[171] He says: ...**because there is no state subsequent to that.** It pertains to the Buddha [state] because this is the final basis[172] for the excellence and absence of all virtues and faults [respectively]. It is described as unsurpassable because another state of excellence subsequent to this cannot be found.

[3] Although [the explanation of] the states in their entirety is complete because of what has been discussed so far, in order to demonstrate the differentiation of the eleven
Y190 spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva*, the states beginning with the course of[173] firm conviction and terminating in the state of consecration etc.[174], are now described. However, in order to demonstrate the differentiation of the three Buddha Bodies, the three beginning with the attainment state are also explained. In the above, the causal and arrival states are to be known as being common to both *bodhisattvas* and others[175]. **(a) The state of firm conviction pertains to the *bodhisattvas* on all the spiritual levels that consists in the course of firm conviction.** In this regard, subsequent to the generation of the resolve [for enlightenment] and before his entry to the spiritual levels, although [the aspirant] has not perceived reality, it is as though he has perceived reality, [for] he comprehends the *dharmas* by way of the three natures on account of his firm conviction in the Buddhas and the *bodhisattvas*. He is intent upon the resources for the achievement of Buddhahood, i.e. generosity and morality etc., which are difficult to perform for other sentient beings, thus this is

169 *śrāvakapratyekabuddhebhyo* but Bhāṣya (N56.12) and Tib. Ṭīkā (D281b.7): *śrāvakādibhyo.*
170 Read: *prativedhakasya* as per Ms.(59b.5) in place of *prativedhasya.*
171 Read: *kiṃ kāraṇam* as per Ms.(59b.6) in place of *kim artham.*
172 *adhiṣṭhāna* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D282a.2.
173 Ms.(59b.7): omits *caryā* which is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.4 p.189.
174 *ādi* is omitted from the Tib.; cf D282a.3.
175 Read: *bodhisattvasya anyānāṃ ca sādhāraṇatvena* in place of *bodhisattvasyānyena sādhāraṇatvaṃ*; Tib. *byaṅ chub sems dpa' daṅ gźan dag thun moṅ par* (D282a.4).

described as the course of firm conviction because it is characterized by the state of firm resolve. Moreover, this[176] [continues] for countless aeons or more. (b) **The state of entry [pertains to the *bodhisattva*] on the first spiritual level**; it is described as the state of entry because, from the very beginning, through the direct intuition of the three natures that is devoid of conceptual differentiation he has the intuitive knowledge and penetration of reality. This same [level] is the path of vision of the *bodhisattva*. (c) **The state of setting forth, on the six spiritual levels subsequent to the latter**; these spiritual levels are described[177] as the state of setting forth because [the *bodhisattva*]: (a) reaches the end of the relinquishment of notional attachment to the multiplicity of signs (*nimitta*) which is to be relinquished through meditative development and (b) reaches the end of preparation that is accompanied by deliberate effort[178]. (d) **The prophetic state, on the eighth[179] spiritual level**; due to the absence of deliberate effort[180] and conceptualization in regard to all signs in every respect on the eighth level, it is prophesized through an open prophecy by the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, that Buddhahood is certain. (e) **The state of teacher[181], on the ninth**; on the ninth level he obtains the four analytical knowledges which are distinctly superior to [those of] the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* and becomes an unsurpassable teacher of the universal Dharma. (f)
Y191 **The state of consecration, on the tenth spiritual level[182]**; for, on the tenth level the *bodhisattva* has reached the end of the path and is consecrated by anointment with rays of light from the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, who are stationed in the world spheres of the ten directions. (g) **The attainment state refers to the Dharma Body of the Buddhas.** It is the Dharma Body of the Buddhas since it: (a) has the nature of the turning about of the basis, (b) has control over all *dharmas* and (c) is without a foundation - these are due to both the relinquishment of all obscuration and the accumulation of the 'seeds' of all *dharmas* that are without impurity and which act as counteragent to those [obscurations]. It is described as the attainment state because by means of this [body the *bodhisattva*] reaches the culminating point in his penetration of the *dharmas*. However, others claim that the extremely pure *dharmadhātu* is [equivalent to] the Dharma Body which is the Body of real nature (*dharmatākāya*)[183] because of the removal of adventitious stain in its entirety. Others

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176 Ms.(60a.2): *sānta*, but Y's emendation to *sā ca* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.190.

177 Read: *ucyante* in place of *ucyate*.

178 *ābhoga*, Tib. (D282b.1): *rtsol ba*; cf. my fn.180 below.

179 Ms.(60a.4): *-ṣṭamyām*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.190.

180 *ābhoga*, but Tib.(D282b.2): *'bad pa*; cf. my fn.178 above.

181 Read: *kathikatvāvasthā* in place of *kathikāvasthā*; cf. Bhāṣya N56.17.

182 Bhāṣya omits *bhūmau*; cf. N56.17.

183 Tib. is slightly different: "the extremely pure *dharmadhātu* is [equivalent to] the Dharma Body because it is the Body of the Dharma", *chos kyi dbyiṅs rab tu rnam par dag pa ñid ni chos kyi sku yin pas chos kyi sku* (D282b.6) = *suviśuddho dharmadhātur eva dharmasya kāyād dharmakāya*.

again believe that the Dharma Body consists in a distinctive direct intuition which proceeds without attachment or hindrance in regard to everything knowable[184]. (h) **The state of benefit refers to the Enjoyment body.** The Essential Nature [Body] is the body established in which he becomes perfectly enlightened [185]. The Enjoyment Body is that body on account of which one experiences the Recitation of the Dharma in the circle of assembly[186] together with the *bodhisattvas* who have reached their final end. (i) **The state of the performance of duty refers to the Transformation Body**[187]. The Transformation Body is that which: (a) has the Essential Nature Body for a basis, (b) takes heed of the aspirations of sentient beings and (c) has infinite divisions in regard to the engagement in undertakings[188] for the sake of those to be trained.

[4] **Moreover, all of these various states, in short, should be known as:**

IV.15 b — **Threefold in relation to the *dharmadhātu* etc.:**

As to how this can be, he says:

IV.15 cd — **(a) impure, (b) impure and pure and (c) purified, as is appropriate.**[189]

Of these, (a) the impure state is inclusive of the causal state up until[190] the preparatory; i.e. the states of cause, arrival, preparation and firm conviction are included. In relation to these states, the impure state is so-called because the stain of the *dharmadhātu* has not been relinquished in its entirety. (b) **The state that is**
Y192 **both impure and pure pertains to those who are still in training;** and in this context, the states of result, that with duties still to be performed[191], distinction, superiority, entry, setting forth, prophecy, teacher and consecration are included. Moreover, in relation to these states, the state that is both impure and pure is so-called because the moral defilement of the *dharmadhātu* is both relinquished and not relinquished. (c) **The purified state pertains to the adepts;** i.e. the states without duties still to be performed, distinction, superiority, attainment, benefit and the performance of duty are described as the purified state because the adepts have relinquished moral defilement in its entirety.

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184 Contrary to Y's fn.1 p.191, the Ms.(60a.7) reads *sarvasminn jñeye 'saktā-* (*jñeye* is inserted in the Ms. margin).

185 Read: *svābhāviko yasmin sa kāye vyavasthito* in place of *svābhāviko yasmin kāye vyavasthite*; Ms.(60b.1): *svābhāviko yasmin satkāye vyavasthito.* Tib. (D282b.7) inserts 'body' (*sku*).

186 Read: *parṣanmaṇḍale* as per Ms.(60b.1) in place of *parṣanmaṇḍalo.*

187 Read: *nirmāṇakāya* in place of *nairmāṇikaḥ kāya*; cf. Bhāṣya N56.19.

188 Read: *kriyā* in place of *prakriyā* since the latter is not substantiated by the Ms.; cf. 60b.2.

189 Read: *yathārhata* in place of *yathocitam*; cf. Bhāṣya N56.22.

190 Read: *yāvat* as per Ms.(60b.2) and Bhāṣya (N56.23) in place of *ā*.

191 Tib.: *'bras bu'i khyad par daṅ bcas pa*, but Y's emendation to *'bras bu daṅ bya ba daṅ bcas pa* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.192.

[5] Furthermore, these states are respectively determined as being pertinent to: (a) ordinary people, (b) those still in training and (c) the adepts. And as to the way in which their various respective establishments should be discerned, he says:

IV.16 ab **Hence is the establishment of individuals[192] considered, as is fitting;**

By "as is fitting" [is meant] - according to circumstances. By "hence" is meant: as the consequence of this differentiation of the states. **In this way: "this [person] is established in a spiritual lineage; that [person] has arrived and so on"** Because of the reference to the word "etc.", [the following possible differentiation of individuals is understood]: this [person] has made preparation; ...has won the stream; ...is a once-returner; ...is a non-returner; ...is an *arhat*; ...possesses ornaments; ...is a *bodhisattva*; ...is a *tathāgata*; ...courses in firm conviction; ...courses in a pure higher[193] aspiration; ...has set forth; ...has been prophesized; ...is a teacher of the Dharma; ...has been consecrated; ...has attained enlightenment; ...possesses deliberate effort; ...performs benefit for others.

The states have now been described.

192 Read: *pudgalānām* in place of *pudgalasya*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.2.

193 Read: *śuddhādhyāśayacārī* as per Ms.(60b.7) in place of *śuddhyādhyāśayacārī*.

3. The Attainment of the Result.

N57.7 Which are the results that are attained?

IV.16 cd — The results respectively are: (a) the fit vessel known as the *karma*-result, (b) strength because of the influence of the latter, (c) inclination, (d) growth and (e) purification.

(a) The fit vessel refers to the *karma*-result that conforms with the wholesome. (b) Strength which is [equivalent to] a preponderance of the wholesome is due to the influence of the fit vessel. (c) Inclination refers to the inclination towards the wholesome that is due to previous practice. (d) Growth refers to the nourishment of the root of the wholesome which is due to practice in regard to the wholesome *dharmas* in the present. (e) Purification refers to the relinquishment of obscuration. These fivefold results are to be known respectively as: (a) the *karma*-result, (b) the influenced result, (c) the result as natural outcome, (d) the result of human effort and (e) the result of dissociation.

IV.17 cd & 18 abcd — The other results are, in brief: (a) the ever increasing, (b) the first, (c) due to the practice of the latter, (d) due to completion, (e) due to conformity, (f) due to adverse elements, (g) due to dissociation, (h) due to excellence, (i) due to superiority and (j) due to unsurpassability.

(a) The ever increasing result is to be understood as a successive development, i.e. the generation of the resolve is due to the spiritual lineage, and so on. (b) The first result refers to the acquisition, from the very beginning, of the supramundane *dharmas.* (c) The result of practice follows after the latter in the state of one still in training. (d) The completion result refers to the qualities of the adept. (e) The conforming result is to be known as the ever increasing result in its causal mode. (f) The result of the adverse elements is [equivalent to] the path of relinquishment and is [to be known as] the first result; [the adverse

elements] are intended as counteragent[194]**. (g) The dissociation-result, i.e. the direct realization of cessation**[195]**, consists in both the result of**
N58 **practice and completion result and refers to the dissociation from moral defilement on the part of one still in training and the adept, respectively. (h) The excellent result refers to the special qualities such as the higher knowledges. (i) The superior result refers to the spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* because these are superior to the other vehicles. (j) The unsurpassable result refers to the spiritual level of the Buddhas. The latter four are divisions of the above-mentioned practice and completion results. The other results are [explained] by way of a condensed explanation but in full detail they are immeasurable.**

[Sthiramati]

Y192.19 [1] Since the state precedes the result, in order to comment on the result immediately after the states, he asks: **which are the results that are attained?** Hence he says:

IV.16 c ...(a) The fit vessel known as the *karma*-result etc.

In brief, the result is fivefold: (a) the fit vessel, (b) strength, (c) inclination, (d) growth
Y193 and (e) purification. Of these, **(a) the fit vessel refers to the *karma*-result that conforms with the wholesome.** Now, that which consists in: (a) the relinquishment of the eight inopportune births, (b) the six sense-fields distinguished as impure and (c) the *karma*-result of the *dharmas* that contribute to enlightenment, is described as the fit vessel because it is the basis for the production of all wholesome *dharmas*. (b) **Strength which is [equivalent to] a preponderance of the root**[196] **of the wholesome,** what is meant is: a thriving condition, **...is due to the influence of the fit vessel;** i.e. it is on account of the feeble production of moral defilement on the part of the basis [i.e. the physical body][197] - this is described as strength. (c) **Inclination**[198] **refers to the inclination towards the wholesome which is due to previous practice**[199]. Due to the practice of the wholesome *dharmas* in previous lives, there is a tendency towards [the practice of] wholesome *dharmas* in the present life, according to the analogy of a river and its currents[200] - this is inclination. (d) **Growth refers to the nourishment of the root of the wholesome**[201] - thus

194 *pratipakṣo 'bhipretaḥ*, but Tib. (D19a.7) *mi mthun pa'i phyogs gñen po la bya bar 'dod do* = *vipakṣaḥ pratipakṣo 'bhipretaḥ*.
195 *nirodhasākṣātkriyā* is omitted from Tib. Bhāṣya (D19a.7) and receives no mention in the Ṭīkā.
196 *mūla* is omitted from the Bhāṣya; cf. N57.11.
197 Read: *āśrayasya* as per Ms.(61a.2) in place of *āśraya*-; Tib.(D283b.5): *lus*.
198 Ms.(61a.2): *ru*-; disregard Y's fn.2 p.193.
199 Read: *pūrvābhyāsāt* in place of *pūrvābhyāsena*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.11.
200 *nadīsrotonyāyena* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D283b.6.
201 Ms.(61a.3): *kuśalapu(ṣṭir...)* but Bhāṣya (N57.12-13): *kuśalamūlaparipuṣṭir*.

is the intended meaning - **which is due to the practice of the *dharmas* that consist in the root**[202] **of the wholesome in the present**[203], i.e. the production of excellent wholesome *dharmas* that were non-existent in the past. This is the difference between strength and growth, for strength consists in firmness in regard to the *karma*-result of the feeble wholesome [*dharmas*][204]. Whereas, growth refers to the ever increasing excellence in wholesome [*dharmas*]. Others again believe that in this context, the statement: "the nourishment of the root of the wholesome", is intended to signify the nourishment of the latent impressions of the excellent wholesome *dharmas*. **(e) Purification refers to the relinquishment of obscuration.** For those who belong to the spiritual lineages of the *śrāvaka* and the *pratyekabuddha*, purification, in this regard, refers to the relinquishment of obscuration that consists in moral defilement; but for those who belong to the spiritual lineage of the *bodhisattva*[205], purification refers to the relinquishment of both the obscuration that consists in moral defilement as well as the cognizable.

[2] **These fivefold results are [to be known] respectively as: (i) the *karma*-result**; i.e. the *karma*-result that is conformable with the wholesome *dharmas*. **(ii) The influenced result**; i.e. the preponderance of wholesome [*dharmas*] that is due to the influence of the fit vessel. **(iii) The result as natural outcome**; i.e. the inclination towards the wholesome that is due to previous practice. **(iv) The result of human effort**; i.e. the nourishment of the root of the wholesome that is due to the practice of the wholesome *dharmas* in the present. **(v) The result of dissociation**; i.e. the relinquishment of obscuration.

[3] The division of these fivefold results that have been mentioned briefly, is now explained in brief:

Y194 **IV.17 c** **[The other results are, in brief]: (a) the ever increasing, (b) the first**[206] **etc.**

(a) The ever increasing result is to be known as a successive development of the states as described above, i.e. **the generation of the resolve is due to the spiritual lineage**, the preparatory [state] is due to the generation of the resolve, **and so on. (b) The first result refers to the acquisition, from the very beginning, of the supramundane *dharmas***; i.e. the attainment of the path of vision. **(c) The result of practice follows after the latter in the state of**

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202 *mūla* is omitted from the Bhāṣya; cf. N57.12.

203 Y:*pratyutpanne*, which accords with the Bhāṣya (N57.12) and with both Tib. eds. of the Bhāṣya as well as P Ṭīkā (cf. 130b.4); however, D(283b.6): *da lta byuṅ ba*- supports the Ms.(61a.3) reading of *pratyutpanna*-.

204 Read: *mandakuśalasya vipāka*- in place of *mandakuśalavipāka*-; Ms.(61a.4): -*lasya vipāka*-

205 Ms.(61a.5): *sambuddha* but Y's emendation to *bodhisattva* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.6 p.193.

206 Read: *ādyaṅ* in place of *ādiś*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.16.

one still in training[207]; i.e. the results pertinent to both the once-returner and the non-returner in the state of one who is still in training which is comprised of the five individuals and is subsequent to the path of vision. It is the result of practice because it consists in the path of meditative development which is subsequent to that [state] accompanied by preparation. (d) **The completion result refers to the qualities of the adept.** Now, these are called: correct view, correct intention, correct speech, correct action, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness, correct meditative concentration as well as liberation and insight into the direct intuition that constitutes liberation. It is described as the completion result because it is situated at the end of all the results. (e) **The conforming result is to be known as the ever increasing result in its causal mode.** The causal mode (*upaniṣadbhāva*) is [equivalent to] the cause (*hetu*)[208]; i.e. because the generation of the resolve therein conforms with the spiritual lineage, the generation of the resolve is [the conforming] result[209]. It should be known that there are separate respective teachings, by way of statement and explanation, for the ever increasing result etc. and the conforming result etc. (f) **The result of the adverse elements is [equivalent to] the path of relinquishment and is [to be known as] the first result**[210]; because the adverse elements themselves are the result, this is [described as] the result of the adverse elements on account of which the path of relinquishment becomes dissociated from moral defilement. The first result is that which was mentioned previously as: "the acquisition, from the beginning, of the supramundane *dharmas*". Although the term "adverse
Y195 element" (*vipakṣa*) is [often] described as an obscuration in the sense that it is a hindrance to the counteragent, in this context, **the adverse elements are intended as the counteragent**[211], for the word can be analysed in this way: the adverse (*vipakṣa*) is the side (*pakṣa*) that impedes (*vi-ghātana*)[212] obscuration. (g) **The dissociation-result consists in both the result of practice and completion-result and refers to the dissociation from moral defilement on the part of one still in training and the adept, respectively.** Dissociation as the result of practice pertains to the five still in training, beginning with the once-returner's entry into the result, because they possess residual moral defilement[213]. Dissocia-

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207 Read: *tasmāt pareṇa śaikṣāvasthāyām iti* in place of *tatparaśaikṣāvastheti*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.21.

208 *upaniṣadbhāvo hetuḥ* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D248b.1.

209 Read: *tatra cittotpādasya gotrānukūlatvāc cittotpādaphalam iti* in place of *tatra cittotpādo gotrānukūlatvāc cittotpādaḥ phalam iti*; Ms.(61b.3): *-ādānukūlatvāc cittotpādaphalam iti.* Tib. is not clear: *de la sems bskyed pa ni rigs daṅ rjes su mthun pa'i phyir sems bskyed pa ni 'bras bu* (D284b.1).

210 Read: *evādiphalaṃ* in place of *ādiphalaṃ tad eva*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.24.

211 Read: *pratipakṣo 'bhipretaḥ* in place of *pratipakṣa ucyata iti matam*; cf. Bhāṣya N57.19.

212 Read: *-vighātana-* in place of *-nirvāsa-* since this is probably an etymological explanation of the term *vipakṣa*; Ms.(61b.5) seems to read *vighārtaya.*

213 Read: *sāvaśeṣakleśatvāt* as per Ms.(61b.6) in place of *kleśasaṣeśatvāt.*

tion[214] as the completion result pertains to the six adepts, beginning with the one susceptible to fall[215], because these have relinquished all moral defilement belonging to the three realms of existence, without remainder. The above [results] have been described by way of their differentiation, now the excellent [result is described] since it is not differentiated: (h) **the excellent result refers to the special qualities such as the higher knowledges**[216]. This should be understood just as the excellence of the practice and completion results[217]. What is the reason? Because [Vasubandhu] has in mind the acquisition of the special qualities on the part of the non-returners, the *arhats*, the *pratyekabuddhas*, the *bodhisattvas*, and the *tathāgatas*. (i) **The superior result refers to the spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva***[218]; here he provides the reason: **because these are superior to the other vehicles**[219]. Even though the spiritual levels of the *bodhisattva* consist in both the first result and the result of practice, because these have the natures of the paths of vision and meditative development, nevertheless, in relation to the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* vehicles, the superior result is to be known to pertain to the spiritual levels[220] of the *bodhisattva* because: (a) it is devoid of conceptual differentiation, (b) it belongs to the spiritual lineage of the Buddhas and (c) it is the result of universal enlightenment[221]. (j) **The unsurpassable result refers to the spiritual level of the Buddhas.** This consists only in the completion result since it is due to the relinquishment of all moral defilement and secondary defilement together with their latent impressions, and is also due to the relinquishment of undefiled nescience. It is described as the unsurpassable result because there is no other spiritual level[222] that is superior to it.

[4] **The other results are [explained] by way of a condensed explanation, however in full detail they are immeasurable**[223]. In full detail, the results that are set forth pertinent to the *śrāvakas*, the *pratyekabuddhas*, the *bodhisattvas* and the Perfectly Enlightened Ones are immeasurable.

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214 Tib. omits *visaṃyogaḥ*; cf. D284b.5-6.

215 Cf. LVP Kośa VI.252 ff. for a full description of these six.

216 Read: *abhijñādiko guṇaviśeṣa* in place of *abhijñādiguṇaviśeṣa*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.1-2. Ms. (61b.7): *-ṣa iti*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.195.

217 Read: *etad abhyāsasamāpti-* as per Ms.(61b.7) in place of *etad apy abhyāsasamāpti-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.195.

218 *sattva* is added in the Ms. margin; cf. Y's fn.3 p.195.

219 Read: *tadanyayānottaratvād* in place of *atadyānottaratvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.2-3.

220 *bhūmīnām* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D285a.3.

221 Ms.(62a.1): *buddhagotratvād ma-*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.195.

222 Tib. omits *bhūmi*; cf. D285a.4.

223 Read: *vyāsatas tv aparimāṇam* in place of *vyāsato 'parimāṇam*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.5.

The Summary Meaning of the Meditative Development of the Counteragent, the State Therein and the Result.

N58.7 The summary meaning of the meditative development of the counteragent consists in: (a) the meditative development of comprehensive learning, (b) the meditative development of abstinence, (c) the meditative development of the necessary preparation, (d) the meditative development of higher enterprise, (e) the connected meditative development because of the connection with the path of vision, (f) the meditative development of entry, (g) the superior meditative development, (h) the meditative development of the beginning, (i) the meditative development of the middle, (j) the meditative development of the end, (k) the higher meditative development, (l) the unsurpassable meditative development which is distinguished in terms of objective support, mental attention and attainment.

The summary meaning of the state consists in: (a) the future state of one stationed in the spiritual lineage, (b) the state of undertaking, up until the preparatory [state][224], (c) the impure state, (d) the impure and pure state, (e) the purified state, (f) the state accompanied by ornamentation, (g) the pervading state because it pervades the ten spiritual levels and (h) the unsurpassable state.

The summary meaning of the result consists in those that are due to: (a) aggregation, (b) the distinction of the latter, (c) previous practice, (d) ever increasing accomplishment, (e) statements and (f) explanations. Of these, (a) that which is due to the aggregation refers to the five results. (b) that which is due to the distinction of the latter refers to the remaining [results]. (c) That which is due to previous practice refers to the *karma*-result. (d) That which is due to ever increasing accomplishment refers to the other four. (e) That which is due to statements refers to the four beginning with the ever increasing result. (f) That which is due to explanations refers to the six beginning with the conforming
N59 result because these are the explanations of the latter four.

224 Both the Tib. Bhāṣya (D19b.5) and Ṭīkā have a different rendering to that given here; cf. Nagao's fn.7 p.58.

Y196.2 [1] The summary meaning of the meditative development of the counter-agent consists in: (a) the meditative development of comprehensive learning; i.e. the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness due to comprehensive learning in regard to the four noble truths. (b) The meditative development of abstinence; i.e. the meditative development of the correct exertions due to abstinence from unwholesome *dharmas*. (c) The meditative development of the necessary preparation; i.e. the meditative development of the bases of psychic power, for these facilitate the necessary preparation for meditative concentration because one's devotion to the eight formative forces that facilitate relinquishment leads to the relinquishment of the five faults. (d) The meditative development of higher enterprise; i.e. the meditative development of the faculties that results from the generation of the root of the wholesome which is conducive to liberation. (e) The connected meditative development[225]; i.e. the meditative development of the powers[226] because of the connection with the path of vision. (f) The meditative development of entry; the meditative development of the limbs of enlightenment because therein one enters into reality[227], either due to entry into the supramundane *dharmas*, or else, due to entry into the Noble Path[228]. (g) The superior meditative development; i.e. the meditative development [component] of the path because the path of meditative development is superior to the path of vision. (h) The meditative development of the beginning[229]; i.e. in the state of the ordinary person it is either conformable, or else, erroneously inverted. (i) The meditative development of the middle; i.e. in the state of one still in training it is not erroneously inverted but is encumbered by erroneous inversion[230]. (j) The meditative development of the end; i.e. in the state of the adept it is not erroneously inverted and is free from the encumbrance of erroneous inversion. (k) The higher meditative development[231]; i.e. that pertinent to the *śrāvaka* etc. (l) The unsurpassable meditative development[232]; i.e. that pertinent to the *bodhisattva*, which is distinguished in terms of objective support, mental attention and attainment. The summary meaning of meditative development has now been set forth[233].

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225 Read: *śliṣṭabhāvanā* in place of *śleṣabhāvanā*; cf. N58.9.
226 Ms.(62a.5): *balabhāvanā* disregard Y's fn.2 p.196.
227 Ms.(62a.5): *tattvapraveśāt*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.196.
228 Ms.(62a.5): *āryabhūmi-*, but Y's emendation to *āryamārga-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.196.
229 Read: *ādibhāvanā* in place of *prathamabhāvanā*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.10.
230 Ms.(62a.6): *viparyāsasānubandhā*, but Y's emendation to *viparyāsānubandhā* is preferred; cf. his fn.5 p.196.
231 Read: *sottarā bhāvanā* in place of *sottarabhāvanā*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.11.
232 Read: *niruttarā bhāvanā* in place of *anuttarabhāvanā*; cf. Bhāṣya N58.11.
233 Read: *abhihito* as per Ms.(62a.7) in place of *a(yaṃ) vihito*.

[2] **The summary meaning of the state consists in: (a) the future state;** Y197 i.e. the causal state. **(b) The state of undertaking refers to preparation together with the generation of the resolve**[234]. **(c) The impure and pure state;** i.e. the two states: the state of result and the state of duties still to be performed. **(d) The purified state;** i.e. the state without duties still to be performed. **(e) The state accompanied by ornamentation;** i.e. the state of excellence. **(f) The pervading state;** i.e. the higher state - it is described as the pervading state because it **pervades the ten spiritual levels** of the *bodhisattvas*. **(g) The unsurpassable state;** i.e. that of the Buddhas, the Venerable Ones, for there is no other state superior to it. And this refers to the attainment state, the state of benefit and[235] the state of the performance of duty, which have been previously described.

[3] **The summary meaning of the result consists in those that are due to: (a) the aggregation, (b) the distinction of the latter, (c) previous practice, (d) ever increasing accomplishment, (e) statements and (f) explanations.** The author of the commentary himself provides an exposition of these: **of these, (a) that which is due to aggregation refers to the five results;** i.e. those beginning with the *karma*-result since all the results are included in these. **(b) That which is due to the distinction of the latter refers to the remaining [results];** i.e. the differentiation of those same five. The remaining [results] should be known as those beginning with the ever increasing result. **(c) That which is due to previous practice refers to the *karma*-result;** i.e. the *karma*-result in the present life which is due to the accumulation of wholesome [*dharmas*] in past lives. Since it arises in conformity with the wholesome, it is described as being due to previous practice. **(d) That which is due to ever increasing accomplishment refers to the other four;** i.e. the influenced result, the result as natural outcome, the result of human effort and the result of dissociation. In relation to these, strength refers to what is accomplished through the *karma*-result; inclination refers to what is accomplished through strength; growth refers to what is accomplished through inclination; purification refers to what is accomplished through growth. Some believe it is described as an ever increasing accomplishment because it is characterized by successive expositions. **(e) That which is due to statements refers to the four beginning with the ever increasing result;** i.e. the ever increasing result, the first result, the result of practice and the completion-result. **(f) That which is due to explanations refers to the six beginning with the conforming result because these are the explanations of the latter**

234 Sanskrit Bhāṣya: *ārambhāvasthā yāvat prayogāt* (N58.13), but Tib. Bhāṣya: *sems bskyed nas bzuṅ ste / sbyor ba'i bar du* (D19b.5). However, both Ms. and Tib. Ṭīkās: *ārambhāvasthā saha cittotpādena prayogaḥ*; cf. N's fn.7 p.58.

235 Ms.(62b.1): *ca yāḥ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.197.

four[236]; i.e. the conforming result is [equivalent to] the explanation of the ever increasing result; the result of adverse elements is [equivalent to] the explanation of the first result; the result of dissociation is [equivalent to] the explanation of both the result of practice and the completion-result. And the excellent result, the superior result and
Y198 the unsurpassable result are [equivalent to] the explanation of that same completion-result because [Vasubandhu] has in mind the possession of ornamentation on its part. However, others believe[237] that the excellent result is [equivalent to] just the explanation of the results of practice and completion, because it is possible for the non-returner also [to possess] the qualities of the higher knowledges etc., whereas, the unsurpassable result is [equivalent to] the explanations of the completion-result.

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236 Read: *nirdeśād* in place of *nirdeśataḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N59.1.

237 As noted by Y (fn.1 p.198) the Ms.(62b) line 7 begins: *-ttaraphalam ādiphalasyābhyāsaphalasya ca nirdeśaḥ* which cannot be reconciled with the Tib.; cf. D287a.4.

Chapter Five

The Supremacy of the Vehicle

1. The Three Kinds of Supremacy.

N60.3 The supremacy of the vehicle should now be mentioned - it is said:

V.1 abc Supremacy is considered as listed in relation to: (a) spiritual practice, (b) objective support and (c) full attainment.

The threefold supremacies which are [incorporated] in the universal vehicle and on account of which it is the supreme vehicle[1] are: (a) supremacy of spiritual practice, (b) supremacy of objective support and (c) supremacy of full attainment.

[Sthiramati]

Y199 [1] The supremacy of the vehicle was [initially] listed immediately after the listing of the six subjects, such as the Characteristics and the Obscurations[2]; hence, subsequent to the explanation of these, the subject under discussion is the explanation of the Supremacy of the Vehicle. Consequently, he says: **the supremacy of the vehicle should now be mentioned - it is said:...** The [word] "now" means "immediately following the explanation of the six [subjects] such as the Characteristic". The intended meaning is: because it was listed immediately after those [subjects].

[2] Alternatively, the Meditative Development of the Counteragent, the State Therein and the Attainment of the Result were explained as common to both the *śrāvaka* etc. and the *bodhisattva*; however, because they do not share the same states[3], the supremacy of the vehicle is not common to both the *bodhisattva* and the *śrāvaka* etc. And in order to demonstrate that it is described as the chief object in this context, he says: "the supremacy of the vehicle should now be mentioned - it is said:...". Since there is nothing higher than this, the word 'supremacy' is a synonym for 'excellence'. But what is this? It is the universal vehicle, for thus, inasmuch as the universal vehicle is superior to both the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* vehicles, there is none other that is more excellent compared with the universal vehicle because of the proportional differences in cause and result in regard to it. Supremacy (*ānuttarya*) refers to the state (*bhāva*) of that which is supreme (*anuttarasya*); but just what is this? Hence he says:

1 Tib. omits *yāna*; cf. D20a.2.

2 Tib. omits *āvaraṇa*; cf. D287a.6.

3 Read perhaps: *asādhāraṇāvasthātaḥ* in place of *asādhāraṇaprasaṅgena* on the basis of the Tib.: *thun moṅ ma yin pa'i gnas skabs su bab pas na* (D287b.1); Ms.(63a) line 3 begins: *yānānut-taryaṃ tu...*

V.1 a — Supremacy [is considered as listed] in relation to: (a) spiritual practice[4] etc.

The threefold supremacies which are [incorporated] in the universal vehicle...[5] But what is this universal vehicle? Just these three: (a) spiritual practice, (b) objective support and (c) full attainment. Of these, (a) the supremacy of spiritual practice refers to the accomplishment of the ten perfections, i.e. the spiritual practice of the *bodhisattva* is described as supreme in regard to the accomplishment of the perfections.
Y200 (b) Moreover, the objective support refers to the *dharmas* of the perfections etc. and to the *dharmadhātu*. By means of this objective support, the *bodhisattvas* have the capacity to provide benefit without remainder for others[6]; hence, the supremacy of objective support refers to its being the cause of the capacity[7] to provide benefit for others. Why? This the objective support of the *bodhisattvas* is described as supreme because it belongs to him. (c) Full attainment refers to the result of: (i) the spiritual lineage, (ii) firm conviction and (iii) the generation of the resolve [for enlightenment] etc. Since the [*bodhisattva*] reaches full knowledge [*samudāgacchanti*] or attains this due to the spiritual lineage etc., it is [described as] full attainment [*samudāgama*]; and it is described as supreme because there is no other full attainment superior to this. Consequently, in this context, supremacy refers to the absence of anything other that is superior to that full attainment. And in this respect, it is said that the spiritual practice of the *bodhisattvas*, together with its foundation and result[8], consists in the universal vehicle. Moreover, it is described as supreme on account of the threefold supremacy that has just been described.

[3] Alternatively, the universal vehicle refers to the direct intuition devoid of all the discursive elaboration of conceptual discrimination in accompaniment with its associated elements, the accumulations, application, subsequently attained direct intuition, the special qualities, objective support and result. Of these, the objective support refers to thusness; the result refers to the *nirvāṇa* in which the *bodhisattva* is not permanently fixed. And the universal vehicle refers to the teachings such as the Sūtras which are expressive of this universal vehicle. Moreover, the [name of the] text is applied figuratively for its subject matter, just as the "Slaying of Kaṃsa" is [figuratively used] for

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4 Read: *ānuttaryaṃ prapattau hi* in place of *pratipatter ānuttaryam*; cf. Bhāṣya N60.4.

5 Read: *trividham ānuttaryaṃ mahāyāne* in place of *mahāyānasya hi trividham ānuttaryam*; cf. Bhāṣya N60.6.

6 Read perhaps: *bodhisattvānāṃ niravaśeṣa-* in place of *bodhisattvānām aśeṣa-*; Ms.(63a.6): *bodhisattvānāṃ viśeṣa-* . Tib.: *dmigs pa 'dis byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams gźan gyi don ma lus par mdzad nus par 'gyur ro* (D287b.6.

7 Tib. is slightly different: "...refers to the fact that it is the objective support that is the cause of the capacity to provide benefit...";*de'i phyir gźan gyi don byed nus pa'i rgyu'i dmigs pa ni* (D287b.6).

8 Ms.(63b.1): *saphala-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.200.

the 'stealing of jewels'[9]. It is universal (*mahat*) because it possesses the seven kinds of universality; it is a vehicle (*yāna*) since [the *bodhisattva*] reaches the unfixed *nirvāṇa* travelling (*yānti*) by means of it. Since it is both a vehicle and is universal, it is the universal vehicle[10]. Furthermore, its sevenfold universality refers to universality in regard to: (a) objective support, (b) spiritual practice, (c) direct intuition, (d) vigour, (e) expedients, (f) attainment and (g) action. Of these, (a) the universality in regard to objective support refers to the Dharma of the endless Sūtras, such as the Hundred Thousand [Prajñāpāramitā], for these form the objective support for the path of the *bodhisattva*. (b) The universality in regard to spiritual practice is the result of spiritual practice concerned with benefit in its entirety for both oneself and others. (c) The universality in regard to direct intuition is due to knowledge of insubstantiality in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas*. (d) The universality in regard to vigour is due to application in regard to the many hundreds of thousands of difficult tasks [to be performed] over three countless aeons. (e) The universality in regard to skill in expedients is due to the fact that [the *bodhisattva*] is fixed neither in *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*. (f) The universality in regard to attainment is due to the understanding of the immeasurable and countless virtues, such as the powers, self-confidence and the
Y201 special Buddha qualities. (g) The universality in regard to actions is due to the performance of the acts of the Buddha by revealing his enlightenment for as long as *saṃsāra* exists. Only this universal vehicle is supreme; the state of the latter is [described as] supremacy[11] because there is no vehicle that is superior to it. Furthermore, it consists in spiritual practice, objective support and full attainment, for thus, the universal vehicle is described as supreme because it possesses these [three] elements. There is supremacy of spiritual practice since spiritual practice is supreme; the supremacy of objective support and the supremacy of full attainment should be understood in the same way. These supremacies are respectively determined with reference to: (a) the path of the *bodhisattva*, (b) its support and (c) the result of that [path]. Moreover, it is just these that are referred to through the statements of the Buddha, viz.: spiritual practice, objective support and the result of that [practice].

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9 It is difficult to establish the full significance of this analagy; perhaps it refers to the appropriation of Kaṃsa's wealth etc. by Kṛṣṇa after he had killed him.

10 The Ms. omits this statement: *de ni theg pa yaṅ yin la chen po yaṅ yin pas theg pa chen po'o* [D288a.5].

11 *tadbhāva ānuttaryam* (Y201.3) is omitted from Tib.

2. Supremacy of Spiritual Practice.

N60.10 **Of these, the supremacy of spiritual practice is to be known by way of the spiritual practice of the ten perfections.**

V.1 d **Spiritual practice is sixfold:**

In relation to those perfections.

V.2 abc **That which: (a) is highest, (b) concerns mental attention, (c) is in conformity with the Dharma, (d) avoids the extremes, (e) is specific and (f) is non-specific;**

These are the six kinds of spiritual practice, namely: (a) the highest spiritual practice, (b) spiritual practice in regard to mental attention, (c) spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma, (d) spiritual practice that avoids the two extremes, (e) specific spiritual practice and (f) non-specific spiritual practice.

[Sthiramati]

Y201.12 [1] Although it is fitting that the objective support be explained firstly because spiritual practice is preceded by the objective support, spiritual practice is mentioned initially in order to demonstrate that it is the essence of the practice of the *bodhisattvas*. Of these, how is the supremacy of spiritual practice [to be known]? Hence he says: **the supremacy of spiritual practice is to be known by way of the practice of the ten perfections.** The spiritual practice of the perfections is [equivalent to] the performance of the perfections; and since this spiritual practice of the perfections is explained only in the universal vehicle and not in any other vehicle[12], he shows the universal vehicle to be supreme. Moreover, this spiritual practice becomes supreme while [the *bodhisattva*] is applying himself to the perfections in their various modes; and in order to illustrate these modes, he says:

V.1 d **Spiritual practice is sixfold:**

It is not known as to how this spiritual practice of the perfections [is sixfold], beginning with the **highest** up until the **non-specific**, hence he says:

12 *yāna* is omitted from Tib.; cf. D288b.6.

a. The Highest Spiritual Practice.

N60.20 Of these:

N61 V.2 d — The highest consists in twelve:

V.3 abcd — (a) Magnanimity, (b) duration, (c) prerogative, (d) inexhaustibility, (e) continuity, (f) non-hardship, (g) wealth and (h) possession;

V.4 ab — (i) Enterprise, (j) acquisition, (k) natural outcome and (l) accomplishment - these are considered as highest.

These twelve types are considered as highest, namely: (a) the highest degree of magnanimity, (b) the highest degree of duration, (c) the highest degree of prerogative, (d) the highest degree of inexhaustibility, (e) the highest degree of continuity, (f) the highest degree of non-hardship, (g) the highest degree of wealth, (h) the highest degree of possession, (i) the highest degree of enterprise, (j) the highest degree of acquisition, (k) the highest degree of natural outcome and (l) the highest degree of accomplishment.

Of these, (a) the highest degree of magnanimity is to be known as not seeking after all mundane success and also as pre-eminence. (b) The highest degree of duration is due to the cultivation [of the perfections] for three countless aeons. (c) The highest degree of prerogative is due to the prerogative for deeds of benefit for all beings. (d) The highest degree of inexhaustibility is due to the complete absence of exhaustion on account of the transformation into universal enlightenment. (e) The highest degree of continuity is due to a firm conviction in the sameness of self and others due to the fulfilment of the perfections of generosity etc. in regard to all beings. (f) The highest degree of non-hardship is due to the fulfilment of the perfections of generosity etc. on the part of others, through his approval alone. (g) The highest degree of wealth is due to the fulfilment of generosity etc. by means of the "treasury of the sky" meditative concentration etc. (h) The highest degree of possession is due to the possession [by the *bodhisattva*] of direct intuition that is devoid of conceptual differentiation. (i) The highest degree of enterprise refers to the abundant measure of patience on the spiritual level of the one who courses in firm conviction. (j) The

highest degree of acquisition refers to the first spiritual level. (k) The highest degree of natural outcome refers to the eight spiritual levels subsequent to the latter. (l) The highest degree of accomplishment refers to the tenth spiritual level and to that of the *tathāgata* since these are the [respective] accomplishments of (a) the *bodhisattva* and (b) the Buddhas.

V.4 cd — Consequently, the ten perfections are considered in the highest sense;

Since these twelvefold [spiritual practices] exist in the highest
N62 degree within the latter [i.e. the perfections], consequently, the ten perfections [are considered][13] in this sense, i.e. as highest. As to which are these ten and in order to disclose their names, it is said:

V.5 abcd — (a) Generosity, (b) morality, (c) patience, (d) vigour, (e) meditative absorption, (f) wisdom, (g) expediency, (h) vows, (i) strength and (j) direct intuition - these are the ten perfections.

Which are the individual actions pertinent to each of these?

V.6 abcdef — Actions that: (a) are of assistance, (b) are non-violent, (c) endure such [violence], (d) increase virtues, (e) have the capacity to initiate and (f) to liberate, (g) are inexhaustible, (h) engage constantly [in generosity] (i) engage eternally in [generosity], (j) are enjoyable and bring [beings] to maturity.

These are the respective actions that pertain to the latter [i.e. to the perfections] for, (a) through his generosity, the *bodhisattva* assists beings. (b) On account of his morality, he does not injure others. (c) Through patience, he endures the injury inflicted by others. (d) Through vigour, he increases his virtues. (e) Through the meditative absorptions, he initiates beings, having attracted them by means of his psychic power etc. (f) Through his wisdom, he liberates them by providing correct counsel. (g) Through the perfection of skill in expe-

13 Tib. inserts *'dod* (*mata*); cf. D20b.5

dients, he causes his generosity etc. to become inexhaustible due to the transformation into universal enlightenment. (h) Through the perfection of vows, he engages in generosity etc. at all times while rejoicing in the birth of a Buddha in all his lives due to his possession of favourable rebirths. (i) Through the perfection of strength, he engages eternally in generosity etc. due to the strength of his critical consideration and meditative development because he is not overcome by adverse elements. (j) Through the perfection of direct intuition, since it removes confusion about the literal meaning of the Dharma, he experiences in return the enjoyment of the Dharma which has generosity etc. as its controlling influence and he brings beings to maturity.

The highest spiritual practice has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y201.12 [1] Of these:

Y202 **V.2 d** **The highest consists in twelve:**

What is meant is: the highest [spiritual practice] which is vast and unsurpassable has twelve modes - in order to demonstrate these modes, he says:

V.3 a **(a) Magnanimity, (b) duration etc.**

From the highest degree of magnanimity up until the highest degree of accomplishment; these twelve types are considered as highest[14]. Of these, the highest degree of magnanimity is to be known as not seeking after[15] all mundane[16] success and also as pre-eminence. Success is [equivalent to] prosperity; and this has two aspects: (a) that which is attained and (b) that not attained. Of these, [the *bodhisattva*] does not become attached to what is attained nor does he strive for what is not attained because he applies himself to the removal of the suffering of others without regard for his own happiness. As has been stated:

> O virtuous one, what fruit of merit you
> have; all that is for the benefit of others, not
> for your own sake[17].

It is [also described as] pre-eminence[18] because its fruit is Buddhahood which is

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14 Read: *eṣā dvādaśavidhā paramā matā* in place of *eṣā dvādaśaprakārā paramatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.5.

15 *-anarthakatvena* here, but Bhāṣya (N61.10): *-anarthitvena*.

16 Read: *sarvalaukika-* in place of *sarvaloka-*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.10.

17 Read: *yad asti puṇyasya phalañ ca sādho /*
sarvaṃ parārthaṃ tava nātmahetor //
in place of *yat puṇyaṃ puṇyaphalaṃ ca sādho sarvaṃ parārthaṃ tava nātmahetor*;
Tib: *dge ba khyod kyi bsod nams 'bras bu gaṅ //*
thams cad gźan gyi don te bdag gi don rgyur min // (D289a.3).
Ms.(64a.4): *-lañ ca sādho...* contrary to Y's reading.

18 Ms.(64a.4): *utkṛṣṭatvaṃ tvam* but Y's reading of *utkṛṣṭatvam* is preferred.

endowed with relinquishment, direct intuition and might. Alternatively, the sublime person is generally described as being of two sorts: (a) munificent and (b) devoid of the desire for services in return. Therefore, the *bodhisattva* does not strive for all mundane success[19] but applies himself to the perfections, such as generosity, which are ever increasing. This is what is described as the magnanimity of spiritual practice.

[2] **The highest degree of duration...**; its pre-eminence is on account of its duration. Moreover, duration refers to the extended practice of the perfections beginning with generosity. And since it is not known as to how long this endures, he says: **is due to the cultivation [of the perfections] for three countless aeons.** For, the *bodhisattvas'* meditative development of the perfections, such as generosity, is of exceeding duration because it is completed over three countless aeons.

[3] **The highest degree of prerogative[20] is due to the prerogative for deeds of benefit for all beings[21].** It is described as the highest by way of prerogative[22] (*adhikārataḥ*) since the *bodhisattvas* engage in generosity etc. without regard for their own happiness for the sake of (*adhikṛtya*) bringing about welfare and happiness for all beings.

[4] **The highest degree of inexhaustibility[23]...**; it is of the highest degree on
Y203 account of the fact that it is inexhaustible; but what is its inexhaustibility due to? Hence he says: **is due to the complete absence of exhaustion on account of the transformation into universal enlightenment[24].** Even after yielding the *karma*-result in all places of rebirth [the perfections], such as generosity which consist in the transformation into universal enlightenment, are not completely severed. Even in the *nirvāṇa* devoid of the remnants of existence they are not exhausted due to: (a) the production of the Dharma Body which is characterized by the turning about of the basis and (b) the inexhaustibility of that [Dharma Body]. However, they are severed in the *nirvāṇa* realm that is devoid of the remnants of existence through the transformation into enlightenment of the *śrāvaka* etc. due to the severance of the basis [i.e. the body][25] in every respect.

[5] Alternatively, [the perfections] such as generosity become inexhaustible through the transformation into universal enlightenment due to the abundant *karma*-result; and what is abundant is said to be inexhaustible because it is not completely exhausted through the yielding of the *karma*-result. But the transformation into enlightenment of

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19 Read: *sarvalaukika-* in place of *sarvaloka-*; cf. my fn.16 above.

20 Ms.(64a.6): *adhikāra-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.202.

21 Read: *sarvasattvārthakriyādhikārād* in place of *sarvasattvārthakriyoddeśād*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.12.

22 Ms.(64a.7): *'dhikārataḥ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.202.

23 Read: *akṣayatvaparamatā* in place of *akṣayaparamatā*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.12. As noted by Y (cf. his fn.5 p.202) this is omitted from the Ms. and has been inserted on the basis of the Tib.

24 Ms.(64a.7): *mahābodhi-*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.203.

25 *āśraya*; Tib. *lus* (D289b.3).

the *śrāvaka* etc. is not inexhaustible in this way. Or else, for the *bodhisattvas*, the roots of the wholesome that are transformed into universal enlightenment for the benefit of beings become inexhaustible, like the realms of beings; hence, like the realms of beings, they are not completely exhausted.

[6] **The highest degree of continuity is due to a firm conviction in the sameness of self and others due to the fulfilment of the perfections of generosity etc. in regard to all beings**[26]. For, on the Joyous spiritual level, the *bodhisattva* becomes firmly convinced of the sameness of self and others because of his awareness of the all-pervading meaning[27] of the *dharmadhātu*. Having relinquished conceptual differentiation in regard to self and others due to his firm conviction in the sameness of self and others he obtains an extremely joyous mind on account of others' generosity etc., just as he does on account of his own generosity etc. As the consequence of this the perfections, such as generosity, are continually fulfilled every instant, every moment and every day.

[7] **The highest degree of non-hardship is due to the fulfillment of the perfection of generosity etc. on the part of others, through his approval alone.** The *bodhisattvas* with joyous mind express their approval of the roots of the wholesome, such as the generosity of beings, in such a way that the perfections, such as generosity, of those [beings] is fulfilled through that approval alone.

[8] **The highest degree of wealth is due to the fulfillment of generosity**
Y204 **etc. on account of the 'treasury of the sky' meditative concentration etc.** The *bodhisattvas* obtain the meditative concentration called 'treasury of the sky' through meditative development which penetrates the *dharmadhātu* . From obtaining this, they cause the fulfillment of the perfection of generosity because they are then able to fulfill all the aspirations of sentient beings. For, under the influence of this, the very sky (*gagana*) becomes a treasury (*gañja*) - thus it is designated as the 'treasury of the sky' (*gagana-gañja*) meditative concentration. Alternatively, a treasury (*gañja*) is established in the sky (*gagana*)[28] because all of the necessities of life are produced from the sky through the power of this meditative concentration[29]. By the word "etc." the meditative concentrations that are taught in the Sūtras of the Prajñāpāramitās etc. are referred to.

[9] **The highest degree of possession is due to the possession [by the *bodhisattva*] of direct intuition that is devoid of conceptual differentiation.** For the *bodhisattvas'* direct intuition is devoid of conceptual differentiation[30]

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26 Read: *sarvasattvadānādibhiḥ pāramitāparipūraṇād* in place of *sarvasattveṣu dānādipāramitāparipūraṇād*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.14-15.

27 Ms.(64b.4): *sarvatragārthā-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.203.

28 The first explanation of the term *gagana-gañja* explains it as a *karmadhāraya* compound and the second as a *tatpuruṣa* compound.

29 The Ms.(65a.1) is illegible prior to *jāyante*; cf. Y's fn.1 p.204.

30 Tib. inserts: *rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes* (D290a.6) which is not found in the Ms.

due to their non-perception of the trio, i.e. the giver[31], the object given and the recipient. Similarly, their direct intuition is devoid of conceptual differentiation due to their non-perception of [the three modes of the other nine perfections[32]] up until the knower, object of knowledge and the knowledge itself. The spiritual practice of generosity etc. is encompassed by that highest direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation. How so? Because it conforms with that [direct intuition] and because it has the latter as objective support - hence is it described as highest.

[10] **The highest degree of enterprise refers to an abundant measure of patience on the spiritual level of the one who courses in firm conviction.** The first immeasurable aeon is described as the level of the one who courses in firm conviction. Moreover, through the force of the spiritual lineage and friends, there is, in those whose resolve for enlightenment has been generated, a totally firm conviction[33] in the insubstantiality of the *dharmas* in terms of the three natures - this consists in an abundant measure of patience which is not overpowered by adverse elements such as lack of faith[34]. For this is the state of enterprise of the ***bodhisattva***, and as a consequence, his patience in abundant measure is described as the highest degree of enterprise.

[11] **The highest degree of acquisition refers to the first spiritual level.**
Y205 For the supramundane perfections are obtained on the first spiritual level because of [the ***bodhisattvas'***] awareness of the all-pervading nature of the ***dharmadhātu***. However, since the mundane [perfections] were included previously by way of the preparation for the first spiritual level, it is said that on the first spiritual level there is the highest degree of acquisition.

[12] **The highest degree of natural outcome refers to the eight [spiritual levels] subsequent to the latter.** Acquisition that is distinctively superior on the eight spiritual levels other than the latter [i.e. the first] is the natural outcome of the perfections acquired on the first spiritual level[35], thus it is the highest degree of natural outcome. Alternatively, the highest degree of acquisition refers to the acquisition of the first spiritual level through the force of the meditative development of the perfections on the level of the one who courses in firm conviction. A quotation from a Sūtra states:

> The first spiritual level is included in the path of vision of the ***bodhisattva*** and because of his entry into that, [the ***bodhisattva***] is born in the spiritual

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31 Read: *dāyaka-* as per Ms.(65a.1) in place of *dāpaka-*; Tib.: *sbyin bdag* (D290a.6).
32 This obviously refers to a series, hence the ten perfections are suggested tentatively.
33 Ms.(65a.3): *-ādhimokṣo*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.204.
34 Tib. is slightly different: "...is victorious over adverse elements"; *mi mthun pa'i phyogs las rgyal ba la bya* (D290b.2).
35 Ms.(65a.5): *pratibhūmipratilabdhānāṃ* contrary to Y's fn.1 p.205; *pra(ti)bhūmi-* is corrected in the Ms. margin to: *pra(thama)bhūmi-*.

lineage of the *tathāgata*[36] due to his acquisition of the qualities that have its nature and are in conformity with it.[37]

The remaining spiritual levels are the highest degree of natural outcome because they are the outcome[38] of the first level acquired through the force of the meditative development[39] of the perfections. Or again, the highest degree of natural outcome refers to the eight spiritual levels [other than the first] because they are the natural outcome of the perfections that are acquired on the first level.

[13] **The highest degree of accomplishment refers to the tenth spiritual level and to that of the *tathāgata*[40] since these are the [respective] accomplishments of (a) the *bodhisattvas* and (b) the Buddhas.** (a) Since the *bodhisattva* reaches the end of all the *bodhisattva* courses on the tenth spiritual level, he is consecrated there[41] as an incumbent [Buddha] by the *tathāgatas.* There is the highest degree of accomplishment for the *bodhisattvas* on the tenth spiritual level[42] because of: (i) the fulfilment of an inconceivable accumulation of merit and direct intuition; (ii) the absence of conceptual differentiation in regard to all *dharmas* and (iii) the production of benefit, in every respect, for oneself and others. (b) But on the spiritual level of the *tathāgatas*[43], since the Venerable One becomes the teacher of the whole world because he attains pre-eminence in relinquishment, direct intuition and might - hence there is accomplishment as the full accomplishment of the Buddhas. But what is this accomplishment? It is the achievement of the qualities of the *bodhisattva* and of the qualities of the Buddha, in every respect.

Y206 [14] Alternatively, the culmination of the perfections that are included on the level of one still in training is [equivalent to] the tenth spiritual level; hence, there is the full accomplishment of the *bodhisattva* on that [level]. The highest limit of [the perfections] that are included on the level of the adept is [equivalent to] the Buddha level. Since training in the perfections is no longer present on that level, there is full accomplishment as the full accomplishment of the Buddhas. Thus, the highest degree of full accomplishment is to be known as: (a) the full accomplishment of the *bodhisattvas* on the tenth spiritual level and (b) the full accomplishment of the Buddha on the level of the *tathāgata.*

36 Ms.(65a.6): *āto* not *jātau* as per Y; read: *jāto gotre tathāgatasya* in place of *jātau tathāgatasyotpannaḥ.* Tib.: *de bźin gśegs pa'i rigs su skyes pa yin* (D290b.5).

37 Tib. omits: *tadanukūla*; cf. D290b.5. Ms.(65a.7) line begins: *-tilambhād iti...* It is difficult to establish precisely where this quotation begins.

38 Tib. omits: *niṣyandatvāt*; cf. D290b.6.

39 Ms.(65a.7) omits *bhāvanā* which is inserted on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D290b.6.

40 *tāthāgatyāṃ* but Bhāṣya (N61.21): *tathāgatyāṃ.*

41 *tatra* is omitted from the Tib.; cf. D291a.1.

42 Tib. inserts *sa bcu pa la* (*daśamyāṃ bhūmau*); cf. D291a.2.

43 Ms.(65b.2): *tāthāgatātyāṃ.*

[15]

V.4 cd **Consequently, the ten perfections are considered[44] in the highest sense.**

Since these[45] twelvefold [spiritual practices] exist in the highest degree within the latter [i.e. in the perfections], such as in the generosity [practised by] the *bodhisattva*, but not in the generosity etc. of the *śrāvaka*, consequently, the ten perfections beginning with generosity and concluding with direct intuition which pertain just to the *bodhisattva* are considered in this sense, i.e. as highest according to the rules of etymology. Thus it is just the spiritual practice that pertains to the ten[46] perfections which is said to be of the highest degree.

[16] Of these [means] of these perfections, with regard to which, even their mere name has not been disclosed; in order to disclose their names, it is said:

V.5 abcd **(a) Generosity, (b) morality, (c) patience, (d) vigour, (e) meditative absorption, (f) wisdom[47], (g) expediency, (h) vows, (i) the powers and (j) direct intuition - these are the ten perfections.**

It was stated that "the highest degree of prerogative is due to the prerogative for deeds of benefit for all beings"[48], hence the question is asked: which are the actions pertinent to each of these? Therefore he says:

V.6 ab **Actions that: (a) are of assistance, (b) are non-violent, (c) endure such [violence] etc.**

For, through generosity, the *bodhisattva* assists beings. (a) In this regard, because he is irreproachable on account of his wish to honour and assist [beings], one who is indifferent to both the service[49] in return for a favour and the *karma*-result abandons objective and subjective entities on account of a particular volition and
Y207 bestows [gifts on beings] through his acts of body and speech - this is the material generosity of the *bodhisattva*. By means of this he assists beings by taking away their sufferings of hunger and thirst etc. (b) The instructions to do with modes of living, scriptural treatises, arts and crafts and [the practice of] non-violence towards beings, [instructions] which are preceded by compassion, as well as the instructions on propitious states of existence and the path to liberation, are the gifts of the Dharma. More-

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44 Read: *matā*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.206.
45 Read: *eṣā* in place of *iyam*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.24.
46 Tib. omits *daśa*; cf. D291a.6.
47 Ms.(65b.6): *prajñāna* which seems to be amended to *prajñā* in the margin.
48 Read: *sarvasattvārthakriyādhikārād* in place of *sarvasattvārthakriyoddeśād*; cf. Bhāṣya N61.12.
49 Ms.(66a) line 1 begins: *-upakāra...*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.206.

over, by means of these [the *bodhisattva*] assists beings by removing the sufferings of *saṃsāra* due to (wrong) modes of living and wretched states of existence. (c) The gift of fearlessness consists of liberation for those who are attacked by kings[50], thieves, kinsmen or beasts of prey etc. and thereby he assists beings by removing the fear of calamity to life, enjoyment, children and wife etc.

[17] **He does not injure these [beings][51] on account of his morality.** Morality refers to abstention from all misdeeds of body and speech, and, in keeping with worldly practice, abstention (from the acts of body and speech) which are forbidden and the performance of the acts of body and speech that are prescribed. Because he is established in this morality [the *bodhisattva*], even for the sake of his life, does not injure or offend beings himself, nor does he cause others to do so.

[18] **Through patience, he endures the injury inflicted[52] by others.** Patience consists in the endurance and toleration of all forms of suffering with a mind predominated by compassion. On account of this [the *bodhisattva*] endures injury such as murder[53], bondage or the beatings inflicted by others, because he has no wish to retaliate[54].

[19] **Through vigour, he increases his virtues.** Vigour is a strength of will with reference to generosity etc.; increase is the accomplishment of superior virtues due to the practice of the virtues of generosity etc. on account of that [vigour].

[20] **Through the meditative absorptions, he initiates [beings], having attracted them by means of his psychic power etc.** By the word "etc.", the knowledge of the mental make-up of others[55] is included. Meditative absorption refers to meditative concentration, i.e. the single-pointedness of mind. Psychic power is [the power of] flying through the air etc. Initiation refers to the exposition of the real nature of the teachings because those who are attracted by psychic power and the extraordinary ability to read the thoughts [of others], which result from the meditative absorptions, have the capacity to be initiated in the teachings.

[21] **Through his wisdom, he liberates [beings] by providing correct**
Y208 **counsel[56].** Wisdom is characterized by the investigation of the *dharmas* in all aspects; moreover, the action pertinent to this is the provision of correct counsel and the relinquishment of moral defilement, [both of] which are dependent upon instruc-

50 Ms.(66a.2): *rāja*...; disregard Y's fn.1 p.207.
51 *eṣām* (Tib. *de dag*) but Bhaṣya (N62.10): *pareṣām*.
52 Ms.(66a.4): *upaghātaṃ marṣayati* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.207.
53 Read perhaps: *vādhaka* in place of *hiṃsa*; Tib. *gsod pa* [D292a.1].
54 Tib. omits *upaghātaṃ* as noted by Y (fn.3 p.207) however Ms.(66a.5): *-m upaghātaṃ marṣayati* contrary to his reading.
55 *citta*(or *cetaḥ*)*paryāyajñāna* is one of the higher knowledges (*abhijñā*); cf. Mvy. #206.
56 Omit *vimocanād* which is not substantiated by the Tib. nor the Bhāṣya.

tions that are free from erroneous inversion. Hence, [the *bodhisattva*] liberates [beings] through his wisdom by providing correct counsel.

[22] **Through the perfection of skill in expedients, he causes his generosity etc. to become inexhaustible due to the transformation into universal enlightenment.** An expedient is a particular device for the accomplishment, the augmentation, the attainment or the relinquishment of a *dharma*; therefore, the skill or proficiency in regard to that is [described as] the skill in expedients. The action pertinent to this causes the generosity etc. that has been performed and accumulated[57] to become inexhaustible through the transformation into universal enlightenment. The roots of the wholesome which consist in the transformation into universal enlightenment, like universal enlightenment itself, become inexhaustible.

[23] **Through the perfection of vows he engages in generosity etc. at all times while rejoicing in the birth of a Buddha[58] in all of his rebirths due to his possession of favourable births.** Because vows have the nature of all sorts of wishes[59], a vow in this context is considered as being the wish for a rebirth in keeping with one's wholesome [deeds]. The action pertinent to this is the engagement in generosity etc. at all times while rejoicing in the birth of a Buddha in each of one's rebirths.

[24] **Through the perfection of strength, he engages eternally in generosity etc. due to the strength[60] of his critical consideration and meditative development, because he is not overcome by adverse elements.** Critical consideration refers to wisdom; meditative development refers to the practice in [developing] the wholesome *dharmas*. Both of these, which cannot be overcome by adverse elements, are described as the perfection of strength. The action pertinent to this is the engagement in generosity etc. of necessity every moment, for the word 'eternal' is synonymous with 'perpetual'. Thus the wholesome [deeds] such as generosity which possesses the strength of critical consideration and meditative development are not overcome by the adverse ones[61].

[25] **Through the perfection of direct intuition, since it removes confusion about the literal meaning of the Dharma, he experiences in return the enjoyment of the Dharma which has generosity etc. as its control-**

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57 Ms.(66b.1): *-citānāṃ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.208.

58 Ms.(66b.2): *buddhotpādārāgaṇato*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.208.

59 Read: *anekavidhaprārthanātmakatvāt* in place of *anekavidhaṃ prārthanātmakatvāt*; Tib. *rnam pa du mar smon pa'i bdag ñid yin mod kyi* (D292b.1-2).

60 Ms.(66b.3) omits *balā-*.

61 Read: *na hi pratisaṃkhyānabhāvanābalavaddānādikuśalāni vipakṣair abhibhūyante* in place of *na hi pratisaṃkhyānabhāvanābalād dānādikuśalaṃ vipakṣeṇābhibhūtam*; Ms.(66b.4) is not clear, but seems to be amended in the margin to read: *...balavaddāna-*. Tib. *so sor rtog pa daṅ bsgom pa'i stobs daṅ ldan pa'i sbyin pa la sogs pa'i dge ba la mi mthun pa'i phyogs rnams kyis zil gyis mi non to* (D292b.4ff.).

Y209 **ling influence, and he brings beings to maturity.** The perfection of direct intuition is the direct intuition that is devoid of confusion concerning the literal meaning of all the doctrinal teachings of the universal vehicle. What is this confusion in regard to the literal meaning? This confusion in regard to literal meaning refers to that whereby one construes [the meaning] in just the literal sense after rejecting the intended meaning. The Dharma, i.e. the Sūtras etc., which is taught with reference to generosity, i.e. having made generosity the objective support, has generosity as its controlling influence, . [The Dharma] should be considered in the same way [in regard to the other perfections] i.e. as having morality, patience and vigour etc. as controlling influence. The actions pertinent to the perfection of direct intuition are: (a) the experiencing of the enjoyment of the Dharma and (b) the maturation of beings, through: (a) analytical discussion [of the Dharma][62] which is free from erroneous inversion concerning the universal vehicle on the part of the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*[63] and (b) the bringing of beings to maturity by means of the Dharma teachings that are free from erroneous inversion because the Dharma instructions, such as the Sūtras, are constituted by the perfection of direct intuition.

b. Spiritual Practice in relation to Mental Attention.

N63.1 **Which is the spiritual practice in relation to mental attention?**

V.7 abcd

> **The *bodhisattva's* mental attention, in the universal vehicle, to the Dharmas as set out, is always through the three modes of wisdom.**

In the universal vehicle, the continuous mental attention to the Dharmas, such as the Sūtras, as set out with reference to generosity etc. is the spiritual practice in regard to mental attention through the wisdom that consists in: (a) learning, (b) reflection and (c) meditative development. Through these three modes of wisdom, what virtue does that mental attention bring[64]?

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62 *sāṃkathyaviniścayakaraṇāt*, but Tib.: *chos bstan pas* (D293a.1).

63 Read: *buddhabodhisattvānām aviparīta-* in place of *buddhabodhisattvenāviparīta-*; Tib. *sans rgyas dan byan chub sems dpa' rnams kyi theg pa chen po las brtsams te* (D292b.7ff. & P139b.5). Ms.(66b.7) line begins: *-parīta...* Cf. Y's fn.2 p.209.

64 *karoti* here, but Tib. Bhāṣya (D21a.5): *thob*; Sanskrit Ṭīkā (Y210.16): *āvahati*; however, Tib. Ṭīkā (D293b.4): *byed*.

V.8 ab — It leads to: (a) the nourishment of the constituent element, (b) entry and (c) success in one's aim;

(a) Through the wisdom that consists in learning there is the nourishment of the constituent element for [the *bodhisattva*] who is mentally attentive. (b) Through [the wisdom] that consists in reflection he whole-heartedly enters into the meaning of what he has learnt. (c) Through [the wisdom] that consists in meditative development he attains success in his aims because [such wisdom] causes the purification for entry to the spiritual levels.

V.8 cd — This [spiritual practice] is to be known as being associated with the ten acts of the Dharma.

Moreover, this spiritual practice in regard to mental attention is to be known as being encompassed by the ten acts of the Dharma. Which are these tenfold Dharmic acts?

V.9 abcd — They are: (a) transcription, (b) veneration, (c) giving, (d) listening, (e) reading, (f) receiving, (g) revealing, (h) recitation, (i) reflection and (j) meditative development.

(a) The transcription [of the works] of the universal vehicle, (b) its veneration, (c) providing others with it, (d) listening when it is being recited by another, (e) reading it oneself, (f) receiving it, (g) teaching the texts or their meaning to others, (h) recitation, (i) reflection and (j) meditative development.

V.10 ab — For these tenfold acts entail an immeasurable collection of merit;

N64 In the Sūtras, why are the acts of the Dharma taught as having an exorbitantly great result only in the universal vehicle, but not in the *śrāvaka* vehicle? For two reasons:

V.10 c — Because of their: (a) superiority and (b) inexhaustibility.

How can it be due to their: (a) superiority and (b) inexhaustibility?

V.10 d — Because they: (a) assist others and (b) do not cease.

They are superior because they are engaged in assisting others. They are to be known as inexhaustible because they are not appeased, i.e. do not cease, even in *parinirvāṇa*.

Spiritual practice in relation to mental attention has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y209.12 [1] The spiritual practice in relation to mental attention should be mentioned immediately following the explanation of the highest spiritual practice; consequently, he asks: which is the spiritual practice in relation to mental attention? Hence he says:

V.7 ab **[The *bodhisattva's*] mental attention, in the universal vehicle, to the Dharmas[65] as set out etc.**

The mental attention to the Dharmas such as the Sūtras as set out[66] with reference to generosity etc., i.e. with reference to[67] generosity, morality, patience, vigour etc. Herein, [the mental attention to] the Dharmas, such as the Sūtras, mixtures of prose and verse and also the prophesies taught by the Venerable One with reference to generosity in whatever mode, which are so devoid of superimposition and negation as to meaning and word, is the **spiritual practice in regard to mental attention**; not anything else. **In the universal vehicle**, but not in the *śrāvaka* vehicle; for, in the latter, generosity etc.[68] is taught as being just for one's own benefit and not for the
Y210 benefit of oneself as well as others, as in the universal vehicle. Therefore, it is just in the universal vehicle that the mental attention by the *bodhisattvas* to the Dharmas, such as the Sūtras as set out with reference to generosity etc., is the spiritual practice in regard to mental attention. It is made known that in the *śrāvaka* vehicle the mental attention to the Sūtras etc. that are preached with reference to generosity etc. is a false spiritual practice in regard to mental attention[69] because it has just the benefit of the individual for its basis. Moreover, for the most part, these [Dharmas of the universal vehicle] are taught with reference to evenmindedness, non-attachment, lack of arrogance and non-perception. Evenmindedness, in this respect, is the wish to assist equally both those who possess virtues and those who do not. Non-attachment, in this respect, is the application in regard to generosity etc. that is only for the benefit of others on the part of one who has no wish for existence and enjoyment. Lack of arro-

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65 Read: *dharmamahāyānamanaskriyā* in place of *dharmo mahāyānamanaskriyā*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.2

66 Read: *yathāprajñaptānāṃ sūtrādidharmāṇāṃ* in place of *sūtrādīnāṃ yathāprajñaptadharmāṇāṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.4.

67 Read: *adhikṛtya* in place of *uddiśya*; Tib. *ched kyi phyir* (D293a.4), cf. Y202.22 & D289a.7.

68 Ms.(67a.3) line begins: *-yo deśitā*..; cf. Y's fn.6 p.209.

69 As noted by Y (fn.1 p.210), Ms.(67a.4) line begins: *-manasikārapratipattiḥ*..., however, *manasikāra* is not substantiated by the Tib.; cf. D293a.7.

gance, in this respect, is to not praise oneself nor despise others on account of one's generosity etc. Non-perception, in this respect, is the purification of the three aspects [of giving] according to the rule of the non-perception of the gift, the giver and the recipient. **Continuously**, i.e. again and again, **through the wisdom that consists in: (a) learning, (b) reflection and (c) meditative development.** Of these, (a) that which consists in learning is the certainty that comes from the authoritative statements of a trustworthy person. (b) That which consists in reflection is [the certainty] that comes from reasoning and profound reflection. (c) That which consists in meditative development is [the certainty] that comes from meditative development.

[2] Since all engagement is for the sake of the result, he asks: **through these three modes of wisdom what virtue does that**[70] **mental attention bring**[71]**?** Hence he says:

V.8 ab **It leads to: (a) the nourishment of the constituent element, (b) entry and (c) success in one's aim;**

The constituent element is the spiritual lineage[72], i.e. the 'seed'; its nourishment is [equivalent to] its augmentation. And, on account of the nourishment of the constituent element, one becomes possessed of brilliant and extensive wisdom in the future. [The ***bodhisattva***] **whole-heartedly enters into the meaning of what he has learnt.** Through the wisdom that consists in reflection, he resolutely enters into the true meaning[73] that is not erroneously inverted[74] because this is generated through the force of reasoning in respect of the meaning of those Dharmas such as the Sūtras that
Y211 he has learnt. **Through [the wisdom] that consists in meditative development, he attains success in his aims.** The success in one's aims is [equivalent to] the understanding of reality. How so? He says: **because [such wisdom] causes the purification for entry to the spiritual levels.** For, he enters the spiritual levels through the purifying [processes] of the applications of mindfulness etc. Hence it is explained that he enters the spiritual levels only through the applications of mindfulness etc. Consequently, he attains success in his aims due to the purifying [processes] that come from the wisdom that consists in the meditative development of the applications of mindfulness etc. which constitute the entry to the spiritual levels. What is meant is: he enters the spiritual levels.

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70 Read: *sā triprakārayā* in place of *tayā triprakārayā*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.6. Ms.(67a.7) line begins: *-yā kaṃ guṇam...*; cf. Y's fns.2 & 3 p.210.

71 *āvahati* here, but Bhāṣya (N63.6): *karoti*; cf. my fn.64.

72 Ms.(67a.7): *dhātur gotram*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.210.

73 Ms.(67b.1) line begins: *'rthasadbhāvam*; cf. Y's fn.7 p.210.

74 Tib. inserts *phyin ci ma log pa*; cf. D293b.6.

[3] Furthermore, this spiritual practice in relation to mental attention is to be known as being in accompaniment with its accessory elements; it is not in isolation. What are its accessory elements[75]? He says:

V.8 cd — **This [spiritual practice] is to be known as being associated with the ten acts of the Dharma**[76]

This is to be known as being encompassed by...; what is meant is: 'surrounded by'. The acts of the Dharma are the acts which have the Dharma as their nature, or else, which have the Dharma as their authority. But since they are not known, he asks[77]: **which are the tenfold acts of the Dharma**[78]? Hence he says:

V.9 a — **They are: (a) transcription, (b) veneration, (c) giving**[79] **etc.**

Of these, there is: the **transcription** by oneself or someone else **[of the works]** of the **universal vehicle** either to preserve them for a long time or in order to listen to them. **Its veneration** with flowers, incense, lamps[80] and perfumes etc. - it is the universal vehicle that is referred to. Having paid respect to it, the **giving** of the written works etc. to **others**[81] by one who has entered the universal vehicle. Having paid respect to it, **listening when it is being recited by another. Reading it oneself** with great reverence. **Receiving it**, i.e. appropriating it oneself with great faith. **Revealing**[82], i.e. making known, through great effort, **the texts or their meaning** to those who are worthy. **Recitation**, i.e. the repeated practice of what has been received. **Reflection**, i.e. determining the meaning by way of reasoning.
Y212 **Meditative development**, i.e. practice by way of wisdom that has been concentrated. The word "and" has the conjunctive sense. Of these, the actions of the body are demonstrated through the four terms: transcription, veneration, giving and listening. The actions of speech are demonstrated through the four terms[83]: reading, receiving[84], revealing and reciting. And the actions of mind are demonstrated through the pair: reflection and meditative development.

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75 Read: *kaḥ saparivāraḥ* in place of *kas tatparivāraḥ*; Ms.(67b.2): *kaḥ*. Tib. *de'i 'khor gaṅ źe na* (D294a.2).

76 Read: *saṃyuktā dharmacaritaiḥ sā jñeyā daśabhiḥ punaḥ*
in place of *sā dharmacaritair jñeyā saṃyuktā daśabhiḥ punaḥ*. Cf. Bhāṣya N63.12.

77 Ms.(67b.3): *iyaty ata ā-* but Y's emendation to *ity ataḥ pṛcchati* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.211.

78 Read: *katamad daśadhā dharmacaritam* in place of *kāni daśavidhāni dharmacaritānīty*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.14.

79 Read: *lekhanā pūjanā dānam* in place of *lekhanaṃ pūjanaṃ dānam*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.15.

80 Tib. inserts *mar me*; cf. D294a.4.

81 Read: *parebhyaḥ* in place of *pareṣu*; cf. Bhāṣya N63.17.

82 *pra(kāśanā)* here, but Bhāṣya (N63.19): *deśanam*.

83 Ms.(67b.7) line begins: *-dair vākkarma* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.212.

84 Ms.(67b.6): *vācanodgrahaḥ* but Y's emendation to *vācanam udgrahaṇam* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.212.

[4]

V.10 ab **For, these tenfold acts entail an immeasurable collection of merit[85];**

The collection of merit that arises from each particular Dharmic act, i.e. from the Dharmic acts that are said to be of ten types, cannot be measured either by oneself or by another because it is far too great. **Why is it, when [both vehicles] are equal as regards explanations of the Dharma in regard to generosity, morality, the meditative absorptions etc., that in the Sūtras, the acts of the Dharma are taught as having an exorbitantly great result only in the universal vehicle, but in** the Sūtras, the acts of the Dharma are not taught **in the *śrāvaka* vehicle** as having a great result? **For two reasons** are the acts of the Dharma taught as having an exorbitantly great result in the universal vehicle - as to which are these two[86], he says:

V.10 c **Because of their: (a) superiority and (b) inexhaustibility;**

Since these two are not known, he asks: **how can it be due to their: (a) superiority and (b) inexhaustibility?** Hence he says:

Y213 **V.10 d** **Because they: (a) assist others and (b) do not cease.**

For, in the universal vehicle, the spiritual practice of the *bodhisattva* in regard to generosity etc. is taught as being uniformly instrumental in providing benefit for all beings[87], but its chief object in the *śrāvaka* vehicle is the benefit for oneself. Hence, the universal vehicle **is superior**[88] to the *śrāvaka* vehicle **because it is engaged in assisting others.** Thus, when one states the motive [for its practice], the universal vehicle is superior in comparison with the *śrāvaka* vehicle. **Its inexhaustibility** is due to the manifestation of an inconceivable result of the accumulation of merit and penetrating insight which: (a) is incorporated in the three [Buddha] Bodies, (b) is engaged in deeds of welfare for beings for as long as the world exists, (c) is not appeased even in the *nirvāṇa* realm that is devoid of the remnants of existence and (d) is characterized by the turning about of the basis. However, this is not so in the case of the *śrāvaka* vehicle, for the result of the accumulations of the *śrāvaka* is said to be exhaustible because it is severed completely on the part of those who have attained the *nirvāṇa* devoid of the remnants of existence. Thus, in respect of *nirvāṇa* too, the universal vehicle is superior to the *śrāvaka* vehicle because of the manifestation of a result that does not cease[89].

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85 Ms.(67b.7): *ameyapuṇyaskandhaṃ iti*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.212.

86 Read: *katamābhyāṃ dvābhyām* as per Ms.(68a.2) in place of *katamābhyām*.

87 Read: *sarvasattvārthakaraṇaikarasā deśyate* in place of *sarvasattvārthakaraṇaikaṃ deśyate*; Ms.(68a.3) line begins: *-karaṇaikarasā deśyate*. Tib. *sems can thams cad kyi don bya bar ro gcig par bstan gyi* (D294b.4ff.)

88 *viśiṣyate* here, although Bhāṣya: *viśiṣṭatvam*; cf. N64.6.

89 Read: *anuparataphaladyotanāc* as per Ms.(68a.5) in place of *anuparataṃ phalaṃ dyotanāc*.

[5] Alternatively, the aim of the universal vehicle which consists in generosity etc. is devoted to the assistance of all beings; however, the aim of the *śrāvaka* vehicle is not the same since it is intent upon benefit for oneself. Moreover, the *bodhisattvas' dharmas*, such as generosity, which are brought about owing to the purity of their bodies, are not interrupted even in *parinirvāṇa*. However, because of the analogy of the path of the *śrāvaka* as a raft[90], [the *dharmas*] are completely eradicated in *parinirvāṇa*, thus they are not inexhaustible. Therefore, it is appropriate that the Dharmic acts provide a great result only in the universal vehicle and not in the *śrāvaka* vehicle.

c. Spiritual Practice that Conforms with the Dharma

N64.10 **Which is the spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma?**

V.11 ab **Spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma is that which becomes free from: (i) distraction and (ii) erroneous inversion;**

These are the twofold spiritual practices that conform with the Dharma, namely, (i) that which becomes free from distraction and (ii) that which becomes free from erroneous inversion.

[Sthiramati]

Y213.22 [1] The spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma should be mentioned immediately after the spiritual practice in relation to mental attention, consequently, he asks: **which is the spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma?** Hence it is said:

Y214 **V.11 ab** **Spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma is that which becomes free from: (i) distraction and (ii) erroneous inversion;**[91]

The spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma refers to the spiritual practice that is adapted to the Dharma, that is to be meditated upon and known, which consists in

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90 Read: *kolopamatvāt* as per Ms.(68a.6) in place of *kaulopamatvāt*; contrary to Y's fn.4 p.213.

91 Read: *avikṣiptāviparyāsaprapatā cānudharmikī* as per Ms.(68a.7) in place of *avikṣiptāviparyāsaprapatāv ānudharmikī*, cf. Bhāṣya N64.11.

the meditative development of tranquillization and penetrating insight[92] that have been entered into. Of these, that which becomes free from distraction consists in the meditative development of tranquillization and that which becomes free from erroneous inversion consists in the meditative development of penetrating insight. These are the twofold spiritual practices that conform with the Dharma.

That which becomes Free from Distraction.

N64.15 The freedom from distraction in this regard is due to the absence of six types of distraction. These six types of distraction are: (a) innate distraction, (b) external distraction, (c) internal distraction, (d) the distraction of signs, (e) distraction consisting in disquiet and (f) distraction to mental attention. How should the characteristic of each of these be understood? He says:

V.11 cd & 12 abcd (a) Emergence, (b) dispersal towards sense objects, (c) relishment, indolence and excitability[93], (d) the tendency to [self] esteem, (e) 'I-notion'
N65 with mental attention and (f) an inferior mentality - these are the distractions to be clearly comprehended by one who possesses intelligence.

Thus are the characteristics of the six types of distraction that should be clearly comprehended by the *bodhisattva*. Of these, (a) innate distraction refers to one's emergence from meditative development through the groups of the five consciousnesses. (b) External distraction refers to the dispersal towards a sense-object. (c) Internal distraction refers to the relishing of meditative concentration and indolence and excitability. (d) The distraction of the 'sign' refers to the intention for [self] esteem, having created this 'sign' through application. (e) Distraction that consists in disquiet refers to the mental attentiveness accompanied by 'I-notion' because pride manifests through the force of disquiet. (f) Distraction to mental attention refers to the inferior mentality because of the manifestation of the mental attention of the inferior vehicle.

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92 Ms.(68b.1): *-vipaśyanābhāvanātmikā*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.214.
93 Read: *-ddhavaḥ* as per Ms. (cf. N's fn.9 p.64); cf. also my fn.59 p.231 (Ch. IV.4).

[Sthiramati]

Y214.7 [1] Since this prefix 'a' occurs in many senses, it is not known as to which of these [is applicable] in the term "freedom from distraction" (*a-vikṣepa*), hence he says: the **freedom from distraction in this regard is due to the absence of six types of distraction.** And since it is not known as to how distraction can be six-fold, he says: **these six types of distraction are: (a) innate distraction, (b) external distraction etc.**[94] etc. Although this is so, distraction has only been shown by way of its differentiation but not by way of its essential nature, thus he asks: **how should the characteristic of each of these six types of distraction be understood?**[95] Hence he says:

V.11 c **(a) Emergence, (b) dispersal towards a sense-object etc.**

The expression: "by one who possesses intelligence" [means] the intelligent one, i.e. the *bodhisattva*. **Of these, one's emergence from meditative concentration through the groups of the five consciousnesses...**; for, when one of any of the five consciousnesses, such as sight, arise in one who is meditatively concentrated, he has then emerged from meditative concentration - **this is innate distraction** because it is occupied with externals. The emergence from meditative concentration through the groups of the five consciousnesses is described as innate distraction because it consists in the distraction that pertains to the groups of the five consciousnesses.

Y215 [2] **External distraction refers to the dispersal**[96] **towards a sense-object.** Some believe that when the mind-consciousness of one who is meditatively concentrated moves unintentionally away from the meditative objective to another objective support it is external distraction because [consciousness] transfers to the other objective support. Others believe that when one who is meditatively concentrated relinquishes the meditative objective, the transference to another sense-object by mind-consciousness is external distraction.

[3] **Internal distraction refers to the relishing of meditative concentration, and indolence and excitability.** If one who is concentrated relishes a particular meditative concentration on account of moral defilement, such as craving, he becomes distracted from that pure meditative concentration due to the proximity of defiled concentration. Also, he is distracted from that meditative concentration wherein tranquillization and penetrating insight are brought together on account of indolence

94 Tib. omits *prakṛtivikṣepaḥ bahirdhāvikṣepaḥ*; cf. D295a.7.

95 Read: *sa eṣa kiṃlakṣaṇaḥ ṣaḍvidho vikṣepo veditavya* in place of *etatṣaḍvidhalakṣaṇo vikṣepaḥ kathaṃ veditavya*; cf. Bhāṣya N64.17.

96 Read: *visāro* in place of *sāro*; cf. Bhāṣya N65.4.

and excitability[97]. Since relishment, indolence and excitability are impairments for one who is concentrated[98], relishing etc. are described as internal distractions.

[4] **The distraction of the 'sign' refers to the intention for [self] esteem.** A meditator may consider himself a great being and thus holds himself in esteem; on account of this 'sign' on the part of one who has applied himself to meditative concentration there is distraction from the wholesome side, whether it has been obtained or not, due to the waning away of his [original] aspiration - this is described as the distraction of the 'sign'. Here now he provides the reason: **having created this 'sign' through application.** Having created the 'sign', i.e. that intention for [self] esteem on account of the desire for a reputation for skill[99], thinking that [thereby], because he has applied himself to meditative concentration, there would be esteem for himself.

[5] **The distraction that consists in disquiet refers to mental attentiveness accompanied by 'I-notion'.** Even while resolutely seeking the virtues of meditative concentration one who possesses mental attention, accompanied by 'I-notion'[100], is associated with pride insofar as he may consider himself to be a meditator - and as a consequence of this he exalts himself and holds others in contempt. Why does this mental attention consist in disquiet? Hence he says: **because pride manifests through the force of disquiet.** This is what is being said: distraction that is characterized by disquiet is [described as] the distraction that consists in disquiet[101]. But what is disquiet? It is the full maturation of the latent impressions of pride since pride manifest on account of it; thus [it is said]: "because pride manifests through the
Y216 force of that [i.e. disquiet]". Others believe that disquiet refers to the false view of individuality.

[6] **Distraction to mental attention refers to the inferior mentality.** On account of: (a) the fear of the sufferings of *saṃsāra*, (b) acting wrongly towards sentient beings and (c) being in company with people who are not good spiritual friends, the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* mentality arises in one who has applied himself to the mental attention of the universal vehicle but whose spiritual lineage as a *śrāvaka* etc. is not determined. This is the inferior mentality because it has merely the benefit for one-

97 Read perhaps: *layauddhatyābhyāṃ* in place of *layauddhatyaṃ*; Tib. *byiṅ ba daṅ rgod pa dag gis* (D295b.6).

98 Read: *samāhitavipātanatvāc* in place of *asamāhitatvāc*; the Ms.(68b.7) is not clear but appears to read *samāhitatvāc* with *vipātana* inserted in the margin. Tib. is slightly different: "since meditative concentration is impaired by relinquishment, indolence and excitability..." *ro myaṅ ba daṅ byiṅ ba daṅ rgod pas tiṅ ṅe 'dzin ñams par 'gyur pas na* (D295b.7).

99 Read: *jñātra-* in place of *jñātu-*; Tib. *śes kyi khe* (D296a.2).

100 Ms.(69a.2): *sāhaṃkāramanaskāramanaskāro 'pi* but Y's reading of *sāhaṃkāramanaskāro 'pi* is correct.

101 Tib. omits *dauṣṭhulyavikṣepa iti*; cf. D296a.4.

self as its main object. This *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* mentality is described[102] as a distraction to mental attention since it is a distraction to the mental attention of the universal vehicle. Here now he provides the reason: **because of the manifestation of the mental attention of the inferior vehicle**[103]. The inferior vehicle refers to the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* vehicles. The manifestation of this mental attention distracts one from the mental attention of the universal vehicle because it is essentially occupied with [attainment of] *parinirvāṇa* for oneself - thus it is said that the distraction to mental attention refers to inferior mentality. Thus this absence of the faults of the six types of distraction on the part of the *bodhisattva* is to be known as the meditative development of tranquillization[104].

That which Becomes Free from Erroneous Inversion.

N65.11 **Therein, the absence of erroneous inversion is to be known in relation to ten kinds of entities, namely:**

V.13 abcd **(a) Syllables, (b) object, (c) mental activity, (d) non-dispersal, (e) & (f) the dual characteristics, (g) lack of purity and purity, (h) what is adventitious, (i) absence of fear and (j) absence of arrogance.**

In regard to these:

V.14 abcd **The object both exists and does not exist (a) because of combination and familiarity and (b) because of separation and lack of familiarity - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables.**

When there is a combination of syllables as an uninterrupted articulation, they have significance due to familiarity inasmuch as one thinks: "this is the name of that". In the contrary case, they are devoid of significance. Seeing that this is so is to be known as the absence of

102 Read: *-vikṣepa ucyate* in place of *-vikṣepaḥ kathyate*; Ms.(69a.5): *-vikṣepa u(pa)cyate*. Tib. *źes bya ste* (D296a.7).

103 Read: *hīnayānamanasikārasamudācārād* in place of *hīnayānena tanmanasikārasamudācārād*; cf. Bhāṣya N65.8.

104 Ms.(69a.7): *śamatha*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.216.

erroneous inversion in relation to syllables. What is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the object?

V.15 abcd

> It appears as the duality but is non-existent as such - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the object and is devoid of existence and non-existence.

It appears as the duality, i.e. as apprehended object and apprehend-
166 ing subject, since it arises in the aspect of these [two] although it does not exist as such, i.e. in the way in which it appears. Seeing this in regard to the object is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to it. The object is devoid of existence because of the non-existence of both apprehended object and apprehending subject; it is devoid of non-existence because of the real existence of its erroneous appearance as that [duality].

V.16 abcd

> Mental activity that consists in talk is developed by that [dualistic] talk and is the basis for it - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity which is the ground for the manifestation of the duality.

Mental activity that consists in talk is fully developed by talk that pertains to the apprehended object and apprehending subject and is the basis for that conceptual differentiation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. Thus, this is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity. In relation to which mental activity? In relation to that which forms the ground for the manifestation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. For, this mental activity that consists in talk is to be known as the basis for the conceptual differentiation of apprehended object and apprehending subject because it is fully developed by verbal notions.

V.17 abcd

> The existence and non-existence of the object is considered like a magical creation etc. - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-diffusion because [mind] does

not disperse towards existence or non-existence.

That which was just described as the existence or non-existence of the object is considered like a magical creation etc. In the same way that a magical creation neither exists as an entity such as an elephant, nor is it non-existent because it exists as 'bare' error; so too does the object neither exist in the way in which it manifests, i.e. as the apprehended object and apprehending subject, nor is it non-existent because it exists as 'bare' error. By the word "etc.", similes such as mirages, dreams and the reflection of the moon on water are to be understood as is appropriate. That which sees the non-dispersal of mind in this way, since it sees in the object its resemblance to a magical creation etc., is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal because the non-dispersal of mind towards existent or non-existent entities is on account of it.

N67 V.18 abc — The fact that everything is name-only is for the non-engagement in all conceptual differentiation - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic;

All this is name-only, i.e. that which comprises [the sense-fields of] sight/form up until mind/non-sensibles - knowing that this is so [acts] as the counteragent to all conceptual differentiation. This is [equivalent to] the absence of conceptual differentiation in relation to the individual characteristic. In relation to which individual characteristic?

V.18 d — In relation to the individual characteristic in an ultimate sense.

However, the notion that this is name-only in a conventional sense, is not accepted.

V.19 abcd — Since no *dharma* is to be found outside the *dharmadhātu*, therefore the latter is the universal characteristic - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to that.

Since no *dharma* whatsoever is to be found that is exempt from the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*, therefore, the *dharmadhātu* is the uni-

versal characteristic of all the *dharmas* - knowing that this is so is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic.

V.20 abcd

The lack of purity on the part of that [i.e. the *dharmadhātu*] and its purity are due to the non-relinquishment and relinquishment of erroneously inverted mental activity - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to that.

A lack of purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu* refers to the non-relinquishment of erroneously inverted mental activity; purity [on its behalf] refers to the relinquishment of that - knowing that this is so is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of purity and purity, respectively.

V.21 abcd

This pair is adventitious, for, the *dharmadhātu* is pure by nature, like space, - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to that. . . .

Moreover, because the *dharmadhātu* is pure by nature, like space, the pair, i.e. its lack of purity and subsequent purity, is adventitious; knowing that this is so is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to its adventitious nature.

N68 V.22 abcd

Defilement and purity do not belong to the *dharmas* nor to the personal entity because they do not exist, hence, there is neither fear nor arrogance - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to that.

There is no defilement nor purity on the part of the personal entity nor the *dharmas* because neither the personal entity exists nor do the *dharmas.* Consequently, there is no defilement nor purification of anyone whatsoever. Hence, concerning the side of defilement, there is no deficiency on the part of anyone and concerning the side of purification, there is no excellence on the part of anyone on account of which fear and arrogance [respectively] would result. This is [equivalent to] the

absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of fear and lack of arrogance.

[Sthiramati]

Y216.15 [1] Thus, the manner in which the spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma and which becomes free from erroneous inversion is to be cultivated by one who is devoid of distraction is now described. That which becomes free from erroneous inversion is that which arises in the nature of the absence of erroneous inversion. The absence of erroneous inversion in this regard refers to the knowledge of an entity exactly as it is. Now, in how many types of entity does such an entity consist? Since this is not known, he says: **therein, the absence of erroneous inversion is to be known in relation to ten types of entity;** in order to demonstrate those entities that are free from erroneous inversion, he says: **namely:**

V.13 ab **(a) Syllables, (b) object, (c) mental activity, (d) non-dispersal, (e) the dual characteristics etc.**

Now, in order to demonstrate the way in which the absence of erroneous inversion relates to these entities, he says: **in regard to these:**

V.14 abcd **The object both exists and does not exist, (a) because of combination and familiarity**[105] **and (b) because of separation and lack of familiarity**[106] **- this**
Y217 **is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables.**

When there is a combination of syllables...; "combination" refers to the close contact of one with another and this is not found on the part of [spoken] syllables because they cannot co-exist since the simultaneous articulation of syllables is not logically tenable. In order to dispel the uncertainty that a preceding articulation[107] does not remain[108] at the time that subsequent syllables are articulated because they pass away immediately after they are articulated, he says: **as an uninterrupted articulation.** This is what is being said: an articulation that is not erroneously inverted or sluggish is considered in this regard as a combination of syllables, but the close contact of syllables, one with another, is not. **Due to familiarity**[109]**, inasmuch as one thinks: "this is the name of that";** i.e. when conventional symbols are learnt by heart, one thinks: "this is the name of that entity", thus, through these two modes [i.e. combina-

105 Read: *saṃstavāc* as per Ms.(69b.2) in place of *saṃbhavāc*.
106 Read: *asaṃstavāt* as per Ms.(69b.2) in place of *asaṃbhavāt*.
107 Read: *pūrvoccaraṇānāṃ* in place of *pūrvavikalpānāṃ*; Tib. *sṅar brjod pa rnams* (D296b.6). Ms.(69b.3) line begins: *-nāṃ uttaravyañjano...*
108 Ms.(69b.3): *'vasthānam* but Y's emendation to *'navasthānam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.217.
109 Read: *saṃstavād* as per Ms.(69b.4) in place of *saṃbhavād*.

tion and familiarity] **they have significance.** what is meant is: the syllables are understood. **In the contrary case, they are devoid of significance**[110]; the contrary case refers to the absence of both, or the lack of one of the two. **Seeing that this is so,** i.e. the knowledge [that this is so], **is to be known as the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables** in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate sense because the absence of erroneous inversion in an ultimate sense is devoid of conceptual differentiation[111]. Thus, through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* penetrates all *dharmas* free from the meaning of words [i.e. he understands without concepts (*vikalpa*) expressed in words (*śabda*)].

[2] Now in order to demonstrate **the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the object** which is the cause for its designation by means of syllables, he says:

V.15 ab **It appears as the duality but is non-existent as such etc.**

It appears as the duality, i.e. as apprehended object and apprehending subject. What does? The other-dependent nature. Why? Because it possesses the 'seed' of the apprehended object and apprehending subject. But what is the meaning of "appears" in this context? Hence he says: **since it arises in the aspect of these [two]**; i.e. it appears as the apprehended object and apprehending subject because it
Y218 arises in the aspect of apprehended object and apprehending subject; but this is not due to the influence of an adjunct, like a crystal. "But is non-existent as such", **although it does not exist as such,** i.e. **in the way,** or in the aspect, **in which it appears**[112] because it is non-dual by nature. **Seeing this in regard to the object,** as it is the cause for the arising of the erroneous consciousness, **is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to it.** The intended meaning is that it avoids [the extremes of] existence and non-existence. **The object is devoid of existence;** here now he provides the reason: **because of the non-existence of both apprehended object and apprehending subject**[113]. The existence of the object [implies] the real existence of apprehended object and apprehending subject; [the object] is devoid of that because it is empty of the aspect of apprehended object and apprehending subject. **It is devoid of non-existence...;** what is the reason? **Because of the real existence of the erroneous appearance as that [duality].** What is meant is: because of the real existence of the erroneous appearance as apprehended object and apprehending subject. And this is said to be an absence of erroneous inversion in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate

110 Read: *viparyayān nirarthakatvam* in place of *viparyatas tv anarthakatvam*; cf. Bhāṣya N65.18.
111 Ms.(69b.5): *nirvikatvād* but Y's reading of *nirvikalpatvād* is correct.
112 Read: *tathā ca na vidyate yathākāreṇa pratibhāsate* in place of *yathā pratibhāsākāras tathā na vidyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N65.23 to 66.1.
113 Ms.(70a.1): *grāhyagrāhakābhāvād*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.218.

sense because it is accompanied by conceptual differentiation. Through this knowledge free from erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* penetrates all *dharmas* as being devoid of the essential nature of apprehended object and apprehending subject.

[3] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the store-consciousness which is the cause for the manifestation[114] of the apprehended object and apprehending subject[115], he says:

V.16 ab — **Mental activity that consists in talk is developed by that [dualistic] talk and is the basis for it etc.**

Mental activity that consists in talk is fully developed by talk that pertains to the apprehended object and apprehending subject[116]. With regard to the object that has the characteristic of the manifestation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject, one has the thought: "that is the object and this is the subject" - such a spoken or mental utterance is described as "talk". What is fully developed by this talk is described as "developed" since it causes the maturation of the 'seed' for the production of talk of the same genre in the future. It is called the mental activity that consists in talk because it is fully developed by talk, for the cause is figuratively expressed in the sense of the effect [which it produces]. However, in this context, talk refers to the latent impressions of talk since talk exists in those [impressions] considering that there is no differentiation between the support and that to be supported [i.e. talk and mental activity]. Alternatively, because there is no mention of the word "support" [i.e. one is not the support of the other], one speaks of mental activity that consists in talk since it is the support for the 'seed' of the **conceptual differentiation**[117] **of apprehended object and apprehending**
Y219 **subject** which is called "talk"[118]. Furthermore, it **is the basis** for talk that arises in dependence upon the latter, **thus, this is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity.** What is meant is: the knowledge that is not erroneously inverted. But this mental activity, in relation to which there is an absence of erroneous inversion, is not known, hence he asks: **in relation to which**[119] **mental activity** is there an absence of erroneous inversion? Hence, in order to specify that mental activity, he says: **in relation to that which forms the ground for the manifestation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject.** What is meant is: it consists in a special aspect of the store-consciousness. In order to demonstrate the way in which the latter forms the ground for the

114 Tib. omits *prakhyāna*; cf. D297b.2.
115 Ms.(70a.3): *grāhyagrāhyagrāhaka* but Y's reading of *grāhyagrāhaka* is correct.
116 Read: *grāhyagrāhakajalpaparibhāvito* in place of *grāhyagrāhakajalpena paribhāvito*; cf. Bhāṣya N66.6.
117 Ms.(70a.6) line begins: *-vikalpasya* contrary to Y's fn.4 p.218.
118 Tib. omits *jalpākhyasya*; cf. D297b.5.
119 Read: *katamasmin* in place of *kasmin*; cf. Bhāṣya N66.8.

manifestation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject, he says: for, this **the mental activity that consists in talk... because it is fully developed by verbal notions.** It is the fact that it [i.e. the store-consciousness] forms the ground for the manifestation of the apprehended object and apprehending subject that is referred to. Alternatively, as to mental activity that consists in talk, in order to demonstrate that this causes one's engagement in verbal notions, he has said[120]: "it is described as mental activity that consists in talk because it is fully developed by verbal notions". Verbal notions refer to notions that arise from speech, or which cause the arising of speech. It is on account of these [notions] together with their associated elements, that the mental activity consisting in talk is described as "fully developed", because they cause the maturation of the individual 'seeds' in the mental activity that consists in talk. This too is an absence of erroneous inversion just in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate sense. Moreover, through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* avoids the underlying cause of erroneous inversion which is characterized by notional attachment to the apprehended object and apprehending subject and in this way disquiet is easily avoided[121].

[4] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal, he says:

V.17 ab **The existence and non-existence of the object is considered like a magical creation etc.**

That which was just described as the existence or non-existence of the object... How was it just described? [As the following]:

It appears as the duality but is non-existent as such - this is the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the object[122] and is devoid of existence and non-existence. [V.15]

It is **considered like a magical creation etc.** "Like a magical creation etc."
Y220 [means]: like entities that are magical creations etc. In order to demonstrate just this, he says: **in the same way that a magical creation neither exists as an entity such as an elephant,** since it manifests in the nature of an elephant etc. which is non-existent in itself[123]. Although it is said that it does not exist as an entity such as an elephant, it is not non-existent in every respect - on the contrary[124]: **nor is it non-**

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120 Ms.(70b.1): ...*ity ato 'bhidhānapravṛttinimittam āha* but on the basis of the Tib., this should read: *ity abhidhānapravṛttinimittapradarśanārtham āha*; Tib. *źes brjod pa 'jug pa'i rgyu yin par bstan pa'i phyir* (cf. D298a.1).

121 Ms.(70b.3): *-titi*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.219.

122 Read: *arthe sa cāviparyāsaḥ* in place of *ayam arthe 'viparyāsaḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N65.22.

123 Read: *prakhyānān na hastyādibhāvenāstīti* in place of *prakhyānād hastyādibhāvena nāstīti*; cf. Bhāṣya N66.14.

124 Tib. omits *kiṃ tarhi*; cf. D298a.6.

existent **because it exists as 'bare'** error[125]. It is not non-existent in every respect because of the existence of that 'bare' error that manifests in the aspect of an elephant etc. **So too does the object neither exist in the way in which it manifests, i.e. as apprehended object and apprehending subject, nor is it non-existent because of the existence of** that **'bare'** error which manifests as such in the essential nature[126] of the mind and the mental concomitants that pertain to the three realms of existence[127]. **By the word "etc.", similes such as mirages, dreams and the reflection of the moon on water etc. are to be understood, as is appropriate.** For the mirages, dreams and reflections of the moon on water etc.[128] neither exist in the way in which they appear in the nature of water, men and women[129], nor indeed do they not exist[130] because of the existence of 'bare' error. In detail, [the statement]: "so too does the object..." is to be connected with each [simile]. Moreover, by the word "etc." in this context[131], cities of Gandharvas and echoes etc. are to be understood. **That which sees in this way,** without distraction, **the non-dispersal of mind** towards the sides of existence and non-existence, **because it sees in the object its resemblance**[132] **to a magical creation etc.**[133], **is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal.** But what is non-dispersal? Some believe that it consists in the meditative concentration of the middle way[134]. If this is so, how can there be an absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal? Hence he says: **because the non-dispersal of mind**[135] **toward existent or non-existent entities is on account of it.** Through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* is

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125 Read: *na ca naivāsti tad bhrāntimātrāstitvād* in place of *nāpi nāsti tasya bhrāntimātrāstitvād*; cf. Bhāṣya N66.14-15. Ms.(70b.5): *tadbhrāntimātrāstitvād* contrary to Y's fn.1 p.220. Tib. *de ni 'khrul pa tsam du yod pa'i phyir med pa 'aṅ ma yin te* (D298a.6).

126 Ms.(70b.6): *-svarūpasyasya* but Y's reading of *svarūpasya* is correct.

127 Read: *tathārtho* (or *evam artho*) *'pi na cāsti yathā saṃprakhyāti grāhyagrāhakatvena na ca naivāsti tasya traidhātukacittacaittasvarūpasya tathā prakhyāyamānasya bhrāntimātrasyāstitvāt* in place of *tathārtho 'pi yathā grāhyagrāhakatvena prabhāsate tathā na ca naivāsti tasya traidhātukacittacaittasvarūpasya tathā prakhyāyamānasya bhrāntimātrasyāstitvān*. Ms. (70b.6): ...*tathā prakhyāyamānasya bhrāntimātrasyāstitvāt* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.220. Tib. *de bźin du don* (not *yod*) *kyaṅ ji ltar gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin par snaṅ ba ltar yod pa 'aṅ ma yin la / khams gsum pa'i sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i raṅ gi ṅo bo de / de lta bur snaṅ ba de 'khrul pa tsam du yod pa'i phyir med pa 'aṅ ma yin no* (D298a.7ff.)

128 Tib. omits *dṛṣṭāntā yathāyogaṃ veditavyā iti na hi marīcisvapnodakacandrādayo*; cf. D298b.1.

129 Read: *yathodakanarastryātmanā* in place of *yathā strīpumātmanā*; Tib. *chu daṅ skyes pa daṅ bud med kyi bdag ñid du ji ltar* (D298b.1).

130 Ms.(70b.7): *na ca na santy*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.220.

131 Read: *atrāpyādiśabdena* in place of *atra cādiśabdena*; Ms.(70b.7): *atra ādiśabdena* with *-pyā* inserted in the margin.

132 Read: *-upamārthe darśanāt* as per Bhāṣya (N66.18) in place of *-upamārthadarśanāt* Ms.(70b.7): *-upamārthapradarśanāt*.

133 Read: *evaṃ yan māyādyupamārthe darśanāt satvāsatvapakṣayor avisāraṃ cetaso 'vikṣepatvena paśyati* in place of *evaṃ yan māyādyupamārthadarśanāt satvāsatvapakṣayoś cittasyāvisāratvenāvikṣepatvena darśanaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N66.18-19.

134 Read: *madhyamāpratipat samādhir* in place of *madhyamā pratipatsamādhir*.

135 Ms.(71a.1): *cittasyāsyāvisaraṇād* but Y's reading of *cittasyāvisaraṇād* is correct; cf. Bhāṣya N66.19.

not distracted from the objective support for [the realization of] emptiness because of the absence of conceptual differentiation in regard to existence and non-existence[136]. Therefore, it is described as the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal[137]. And this is an absence of erroneous inversion in just a conventional sense, but not in an ultimate sense, for the latter is devoid of conceptual differentiation.

[5] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic, he says:

V.18 ab **The fact that everything is name-only is for the non-engagement in all conceptual differentiation[138] etc.**

Y221 **All this is name-only, i.e. that which[139] comprises [the sense-fields of] sight/form up until mind/non-sensibles** - hence all that comprises the twelve sense-fields is to be known as name-only. The designation, in this respect, comprises the own-being and the particulars of the name; also, the own-being of either the object to be designated or the designation does not exist because: (a) it is imaginatively constructed in such a nature and (b) what is imaginatively constructed does not exist. Otherwise, apprehending would take place through sight etc.[140] regardless of the name, yet there can be no apprehending[141] of a conventional symbol that is not known. Therefore, because that object implied by the terms sight/form etc. does not have the own-being of that [sight/form], [the sense-fields of] sight/form up until mind/non-sensibles are indeed name-only, [hence] **knowing that this is so [acts] as the counteragent to all conceptual differentiation[142]. This is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic.** One engages in all conceptual differentiation in regard to all *dharmas* by way of imaginary *dharmas*[143]. Hence, the knowledge which penetrates [the realization that all is] name-only and which is the counteragent to all conceptual differentiation, is described as the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic. However, it is not known in this regard whether the latter refers to the individual characteristic in an ultimate sense or in a conventional sense, consequently he asks: in

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136 Read: *bodhisattvaḥ sattvāsattvavikalparahitatvāc chūnyatālambanād avikṣepo bhavati* in place of *bodhisattvo bhāvābhāvavikalparahitāc chūnyatālambane 'vikṣepo bhavati.* Ms. (71a.1) line ends: ...*bodhisattvaḥ* contrary to Y's reading; Tib. *byaṅ chub sems dpa' yod pa daṅ med par rtog pa med pa'i phyir ro // stoṅ pa ñid la dmigs pa las mi g-yeṅ ste* (D298b.3-4).

137 Read: *avisāre 'viparyāsa* in place of *avisāre viparyāsa*; Tib. *mi 'phro ba la phyin ci ma log pa* (D298b.4); Ms.(71a.2): *visāre 'viparyāsa.*

138 Read: *sarvakalpāpravṛttaye* in place of *sarvakalpāpravartanāt*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.1.

139 Read: *yad idaṃ* in place of *yad etac*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.3.

140 Ms.(71a.4): *-kṣurāditvena*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.221.

141 Tib.: *mi 'dzin pa* (= *agrahaṇam*) which should be amended to *'dzin pa*; cf. D298b.7.

142 Read: *sarvavikalpānāṃ pratipakṣeṇa /* in place of *sarvavikalpasya pratipakṣa iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.4.

143 Ms.(71a.5): *-rikalpitadharmamukhena*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.221.

relation to which individual characteristic? Hence he says that this absence of erroneous inversion is:

V.18 d — **In relation to the individual characteristic in an ultimate sense.**

Because the individual characteristic, in an ultimate sense, is inexpressible but not so in a conventional sense. What is the reason? Because **the notion that this is name-only in a conventional sense, is not accepted**[144]; for, imaginative constructions[145] arise in relation to the essential nature of a *dharma* through speech; however, this is just in a conventional sense and not in an ultimate sense because it is the process of conceptual differentiation that recognizes that it is name-only. Through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* becomes skilled in both the conventional and the ultimate.

[6] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic, he says:

V.19 ab — **Since no *dharma* is to be found outside the *dharmadhātu*[146] etc.**

Y222 **For, no *dharma* whatsoever** whether material or non-material **is to be found that is exempt from the insubstantiality of the *dharmas*,** because all *dharmas* are inexpressible and non-dual[147] by nature since they are devoid of the relation of apprehended object and apprehending subject. Therefore, **the *dharmadhātu* is the universal characteristic of all *dharmas*;** it is described as the universal characteristic of [all] these existing [*dharmas*][148] as it is not different in all *dharmas*. **Knowing that this is so is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic**[149]; i.e. in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate sense because the latter is devoid of conceptual differentiation. Through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* becomes skilled in the objective support of purity because it is the object of direct intuition free from conceptual differentiation.

[7] How does one distinguish between the universal characteristic and the individual characteristic? The characteristic in the ultimate sense[150] refers to the inexpressible essential nature [which acts] as the counteragent[151] to the superimposed essential

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144 Read: *gṛhyate* in place of *gṛhṇāti*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.7.

145 Read: *parikalpa-* in place of *saṃkalpa-*; Tib. *kun tu rtog pa* (D299a.4).

146 Read: *dharmadhātuvinirmukto* in place of *dharmadhātur vinirmukto*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.8.

147 Tib. omits *advaya*; cf. D299a.5.

148 Y's *tatsat* is very doubtful - read perhaps: [*sarvadharmāṇām*] *teṣām satāṃ*; Tib. *de yod pa'i* (D299a.6).

149 Read: *-lakṣaṇe* in place of *-lakṣaṇatve*; cf. Bhāṣya N67.12.

150 Read: *paramārthaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ* in place of *paramārthalakṣaṇaṃ*; the *anusvāra* is inserted in the Ms. margin.

151 Ms.(71b.3): *-tikṣepaṃ* but Y's emendation to *(prati)pakṣena* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.222.

nature [expressed] in speech. Furthermore, the universal characteristic refers to the insubstantial imaginary nature which is innate to all *dharmas*. Thus, this distinction is in accord with a difference in perspectives but is not due to the object.

[8] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of purity or the purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu*, he says:

V.20 bc **...Are due to the non-relinquishment and relinquishment of erroneously inverted[152] mental activity etc.**

A lack of purity[153] on the part of the *dharmadhātu* refers to the non-relinquishment of erroneously inverted[154] mental activity; the purity [on its behalf] refers to the relinquishment of that. In this respect, erroneously inverted[155] mental activity is conceptual differentiation that consists in erroneous inversion and is the ground of the store-consciousness. The lack of purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu* refers to the non-relinquishment of the latter[156]; purity [on its behalf] refers to its relinquishment. **Knowing that this is so is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of purity and purity, respectively.** The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu* refers to the fact that the non-relinquishment of erroneously inverted[157] mental activity is [equivalent to] the lack of purity on the part
Y223 of the *dharmadhātu*. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to its purity refers to the fact that its relinquishment is [equivalent to] purity [on its behalf]. What is the reason? Because the *dharmadhātu* is defiled by adventitious secondary defilement. This too is an absence of erroneous inversion only in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate sense; and, through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva* clearly comprehends: (a) the obscuration to the *dharmadhātu* that has not been relinquished and (b) that which has been relinquished.

[9] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the adventitious nature of both the lack of purity and the purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu*, he says:

V.21 ab **...For, the *dharmadhātu* is pure by nature, like space etc.**

Moreover, because the *dharmadhātu* is pure by nature, like space, this pair, i.e. its lack of purity and subsequent purity[158], is adventitious. The

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152 Read: *viparyasta-* as per Ms.(71b.4) in place of *viparyastu-*.
153 Ms.(71b.4): *aviśuddhiḥ*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.222.
154 Read: *viparyasta-* as per Ms.(71b.4) in place of *viparyastu-*.
155 Read: *viparyasta-* in place of *viparyastu-*. on the basis of my fns.154 & 157.
156 Ms.(71b.4): *tasyāprahāṇan dharmadhātor*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.222.
157 Read: *viparyasta-* as per Ms.(71b.5) in place of *viparyastu-*
158 Ms.(71b.7): *aviśuddhir viśu-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.223.

lack of purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu* is mentioned in this regard because it is [superficially] defiled by unreal conceptual differentiation; its purity [is mentioned] because one subsequently relinquishes that [secondary defilement] through the arising of the counteragent and both of these are adventitious to the *dharmadhātu*. What is the reason? Because the innate purity of the *dharmadhātu* is like that of space. [Objection]: A lack of purity on the part of what is pure by nature may be adventitious, but, since its purity is an eternal purity, how can it be adventitious? [Response]: This fault is not [applicable] since, in this context, this purity is intended[159] as an absence of stain; only because of this is it stated that its purity is subsequent. **Knowing that this is so in regard to the** ***dharmadhātu***[160] **is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the adventitious nature of** both the lack of purity and the purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu*. This too is [an absence of erroneous inversion] in a conventional sense but not in an ultimate sense. Through this absence of erroneous inversion, the *bodhisattva*[161] clearly comprehends the fabricated nature[162] of the states of defilement and purification in regard to the *dharmadhātu*..

[10] Now, in order to demonstrate the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of fear and lack of arrogance, he says:

V.22 ab **Defilement and purity do not belong to the** ***dharmas*** **nor to the personal entity etc.**

There is no defilement nor purity on the part of the personal entity[163] **nor the** ***dharmas***; [the words]: "defilement and purity" remain in force in regard to
Y224 the latter [i.e. the *dharmas*]. Here now he provides the reason: **because neither the personal entity exists, nor do the** ***dharmas***; [the word] "exists" remains in force in regard to the latter[164]. At the time of the states of defilement and purification[165], if [an entity] exists separately from defilement and purification it would be tenable to imagine that it can possess defilement or purification, and diminution and increase[166] would also exist separately from that [entity]. [However], there is no personal entity such as that because it is not an object of direct perception or inference. Also, the *dharmas* which possess an imaginary nature are certainly non-existent

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159 Read: *malarahitatvena yā viśuddhiḥ* in place of *yā malavigamatātmatayā viśuddhiḥ*; Tib. *dri ma daṅ bral bas rnam par dag pa gaṅ yin pa* (D300a.2). The first two syllables of the Ms.(72a.2) are not clear but do not support Y's reading, nor does the Tib.

160 Tib. omits *dharmadhātu*; cf. D300a.2-3.

161 Ms.(72a.3) line begins: *dharmadhātoḥ saṃkleśa...*; cf. Y's fn.3 p.223.

162 D is not clear; P (147b.7): *bcos ma ma yin par* for *kṛtrimatvaṃ* which should read: *bcos ma yin par*.

163 Read: *na hi pudgalasya saṃkleśo na viśuddhiḥ* in place of *na pudgalasya saṃkleśo 'sti na viśuddhiḥ*; cf. Bhāṣya N68.3.

164 The Tib. omits *astīty anuvartate* because its phrasing of this quotation from the Bhāṣya requires no further elaboration; cf. Y's fn.1 p.224.

165 *kun nas ñon moṅs pa daṅ / rnam par byaṅ ba gñis kyi dus na* - this statement is only found in the Tib. (D300a.5).

166 Ms.(72a.5) line begins: *sa tādṛśaḥ...*; cf. Y's fn.2 p.224.

because numerous imaginative constructions arise in regard to the one entity, and it is not tenable that the one [entity] can have numerous natures. **Consequently,** because both the personal entity and the *dharmas* are non-existent, like the son of an infertile woman etc., **there is no defilement or purification;** the possession of defilement and purity is not accepted[167] even on the part of the other-dependent [nature] which is the sphere of pure mundane direct intuition. For what reason? Because it is inexpressible and non-dual by nature. [Objection]: If [defilement and purity] are not even accepted[168] as belonging to the other-dependent [nature], to which [nature] would they belong for the effort directed towards the relinquishment of defilement and the acquisition of purity[169] would be in vain if they [i.e. defilement and purity] did not exist? [Response]: This fault is not [applicable] since defilement and purity belong to the *dharmadhātu*, [or rather] although they are respectively determined as belonging to the *dharmadhātu*, they are certainly not identical with it because they are both adventitious to the *dharmadhātu*[170] and, like space, the *dharmadhātu* does not change. **Hence, concerning the side of defilement, there is no deficiency whatsoever and concerning the side of purification, there is no excellence whatsoever[171] on account of which fear or arrogance [respectively] would result. This is [equivalent to] the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of fear and the lack of arrogance.**

[11] However, others say that in regard to the side of defilement, there is no deficiency on the part of anyone and in regard to the side of purification, there is no excellence[172] because there is no one who possesses both of these. Since the two do not exist in this
Y225 way[173], how, in this respect, can one either fear that: "this is not mine", or have the prideful notion that: "this[174] excellence belongs to me"?

[12] Others again believe that in the first place the personal entity does not exist and a *dharma* which experiences the two states and to which the two are imagined to belong also does not exist. On the contrary, this defilement and purification is none other than dependent origination.

[13] This too is [intended] in the conventional but not in the absolute sense[175] because

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167 Ms.(72a.6): *naiveṣyate*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.224.

168 Ms.(72a.6): *neṣyate*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.224.

169 Ms.(72a.7) line begins: *-prāptiyatna...*; cf. Y's fn.5 p.224.

170 Ms.(72a.7): *dharmadhātau*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.224.

171 Ms.(72b.1) line begins: *kaś cid viśeṣo...*; cf. Y's fn.7 p.224. This apparent quote from the Bhāṣya is quite different to the corresponding passage from the Sanskrit Bhāṣya which echoes the view expressed by Sthiramati in paragraph [11] below.

172 Ms.(72b.1): *viśeṣo*; disregard Y's fn.8 p.224.

173 Read: *na bhavatas* in place of *bhavatas*; Tib. *ma yin pas* (D300b.4). P (148b) omits the *ma*.

174 Ms.(72b.2): *ayam*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.225. In the Ms. this line begins: *Iti kim...*; cf. Y's fn.1 p.225.

175 Ms.(72b.3) line begins: *-ārthataḥ / tasya...*; cf. Y's fn.3 p.225.

the latter is devoid of conceptual differentiation. Through this absence of erroneous inversion, [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates the unchanging nature of the *dharmadhātu* because of the absence of decay and growth[176].

[14] Others believe that [the *bodhisattva*] goes forth free from obscuration after having relinquished all obscuration through this absence of erroneous inversion. Alternatively, the absence of erroneous inversion in an absolute sense is indicated here by way of the tenfold absences of erroneous inversion which consist in the conventional[177], since it is not possible to explain it in any other way. Others say that these absences of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables, object, mental activity, non-dispersal, individual characteristic, universal characteristic, lack of purity, purity, what is adventitious, lack of fear and lack of arrogance also refer to the three natures[178]. Of these, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables and object refer to the imaginary nature because both [the notions of] combination and object that has 'fallen' into duality are imaginary. Although they do not have a reality for their object, these two do consist in an absence of erroneous inversion since they are without erroneous
Y226 inversion as such in this way. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity[179] refers to the other-dependent nature because the mental activity that consists in talk is intrinsic to the nature of the store-consciousness. The absence of erroneous inversion[180] in relation to non-dispersal[181] refers to the perfected nature. Why? Because: (a) direct intuition that is devoid of conceptual differentiation is not distracted [by conjecture] about existent or non-existent [entities] and (b) the latter is incorporated in the perfected nature since it is perfection as an absence of erroneous inversion[182]. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual and universal characteristics refers just to the *dharmadhātu* because the essential nature of the latter transcends the sphere of conceptual differentiation. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to both the lack of purity and purity refers to a special state of the *dharmadhātu*. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to what is adventitious refers to that same *dharmadhātu*; for it is due to the mental defilement and the mental purity of that which, like space, is pure by nature that the two [purity and its lack] are respectively determined as adventitious. The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the

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176 Ms.(72b.3): *-vṛddhir api tattvād* but Y's emendation to *-vṛddhyasadbhāvād* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf, his fn.4 p.225.

177 Ms.(72b.4) line begins: *-viparyāsena paramārthā...*; cf. Y's fn.5 p.225.

178 Read: *'nunnatau cāviparyāsās te svabhāvatrayam adhikṛtyeti* in place of *'nunnatau cāviparyāsa-kalpita āśraye śāste svabhāvatrayam adhikṛtyeti*; Ms.(72b.5): *-sās te svabhāvatrayam adhikṛtyeti*. Tib. *khens pa med pa la phyin ci ma log pa de dag ṅo bo ñid gsum gyi dbaṅ du byas pa'o źe'o* (D301a.1-2). There seems to be some confusion in folio 72b of Y's Ms. where some extraneous text appears to be inserted at the beginning of lines 2 through to 6. The readings noted by Y in his fns.1, 3, 5, 6 & 7 p.225 are completely absent from the Ms.

179 Ms.(72b.6): *-saḥ paratantrasvabhāvam...*; cf. Y's fn.7 p.225.

180 Ms.(72b.6): *avipaviparyāsaḥ* but Y's emendation to *'viparyāsaḥ* is preferred.

181 *vi* of *avisāre* is inserted in the Ms. margin.

182 Ms.(72b.7) line begins: *-pariniṣpattyā ca...*; cf. Y's fn.2 p.226

lack of fear and the lack of arrogance refers also to the *dharmadhātu* because of the unfabricated nature of the latter, for, like space, it is devoid of deficiency and excellence. These tenfold absences of erroneous inversion are to be understood in this way in relation to the three natures.

The Ten *Vajra* Words

N68.9 Furthermore, these ten absences of erroneous inversion are to be connected respectively with the ten *vajra* words. The ten *vajra* words are: (i) existence and non-existence, (ii) the absence of erroneous inversion, (iii) the basis, (iv) the resemblance to a magical creation, (v) the absence of conceptual differentiation, (vi) intrinsic luminosity, (vii) defilement and purification, (viii) the resemblance to space, (ix) non-deficiency and (x) non-excellence.

The 'body' of the *vajra* words is established by way of: (a) own-being, (b) objective support, (c) absence of conceptual differentiation and (d) objections and refutations. Of these, (a) "by way of own-being" refers to the three natures called 'perfected', 'imaginary' and 'other-dependent' corresponding respectively with the first three [*vajra*] words.[183] (b) "By way of objective support" refers to these same [three] natures. (c) "By way of the absence of conceptual differentiation" refers to: (i) that on account of which one does not conceptually differentiate, i.e. direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation, and (ii) that which does not perform conceptual differentiation in regard to intrinsic luminosity. Then, by means of these, the establishment of both the object of knowledge and the act of knowing is to be understood respectively, namely, through the three natures and the absence of conceptual differentiation. (d) "By way of objections and refutations" refers to the remaining [*vajra*] words. This is the objection in this regard: "If these *dharmas* which are characterized by the imaginary and the other-dependent [natures] are non-existent, how can they be perceived? On the other hand if they do exist, the intrinsic luminosity of
N69 the *dharmas* is not tenable." One refutes this through their resemblance to a magical creation, i.e. on the grounds that what comprises a magical creation does not exist yet it is perceived. [An objection]: "If the *dharmas* possess intrinsic luminosity, how can they be defiled initially

183 The Tib. Bhāṣya appears confused in this area and inserts the first of the three *antaraśloka* here, whereas in the Sanskrit Bhāṣya all three are found at the end of this section.

and subsequently purified?" Its refutation: Defilement and purification are to be understood according to their resemblance to space, i.e. on the grounds that space, which is pure by nature, can be defiled and then purified. [An objection]: "If there is the removal of the moral defilement[184] of immeasurable numbers of sentient beings when immeasurable numbers of Buddhas are born, how is it that *saṃsāra* is not eradicated and *nirvāṇa* is not augmented?" Its refutation is on the grounds of non-deficiency and non-excellence, because the realms of sentient beings and 'sides' to purification are immeasurable.

Secondly, the 'body' is established as follows:

> (a) Wherein, whatever and whence is error and (b) wherein and whatever is non-error and indeed (c) the results of both error and non-error and (d) the end of these two.
>
> (i) Existence and non-existence, (ii) the absence of erroneous inversion, (iii) the basis, (iv) the resemblance to a magical creation, (v) the absence of conceptual differentiation, (vi) eternal intrinsic luminosity,
>
> (vii) Defilement and purification, (viii) the resemblance to space, (ix) non-deficiency and (x) non-excellence;
> These are the ten *vajra* words.

The spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y226.14 [1] These ten absences of erroneous inversion that have just been described are to be connected respectively with the ten *vajra* words described in the
Y227 Sūtras. Which are the ten *vajra* words? They are: (i) existence and non-existence, (ii) the absence of erroneous inversion, (iii) the basis, (iv) the resemblance to a magical creation, (v) the absence of conceptual

184 Read: *kleśāpagamaḥ* in place of *kleśāpaśamaḥ*; Tib. *kun nas ñon moṅs pa bsal na* (D23b.4). Cf. N's fn.2 p.69.

differentiation[185], **(vi) intrinsic luminosity**[186], **(vii) defilement and purification**[187], **(viii) the resemblance to space, (ix) non-deficiency and (x) non-excellence.** These are [of the nature of] a *vajra* because: (a) like a *vajra*, they penetrate all erroneous inversion and (b) the former cannot be penetrated by the latter. This is [equivalent to] the knowledge of the absence of erroneous inversion that has just been described [in the last section]. And since this[188] *vajra*[-like knowledge] is illustrated, i.e. is made known, through them, they are [described as] the *vajra* words; what is meant is: *vajra*-like explanations. Furthermore, it is [the ten words of the previous section] beginning with "syllable", "object" and "mental activity" that are signified by the term "word". Consequently, "words of the *vajra*" means: 'objective supports of the *vajra*; alternatively, these words are described as *vajra* words because, like a *vajra*, they are difficult to split[189]. The *vajra* words are specifically mentioned in this context because the absences of erroneous inversion must be connected with the Sūtras. Alternatively, it is to demonstrate that this explanation of the *vajra* words is through the ten kinds of absence of erroneous inversion. Of these, (a) the existence or non-existence of the meaning of syllables is [equivalent to the *vajra* word] "existence and non-existence"; hence, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables is to be known as referring to "existence and non-existence" [listed] among the *vajra* words. (b) The appearance as the duality which is imaginary refers to the "object" in this context and the [knowledge] that it is non-existent as such refers to the absence of erroneous inversion in this regard. Thus, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the object is to be connected with the "absence of erroneous inversion" [listed] among the *vajra* words. (c) Since that same mental activity that consists in talk is a 'basis' in this context, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity is to be connected with the "basis" [listed] among the *vajra* words. (d) The absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the non-dispersal of mind, since [it sees in the object] its resemblance to a magical creation etc.[190], is to be connected with the "resemblance to a magical creation" [listed] among the *vajra* words[191]. (e) It is that same individual characteristic of the *dharmadhātu* that is [equivalent to] the absence of conceptual differentiation since it is devoid of imaginative constructions; therefore, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic is to be regarded as the

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185 Read: *avikalpanatā* in place of *nirvikalpanatvam*; cf. Bhāṣya N68.11.

186 Read: *prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā* in place of *prakṛtiprabhāsvaratvam*; cf. Bhāṣya N68.11.

187 Ms.(74b.3) line begins: *-śavyavadānam*; cf. Y's fn.2 p.227.

188 Ms.(74b.3): *yadya* but Y's emendation to *yac ca* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.227.

189 I.e. *vajra-pāda* may be interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa* or *karmadhāraya* compound.

190 Ms.(74b.7): *māyādyupamayā* but Y's emendation to *māyādyupamatayā* is correct; cf. his fn.5 p.227.

191 Ms.(74b.6): *vajrapadeṣu viparyāse* but Y's emendation to *vajrapadeṣv aviparyāse* is preferred; cf. his fn.4 p.227.

Y228 "absence of conceptual differentiation"[192]. (f) The universal[193] [characteristic] of the *dharmadhātu* refers to its intrinsic luminosity; therefore, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic is included as "intrinsic luminosity". (g) Since a special lack of purity[194] and a special purity on the part of the *dharmadhātu* is [equivalent to] its defilement and purification[195], the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of purity and purity is included by [the *vajra* word] "defilement and purification". (h) Moreover, the absence of erroneous inversion[196] in relation to the adventitious nature of defilement and purification on the part of the *dharmadhātu* is to be connected with the "resemblance to space". (i) & (j) Since there is no destruction or growth of the *dharmadhātu* in relation to its states of defilement and purification, the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of fear and lack of arrogance is to be connected with "non-deficiency" and "non-excellence" [listed] among the *vajra* words. These ten absences of erroneous inversion are to be connected[197] respectively with the ten *vajra* words in this way.

[2] **The 'body' of the *vajra* words is established** as follows: the *vajra* words are employed with reference to[198] certain categories - these categories form their 'body'. However, they are also established as fourfold, i.e. **by way of: (a) own-being, (b) objective support, (c) absence of conceptual differentiation and (d) objections and refutations.**

[3] **Of these, ...the three natures called 'perfected', 'imaginary' and 'other-dependent' correspond respectively with the first three [*vajra*] words.** Therein, the first [three][199] are: "existence and non-existence", "the absence of erroneous inversion" and "the basis". Of these, by "existence and non-existence", the perfected [nature] is referred to; by "the absence of erroneous inversion", the imaginary [nature] is referred to; by "the basis", the other-dependent [nature] is referred to. How so? Certain people believe that the perfected is explained as both
Y229 existent and non-existent because it both exists and does not exist[200]. How can it be due to the fact that the perfected [nature] has the characteristic of both existence and non-existence?[201] Some believe that this is because it is verbally expressed as existent

192 Read: *akalpanatā* in place of *nirvikalpanatvena*; cf. Bhāṣya N68.11.
193 Ms.(74a.1): *-nyaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.227.
194 Ms.(74a.1): *aviśuddhiviśeṣo*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.228.
195 Ms.(74a.2): *vyavadānaṁ cety*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.228.
196 Ms.(74a.2) includes the *avagraha*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.228.
197 Ms.(74a.3): *-draṣṭavyā* but Y's emendation to *yojayitavyā* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.228.
198 Ms.(74a.3): *adhikṛtya vajra-*; disregard Y's fn.7 p.228.
199 The words: *bhavānyād yāni tāni* which are inserted here (Ms.74a.4) have not been translated for they have no coherence in the context and are not found in the Tib. (cf. D302a.5).
200 There is an inconsistency between the Sanskrit and Tib. texts in this area that is difficult to reconcile, for the reconstructed portion is far in excess of the lacunae. As noted by Y (fn.10 p.228), the Ms.(74a.5) line begins: *-paratantraḥ*, but his emendation to *iti ke cit* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.
201 Cf. Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, verse 13.

and non-existent. Others believe that because syllables possess combination and familiarity, one sees the object as having significance insofar as it is mentally constructed and, in the contrary case, one sees it as being devoid of significance, [thus], it is understood that the perfected nature is inexpressible. Hence, this [*vajra* word] "existence and non-existence" is said to refer to the perfected nature. Others again believe that the Dharma that comprises the teachings of the universal vehicle is described as the perfected nature because: (a) it flows out of the extremely pure *dharmadhātu* and (b) it is the objective support which acts as counteragent to erroneous inversion; and although, as an objective entity its essential nature is conceptually differentiated[202], it is not imaginary. Hence, [the *vajra* word] "existence and non-existence" is said to refer to the perfected. However, others say that "existence and non-existence" is said to refer to the perfected nature because it is not erroneously inverted[203]. The imaginary is [described] as being without erroneous inversion[204] because it is characterized[205] by manifesting in the nature of the duality which does not exist. The other-dependent is described verbally as "the basis"[206]; it is described as the basis because it is the (causal) ground and is described as other-dependent because it is the result.

[4] **These three natures should be known by way of objective support**[207].

[5] **By way of the absence of conceptual differentiation refers to...** Since there are different ways of resolving this compound in this context, he says: **(i) that on account of which one does not conceptually differentiate, i.e. direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation and (ii) that which does not perform conceptual differentiation in regard to intrinsic luminosity.** These are the different ways of resolving the compound[208] (***avikalpanatā***): (a) there is an absence of conceptual differentiation (***avikalpana***) since, on account of this, one does not conceptually differentiate and (b) there is an absence of conceptual differentiation (***avikalpana***) since it [i.e. intrinsic luminosity] is not conceptually differentiated. The state (***bhāva***) of that is [equivalent to] the absence of conceptual differentiation (***avikalpanatā***). In this way he shows that the absence of conceptual differentiation is revealed by these two *vajra* words [i.e. ***avikalpanatā*** and ***prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā***]. **Then, by means of these, the establishment of both the object of knowledge**

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202 Read: *sa kalpitasvabhāvārtho 'pi bhavati* in place of *so 'rthaḥ kalpitasvabhāvasya bhavati*. Ms.(74a.6): *sa-*, not *so-* as per Y; Tib. *rnam par brtags pa'i ṅo bo ñid kyi don yin du zin kyaṅ* (D312b.1).

203 Ms.(74a.7): *'viparyastatvāt*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.229.

204 Ms.(74a.7): *viparyāsena* but Y's emendation to *aviparyāsena* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.229.

205 Read: *-lakṣaṇatvāt* as per Ms.(75a.1) in place of *-lakṣaṇāt*.

206 Read: *āśrayeṇa paratantrasyābhidhānam* as per Ms.(75a.1) in place of *āśrayeṇa paratantras tasyābhidhānam*; disregard Y's fns.3 & 4 p.229.

207 Ms.(75a.1) is corrected to read: *ālambanato jñeyam*; cf. Y's fn.5 p.229.

208 Ms.(75a.2): *vigrahabhedo*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.229.

and the act of knowing are to be understood respectively, namely[209]**, through the three natures and the absence of conceptual differentiation.** Therein, the object of knowledge is established through the three natures because they
230 consist in the apprehended object; the act of knowing is established through the absence of conceptual differentiation because it consists in the apprehending subject.

[6] **By way of objections and refutations** that are employed **refers to the remaining** *vajra* **words**[210]. With regard to this, certain *vajra* words actually are refutations of objections; examples of these are "the resemblance to a magical creation", "the resemblance to space", "non-deficiency" and "non-excellence". However, some [*vajra* words] are just objections, for example, "defilement and purification". Therefore, [the *vajra* word] "objections and refutations" (*codyaparihāra*) can be [interpreted both as] 'refutations of objections' and 'objections'; together they produce 'objections and refutations' (*codyaparihārau*)[211], considering the rule (cf. Pāṇini III.I.94 & I.II.64) that of two 'original' words (i.e. *codyaparihāra* and *codya*), only one remains (i.e. *codyaparihārau*). **This**[212] **is the objection in this regard: "If these** ***dharmas*** **which are characterized by the imaginary and other-dependent [natures] are non-existent...,** the ellipsis is: as apprehended object and apprehending subject, **how can they be perceived?** I.e., as apprehended object and apprehending subject - this is what is intended. **On the other hand if they do exist, the intrinsic luminosity of the** ***dharmas*** **is not tenable";** because they exist in the aspects of apprehended object and apprehending subject - this is the objection. **One refutes this through their resemblance to a magical creation, i.e. on the grounds that what comprises a magical creation does not exist yet it is perceived.** For a magical creation exists as a perception; consequently, its existence as such cannot be known. **An objection: if the** ***dharmas*** **possess intrinsic luminosity, how can they be defiled initially**[213] **and subsequently purified?** For, if they are pure by nature, the defiled state is never possible. **Its refutation: Defilement and purification are to be understood according to their resemblance with space, i.e. on the grounds that space, which is pure by nature**[214]**, can be**

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209 Read: *veditavyam / yad uta* in place of *vijñeyaṃ tad yathā*; cf. Bhāṣya N68.19.

210 Ms.(75a.3): *śiṣṭāni va-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.230. The Tib. is slightly different here: "By way of objections and refutations refers to the remaining *vajra* words that were mentioned"; *brgal ba daṅ lan ni rdo rje'i tshig bśad zin pa'i lhag ma rnams so* (D302b.6).

211 Read perhaps: *codyaparihāraś ca codyasya parihāraś ca codyaṃ ca / codyaṃ ca codyaparihāraś ca codyaparihārau*. Ms.(75a.4-5): *codyaparihāraś ca codyasya parihā*(lacuna of 12-14 syllables)*raś ca codyaparihārau*; Y's reading fails to account for the lacuna. The Tib. (D302b.7) supports the above reconstruction although is somewhat abridged: *brgal ba'i lan daṅ brgal ba ni / brgal ba daṅ lan te* = *codyaparihāraś ca codyaṃ ca codyaparihārau*. On *ekaśeṣa*, see L. Renou: Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit. I am indebted to Johannes Bronkhorst of the Instituut Kern, Leiden for his assistance in arriving at this interpretation.

212 Bhāṣya inserts: *idaṃ* which is not found in Ṭīkā; cf. Bhāṣya N68.20.

213 Read: *pūrvaṃ saṃkleśaḥ* as per Ms.(75a.7) in place of *pūrvasaṃkleśaḥ*; cf. also Bhāṣya N69.3.

214 Read: *yathākāśaṃ prakṛtipariśuddham* in place of *tad yathā prakṛtiviśuddha ākāśa*; cf. Bhāṣya N69.4-5.

defiled by adventitious secondary defilement and then, due to the removal of the latter, purified[215]. Thus, although it is pure by nature, the defilement on the part of the *dharmadhātu* is on account of adventitious secondary defilement and purification [on its behalf] is due to the removal of the latter. An objection: "**If there is the removal of the moral defilement[216] of immeasurable numbers of sentient beings when immeasurable numbers of Buddhas are born, how is that[217]**, although the Buddhas are born individually in beginningless ***saṃsāra***, ***saṃsāra*** **is not eradicated and *nirvāṇa* is not augmented** due to the removal of immeasurable numbers of sentient beings from *saṃsāra* and their entry to *nirvāṇa*?
Y231 **Its refutation is on the grounds of non-deficiency and non-excellence, because the realms of sentient beings and 'sides' to purification are immeasurable.** For, the diminution or eradication of something which possesses limitations can be conceived[218] but the realm of sentient beings is immeasurable and its diminution cannot be conceived, how much less can its eradication, like that of space, possibly be conceived? Since there is indeed no excellence of purification too because of its immeasurable nature, how can there be augmentation on its part, like with space, because both the removal of obscuration and the arising of obscuration belong to it?

[7] **Secondly, the 'body' is established[219] as follows,** i.e. with reference to the *vajra* words:

> **(a) Wherein, whatever and whence is error and (b) wherein and whatever is non-error and indeed (c) the results of both error and non-error and (d) the end of these two.**

The object of error, the essential nature of error[220], the cause of error, the result of error and the end of the result of error[221] are explained by the *vajra* words. Similarly, the essential nature of non-error, the object of non-error, the result of non-error and the end result of the latter[222] are explained[223]. In regard to the above [verse], "wherein there is error" refers to existence and non-existence, i.e. the characterizing of syllables as having significance or being without significance, because the verbal expression and the object of the expression and the connection between them is imaginatively con-

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215 Read: *vyavadāyate* as per Ms.(75b.1) in place of *vyavadīyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N69.5.
216 Read: *kleśāpagamaḥ* in place of *saṃkleśo nirākriyate*; cf. Bhāṣya N69.6 and my fn.184 above.
217 Read: *tat katham* in place of *katham*; cf. Bhāṣya N69.7.
218 The Tib. (D303a.7) *sñon gyi* for *prajñāyate* should be amended to *mṅon gyi*.
219 Ms.(75b.4): *-vyavasthānam*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.231.
220 Ms.(75b.4): *bhrāntiviṣayo bhrānti-*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.231.
221 Read: *bhrāntiphalaparyantaś* in place of *bhrāntiparyantaś*; Tib. *'khrul pa'i 'bras bu mthar phyin pa* (D303b.2).
222 Read: *tasya ca phalaparyanta iti* as per Ms.(75b.5) in place of *tatparyantaś ceti*; although *phala* is not found in the Tib. (cf. D303b.3).
223 Tib. inserts *bstan* = *nirdiṣṭa* which is not in the Ms.

structed in the nature of an entity. "Whatever is error" refers to erroneous inversion, i.e. error, because it manifests in the aspect of the duality but is non-existent in itself. "Whence is error" refers to the fact that error comes from a basis - this basis is the mental activity that is developed by talk and which consists in the store-consciousness. "And whatever is non-error" refers to the absence of error, i.e. non-dispersal towards the existence or non-existence of the object which is [in reality] like a magical creation etc. The absence of error is the counteragent to the error which consists in the notional attachment to existent and non-existent entities and these are explained respectively through their resemblance to a magical creation and the absence of conceptual differentiation[224]. "And wherein" refers to where there is an absence of error; moreover, this refers to intrinsic luminosity which has the characteristic of the perfected nature. "And
Y232 indeed the results of error and non-error": in this regard, defilement is the result of error - the ellipsis is - i.e. the natural outcome of error. Since the absence of error consists in the natural outcome of the absence of error[225], the result of the absence of error is purification because it is the result of the absence of error - the ellipsis is - [purification] together with its associates. The use of the particle "indeed" refers to these two results described by [the *vajra* word] 'defilement and purification'; however, in order to demonstrate that through [the *vajra* word] 'the resemblance to space', the results of both error and the absence of error on the part of the *dharmadhātu* is seen to have the nature of defilement and purification, but they are not intrinsic to it. "And the end of these two": some people believe that this refers to the end of both defilement and purification, i.e. *nirvāṇa*; moreover, the latter is described as the 'end'[226] insofar as it is without deficiency and excellence. However, others believe that the end of defilement is [equivalent to] the possession of non-deficiency because [defilement] does not accumulate due to the immeasurable nature of *saṃsāra*; and the end of purification is [equivalent to] the possession of non-excellence[227] because [purification] does not increase due to the immeasurable nature of *nirvāṇa*.

[8] These ten *vajra* words have been described through their connection with the absence of erroneous inversion; however, since they do not derive from a Sūtra, they are included by way of two internal verses:

> **(i) Existence and non-existence, (ii) the absence of erroneous inversion, (iii) the basis, (iv) the resemblance to a magical creation, (v) the absence**

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224 Ms.(75b.7): *'vikalpanatayā*; disregard Y's errata amendment p.143.

225 Ms.(76a.1): *-niṣyandāyā bhrānter*, but Y's emendation to *-niṣyandāyā abhrānter* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.232.

226 Read: *paryantatvam* as per Ms.(76a.2) in place of *paryantam*, as noted by Y (cf. his fn.2 p.232), Tib. (D304a.3): *mthar thug pa med pa'i phyir = aparyantatvāt*.

227 Ms.(76a.3): *-ṣpatāyukto*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.232.

of conceptual differentiation, (vi) eternal intrinsic luminosity[228];

(vii) Defilement and purification, (viii) the resemblance to space, (ix) non-deficiency and (x) non-excellence[229] - these are the ten *vajra* words.

[9] In this context, (a) the view that the connection between a word and its object belongs to the perfected [nature] is erroneous inversion. (b) The view that objects exist by way of essential nature in exactly that way in which they appear is erroneous inversion. (c) The view [that incorporates] the cause for the arising of the object is erroneous inversion[230]. (d) The views that [incorporate] imputation or negation in regard to the object are erroneous inversion. (e) The view that the own-being of the object is
Y233 in accord with its nominal designation[231] is erroneous inversion. (f) & (g) The views that regards the individual or universal characteristics[232] of entities as substantially existent are erroneous inversion. (h) The view that the purity or the lack of purity of actions is due to auspicious or inauspicious behaviour is erroneous inversion. The view that both the lack of purity and purity belong to one and the same [entity] is erroneous inversion. (i) & (j) The manifestation of fear and arrogance because of the belief in deficiency and excellence in regard to the relinquishment and acquisition of defilement and purification [respectively] is erroneous inversion. These are the ten erroneous inversions; because they are non-existent on the part of the *bodhisattva*, [the spiritual practice] which becomes free from erroneous inversion in relation to the categories as described should be known as the meditative development of penetrating insight[233]. **The spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma has now been described.**

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228 Read: *sadasattāviparyāsa āśrayo māyopamā //*
akalpanā prakṛtyā ca bhāsvaratvaṃ sadaiva hi //
in place of: *sadasattāviparyāsa māyopamatvam āśrayaḥ //*
nirvikalpaḥ prakṛtyā ca prabhāsvarā sadaiva hi //
Ms.(76a.3-4): *sadasattāviparyāsa- .....-sadaiva hi //* cf. Bhāṣya N69.13-14.

229 Read: *ahīnānadhikatvaṃ* as per Ms.(76a.4) in place of *ahīnatvādhikatvaṃ* disregarding Y's fn.5 p.232.

230 Tib.: *don de 'byuṅ ba'i rgyu la phyin ci log* which omits *darśanaṃ*; amend to: *...rgyur lta ba'i phyin ci log*. Cf. D304a.6.

231 This sentence in the Ms.(76a.5) is enclosed by parentheses.

232 Ms.(76a.5): *svasāmānyalakṣaṇayor*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.232.

233 Read: *bodhisattvasya tadabhāvād yathokteṣv artheṣv aviparyāsapariṇatā vidarśanābhāvanā veditavyā* in place of *bodhisattvasya tadabhāvād aviparyāsāvasthitasya yathokteṣv artheṣv apariṇatā vidarśanābhāvanā veditavyā*; Ms.(76a.7): *-ṣv aviparyāsapariṇatā...* Tib. *byaṅ chub sems dpa' la de dag med pas ji skad bśad pa'i don rnams la phyin ci ma log par gnas pa ni lhag mthoṅ bsgom pa yin par rig par bya* (D304b.1-2).

d. Spiritual Practice in Relation to the Avoidance of the Two Extremes.

169.19 Which is the spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes? That which is taught as the middle way in the Ratnakūṭa. This is to be known as being due to the avoidance of which extremes?

V.23 abcd The extremes concerning separateness and identity, those of the *tīrthika* and *śrāvaka*, the twofold extremes of imputation and negation in regard to the personal entity and the *dharmas*.

V.24 abcd The extremes concerning adverse elements and their counteragents, those termed eternalism and annihilationism, the twofold and threefold [extremes] concerning the apprehended object and apprehending subject as well as defilement and purification.

V.25 abcd The seven kinds of dual extremes consisting in conceptual differentiation are also considered in regard to: (a) existent and non-existent entities, (b) the object of appeasement and the [act of] appeasing, (c) the object of fear and the dread of the latter;

N70 V.26 abcd (d) The apprehended object and apprehending subject, (e) correctness and falsity, (f) performance and non[-performance] and (g) non-origination and simultaneity - these are the dual extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.

Of these, (a) the notion that the self is something separate from form etc. is one extreme; the notion that it is identical is another extreme. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these, i.e. that which does not investigate a self, concluding with the non-investigation

of the human kind, for, among the views concerning a self, there is one view that holds the individual soul to be [identical with] the physical body and [another view that holds] the individual soul to be one [entity] and the physical body another.

The notion that form is permanent is an extreme embraced by the *tīrthikas*; the notion that it is impermanent is an extreme embraced by the *śrāvakas*. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these, i.e. that which does not investigate the permanence, nor does it investigate the impermanence, of form etc.

The notion that the self exists[234] is the extreme of imputation in regard to the personal entity; the notion that it is insubstantial is the extreme of negation, for, there is the negation of just that which exists as a designation. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these, i.e. the direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation which holds the mean position between [the existence of] a self and its insubstantiality.

The notion that mind is real is the extreme of imputation in regard to the *dharmas*; the notion that it is not real is the extreme of negation. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these, i.e. that [perspective] wherein there is no mind, nor volition, nor thought, nor consciousness.

The notion that the *dharmas*, such as those that are unwholesome, are [equivalent to] defilement is an extreme in regard to adverse elements; the notion that the wholesome ones etc. are [equivalent to] purification is an extreme in regard to the counteragent. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these, i.e. that which consists in the non-acceptance, non-utterance and non-communication of these two extremes.

The notion that both the personal entity and the *dharmas* exist is the extreme of eternalism; the notion that they do not exist is the extreme of annihilationism. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these since it holds a mean position between the two extremes.

The notion that nescience consists in the apprehended object and apprehending subject[235] is one extreme; likewise the notion that knowledge, the formative forces and the unconditioned which is the counteragent to the latter, up until old-age and death, consist in the apprehended object and apprehending subject is another extreme.

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234 Tib. inserts *yod* (D305b.3) which is not found in the Sanskrit.

235 Read: *grāhikā* which accords with the Bhāṣya Ms.(cf. N's fn.12 p.70) and Ṭīkā quotation (Ms.78a.5); cf. my fn.273 below.

Alternatively, the notion that the cessation of these consists in the
71 apprehended object and apprehending subject is an extreme, i.e. it is checked by that path. Thus, the extremes in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject are twofold according to their differentiation as belonging to the 'black' or the 'white' side. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these. i.e. in detail, both knowledge and nescience are non-dual because of the absence of the apprehended object and the apprehending subject on the part of knowledge and nescience etc.

Defilement is threefold: (a) the defilement of moral defilement, (b) the defilement of action and (c) the defilement of rebirth. In regard to these, the defilement of moral defilement is threefold: (i) false view, (ii) the causes of passion, aversion and delusion and (iii) the resolve for a new existence. The counteragents to these are: (i) emptiness knowledge, (ii) signless knowledge and (iii) non-resolve knowledge. The defilement of action refers to the formative influence of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. The counteragent to these is knowledge without formative influence. The defilement of rebirth refers to: (i) rebirth in a new existence, (ii) the production of the mind and the mental concomitants every moment in one who is reborn and (iii) the continuance of a new existence. The counteragents to these are: (i) non-birth knowledge, (ii) non-production knowledge and (iii) absence of own-being knowledge. The removal of these three kinds of defilement is [equivalent to] purification. In this regard, through emptiness knowledge etc. the *dharmas* that are the objects of emptiness knowledge etc., up to [the *dharmas* that are the objects of the absence of own-being knowledge], are not respectively caused to be emptiness etc. on account of these three kinds of defilement, [rather], they are emptiness etc. by their very nature because the *dharmadhātu* is undefiled by nature. Therefore, if one imagines that the *dharmadhātu* is defiled or is purified, this is an extreme because there can be no defilement or purity on the part of that which is undefiled by nature. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding this extreme, i.e. that which does not cause the *dharmas* to be empty through emptiness; on the contrary the *dharmas* are already empty and the same holds for the other [six categories of knowledge].

There are an additional seven kinds of dual extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation, for example, the conceptual differentiation in regard to an existent entity is one extreme and the conceptual differen-

tiation in regard to a non-existent entity is another extreme[236]. These are due to imagining that: (a) emptiness is for the destruction of the
N72 belief in the existence of the personal entity, or else, (b) insubstantiality is non-existent. This middle way is for the purpose of avoiding these dual extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation. Emptiness is certainly not for the destruction of the belief in the personal entity, moreover, emptiness itself is empty. In detail, the same holds for past emptiness and future emptiness etc.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to the object of appeasement is one extreme and conceptual differentiation in regard to the [act of] appeasing is another extreme. These are on account of imaginative constructions in regard to the object of relinquishment and the [act of] relinquishing which are due to fear of emptiness. The example of 'space' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to the object of fear is one extreme and [conceptual differentiation] in regard to the dread of that object of fear [is another extreme]. These result from fear of imaginary forms etc. and are on account of the dread of suffering. The example of the 'painter' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation. The former example is in relation to the ***śrāvaka***, but the latter is [in relation to] the ***bodhisattva***.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to the apprehended object is one extreme and [conceptual differentiation] in regard to the apprehending subject [is another extreme]. The example of the 'magician' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation. For, the knowledge of the non-existence of the object is caused by the knowledge of representation-only and the knowledge of the non-existence of the object annuls that very knowledge of representation-only because, if the object is non-existent, its representation is not possible; thus, these two are similar in this respect.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to correctness is one extreme and [conceptual differentiation] in regard to falsity [is another extreme]. Both of these conceptually differentiate the investigation of what is real as correct or false. The example of 'fire coming from two sticks' is for
N73 the purpose of avoiding these two extremes; i.e., just as fire is generated from two sticks which are devoid of the characteristic of fire and [the fire] that is generated consumes those two sticks; similarly, the

236 Ṭīkā and Tib. Bhāṣya confirm a reading of *abhāve 'pi vikalpo 'ntaḥ*; cf. N's fn.14 p.71.

noble faculty of wisdom which has the characteristic of correctness is generated from the investigation [of phenomena] as they are in reality which is devoid of the characteristic of correctness and [the faculty of wisdom] that is generated annihilates [through clear understanding] that investigation of what is real; thus, these two are similar in this respect. And although the investigation of what is real is devoid of the characteristic of correctness, it does not have the characteristic of falsity because it is in conformity with correctness.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to the performance of action is one extreme and [conceptual differentiation] in regard to the non-performance of action [is another extreme]. Both of these imagine direct intuition to involve an act that is preceded by intelligence, or else, as being devoid of efficacy. The example of the 'oil-lamp' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.

Conceptual differentiation in regard to non-origination is one extreme and [conceptual differentiation] in regard to simultaneity [is another extreme], i.e., if one imagines that the counteragent does not arise, or else, [imagines] defilement to endure for a long time. The second example of the 'oil-lamp' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.

The spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y233.9 [1] Immediately following the spiritual practice that conforms with the Dharma, the spiritual practice that relates to the avoidance of the two extremes[237] should be mentioned. Hence he asks: **which is the spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes?** So he says: **that which is taught as the middle way in the** Dharma discourse named **the Ratnakūṭa** for the purpose of illustrating the essential nature of correct spiritual practice. In detail, it is taught as follows concluding with the second example of the 'oil-lamp'[238]:

"In this matter, O Kāśyapa, the *bodhisattva* who desires instruction through the Dharma discourse, the Mahā[239] Ratnakūṭa, should apply himself properly to the Dharma. And as to what is proper application to the Dharma: namely, it is

237 Ms.(76a.7): *anudharmapratipattyanantaram antadvayavarjane pratipattir*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.233.

238 Read: *dvitīyatailapradyotadṛṣṭāntaparyantaḥ* in place of *dvitīyapradīpodāharaṇaparyantaḥ*; Tib. *mar me'i dpe gñis pa la thug gi bar du* (D304b.5). Cf. Y250.11 = D313a.7.

239 *mahā* is omitted from the Ms. (cf. 76b.1) but is found in the Tib. (D304b.3) and the KP (#52 p.82).

that which investigates the reality of all *dharmas*, i.e. which does not investigate a self, nor does it investigate a sentient being, nor an individual soul, nor a man, nor mankind[240], nor a personal entity, nor a human, nor the human kind. This is described as the middle way, O Kāśyapa."[241]

[2] **This is to be known as being due to the avoidance of which extremes?**[242] What is meant is: the spiritual practice of the middle way should be known as being due to the avoidance of which extremes? Hence he says:

V.23 ab **The extremes concerning separateness and identity, those of the *tīrthika* and *śrāvaka* etc.**

Y234 These fifteen types are differentiated into two extremes; this [the middle way] is to be known as being due to the avoidance of these. In this regard, the views concerning separateness etc.[243] are extremes considering that there is the figurative use of a cause in regard to the effect because one becomes notionally attached each to his own view. **Of these, the notion that the self is something separate from form etc. is one extreme; the notion that it is identical is another extreme.** In this respect, those [views] which construe form etc., the aggregates, the sense-fields and the elements as entities to be enjoyed on the part of an eternally existing self are [equivalent to] the extreme view which holds the self to be something separate from form etc. Again, the extreme view that the self is identical to form etc. refers to those [views] which hold the internal formative forces consisting in form etc. to be the self and which construe that which sees, hears and discerns[244] as the self, and external things as belonging to the self. **There is one view, expressed in a Sūtra, that holds the individual soul to be [identical with] the physical body and [another view that holds] the individual soul to be one [entity] and the physical body another** - these are described by the word "extreme" in this context. **For the purpose of avoiding both of these,** i.e. for the purpose of avoiding[245] the extremes of identity and difference of the self[246] in relation to form etc., there is **the middle way**[247], i.e. direct intuition that has for its object only the *dharmas*. In order to demonstrate this, he says: **i.e. that which does not investigate a self, concluding with the non-investigation of a human being.** For, when [the

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240 Read: *nasattvanajīvanapoṣanapuruṣa-* as per Ms.(76b.2) in place of *nasattvanajīvanapoṣa-*; Tib. *sems can med pa daṅ / srog med pa daṅ / gso ba med pa daṅ / skyes bu med pa daṅ* (D304b.4).

241 From KP #52 p.82.

242 Read: *kasyāntasya varjanād asau veditavyā* in place of *katamasyāntasya varjanāt sā veditavyā*; Ms.(76b.3): *-ād asau veditavyā* contrary to Y's fn.5 p.233. Cf. Bhāṣya N69.20.

243 Read: *pṛthaktvādi-* in place of *pṛthagādi-*; cf. Y234.3.

244 Read: *vijānāti* as per Ms.(76b.4) in place of *jānāti*.

245 Ms.(76b.6): *-parivarjanārtham*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.234.

246 Read: *ātmano* as per Ms.(76b.6) in place of *ātmanaḥ /*.

247 Ms.(76b.6): *pratipad vā* contrary to Y's fn.2 p.234; however his emendation to *pratipad ya(d)* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.

bodhisattva] understands that the self is non-existent, like the son of an infertile woman, due to the insight that it is only *dharmas*, he does not see a self; what is meant is: he does not adhere to [the belief in a self]. What is the reason that its identity or difference is perceived in relation to form etc. and why is [the self] mentioned by special synonyms[248], such as "sentient being" when it is understood in that sense just by the word "self"? Since all [people] do not understand all synonyms, it is explained through another synonym in order that everyone can understand its meaning. Alternatively, it is for the purpose[249] of conveying its meaning through different synonyms to those who were distracted at a particular time because when it is mentioned through that description, it is conveyed to others.

[3] **The notion that form is permanent[250] is an extreme embraced by the *tīrthikas*.** For, having become attached to imaginary form as an entity, they construe it to be permanent because they are misled through erroneously inverting it as permanent.

Y235 **The notion that it is impermanent is an extreme embraced by the *śrāvakas*.** This is an extreme because they impute a substantial although impermanent nature[251] upon form etc. whose essential nature is imaginary. The view that [form] is impermanent is an extreme because it causes one to shrink excessively from *saṃsāra* and to fall into an extreme in regard to *nirvāṇa*. **For the purpose of avoiding both of these[252]**, i.e. for the purpose of avoiding the views [of form] as permanent or impermanent, **there is the middle way, i.e. that which does not investigate permanence, nor does it investigate the impermanence, of form etc.** Just what is this [middle way]? It is direct intuition free from conceptual differentiation, i.e. that which does not understand form etc. just in relation to [entities of] form etc. or as permanent or impermanent. The word "etc." in the term "form etc."[253] refers to the [four other] aggregates of sensation, ideation, the formative forces and consciousness, the elements of earth, water, fire, wind and space and the sense-fields of sight, hearing, smell, taste, tactility and mind.

[4] **The notion that the self exists is the extreme of imputation in regard to the personal entity.** The [view] which regards the self, which is non-existent in actuality[254] like the son of an infertile woman, as separate or not separate from the aggregates, elements or sense-fields is an extreme because it imputes[255] the self, in the nature of an entity, upon the personal entity. **The notion that it is insubstantial**

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248 Ms.(73a.1): *-paryāyaviśeṣā-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.234.
249 Read: *-ārtham* in place of *-ārthaḥ*.
250 Read: *nityaṃ rūpam iti* in place of *rūpādayo nityam iti*; cf. Bhāṣya N70,7.
251 Ms.(73a.2): *vasturūpeṇānityatvena*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.235.
252 Ms.(73a.3): *tadubhayaparivarjanārtham*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.235.
253 *rūpādīnām* seems to be corrected to *rūpādīn* in the Ms. margin (73a.4).
254 Tib.(D305b.4): *rdzas med par* (= *adravyataḥ*) but Ms.(73a.5): *dravyataḥ* (contrary to Y's fn.3 p.235).
255 *samāropaṇam* but Tib.(D305b.4): *sgro 'dogs pa'i phyir* = *samāropatvāt*.

is the extreme of negation. For, negation is described as imagining that something existent is non-existent[256]. But if the self does not exist, how can its description as 'insubstantial' be an extreme of negation? **For, there is the negation of just that which exists as a designation**[257]. It is an extreme which negates [the existence] as something insubstantial that is referred to. Moreover, it is a continuum of *dharmas* wherein the close connection of cause and result is evident. Alternatively, it is a totality in regard to which the designation as god or human [is made]. **The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these,** i.e. for the purpose of avoiding the views that the self exists or does not exist; and now, in order to define what is the middle way[258], he says: **i.e. that which holds the mean position**[259] **between [the existence of] a self and its insubstantiality;** but what does that mean consist in? **Direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation.**

[5] Having shown that conceptual differentiation in regard to the apprehended object is
Y236 an extreme [and] in order to demonstrate that conceptual differentiation[260] in regard to the apprehending subject is also an extreme, he says: **the notion that mind is real etc.** Alternatively, after showing that imputation and negation in regard to the personal entity is an extreme and in order to show the extremes of imputation and negation in regard to the *dharmas*, he says: "the notion that mind is real etc.". The notion that mind exists as a reality in exactly that way in which it appears, or, as it is expressed[261] - this **is the extreme of imputation in regard to the *dharmas*,** because the own-being of mind[262] which is without reality, is imputed as real. **The notion that mind is not real is the extreme of negation.** The view which regards [mind] as unreal although existent in a nature devoid of the apprehended object and apprehending subject and inexpressible is an extreme of negation because it completely negates the own-being of the *dharmas*. **For the purpose of avoiding both of these,** i.e. for the purpose of penetrating the insubstantiality of the *dharmas* which is devoid of imputation and negation, **there is the middle way, i.e. that [perspective] wherein there is no mind, nor volition, nor thought, nor consciousness**[263]; the ellipsis is that the notional attachment [to mind etc.] does [not]

256 Ms.(73a.5): *'satya-* but Y's emendation to *'sattva-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.235.

257 Ms.(73a.6): *-ptisato*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.235.

258 Ms.(73a.7): *-tipado*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.235.

259 Read: *madhyam* as per Ms.(73a.7) in place of *madhyamaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N70.12.

260 Read: *-vikalpasyāntatvapradarśanārtham* as per Ms.(73a.7) in place of *-vikalpasyāntatvaṃ pradarśanārtham*; cf. Bhāṣya N70.14.

261 Ms.(73b.1): *abhilipyate* but Y's emendation to *abhilapyate* is preferred; cf. his fn.1 p.236.

262 Ms.(73b.1): *cittasvabhāvasya*; Y's parentheses?!

263 Read: *yatra na cittaṃ na cetanā na mano na vijñānam* in place of *sā yatrācittam acetanā amano 'vijñānam*; cf. Bhāṣya N70.14.

occur[264]. Alternatively, that sphere within which mind does not arise in its nature as a collection[265] of latent impressions accompanied by impurity, nor does volition [arise] characterized by formative influence[266], nor does thought in the aspect of self-conceit [arise], nor does consciousness [arise] as conceptual differentiation - this is described as the middle way. Therein, "mind" refers to the store-consciousness since it is the collection of latent impressions of all *dharmas* accompanied by impurity. "Volition" refers to the actions of mind and consists in the actions that stimulate mind toward the wholesome, the unwholesome and the neutral. "Thought" refers to defiled mind. "Consciousness" refers to the six groups of consciousness.

[6] **The notion that the *dharmas*, such as those that are unwholesome, are [equivalent to] defilement is an extreme in regard to adverse elements; the notion that the wholesome ones etc. are [equivalent to] purification is an extreme in regard to the counteragent.** By the word "etc.", the explanations [of *dharmas*] are referred to that are reprehensible[267], not reprehensible, mundane, supramundane, with and without impurity, conditioned and unconditioned etc. In this respect, the extreme in regard to adverse elements and the extreme in regard to the counteragent refers to the notion that defilement and purification are exactly [equivalent to] the mode in which the unwholesome and wholesome *dharmas* appear and are articulated. Therein [the *dharmas*] are unwholesome because they have the sense of discomfort; they are reprehensible because they cause the mani-
Y237 festation of bad conduct; they are mundane because they are erroneously inverted; they are accompanied by impurity because they have a propensity towards impurity; they are conditioned because they are produced from causal conditions. However, the wholesome ones etc. should be known as the inverse of these. **The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these;** the term "both of these" refers to the adverse element and the counteragent. Since the middle way is not known in relation to this, he says: **that which consists in the non-acceptance, non-utterance and non-communication of these two extremes.** Of these, non-acceptance[268] refers to the absence of the notional attachment to adverse elements and the counteragent. It is non-utterance because it does not cause others to accept these extremes in regard to adverse elements and the counteragent. It is non-communication

264 Read: *abhiniveśāḥ pravartanta iti* as per Ms.(73b.3). The negative particle inserted by Y (cf. his fn.2 p.236) is unnecessary since the Sanskrit construction retains the force of the negative particles of the prior quotation from the Bhāṣya.

265 Ms.(73b.3): *citātmakaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.236.

266 Tib. inserts *med pa* in error; cf. D306a.4.

267 Ms.(73b.5): *savadya-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.236.

268 Ms.(78a.1): *-ānupagamo*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.237.

because it does not recommend[269] [to others] the extremes[270] in regard to adverse elements and the counteragent.

[7] Having taught the middle way [which acts] as counteragent to the extremes embraced by the *tīrthikas* and *śrāvakas* and in order to clearly illustrate the middle way [which acts] as counteragent to the extremes pertinent to the *bodhisattva*, he says: the **notion that both the personal entity and the *dharmas* exist is the extreme of eternalism; the notion that they do not exist is the extreme of annihilationism.** The notion that they exist at all times is the extreme of eternalism because of the imputation of the individual characteristic; the notion that they do not exist is the extreme of annihilationism because their essential nature is negated, in every respect. **The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding both of these since it holds a mean position between the two extremes.** Some believe that the "mean" in this context is intended as being separate from both extremes. Others maintain that the "mean" here lies between these two extremes[271] and has the characteristic of both. Having considered [these two views], how [should it be understood]? The extreme of eternalism refers to the notional attachment to the view that an entity that is an object both of knowledge and verbal description, like the imagination of what is unreal or the *dharmadhātu*, exists substantially and in an ultimate sense - [this is an extreme] because these [entities] do not exist as such. Similarly[272], the view that [an entity] definitely does not exist, like the horns of a hare, is the extreme of annihilationism. What is the reason? Because it does exist as a designation. Hence, since it denies [the existence of] the latter, it is described as the extreme of annihilationism. Consequently, that which holds the mean position between existence and non-existence has the characteristic of both since it does not exist substantially nor in an ultimate sense and does exist as a designation.

Y238 [8] With reference to the extreme of imputation in regard to the adverse elements and their counteragent, he says: **the notion that nescience consists in the apprehended object and apprehending subject[273] is one extreme; likewise the notion that knowledge, the formative forces and the unconditioned, which is the counteragent to the latter, consists in the apprehended object and apprehending subject, is another extreme.** Moreover, because of the reference here to the final member [of the twelve *nidāna* by the words]: **up until old-age and death,** consciousness and name/form etc. are also included. The notion that consciousness consists in the apprehended object and apprehending subject is an

269 Ms.(78a.1): *asaṃvarṇanā* but Y's emendation to *asaṃvarṇanāt* on the basis of the Tib. is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.237.

270 Tib. omits *anta*; cf. D306b.4.

271 Ms.(78a.3): *antayor*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.237.

272 Ms.(78a.1): *tathā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.237.

273 Read: *grāhikā* as per Ms.(78a.5) in place of *grāhakā*; cf. Bhāṣya N70.20 & fn.12.

extreme; similarly, the notion that name/form, the six sense-fields, contact, sensation, craving, grasping, becoming, birth and also old-age and death, consist in the apprehended object and apprehending subject is also an extreme. Therein, nescience consists in an absence of the knowledge of the [four] truths and the [three] jewels. The formative forces are impure volitions which have meritorious, demeritorious and neutral[274] [tendencies] for their own-being because they are the formative influences for the new existence. Similarly, consciousness etc. should be stated in detail in a way that conforms with the explanations [given in the section entitled]: 'The Characteristic of Defilement'[275]. Knowledge refers to direct intuition devoid of impurity. The counteragent to the formative forces refers just to direct intuition that is unconditioned; it is only hence[276] and in order to distinguish it from other unconditioned [elements] that he says: "the counteragent to the latter". However, others consider that in this respect the unconditioned is also eightfold[277] because of the fact that it possesses non-origination; but the counteragent refers to volition that is without impurity[278] because it does not formatively influence the new existence. **Alternatively, the notion that the cessation of these consists in the apprehended object and apprehending subject is an extreme.** By the word "these", [the *nidāna*] beginning with consciousness and concluding with old-age and death, are referred to. Since it is not known whether sensation is an entity or a cause, he says: it, i.e. name/form, **is checked by that...**; by what is name/form checked? By the **path** which is without impurity and which is the counteragent to name/form. Knowledge and nescience which are non-dual do not make a duality, thus, in this context the path is comprised only by direct intuition together with its associated elements. Consequently[279], since [name/form] is checked by this [i.e. the path], there is cessation; but what is the extreme here[280]? Just the notional attachment to the apprehended object and appre-
Y239 hending subject. What is the reason? Because the imposition of a non-existing duality occurs in regard to nescience etc. which are non-dual by nature[281]. **Thus, the extremes in regard to the apprehended object and apprehending subject are twofold according to their differentiation as belonging to the 'black' or the 'white' side.** Therein, the 'black' side refers to the twelve limbs that consist in becoming, i.e. from nescience up until old-age and death. Likewise, the 'white' side refers to the same twelve modes according to their differentiation as the cessation of

274 Ms.(78a.6): *-āniska-* but Y's emendation to *-āniñjya-* is correct.
275 Cf. Chapter I (Y36-44).
276 Ms.(78a.7): *atha vā* but Y's emendation to *ata evā-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.238.
277 These eight are, according to Y's Japanese translation (p.383 fn.11): *kuśala, akuśala, avyākṛta, śūnya, apratisaṃkhyānanirodha, pratisaṃkhyānanirodha, acala,* and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*
278 Ms.(78b.1): *-tipakṣas tv anāsravā cetanā*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.238.
279 Ms.(78b.2): *mārgo taś ca* contrary to Y's fn.5 p.238 but his emendation to *mārgaḥ / ataś ca* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.
280 Ms.(78b.2): *punar atrāntaḥ*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.238.
281 Ms.(78b.3): *pratikṛtiṣv* but Y's emendation to *prakṛtiṣv* is correct.

nescience etc., i.e. from the cessation of ignorance up until the cessation of old-age and death. Moreover, in this context, it is just the path that is the counteragent to these [twelve] that is signified by the word "cessation" since ignorance etc. is checked on account of it. **For the purpose of avoiding these**, i.e. for the purpose of avoiding the extremes that consist in the apprehended object and apprehending subject[282], **the middle way is mentioned**, i.e. is referred to. And since the latter[283] is not known, he says: **both knowledge and nescience are non-dual.** How can knowledge and nescience, up until old-age and death and the cessation of the latter, be non-dual? Hence he says: **because of the absence of the apprehended object and apprehending subject on the part of knowledge and nescience etc.** However, that absence is because of the fact that nescience etc. is non-dual by nature. Alternatively, since both knowledge and nescience have an imaginary nature, knowledge and nescience are non-dual since the non-existence of both knowledge and nescience, which have an imaginary nature, is the same. It should be stated similarly for the formative forces, the unconditioned, consciousness and the cessation of the latter, up until old-age and death and its cessation. But what is the middle way in this context? Just this knowledge that, since knowledge and nescience are non-dual[284] and do not make a duality[285], the knowledge to be generated is non-existent and the nescience to be checked is non-existent, the formative forces to be relinquished are non-existent and the cessation of the latter which is to be attained is non-existent. The knowledge that this is so is the non-making of duality[286].

[9] **Defilement is threefold.** In this respect, moral defilements[287] are described as defilements either because: (a) they cause the defilements of action and rebirth and (b) they are defiled in themselves; alternatively, it is because they cause disturbance to oneself and others. Action is also described as defilement, because: (a) it develops under the influence of moral defilement, (b) it is the cause of rebirth and (c) certain
Y240 [actions] are morally defiled in themselves. Rebirth too is [described as] defilement because it is both the cause[288] of the moral defilement of action and it is the basis of all misfortune[289]. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the threefold differentiation of the defilement of moral defilements, he says: **the defilement of moral defilement is threefold etc.** Of these, (i) **false view** refers to the five beginning with the false

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282 Ms.(78b.4): *grāhyagrāhakānta-*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.239.

283 Ms.(78b.5): *śānta* but Y's emendation to *sā ca* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.239.

284 Ms.(78b.7): *cādvayam*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.239.

285 Ms.(78b.7): *advaidhikāram* corrected to *advaidhīkāram* in the margin.

286 Ms.(78b.7): *etad advaidhīkāram*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.239.

287 Read: *kleśāḥ* as per Ms.(79a.1) in place of *kleśaḥ* - this is substantiated by the Tib. *ñon mońs rnams* (D308a.2).

288 *nimittatvāt* but Tib. *dbaṅ gis byuṅ ba ...phyir* (D308a.3).

289 Ms.(79a.1-2): *dravāsyada-* but Y's emendation to *dravāśraya-* on the basis of the Tib. is preferred; cf. his fn.2 p.240.

view of individuality. **(ii) Passion, aversion and delusion indeed are causes** because they are causes of grief etc. and the new existence. However, others say that the causes of passion etc. are: the sense faculties and objects conducive to it, superficial mental attention and the latent impressions of passion etc. that are lodged in the store-consciousness; but they claim that they, as they appear as these [i.e. passion etc.], are the cause of passion etc. **(iii) The resolve for a new existence;** i.e. the desire for a new existence. **The counteragents to these are: (i) emptiness knowledge etc.** Of these, the counteragent to false views is emptiness knowledge; in this context, emptiness knowledge refers to knowledge that has emptiness for its object. The counteragent to the cause of passion etc. is **(ii) signless knowledge** because it is devoid of all signs. Alternatively, signless knowledge refers to knowledge that has the signless for its object because it has the emptiness of imaginary passion etc. for its object. The counteragent to the resolve for the new existence is **(iii) non-resolve knowledge.** Non-resolve knowledge[290] refers to knowledge that is either devoid of the resolve for the new existence, or else, which has the emptiness of the new existence for its object. **The defilement of action refers to the formative influence of virtuous and non-virtuous actions**[291]. Formative influence refers to the accumulation and actualization of the actions, both virtuous and non-virtuous, which project the new existence. **The counteragent to these is knowledge without formative influence.** Knowledge without formative influence refers to that knowledge, on account of which, one's actions do not formatively influence the new existence; and this has thusness for its object. **The defilement of rebirth refers to: (i) the birth in a new existence,** i.e. the mind at conception; **(ii) the arising of the mind and the mental concomitants every moment in one who has been born,** i.e. subsequent to conception, **up until death**[292]; **and (iii) the**
Y241 **continuance of the new existence,** i.e. the death state in accompaniment with moral defilement which is followed immediately by the intermediate state[293] and following from the latter comes the rebirth state. However, for those who have gained the formless attainments, the rebirth state follows immediately after the death state. **The counteragents to these are: (i) non-birth knowledge, (ii) non-production knowledge and (iii) the absence of own-being knowledge.** Of these, the non-birth knowledge refers to the knowledge that all *dharmas* are 'unborn' since they have the nature of imaginative construction; alternatively, it is that which has emptiness for its object[294]. The non-production knowledge refers to the knowledge

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290 Ms.(79a.5): *jñānaprahitam* but Y's emendation to *jñānapraṇihitam* on the basis of the Tib. is preferred; cf. his fn.3 p.240.

291 Ms.(79a.5) omits *karma* which should be inserted on the basis of the Bhāṣya (cf. N71.8) and the Tib. (D308b.1).

292 Ms.(79a.6): *ūrdhvam ā maraṇāt*; disregard Y's fn.5 p.240.

293 Ms.(79a.7) line begins: *-nantaram antarābhavaḥ...*; cf. Y's fn.6 p.240.

294 Ms.(79b.1) line begins: *-viṣayaṃ vā taj jñānājñāḥ...*; cf. Y's fn.1 p.241.

that has for its object the emptiness of the imaginary *dharmas* because one penetrates their non-production on account of this [knowledge]. The absence of own-being knowledge refers to the knowledge that the continued existence of an entity[295] is devoid of own-being, because, like the son of an infertile woman, it does not exist. These seven kinds of knowledge beginning with emptiness knowledge are the counter-agents to the seven kinds of adverse elements beginning with false view as have just been described. **The removal of these three kinds of defilement** consisting in moral defilement, action and rebirth which are differentiated as sevenfold is [equivalent to] **purification**; 'removal' [has the sense of] relinquishment. However, others believe that purification refers to thusness, the path and *nirvāṇa* because the resolution of the term [*apagama*] is as follows: [defilement] departs (*apagacchati*) in it [i.e. *tathatā*], by means of it [i.e. *mārga*] and there is the departure itself [i.e. *nirvāṇa*], therefore, purification refers to thusness etc. **In this regard, ...through emptiness knowledge etc....**; due to the word "etc.", the following are included: emptiness knowledge, signless knowledge, non-resolve knowledge, knowledge without formative influence, non-birth knowledge, non-production knowledge and absence of own-being knowledge. **The *dharmas* that are the objects of emptiness knowledge etc....**; and here too, by the word "etc.", the following are included: the object of emptiness knowledge, the object of signless knowledge, the object of non-resolve knowledge, the object of knowledge without formative influence[296], the object of non-birth knowledge, the object of non-production knowledge and the object of the absence of own-being knowledge all of which are characterized by the perfected [nature]. **Up to [the *dharmas* that are the objects of the absence of own-being knowledge], are not respectively caused to be emptiness etc. on account of these three kinds of defilement**; i.e. the *dharmas* that are the object of emptiness knowledge etc., which are separate from the defilements of moral defilement, action and rebirth that were just described, are not caused [to be empty etc.] through emptiness knowledge etc.[297] What is the reason that they are not caused [to be empty etc.]? **Because they are emptiness etc. by their very nature.** What is
Y242 meant is: they are devoid of the own-being of false view etc. by their very nature. As to why this is so, he says: **because the *dharmadhātu* is undefiled by nature.** Hence, since the *dharmas* that are the object of emptiness knowledge etc. are emptiness etc. by their very nature, they are not caused [to be empty etc.] through emptiness knowledge etc. The term "respectively" has the sense of 'appropriate' in this context, i.e. the object of emptiness knowledge which is devoid of, or free from the defilement

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295 Ms.(79b.1): *bhava-* but Y's reading of *bhāva-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.: *dṅos po* (D308b.6).

296 Ms.(79b.4): *jñeyānibhisaṃskāro* but Y's reading of *jñeyānabhisaṃskāro* is correct.

297 The Tib. omits from *jñānaśūnyatādibhir* (Y241.24) to *dharmāḥ* (Y242.2).

of false view, is not caused[298] [to be empty] through emptiness knowledge[299] because the emptiness of false view is, in itself, devoid of the own-being of false view. Thus, the object of signless knowledge which is devoid of the sign of passion etc. is not caused [to be signless] through signless knowledge because the emptiness of the sign of passion etc. is, in itself, signless. The object of non-resolve knowledge is not caused [to be non-resolve] through non-resolve knowledge because the emptiness of resolve is, by its very nature, characterized by non-resolve[300]. The object of knowledge without formative influence is not caused [to be devoid of formative influence] through knowledge that is without formative influence because the emptiness of formative influence is, by its very nature, characterized by the absence of formative influence. The object of non-birth knowledge is not caused [to be non-born] through non-birth knowledge because the emptiness of birth is, by its very nature, characterized by non-birth. The object of non-production knowledge[301] is not caused [to be non-produced] through non-production knowledge because the emptiness of the production of the mind and the mental concomitants every moment is, by its very nature, characterized by non-production. The object of the absence of own-being knowledge is not caused [to be devoid of own-being] through the absence of own-being knowledge because the emptiness of the new existence is, by its very nature, devoid of own-being. Alternatively, the statement: "...respectively ...on account of the three kinds of defilement etc.", [can be interpreted as follows]: a particular *dharma* of the *dharmas* that are objects of emptiness knowledge etc. which has a connection with the defilements of moral defilement, action and rebirth that are differentiated as sevenfold, i.e. with a particular variety of defilement, is not caused [to be emptiness][302] through emptiness knowledge etc.; on the contrary, it is understood (*adhigamyate*) [to be emptiness]. In this respect, emptiness knowledge is connected with defilement that consists in false view, and similarly up to [the seventh relation wherein] the absence of own-being knowledge is connected with [defilement that consists in] the continuance of the new existence. What is the reason that [the object of emptiness knowledge etc.] is not caused [to be empty etc.]? Because these *dharmas* are emptiness etc. by their very nature for the *dharmadhātu* is undefiled by nature. In this respect, false views are not caused to be empty through emptiness knowledge, because, by their very nature they are characterized by emptiness. The sign of passion etc. is not caused to be signless through signless knowledge[303] because the *dharmadhātu* is signless by its very nature.
Y243 Likewise up to [the seventh category wherein] the continuance of the new existence is not caused to be devoid of own-being through the absence of own-being knowledge

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298 Read: *kriyate* as per Ms.(79b.6) in place of *kriyante*.
299 Ms.(79b.6) erroneously inserts *jñenaśūnyatāyā* between *jñānaśūnyatayā* and *jñeyaśūnyatā*.
300 Ms.(79b.7): *-praṇidhānalakṣaṇatvāt*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.242.
301 Ms.(80a.1): *jñeyānutpādo*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.242.
302 Tib. inserts *śūnyatā* (i.e. *stoṅ pa ñid*); cf. D309b.4.
303 Ms.(80a.4): *jñānajñānānimittena* but Y's reading of *jñānānimittena* is correct.

for even when the counteragent has not arisen, the imaginary nature is simply non-existent; and since this is the case, then, if one imagines that the ***dharmadhātu*** **is defiled or is purified, this is an extreme.** What is the reason? He says: **because there can be no defilement or purity**[304] **on the part of that which, like space, is undefiled by nature. The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding this extreme, i.e. that which does not cause the *dharmas*,** which are the objects of emptiness knowledge etc.[305] and which consist in the perfected nature, **to be empty**[306], i.e. as devoid of false view etc. which belongs to the other-dependent nature and is adverse to it[307] [i.e. the perfected nature] through emptiness in the nature of knowledge[308]. **On the contrary, the *dharmas* are already empty** of the essential nature of false view which belongs to the imaginary nature, even when knowledge has not arisen. Similarly, [the middle way] does not cause the *dharmas* to be signless through [the knowledge of] signlessness, [rather] the *dharmas* are already signless, and so on up to [the seventh category in relation to which the middle way] does not cause the *dharmas* to be devoid of own-being through [the knowledge of] their absence of own-being, [rather] the *dharmas* are already devoid of own-being. "A perspective such as this, O Kāśyapa, is described as an investigation of the reality of the *dharmas*."[309] In this way, both the existence of knowledge and the existence of what is adverse to it are revealed[310] as being devoid of the imaginary nature; thus, the repudiation of the extremes that consist in imposition and negation is complete.

[10] The above [represents] the classification of conceptual differentiation in sequential order; **in addition to these there are seven kinds of dual extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** In order to demonstrate [this] classification of conceptual differentiation, he says: **for example, the conceptual differentiation in regard to an existent entity is one extreme and the conceptual differentiation in regard to a non-existent entity is another extreme.** How so? Hence he says: **these are due to imagining that: (a) emptiness is for the destruction of the belief in the existence of the personal entity, or else, (b) insubstantiality is non-existent.** If [knowledge] does not cause the *dharmas* to be empty through emptiness [knowledge] because they are empty by nature, then in that case, emptiness is for the destruction of

304 Read: *-viśuddhy-*; as per Ms.(80a.5) in place of *-śuddhy-* (*vi* is inserted in the margin).

305 Ms.(80a.6): *dharmān jñeyaśūnyatādīn*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.243.

306 *śūnyān* is inserted in the margin of the Ms.(80a.6).

307 Ms.(80a.6): *śuddhipakṣeṇa* but Y's emendation to *tadvipakṣeṇa* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.243.

308 Read: *śūnyatayā vidyātmikayā* as per Ms.(80a.6) in place of *śūnyatāyā vidyātmikāyā*.

309 From KP #63.

310 Read: *paridīpitam iti* in place of *paridīpayann*; Tib. *bstan pas* (D310a.4). Ms.(80b.1) is unclear but does not substantiate Y's rendering.

Y244 that [notion] that the personal entity exists, or else [the notion that] insubstantiality does not exist because of the non-existence of the personal entity; for, without an adverse element, there is no counteragent. Therefore, it is to be accepted necessarily that the personal entity exists or, that insubstantiality does not[311]. Conceptual differentiation in regard to the existence[312] and non-existence of these two is an extreme. **The middle way is for the purpose of avoiding these dual extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation in regard to existence and non-existence. "Emptiness, O Kāśyapa, is certainly not for the destruction of the personal entity, moreover, emptiness itself is empty etc."** - thus is the quotation from the Sūtra[313]. In this respect, emptiness is neither for the destruction of the defiled personal entity, nor for the production of a purified[314] personal entity for there can be no destruction nor production of the personal entity because it exists just as a designation, like an 'army' etc. Moreover, emptiness itself is empty but it is not [empty] of the personal entity that is imputed through the false view of individuality because the latter is absolutely non-existent. After considering it in this way, the emptiness of the personal entity and the *dharmas* by way of substantiality is not an *ens* because it is devoid of the latter; nor is it a non-*ens* since it consists in the perfected [nature][315]. Moreover, in order to illustrate that emptiness does consist in the perfected [nature], he says: **the same holds for past emptiness, future emptiness and the emptiness of the present**[316] because it illustrates the fact that [emptiness] exists as such in all the three times; alternatively, it is because it illustrates the fact that [emptiness] exists as such in the states of the ordinary person, the adept and the one still in training. Of these, the [emptiness of the] past refers to the state of the ordinary person; future [emptiness] refers to the state of the adept; and the [emptiness of the] present refers to the state of the one still in training. And since the emptiness of own-being of existent and non-existent entities is thus, it is therefore said that: "you should rely on emptiness, O Kāśyapa"[317], because it is the object of direct intuition free from conceptual differentiation, "...do not [rely on] the personal entity[318]", because it is just a verbal expression.

[11] **Conceptual differentiation in regard to the object of appeasement is an extreme and in regard to the [act of] appeasing;** the fact that conceptual

311 Ms.(80b.3): *nairātmyābhāvo*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.244.

312 Tib. omits "existence" but reads: "...in regard to the non-existence of these two..."; *de med pa(r) yaṅ rnam par rtog pa'i mtha' o* (D310a.7).

313 KP #64.

314 Read: *vyavadāta-* as per Ms.(80b.4) in place of *vyavadāna-*.

315 *pariniṣpannena* but Tib.(D310b.3): *pariniṣpannātmakatvena* (*yoṅs su grub pa'i bdag ñid kyis*).

316 Bhāṣya (N72.3): *pūrvāntaśūnyatā / aparāntaśūnyatā ity evamādivistaraḥ* but Ṭīkā (Y244. 13): *pūrvāntaśūnyā / aparāntaśūnyā / pratyutpannaśūnyeti.*

317 KP #64 which differs slightly: *śūnyatā kāśyapa pratisaratha.*

318 Read: *mā pudgalam* in place of *na pudgalam*; cf. KP ibid. Ms.(80b.7) line begins: *-ity abhidhāna...* contrary to Y's fn.5 p.244.

differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme has to be understood[319]. How

Y245 so? Hence he says: **these are on account of imaginative constructions in regard to the object of relinquishment and the [act of] relinquishing which are due to the fear of emptiness.** Of these, the object of appeasement is [equivalent to] the object of relinquishment; the [act of] appeasing is [equivalent to] the [act of] relinquishing. After imagining the *dharmas* to be [equivalent to] objects of relinquishment and [the knowledge of] emptiness to be [equivalent to] the relinquishing[320], fear is generated in regard to emptiness; for, how can the three kinds of defilement be objects of relinquishment if they are empty by nature? Hence, they, like the personal entity, ought not be objects of relinquishment and consequently, since there can be no relinquishing in the absence of the object of relinquishment, fear is generated in regard to emptiness - this is certainly an extreme. What is the reason? Because [people] are notionally attached to the fact that the *dharmas* of form and sensation etc. exist substantially in exactly that way in which they are transformed[321] in the nature of consciousness. They fear[322] emptiness due to ignorance[323] of the fact that those [*dharmas*] of form etc. whose essential nature is imaginary, are, by their very nature, non-existent like the self. Therefore, **the example of 'space' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** For instance:

> "[Just as] a certain person who is afraid of space[324] may beat his chest and cry out saying: "remove this space!" What do you think, Kāśyapa, would he be able to remove the space?" [Kāśyapa] replies: "Certainly not, O Venerable One." The Venerable One continues: "Similarly, Kāśyapa[325], I would say that those *śramaṇas* and *brahmans* who are fearful in regard to emptiness have met with a severe distraction; and for what reason? Because, O Kāśyapa, they go astray in regard to emptiness itself and are consequently fearful of it".[326]

This is what is being said: just as one is unable to remove space because it consists in all form, similarly, emptiness cannot be removed since it is established in all *dharmas* at all times, and emptiness cannot be removed from the state of being established through

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319 *anuvartate* literally means "persists" or "remains in force". The Tib. omits *śamane 'pi vikalpo 'nta ity anuvartate*; cf. D310b.6.

320 *śūnyatāṃ ca prahāṇatvena* is added in the margin of the Ms.; cf. 80b.

321 *viparivartante*; Tib.(D311a.1): *snaṅ ba.*

322 Ms.(81a.2): *vibheti*, contrary to Y's fn.4 p.245, however his emendation to *bibheti* is correct.

323 Ms.(81a.2): *ajñānānāstac* but Y's emendation to *ajñānāc* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.245.

324 Read: *ākāśato* in place of *ākāśajo*; Ms.(81a.2): *ākāsata.*

325 Ms.(81a.3): *kāśyapapa* but Y's reading of *kāśyapa* is correct.

326 KP #66.

the non-relinquishment of *dharmas*[327], nor can emptiness be established through the
Y246 relinquishment of *dharmas* and he consequently shows that this is a groundless fear.

[12] **Conceptual differentiation[328] in regard to the object of fear is an extreme and in regard to the dread of that object of fear;** it is the fact that conceptual differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme that is referred to. That, from which fear arises, is described as the object of fear; insofar as one becomes fearful of this, there is dread, i.e. an undesirable result of that [original fear]. That which one imaginatively construes in regard to both the object of fear and the dread [of the latter] are the extremes[329]. How so? Hence he says: **these result from fear of imaginary forms etc. and are on account of the dread of suffering.** For, naive people, after imagining forms etc. which have an imaginary nature[330] as being substantial, then imagine the fear from these [forms etc.] and their undesired result. Consequently, on account of their dread of suffering, they become fearful both of their forms etc. and their signs. **The example of the 'painter' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** For instance:

> "[Just as] a painter, O Kāśyapa, after creating the terrifying figure of a *yakṣa*[331] by himself is rendered unconscious after collapsing and falling face-first in abject terror[332] of it; similarly, O Kāśyapa, all[333] ordinary naive people, after creating forms, sounds, odours, tastes and tangible things by themselves, wander in *saṃsāra* because of those [forms etc.] and fail to understand those *dharmas* as they are in reality".[334]

Moreover, just as the painter, having, through false conceptual differentiation, superimposed the existence of a real *yakṣa* upon the terrifying figure of the *yakṣa* that he himself has created, and fearing it, is rendered unconscious, similarly, all ordinary people who are impelled by false conceptual differentiation wander in *saṃsāra* on account of their individual conceptual differentiations[335] which are described as their own creations and are in a momentary state because they are not established in homogeneous groups. **The former example is in relation to the *śrāvaka* but the**

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327 Read: *na ca dharmāprahāṇena śūnyatā vyavasthānād apanetuṃ śakyate* in place of *na ca dharme 'prahāṇe śūnyatāvyavasthitād apanetuṃ śakyate*; Tib. *chos ma spaṅs pas stoṅ pa ñid gnas pa las bsal bar yaṅ mi nus la* (D311a.5). This passage is omitted from the Ms.

328 Read: *vikalpo* as per Ms.(81a.5) and Bhāṣya (N72.8) in place of *kalpo*.

329 Ms.(81a.6) line begins: *-ṣṭaphalaṃ / tasmiṃs ...so 'ntaḥ...*; the reading noted by Y in his fn.1 p.246 obviously belongs to the following line and is now missing from the Ms.

330 Read: *parikalpitarūparūpādīn* in place of *parikalpitarūpādīn*; Ms.(81a.6): *parikalpitarūpārūpādīn*. Tib. *kun brtags pa'i ṅo bo gzugs la sogs pa la* (D311a.7-311b.1)

331 Ms.(81a.7): *yakṣarūpaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.246.

332 Read perhaps *bhītatrasto* in place of *bhītasrasto*; Ms.(81a.7): *bhītastasto*.

333 Tib. omits *sarva*; cf. D311b.1.

334 KP #67.

335 Read: *iti svayaṃ vikalpitaiḥ* as per Ms. in place of *iti vikalpitaiḥ*; Tib. *źes bya ba bdag ñid kyi(s) rnam par rtog pa dag gis* (D311b.5). Ms.(81b.2) line begins *-sṛtāḥ svayaṃ kṛ... ....bhrāmyante* etc.

latter is [in relation to] the ***bodhisattva*.** Some believe that the *śrāvaka* is afraid of emptiness because he has not gained mastery over emptiness; however, the
Y247 *bodhisattva* is defiled by conceptual differentiation in regard to the imaginary *dharmas* because moral defilement consists in conceptual differentiation. Others believe there is no meaningful distinction between the two, nevertheless, they are verbally expressed as a pair on account of the influence of the two categories. Others again believe that due to his fear of emptiness, the *śrāvaka* fails to understand what is to be understood[336]; although the *bodhisattva's* [failure to understand] is due to his fear of the *dharmas* that are conceptually differentiated. Others believe that the former [example acts] as the counteragent to the [tendency to] cling to the self, whereas the latter [acts] as the counteragent to the [tendency to] cling to the *dharmas*.

[13] **Conceptual differentiation in regard to the apprehended object is an extreme and in regard to the apprehending subject;** it is the fact that conceptual differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme that is referred to. How can these apprehended objects of form etc. and their apprehending subjects, i.e. the groups of consciousness which are perceived in terms of individual characteristic and result, have the nature of superimposition[337] like the self etc.? It is the imaginative construction of apprehended object and apprehending subject as substantial entities that is intended as an extreme. **The example of the 'magician' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** For instance:

> "[Just as], O Kāśyapa, a magician conjures up a magical creation, then that which is created by means of the magical show[338] may devour the magician himself; similarly, O Kāśyapa, when a *bhikṣu* who practises spiritual discipline (*yogācāra*) is mentally attentive[339] to any particular objective support[340], everything appears as just a void for him etc".[341]

How does one thereby avoid[342] the two kinds of extreme that consist in the conceptual differentiation of this kind? Hence he says: **for, the knowledge of the non-existence of the object is caused by the knowledge of representation-only and that knowledge of the non-existence of the object annuls that very knowledge of representation-only, because if the object is non-existent, its representation[343] is not possible; thus these [two] are**

336 Ms.(81b.3): *anadhigatam* but Y's emendation to *adhigantavyam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.247.

337 Ms.(81b.4): *anadhyāropitātmano* but Y's emendation to *adhyāropitātmano* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.2 p.247.

338 Read: *sa māyānirmitas* as per Ms.(81b.5) in place of *samayā nirmitas.*

339 Read: *manasikaroti* as per Ms.(81b.6) in place of *manaskaroti.*

340 Ms.(81b.6): *evārambaṇam.*

341 KP #68.

342 Read: *parivarjayatīty* in place of *parivarjayantīty*; Ms.(81b.6): *parivarjayatītiy.*

343 Tib.(D312a.5): *rnam par śes pa* = *vijñāna* but Ṭīkā and Bhāṣya: *vijñapti.*

similar in this respect. The knowledge of representation-only functions as the magician [in the example]; the knowledge of the non-existence of the object functions as the *yakṣa* that is conjured up, for, the knowledge of the non-existence of the object is characterized by the knowledge that it is representation-only. In the same way that [the *yakṣa*] which is conjured up may devour its creator, similarly, the knowledge of the non-existence of the object will 'devour' that very knowledge of the latter as repre-
Y248 sentation-only, considering that the perception of the object is a representation, because, if the object does not exist, that it is representation-only is not possible.

[14] **Conceptual differentiation in regard to correctness is an extreme and in regard to falsity**; it is the fact that conceptual differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme that is referred to. In the state that is conducive to penetration, **both of these conceptually differentiate the investigation of what is real** as being dual extremes, i.e. **as correct or false.** How so? Correctness refers to the *dharmas* that are without impurity; falsity refers to those that are accompanied by impurity. In this respect, if one attaches to the investigation of what is real just in terms of correctness, then it is [only an investigation of] the wholesome *dharmas* that are accompanied by impurity and it would not constitute an investigation of what is real. Again, if [the investigation of what is real is thought to be] characterized by incorrectness, then it is only falsity that is produced like the wholesome [*dharmas*] that are associated with the three realms of existence[344]. **The example of 'fire coming from two sticks' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes.** For instance:

> "[Just as], O Kāśyapa, a fire is generated in dependence upon two sticks and that very [fire] being generated[345] consumes those two sticks, similarly, O Kāśyapa, the noble faculty of wisdom is generated in dependence upon the investigation of what is real and when it has been generated, it consumes that very investigation of what is real".[346]

This is what is meant here: **just as fire is generated from two sticks which are devoid of the characteristic of fire and** [the fire] **that is generated consumes the same two sticks, similarly, the noble faculty of wisdom, which has the characteristic of correctness, is generated from the investigation of what is real[347] which is devoid of the characteristic of correctness[348], and** [the faculty of wisdom] **that is generated annihilates**

344 Ms.(82a.2-3): *traidhātukatraidhātukapratisaṃyukta*... but Y's reading of *traidhātukapratisaṃyu–kta*... is correct.

345 Read: *jātaś* as per Ms.(82a.3) in place of *'gnijātaś*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.248.

346 KP #69.

347 *bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ* here but Bhāṣya (N73.2): *yathābhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ*.

348 Contrary to Y's fn.3 p.248, the words: *bhūtaṃ pratyavekṣaṃ* are not inserted here in the Ms.(82a.4), rather, it is in agreement with the Bhāṣya (N73.2).

[through clear understanding][349], i.e. consumes, that very **investigation of**
Y249 **what is real** - thus is the meaning. The latter is described as "consumed" it being as if consumed due to precisely the destruction because one observes that it is modified. And even if this **investigation of what is real** is[350] accompanied by impurity, it is described as the investigation of what is real **because it is in conformity with correctness.**

[15] **Conceptual differentiation in regard to the performance of action is an extreme and in regard to the non-performance of action**; it is the fact that conceptual differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme that is referred to. How so? Hence he says: **both imagine direct intuition to involve an act that is preceded by intelligence, or else, as being devoid of efficacy.** Having considered: "I will relinquish nescience" if this direct intuition[351] engages in activity for the sake of the relinquishment of that [nescience], this is the extreme that consists in conceptual differentiation in regard to the performance of action. The notion that, because of its momentary nature, the existence of direct intuition is not possible at the time of the performance of action that leads to relinquishment and consequently is not able to relinquish nescience, is the extreme that consists in conceptual differentiation in regard to the non-performance of action. **The example of the 'oil-lamp' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** For instance:

> "[Just as], O Kāśyapa, when an oil-lamp is lit, pitch-darkness vanishes and by no means, O Kāśyapa, does the oil-lamp have this thought: "I can disperse all pitch-darkness"; on the contrary, pitch-darkness vanishes in dependence upon the oil-lamp. Similarly, O Kāśyapa, when direct intuition arises, nescience vanishes and by no means, O Kāśyapa, does direct intuition have this thought: "I can disperse nescience". On the contrary, nescience vanishes in dependence upon direct intuition".[352]

This is what is being said: in the same way that, although a lamp is empty of the performance of action and is devoid of the intention to dispel pitch-darkness, just through the mere presence of the lamp, all darkness[353] vanishes from that place where it is lit[354]. Similarly, direct intuition that is free from conceptual differentiation is produced in one's mental continuum and nescience vanishes from that mental continuum just because of the mere fact that it is present there. There is no [deliberate] act

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349 Read: *vibhāvayatīty* as per Ms.(82a.5) and Bhāṣya N73.4 in place of *vibhāvayaṃtīty*.

350 Ms.(82a.5): *satī*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.249.

351 Read perhaps: *anena jñānena* which accords with the Tib.: *ye śes 'dis* (D312b.6) in place of the Ms.(82a.6) reading of *jñānam idam*.

352 KP #70.

353 Read: *sarvaṃ tamo* as per Ms.(82b.2) in place of *sarvatamo*.

354 Ms.(82b) line 1 ends: *vyāpāraśūnya-* (Y249.19); line 2 begins: *-deśe kriyate...*(Y249.20). Cf. Y's fns.3 & 4 p.249.

(*kriyā*) on the part of direct intuition because it is devoid of conceptual differentiation. And similarly, because of the absence of the efficacy of the performance of action on
Y250 the part of direct intuition[355], it dispels adverse elements[356] through its mere presence, like the lamp.

[16] **Conceptual differentiation in regard to non-origination is an extreme and in regard to simultaneity**; the fact that conceptual differentiation [in regard to the latter] is another extreme is understood. How so? Hence he says: **if one imagines that the counteragent does not arise...**; the extreme that consists in conceptual differentiation in regard to non-origination refers to the notion that insofar as the counteragent has not arisen for a period of time in the past, so too will it not arise in the present. **Or else, [one imagines] defilement to endure for a long time**; i.e. if nescience is only established as the counter correlate to direct intuition, direct intuition does not have the capacity to arise and if it is produced in some way, even so, the removal of nescience is unable to be carried out by means of direct intuition whose nature is momentary because [nescience] has developed over a long period of time, and consequently, there would be simultaneity on the part of defilement and purification. **The second example of the 'oil-lamp' is for the purpose of avoiding these two extremes that consist in conceptual differentiation.** For instance:

> "[Just as], O Kāśyapa, there is an oil-lamp in a house, an abode, or a cottage[357] which has not been lit by anyone for over a thousand years, then if some person were to light that oil-lamp - what do you think, O Kāśyapa, would the pitch-darkness have this thought: "I have accumulated for a thousand years and I shall not depart from here"?" [Kāśyapa] replied: "Indeed not, O Venerable One, for when the oil-lamp is lit, pitch-darkness does not have the power not to depart - it must necessarily depart from there." The Venerable One then said: "Similarly, O Kāśyapa, although *karma* and moral defilement have accumulated for hundreds of thousands of aeons, they vanish in an instant on account of an investigation facilitated by proper mental attention[358]. As to the oil-lamp, O Kāśyapa, it is an epithet for the noble faculty of wisdom; the pitch-darkness, O Kāśyapa[359], is an epithet for *karma* and moral defilement."[360]

By means of this simile [the Buddha] refutes [the notions that]: (a) the counteragent does not arise on the grounds that its arising is dependent upon conditions and (b) the

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355 Ms.(82b.3): *evan na jñānasya ...sāmarthyābhāvāt sāmarthyābhāvaḥ* but Y's emendation to *evaṃ ca jñānasya vyāpārasāmarthyābhāvāt* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.5 p.249.

356 Ms.(82b.3): *pratipakṣa-* but Y's emendation to *vipakṣa-* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.1 p.250.

357 Ms.(82b.5) is not clear - *avacarake* or *avavarake*; Tib. *khaṅ phran lo* (D313a.7).

358 Ms.(82b.7): *yoniśomanaskāreṇa vigacchati* but Y's emendation to *yoniśomanaskārapratyavekṣayā vigacchati* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.3 p.250.

359 Ms.(82b.7): *savalasyai* but Y's emendation to *kāśyapa* is correct.

360 KP #71 p.106.

simultaneous [co-existence] of defilement [and purification] on the grounds that the
Y251 'black' side has little strength although its counteragent is strong, like [in the example of] the oil-lamp and pitch-darkness.

Spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes has now been described.

e. Specific and Non-specific Spiritual Practice.

N73.16 **Which are the specific and non-specific spiritual practices?**

V.27 ab **The specific and non-specific are to be known in relation to the ten spiritual levels;**

That perfection which predominates on a particular spiritual level is specific to that [level]. When [the *bodhisattva*] becomes fully accomplished in every respect in regard to all [the perfections], it is [described as] non-specific.

The supremacy in relation to spiritual practice has now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y251.4 [1] The specific and non-specific spiritual practices were listed immediately after the spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes. Hence, immediately following the explanation of the spiritual practice in relation to the avoidance of the two extremes, he asks: **which are the specific and non-specific spiritual practices?** Hence he says:

V.27 ab **The specific and non-specific are to be known in relation to the ten spiritual levels;**

In relation to each of the ten spiritual levels[361] there are two modes of spiritual practice. How so? Hence he says: **that perfection which predominates on a particular spiritual level** etc. A *bodhisattva* established on a particular *bodhisattva* level applies himself strenuously to a particular perfection; the latter predominates in comparison with the other perfections on that *bodhisattva* level and is described as specific. For example, on the first spiritual level the perfection of generosity pre-

361 Y inserts: *tāsu daśasu bhūmiṣv ekaikaśo*, on the basis of the Tib.: *sa bcu po de dag re re la* (D313b.5), which is not found in the Ms.

dominates and thus the spiritual practice in regard to it is described as "specific". The same applies [to the other spiritual levels], up until the perfection of direct intuition on the tenth [level]. **When [the *bodhisattva*] becomes fully accomplished in regard to all** the remaining perfections on each of the spiritual levels[362], without distinction, the spiritual practice on these [levels] is described as **non-specific**; as has been stated: "on the joyous level [i.e. the first level] the perfection of generosity predominates...". And nor does [the *bodhisattva*] not become fully accomplished in regard to the other [perfections] according to his power and capacity[363]. The explanations concerning the remaining spiritual levels should similarly be known in accordance with the Sūtras.

The supremacy in relation to spiritual practice has now been described.

362 Ms.(83a.4): *tasyāṃ tasyāṃ bhūmau* which agrees with the Tib.; cf. Y's fn.3 p.251. Y's parentheses?!

363 Cf. DS p.20.10.

3. Supremacy of Objective Support.

N73.22 Which are the supremacies of objective support?

V.27 cd & 28 abcd These are considered to consist in: (a) the establishment, (b) the [*dharma*]*dhātu*, (c) the probandum, (d) the probans, (e) retention, (f) correct determination, (g) preservation, (h) penetration, (i) diffusion,
N74 (j) understanding, (k) meditative calm and (l) the culminating objective support.

There are twelve kinds of objective support, namely, (a) the objective support for establishing the designations of the *dharmas*; (b) the *dharmadhātu* as objective support; (c) the probandum as objective support; (d) the probans as objective support; (e) the objective support for retention; (f) the objective support for correct determination; (g) the objective support for preservation; (h) the objective support for penetration; (i) the objective support for diffusion; (j) the objective support for understanding; (k) the objective support for meditative calm and (l) the culminating objective support. Of these, the first refers to those *dharmas* that are respectively determined as the perfections etc. The second refers to thusness. The third and fourth refer respectively to [the latter] two again because [the *bodhisattva*] arrives at an understanding of the *dharmas*, such as the perfections, through his penetration of the *dharmadhātu*. The fifth is the objective support for the knowledge that consists in learning. The sixth [is the objective support for the knowledge that] consists in reflection since [the *bodhisattva*] retains it after having understood it. The seventh [is the objective support for the knowledge that] consists in meditative development due to its retention [by each *bodhisattva*], individually. The eighth is [the objective support] on the first spiritual level for the path of vision. The ninth is [the objective support] for the path of meditative development, up until the seventh spiritual level. The tenth is [the objective support] for the mundane and supramundane paths on that same [level] because [the *bodhisattva*] arrives at the understanding of the Dharma in its

various modes[364]. The eleventh is [the objective support] on the eighth spiritual level. The twelfth is [the objective support] on the three spiritual levels beginning with the ninth. And those [original] first and second [objective supports] receive nominal designations as the respective objective supports pertinent to each state.

The objective supports have now been described.

[Sthiramati]

Y252.2 [1] Since this is the appropriate place for an explanation of supremacy in relation to the objective support[365], he says: **which are the supremacies of objective support?**[366] Hence, in order to define these[367], he says:

V.27 a — **[They are considered to consist in]: (a) the establishment, (b) the [*dharma*]*dhātu* etc.**

There are twelve kinds of objective support, beginning with the objective support for establishing, up until the culminating objective support. These are described as the supremacies in relation to the objective supports[368] because they are pre-eminent in comparison with all the other objective supports; it is just the highest that is supreme and this refers to something unequalled and extraordinary[369]. **Of these, the first refers to those *dharmas* which are [respectively determined] as the perfections etc.; and since these are respectively determined** by the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* for the purpose of helping sentient beings, they are [equivalent to] the term "establishment". In order to demonstrate just this, the author of the commentary says: **the objective support for establishing the designations of the *dharmas*.** The designations of the *dharmas* refers to the designations of the *dharmas*, such as the perfection of generosity, the factors that contribute to enlightenment and the noble truths etc., i.e. [the *dharmas*] are established by such [a designation][370]; or else, that [i.e. the designation] is [equivalent to] the establishment in this regard - thus is the establishment of the designations of the *dharmas*. And in the following[371], the successive order of the objective supports,

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364 Tib. omits *prakāraśo*; cf. D26a.6 & 7.

365 Read: *ālambanānuttaryanirdeśāvasara* as per Ms.(83a.5) in place of *ālambanānuttaryaṃ nirdeśāvasara*; disregard Y's fns.1 p.252.

366 Ms.(83a.5-6): *ālambanānuttaryaṃ*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.252.

367 *tannirdhāraṇārthaṃ* however, Tib. is slightly different: *de'i 'og tu de dmigs kyis dbye ba'i phyir* "...immediately after the latter and in order to define them as objective supports, [he says]:" (D314a.3).

368 Ms.(83a.6): *ālambanānuttaryam*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.252.

369 Ms.(83a.6) is not clear, read perhaps: *anuttaram evānuttaryam / vaikṛtavaiśamaṃ ca*; Y's reading of fn.3 p.252 is not correct. This senrence is not found in the Tib. (cf. D314a.4).

370 Read: *tayā vyavatiṣṭhanti* in place of *tayā vyavatiṣṭhate*; Ms.(83b.1) line begins: *-vyavatiṣṭhanti...* Cf. Y's fn.5 p.252.

371 Ms.(83b.1): *cātra vyavasthānā-*; disregard Y's fn.6 p.252.

beginning with the establishment, shall be shown because [this order] is in conformity with one's direct realization. **The second refers to thusness** because it is synonymous with '*dharmadhātu*'. **The third and fourth...**; of these, the third refers to the probandum as objective support and the fourth, the probans as objective support; **refer to the latter two, i.e.** the first and the second, **respectively.** The first refers to **the probandum as objective support** and the second refers to **the probans as objective support.** He provides the reason in regard to this: **since [the *bodhisattva*] arrives at an understanding of the *dharmas*, such as the**
Y253 **perfections, through his penetration of the *dharmadhātu*.** What is meant is[372]: they arrive at an understanding of the perfections which are devoid of impurity due to their penetration of the *dharmadhātu*[373], i.e. firstly, they have the probandum as objective support, and secondly, the probans as objective support. **The fifth, the objective support for retention, is for the knowledge that consists in learning**[374]. The knowledge that consists in learning is described as retention because it holds fast to the *dharmas* such as the perfections and to the *dharmadhātu*, upon hearing it [for the first time]. The term: "the objective support for retention" (*dhāraṇālambanam*) is [resolved as]: the objective support that leads to retention (*dhāraṇāyā ālambanam*); furthermore, it refers to the first and second [objective supports], i.e. (a) the objective support for establishment and (b) the *dharmadhātu* as objective support. **The sixth [is the objective support for knowledge that] consists in reflection because [the *bodhisattva*] retains it after having understood it.** [The *bodhisattva*] arrives at an understanding by means of [the four kinds of] reasoning, i.e. (a) dependence, (b) cause and effect, (c) proof of logical possibility and (d) real nature, due to his retention of the meaning of what is learnt. Correct determination refers to the knowledge that consists in reflection; its objective support is **the objective support for correct determination. The seventh is that [of the knowledge] that consists in meditative development**; that it is the objective support for the latter is understood. **Due to its retention [by each *bodhisattva*], individually** - preservation is due to retention of the meaning [by each *bodhisattva*], individually. The knowledge that consists in meditative development is applicable to the entry to the first spiritual level. Furthermore, this relates to the applications of mindfulness, up until the powers, and its objective support is **the objective support for preservation. The eighth is [the objective support] for the path of vision on the first spiritual level.** This refers to the penetration of the all-pervading nature of the *dharmadhātu* which is without duality

372 Ms.(83b.2): *-ity ataḥ* but Y's emendation to *ity arthaḥ* on the basis of the Tib. is correct; cf. his fn.1 p.253.

373 Ms.(83b.2): *-prativedhādvyanāsravāḥ* but Y's emendation to *prativedhād anāsravāḥ* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.8 p.252.

374 *chrutamayasya jñānasya* but Bhāṣya: *śrutamayajñāna-* (N74.9-10).

[by the *bodhisattvas*], individually. Alternatively, penetration refers to the piercing of the resistance of: (a) moral defilements that are to be relinquished by [the path of] vision and (b) undefiled nescience which has the meaning of the all-pervading as its object; moreover, this is the path of vision. Its objective support is the **objective support for penetration. The ninth is [the objective support] for the path of meditative development, up until the seventh spiritual level.** Diffusion refers to the state of existence of the most excellent culminating point and is due to the practice of that same penetration of the *dharmadhātu*. It consists in the path of meditative development, up until the seventh spiritual level. The objective support for that path of meditative development is [equivalent to] the **objective support for diffusion. The tenth is that for the mundane and supramundane paths on that same [level]** - that it is the objective support for the latter is understood; **since [the *bodhisattva*] arrives at the understanding of the Dharma in its various modes.** It is an "understanding" (***pragama***) since, on that same spiritual level, he attains the understanding (***adhigama***) of the Dharma in its various modes (*prakāra*)[375] by virtue of his freedom from the notional attachment to all[376] the modes
Y254 etc. of the signs of the Dharma such as the Sūtras. The latter is described as the path of meditative development on that same seventh spiritual level. The objective support that pertains to understanding is **the objective support for understanding. The eleventh is [the objective support] on the eighth spiritual level;** since, on the eighth level, the meditative calm flows[377] spontaneously on the part of [the *bodhisattva*] whose mental attention is devoid of all signs and effort, that same path of meditative development is described as meditative calm[378]. The objective support that pertains to meditative calm is **the objective support for meditative calm. The twelfth is [the objective support] on the three spiritual levels beginning with the ninth,** because, on the ninth, he attains the culminating point of direct intuition that consists in the analytical knowledges, on the tenth he attains the culminating point of mastery over *karma* and on the Buddha level he attains the culminating point of the purification of obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable, in its entirety. In this way, because he reaches the culminating point of the purification of both direct intuition and *karma* on the three spiritual levels beginning with the ninth, the objective support of one who is established on those levels is described as **the culminating objective support.** However, others believe that the culminating objective support is mentioned in regard to the three spiritual levels[379], after considering the differentiation of the culminating point of the path as weak, middling and strong. **And**

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375 Read: *prakāraśo* as per Ms.(84a.1) in place of *prakāreṇa*.
376 Tib. omits *sarva*; cf. D315a.2.
377 Ms.(84a.2): *praśaṭhavahanāt*; disregard Y's fn.1 p.254.
378 Read: *praśaṭha ucyate* as per Ms.(84a.2) in place of *praśaṭhatā ucyate*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.254.
379 Ms.(84a.3): *tisṛṣu bhūmiṣu bhūmiṣūktam* but Y's reading of *tisṛṣu bhūmiṣūktam* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. D315a.6-7.

those [original] first and second [objective supports] receive nominal designations as the respective objective supports[380] pertinent to each state - so extensive are the objective supports, namely[381], the objective support for the establishment of the *dharmas* and the *dharmadhātu* as objective support. In this respect[382], these two objective supports receive particular nominal designations in relation to each state of direct intuition, [for example], the objective support for retention exists in the state of the knowledge that consists in learning because what is learnt is the object of direct intuition consisting in retention, therefore[383], retention knowledge is described as retention. The same should be stated [for the other seven objective supports] up until the culminating objective support. On the ninth, tenth and Buddha levels, there is the culminating attainment, i.e. supramundane direct intuition and the mundane [direct intuition] attained subsequently to that. Thus, the objective support pertinent to this is the culminating objective support.

The supremacy of objective support has now been described.

380 Read: *tad tad ālambanaṃ nāma* as per Ms.(84a.4) and Bhāṣya (N74.16) in place of *tad tad ālambananāma.*

381 Ms.(84a.4) *etāvad dhy ālambanaṃ yad uta*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.254.

382 Ms.(84a.4): *taccaitad* but Y's emendation to *tatraitad* is preferred on the basis of the Tib.; cf. his fn.4 p.254.

383 Read: *tena dhāraṇā-* as per Ms.(84a.5) in place of *tena ca dhāraṇā-* contrary to Y's fn.5 p.254.

4. Supremacy of Full Attainment.

N74.20 **Which are the full attainments?**

V.29 abcdef — **Those which consist in: (a) non-defect, (b) non-rejection, (c) non-distraction, (d) fulfilment, (e) generation, (f) development, (g) pliability, (h) non-fixation, (i) non-obscuration and (j) the full attainment of the latter without interruption.**

These are the ten kinds of full attainment. Of these, (a) the absence of defects in causal conditions refers to full attainment in relation to the
N75 **spiritual lineage. (b) The non-rejection of the universal vehicle refers to full attainment in relation to firm conviction. (c) The absence of distraction away to the lesser vehicle refers to full attainment in relation to the generation of the resolve [for enlightenment]. (d) The fulfilment of the perfections refers to full attainment in relation to spiritual practice. (e) The generation of the noble path refers to full attainment in relation to the entry into certainty. (f) The development of the roots of the wholesome refers to full attainment in relation to the maturation of sentient beings due to the prolonged exercise. (g) The pliability of mind refers to full attainment in relation to the purification of the field. (h) Non-fixation in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa* refers to full attainment in relation to the acquisition of the prophesies at the irreversible level because [the *bodhisattva*] does not turn away from *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa*. (i) The absence of obscuration refers to full attainment in relation to the Buddha-level. (j) The non-interruption of the latter refers to full attainment in relation to the complete exposition of enlightenment.**

[Sthiramati]

Y255.2 [1] Now, in order to correctly determine the supremacy in relation to full attainment whose appropriate place [for exposition] has arrived, he says: **which are the full attainments?** They are full attainments insofar as they are brought about through particular spiritual practices. They are described as supreme because: (a) they are superior to other full attainments and (b) there are no other full attainments that are superior to them. In order to demonstrate them, he says:

V.29 ab **Those which consist in: (a) non-defect, (b) non-rejection[384], (c) non-distraction, (d) fulfilment etc.**

Therein, **there are ten kinds of full attainment**, beginning with the absence of defects in causal conditions and concluding with the complete exposition of enlightenment. **Of these, the absence of defects in causal conditions refers to full attainment in relation to the spiritual lineage.** The absence of defects in causal conditions [means that] each of them is present; when these are secured [the *bodhisattva*] attains the spiritual lineage in full - what is meant is: the latter [i.e. the spiritual lineage] becomes abundant and ever more excellent. Moreover, [these conditions] refer to the mixing with good men, listening to the True Dharma and proper mental attention etc. A defect in these is due to defects in relation to the spiritual lineage and friends etc.[385]

[2] **The non-rejection of the universal vehicle refers to full attainment in relation to firm conviction.** If one does not reject the Dharma of the universal vehicle which is characterized by profundity and magnanimity then the growth of firm conviction which has the nature of the maintenance of [the *bodhisattva's*] determination, ensues.

[3] **The absence of distraction away to the lesser vehicle refers to full attainment in relation to the generation of the resolve [for enlightenment].** Although the conditions may exist for a reversal of the resolve for enlightenment on the part of one whose resolve for enlightenment has been generated, if[386] his resolve does not stray to the *śrāvaka* vehicle or to the *pratyekabuddha* vehicle, then his resolve for enlightenment reaches maturity.

[4] **The fulfilment of the perfections refers to full attainment in relation**
Y256 **to spiritual practice.** On account of the fulfilment of the perfection of generosity etc. there is growth in the accomplishment of omniscience on the part of those whose resolve for enlightenment has been generated due to the force of the latter [i.e. *bodhicitta*].

[5] **The generation of the noble path refers to full attainment in relation to the entry into certainty[387].** From the very beginning one enters into certainty due to the generation of the noble path which has not [been generated] previously[388].

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384 Ms.(84a.7) line begins: *vikṣepaś ca*...

385 Ms.(84b.1): *tadgotramitrādi*; disregard Y's fn.3 p.255.

386 Ms.(84b.2): *yady*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.255.

387 *nyāmāvakrānti*- but Bhāṣya (N75.3): *niyāmāvakrānti*-; *nyāma* and *niyāma* (also *niyama*) are parallel terms - for a full discussion on these cf. U. Wogihara's "Lexikalisches aus der Bodhisattvabhūmi", pp.28-31 of his edition of BB.

388 Read: *prathamata evāpūrvasyāryamārgasyotpādān* as per Ms.(84b.4) in place of *prathamata evāpūrvasyāryamārgasyotpādc*; Tib. *thog ma ñid du sṅon ma skyes pa'i 'phags pa'i lam bskyed pas* (D316a.2-3). Disregard Y's fn.1 p.256.

Something faulty or in decay is described as 'raw' (*āma*) - where this is non-existent, it is certain [lit. 'free from defect'] (*nyāma*), like a place sheltered from the wind[389], i.e. a region free from impurity. [The term]: 'entry into certainty' (*nyāmāvakrānti*) is [resolved as] entry into certainty (*nyāmāyām avakrānti*); what is meant is: the latter [i.e. *avakrānti*, lit. 'descent'] is [equivalent to] 'entry' (*praveśa*)[390]. Also, as regards the reading: 'entry into certainty' (*niyamāvakrānti*), the word 'certitude' (*niyama*) is none other than certainty (*niyama*), for thus it is said that one for whom the path of vision has arisen is certain [to be born] in a propitious state of existence or *nirvāṇa*.

[6] **The development of the roots of the wholesome refers to full attainment in relation to the maturation of sentient beings due to the prolonged exercise.** The development of the roots of the wholesome refers to the growth of the roots of the wholesome in those who have attained the path of vision due to prolonged exercise or practice on the path of meditative development which is attained subsequently to that [path of vision]. Since [the *bodhisattva*] has the ability to bring beings to maturity on account of that [growth], consequently[391], the development of the roots of the wholesome refers to full attainment in relation to the maturation of beings. However, others believe that the maturation of sentient beings by [the *bodhisattva*] in this way is fully attained because[392] the roots of the wholesome are strengthened[393] in the mental continuum of sentient beings owing to prolonged practice by him.

[7] **The pliability of mind[394] refers to full attainment in relation to the purification of the field[395].** Since the pliability of mind on the part of those whose roots of the wholesome have increased through meditative development is due to separation from both the signs and the effort that are adverse to the path traversable by just the one [i.e. the Buddha], he shows the Buddha-field [is attained], like crystal etc. according to one's wish, through the influence of pliability[396]. Hence, the pliability of mind refers to full attainment in regard to the purification of the field. [397] Although in a different Sūtra it is said: "One who wishes the pure Buddha-field should [first] purify his own mind".

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389 Ms.(84b.4): *nivātavad*; disregard Y's fn.2 p.256.

390 Read: *nyāmāvakrāntiḥ praveśa* as per Ms.(84b.4) in place of *nyāmāvakrāntipraveśa*; this is omitted from the Tib. (D316a.3).

391 Read: *-samartho bhavatīty ataḥ* as per Ms.(84b.6) in place of *-samartho bhavati / ataḥ*.

392 Read: *yato* as per Y's original reading in place of the Ms.(84b.6) reading of *yady*; Tib. (D316a.6): *'di ltar*.

393 Read: *dṛḍhīkṛtaṃ bhavatīti* as per Ms.(84b.7) in place of *dṛḍhīkṛtam*.

394 Read: *cittakarmaṇyatvaṃ* as per Ms.(84b.7) and Bhāṣya (N75.5) in place of *cittakarmaṇyatā*.

395 Ms.(84b.7): *kṣetra-*; disregard Y's fn.4 p.256.

396 Cf. MSA VII.7 comm.

397 The translation of the Ṭīkā from here, i.e. Y256.22, until Y261.11 is based entirely on the Tib. and the Bhāṣya since the Ms. for this section is completely absent.

Y257 [8] **Non-fixation in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa* refers to full attainment in relation to the acquisition of the prophesies at the irreversible level.** How so? Hence he says: **because [the *bodhisattva*] does not turn away from *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa*,** because he is not fixed in *saṃsāra* or *nirvāṇa* on account of his mental pliability. Since he possesses the prosperous result of the three perfections beginning with generosity, he is not fixed in *nirvāṇa* due to his regard for sentient beings. Since he possesses the three perfections beginning with vigour, he is not defiled by the moral defilements of *saṃsāra*; therefore, he is not fixed in *saṃsāra*. Alternatively, he is not fixed in *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa* for he does not turn away from either of them. In this respect, he does not turn away from *saṃsāra* because of his regard for sentient beings for he accepts *saṃsāra* out of compassion; nor does he turn away from *nirvāṇa* on account of his wisdom. Thus, since the *bodhisattva* is fixed neither in *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*, he remains on the unshakable level which is irreversible, and [experiences] full attainment in relation to the acquisition of the prophesy of his Buddha[hood]. Alternatively, [he experiences] full attainment in relation to both the acquisition of the irreversible level and the acquisition of the prophesy.

[9] **The absence of obscuration refers to full attainment in relation to the Buddha-level**[398], because [the *bodhisattva* experiences] full attainment in relation to the Buddha-level, which incorporates the three Bodies, on account of his relinquishment of all obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable together with their latent impressions. Therefore, the absence of obscuration refers to full attainment in relation to the Buddha-level.

[10] **The non-interruption of the latter refers to full attainment in relation to the complete exposition of enlightenment.** There is no interruption to
Y258 that Buddha's enlightenment due to the force of his universal compassion [which endures] for as long as the world exists. Full attainment in relation to the complete exposition of enlightenment is [equivalent to] the demonstration of enlightenment. In this regard, [the Buddha's] dwelling in the Tuṣita realm, his descent into the womb, his birth, his enjoyment of sense-pleasures, his departure from home, his performance of difficult deeds, his turning of the Great Wheel of the Dharma and his *mahāparinirvāṇa* etc. are demonstrated, because the complete exposition of enlightenment is not something separate from these [events]. The expression: "the complete exposition of enlightenment", includes [these] additional [events] also, since it is mentioned just as an example.

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398 The Tib. Ṭīkā (D316b.6) appears to phrase this passage in verse form:
sgrib pa med pa'i saṅs rgyas kyi //
sa yaṅ dag par 'grub pa'o //
However, the second line, for metrical reasons, cannot possibly be in verse form and the reading of the Tib. Bhāṣya (D26b.4) is preferred: *sgrib pa med pa ni saṅs rgyas kyi sa yaṅ dag par 'grub pa* = *nirāvaraṇatā buddhabhūmisamudāgama*; cf. Bhāṣya N75.8.

The Explanation of the Name of the Treatise.

N75.11 Thus, this is:

V.30 a — The treatise that consists in the analysis of the middle;

Because it elucidates the middle way. This is also the analysis of the middle and the extremes because it elucidates the middle and the two extremes. Alternatively, it [elucidates] the middle which is devoid of beginning and end.

V.30 b — Its meaning is hidden and quintessential;

Because it is not the sphere of speculation nor can it be shattered by those who hold other views, respectively.

V.30 c- — And it has universal meaning;

Because it is relevant to both oneself and to others.

V.30 c+ — It incorporates all meaning;

Because it is relevant to the three vehicles.

V.30 d — It removes all ill.

N76 Because it brings about the relinquishment of both the obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable.

[Sthiramati]

Y258.12 [1] **Thus,** i.e. since the general meanings of the words herein are complete and in order to express or to understand the name [of the treatise] in conformity with these meanings, **this is** described as:

V.30 a — **The treatise that consists in the analysis of the middle;**

To provide the reason for engagement in the entry herein, he says: **because it elucidates the middle way;** because this treatise herein elucidates the middle way devoid of the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. Therefore, this treatise is described as the analysis of the middle - what is meant is: it is an exposition and illustration of the middle [way]. **This is also the analysis of the middle and the extremes;** here now he provides the reason: **because it elucidates the middle and the two extremes,** hence it is described as the analysis of the middle and the extremes. The

middle, in this context, refers to the *dharmadhātu* which is without duality and the extremes refer to imputation and negation. **Alternatively,** since it elucidates **the middle which is devoid of beginning and end,** some believe this refers to thusness; others believe that it is the imagination of the unreal which is without begin-
Y259 ning and end that is elucidated in this context and is referred to by the words 'middle and extremes'.

V.30 b **Its meaning is hidden and quintessential;**

Its meaning is hidden **because it is not the sphere of speculation** and its meaning is quintessential **because it cannot be shattered by those who hold other views, respectively.** It is not the sphere of speculation because it is recognized as the domain of direct intuition devoid of conceptual differentiation. Its meaning is quintessential because it promulgates the meaning [of phenomena] as they are in reality.

V.30 c- **And it has universal meaning;**

Because it is relevant to both oneself and to others; because it is relevant to the *bodhisattva's* way of life, and because that way of life of the *bodhisattva* causes the attainment of benefit for oneself and others.

V.30 + **It incorporates all meaning;**

Because it is relevant to the three vehicles; since it illustrates the path of the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha* and the *bodhisattva.*

V.30 d **It removes all ill.**

Because it brings about the relinquishment of both the obscuration that consists in moral defilement and the knowable.

The Summary Meaning of the Supremacy of the Vehicle.

N76.3 The summary meaning of supremacy. Summarily, supremacy is threefold: (a) spiritual practice, (b) the foundation of spiritual practice and (c) the result of spiritual practice. Which kind of spiritual practice is highest and in which way [is that practice performed]? "Mental attention to the Dharma of the universal vehicle, as set forth etc." [V.7 ab], i.e. how and in which mode does it: (a) become free from distraction through the meditative development of tranquillity and (b) become free from erroneous inversion through the meditative development of penetrating insight? As to its purpose - it is in order to go forth by the middle way. And it is in relation to what? "The specific and non-specific are [to be known] in relation to the ten spiritual levels" [V.27 ab].

The summary meaning of the [various categories of] absence of erroneous inversion: (a) [the ***bodhisattva***] penetrates the sign of tranquillity and the sign of direct intuition[399] through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables. (b) He penetrates the sign of erroneous inversion[400] through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to objects. (c) He avoids the underlying cause of erroneous inversion through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity. (d) He firmly grasps the sign of the latter through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal. (e) He cultivates the path devoid of conceptual differentiation which [acts] as the counteragent to the latter through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic. (f) He penetrates that which is pure by nature through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic. (g) He understands in full the relinquishment and non-relinquishment of obscuration to the latter through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to impure and pure mental activity. (h) He understands defilement and purification in full, as they are in reality, through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to their adventitious nature. (i) He sets forth towards the

399 Read: *śamathanimittaṃ vipaśyanānimittaṃ ca* in place of *śamathanimittaṃ* on the basis of D; cf. Nagao's fn.5 p.76 of the Bhāṣya.

400 Read: *viparyāsanimittaṃ* in place of *vipaśyanānimittaṃ* on the basis of the Tib. etc.; cf. N fn.6 p.76 of the Bhāṣya.

absence of obscuration through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to lack of fear and lack of arrogance.

The Madhyāntavibhāga is completed

Whatever virtue there is in writing this commentary,
May it be for the increase of merit and knowledge
for the great universe;
As the consequence of this, may the universe enjoy,
before long,
Great prosperity and the threefold enlightenment.

[Sthiramati]

Y259.22 [1] The summary meaning of supremacy; the purpose for expressing the
summary meaning has been discussed previously. Summarily, supremacy is
Y260 threefold, although in detail it is infinite: (a) spiritual practice; he has stated that:
"supremacy is [considered] in relation to: spiritual practice..." [V.1 a]. (b) The
foundation of spiritual practice; he has stated that [it is considered: "in relation
to objective support" [V.1 b-]. (c) The result of spiritual practice; he has stated
that: "it is considered as listed in relation to full attainment" [V.b+c].

[2] Which kind of spiritual practice is highest? He has stated: "the highest
consists in twelve" [V.2 d]. And in which way [is that practice performed]?
"Mental attention to the Dharma of the universal vehicle, according to
its teaching, etc. is perpetual on the part of the *bodhisattva*, through the three modes
of wisdom" [V.7 abcd]; and similarly: "this [spiritual practice] is to be known as being
associated with the ten acts of the Dharma" [V.8 cd], i.e. how and in which mode
does it: (a) become free from distraction through the meditative devel-
opment of tranquillity due to the absence of the six kinds of distraction, and (b)
become free from erroneous inversion through the meditative develop-
ment of penetrating insight due to the absence of erroneous inversion in relation
to the ten [categories] beginning with syllables? As to its purpose - it is in
Y261 order to go forth by the middle way; he has stated: "which is the spiritual
practice which incorporates the avoidance of the two extremes? [cf. Bhāṣya N69.19]
And it is in relation to what? "In relation to the ten spiritual levels"
[V.27 b]. What is [the spiritual practice]? "The specific and non-specific"
[V.27 c]. How so? It was stated: "...are to be known in relation to the ten spiritual
levels" [V.27 b].

[3] The summary meaning of the [various categories of] absence of erroneous inversion: (a) [the *bodhisattva*] penetrates[401] the sign of tranquillity and the sign of direct intuition[402] through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to syllables; i.e. he comes to the realization that a combination [of syllables] is devoid of essential nature. (b) He penetrates the sign of erroneous inversion through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to objects; i.e. [he realizes] that the duality is just an appearance. (c) He avoids the underlying cause of erroneous inversion[403]; i.e. the 'seed' of the notional attachment to the duality which is deposited in the store-consciousness, through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to mental activity.[404] (d) He firmly grasps the sign of erroneous inversion owing to the absence of the notional attachment to existent and non-existent [entities] which are like magical creations, through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to non-dispersal. (e) He cultivates the path devoid of conceptual differentiation, which has the individual characteristic[405] of the *dharmas* for its object and is free from speech, which [acts] as the counteragent to the latter through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the individual characteristic. (f) He penetrates that which is pure by nature, as being common to all *dharmas*, through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the universal characteristic. (g) He understands in full the relinquishment and non-relinquishment[406] of obscuration to the latter through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to impure and pure mental activity, because the *dharmadhātu* which is luminous by nature is defiled by adventitious secondary defilement. (h) He understands defilement and purification in full through the lack of erroneous inversion in relation to their adventitious nature, because it is impossible that defilement and purification can
Y262 belong to what is luminous by nature, in any other way [i.e. other than as adventitious]. (i) He sets forth towards the absence of obscuration[407] through the absence of erroneous inversion in relation to the lack of fear and lack of arrogance on account of the absence of the notional attachment to the personal entity and the *dharmas*.

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401 Read: *pratividhyati* as per Bhāṣya (cf. N76.13 = D27a.2), but Tib.: *dmigs pa* (D318a.1) which should be changed to *rab tu rtogs pa* as noted by Y (cf. his fn.5 p.261).

402 *vipaśyanānimittaṃ* is omitted from both the Sanskrit and Tib. Bhāṣya but is found in the Tib. Ṭīkā: *lhag mthoṅ gi mtshan ma* (D318a.1); cf. N's fn.5 p.76.

403 Read: *viparyāsanidānaṃ* in place of *viparyāsāśrayaṃ*; cf. Bhāṣya N76.14. Ms.(85.1) line begins: *-taṃ dvayābhiniveśabījaṃ...*

404 The final portion of the Ms. begins here (Y261.11) and continues to the end.

405 Ms.(85.2): *dharmalakṣaṇa...* but Y's emendation to *dharmasvalakṣaṇa...* is preferred on the basis of the Tib. *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* (D318a.3). Ms. line 2 begins: *-naprakṛtiṃ sarvadharma...*; cf. Y's fn.7 p.261.

406 Ms.(85.2): *...prahīṇāprahīṇātāṃ* but Y's reading of *...prahīṇāprahīṇatāṃ* is preferred.

407 Read: *nirāvaraṇe* as per Bhāṣya (N76.20) in place of Ms.(85.3): *nirāvaraṇo*.

And so is completed this sub-commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga composed by the Ācārya Sthiramati which follows scriptural tradition; and thus, the essence of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā is completed.[408]

408 A portion of the Ms.(85.3) is missing and the words *prajñāpāramitā pañca-* are inserted after Y's fn.3 p.262. The Tib. (D318a.6-7) has quite a different reading for this passage and is translated as follows: "The sub-commentary on the Fifth Chapter from the Madhyāntavibhāga Śāstra by the cārya Sthiramati concerning the Supremacy of the Vehicle is complete."

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